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Abstract 
 
 
Operation Breadbasket was a Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
project that was founded in 1962, and was dedicated to improving the 
economic conditions of black communities across the United States. This 
thesis shows how the economic agenda of the early Operation Breadbasket –
to facilitate integration in the workplace – gave way to its later counterpart 
which embraced a friendlier attitude toward capitalism and was more 
solicitous of the black middle class. In particular, this thesis identifies the 
personalities and events responsible for this transformation while pointing to 
the broader trends in American capitalism that made the advocacy of  
workplace integration increasingly less important than access to capital and 
mass consumption. Since there is not a dedicated study on Operation 
Breadbasket, this thesis begins to fill that gap in historiography. 
Drawing on archival research and original oral histories collected through 
interviews with veterans, this thesis reconsiders Jesse Jackson’s historical role 
in the success of Operation Breadbasket as an empowerment organization 
enlarging economic opportunities for black workers and entrepreneurs. In 
particular, it argues that Operation Breadbasket was a remarkable program 
that contributed to the convergence of the Black Church-driven Civil Rights 
Movement and the activist-based Black Power struggle in the economic 
arena. To fully appreciate the transformation of Operation Breadbasket’s 
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activities from a more traditional Civil Rights program pursuing job 
desegregation to a militant, innovative campaign addressing issues such as 
black business development, the more recent scholarly work on Black Power 
and its intersection with the Civil Right Movement has been taken into 
account.  
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“Moderation is a delusion,  
and only extremists are in touch with reality.”  
Frederick Asals1 
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On Operation Breadbasket 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite all of the scholarly work done in the last few decades on the Civil 
Rights campaigns, this literature does not contain a dedicated work on 
Operation Breadbasket. Moreover, in terms of interpretation, certainly 
Operation Breadbasket has suffered from excessive identification with Jesse 
Jackson. In this chapter, the main historiographical issues are addressed, 
specifically the apparent irrelevance of Operation Breadbasket in Civil Rights 
history and the controversial legacy of Jackson as Operation Breadbasket’s 
leader. However, these interpretative issues can be clarified, if not solved, by 
reshaping the historical settings, and placing Operation Breadbasket at the 
intersection of Black Studies and economic (business) history, and 
consequently within the perimeter of the emerging body of scholarship on 
the economic narratives of Civil Rights and Black Power. In this chapter, a 
closer look is given to the literature on the U.S. economy in the 1960s, in 
transition from growth to inflation, combined with the rapid escalation of the 
war in Vietnam. Also, attention is paid to the emerging field of research on 
the business-friendly conservative forces and ideologies that opposed the 
Civil Rights movement. In addition, the recent scholarship that innovatively 
deals with the less militant, more moderate wing of the Black Power 
movement is examined. The dissolving boundaries between the Civil Rights 
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and the Black Power movements in the economic domain, is also taken into 
account.  
Operation Breadbasket 
Operation Breadbasket (henceforth “Breadbasket”) was a program 
sponsored by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (henceforth 
“S.C.L.C.”) to fight economic discrimination against African Americans.2 
The S.C.L.C. was established in 1957, by Martin Luther King, Jr., and other 
members of the black clergy to coordinate the action of local protest groups 
throughout the South.3 As early as 1962, the S.C.L.C. broadened its focus to 
include issues of economic inequality. Seeing poverty as the root of social 
inequality, in November 1962, S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in Atlanta to 
desegregate jobs and create new employment opportunities in the black 
community.  
Incorporated in Atlanta, the program was initially directed by Fred C. 
Bennette, Jr., who also served as interim pastor (1964-1965) of the Mount 
Welcome Baptist Church, which was then located in the Pittsburg 
Community of Atlanta. Its goal was initially to promote equal employment 
opportunities for African-American workers. While Breadbasket mobilized 
buying campaigns to pressure businesses and corporations to hire minorities, 
it was also under way in a number of smaller Southern cities, as well as in 
Atlanta. When the S.C.L.C. turned its attention to Chicago, it promoted, 
together with other organizations, the Chicago Freedom Movement. At that 
point, the Breadbasket program became an accessory to the main housing 
14 
 
desegregation project. It expanded its activities moving beyond the more 
traditional goals of job desegregation by addressing non-conventional issues 
such as access to financial resources, banking, development of brands, and 
corporate board memberships. The head of Chicago’s Breadbasket office, 
Jesse Jackson, a student of theology and then “country preacher,” became its 
national director in place of Bennette in 1967.4 It was in Chicago and under 
the direction of Jackson that Breadbasket achieved national recognition. In 
1967, Martin Luther King, S.C.L.C. chairman, characterized Breadbasket as 
the “most spectacularly successful program’’ in Chicago.5  
Not without controversy, Breadbasket increasingly became a sort of 
economic development agency to support African American 
entrepreneurship, actually working to support the growth of “black 
capitalism” in Chicago. Later on, King expressed “grave doubts” about 
Breadbasket’s goals.6 A conflict arose between Breadbasket’s focus on black 
capitalism, as envisioned and pursued by Jackson, and King’s increasingly 
social-democratic economic views. “We were very aware of some of the 
contradictions [inside Breadbasket], and ambivalent about it,” Calvin Morris, 
then associate director of Breadbasket, remembered. William (Bill) 
Rutherford, S.C.L.C. executive director, appreciated that King’s unhappiness 
with Jackson went beyond spirit and ideology. “He didn’t trust Jesse, he 
didn’t even like Jesse … If you ask me if there was any suspicion about 
Jesse’s motives and even devotion to the movement, I would say 
categorically yes, there was – considerable. And we talked about it.”7 
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After the assassination of King, Breadbasket continued to develop as a 
program, increasingly distancing itself from the original atmosphere and 
classic posture of the Black Church in the South, while becoming more 
aligned with the diverse, militant, and chaotic social atmosphere of Black 
Chicago. Indeed, in the late 1960s, Breadbasket came to assume its mature 
and lasting form – a form substantially different from the scope and activities 
that had shaped the earlier stage of the program.  
In this thesis, Breadbasket is framed as a story of transformation. The 
original incarnation of Breadbasket was a clergy-driven program that was 
very strongly influenced by the experience of Rev. Leon Sullivan’s rhetoric 
on the social gospel, and economic justice activism, notably a series of well-
organized selective patronage campaigns targeting prominent manufacturers 
like Tasty Baking Company and Pepsi-Cola in Philadelphia. The initial phase 
of Breadbasket was marked by the black clergy’s heavy engagement in the 
program for the sake of economic justice. Economic concerns have been 
part of the Black Church’s mission in the South since Reconstruction, and 
clergy has always been committed to social inclusion and economic 
improvement.8 For more than a century, the Black Church had served the 
social, economic, and educational interests of the black community, 
becoming the most revered institution in the black community, and 
providing organizational support, strategic direction, and cultural identity.9 
Black evangelical congregations had provided literacy training, established 
schools, purchased property, and offered housing to the disadvantaged, the 
poor, the aged, and the sick. However, it was only in the 1960s that, in the 
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context of the emerging economic reality of the New South,  pastors 
assumed a more aggressive stance, solidified around Breadbasket and other 
color-conscious programs, and promoted the boycotting of businesses that 
were notorious for  not hiring blacks.10  
The second phase of Breadbasket emerged during the late 1960s when 
Jackson rethought his convictions about civil rights in response to the 
realities of the world in which he lived. There was mounting awareness of the 
incomplete achievements of the Civil Rights Movement and increasing 
economic concerns, while the economic downfall of 1967-68 was 
substantially altering the environment in which Breadbasket was acting. This 
setting was a reality of increasing racial polarization and radicalism, 
dominated by  Black Power and the ideological rationales that sustained and 
invigorated its success. It was a workplace in which unskilled workers, 
farmers, porters and barbers, whose interests had inspired Dr. King and his 
close aids, were rapidly losing their way to American capitalism; it was an 
economic landscape in which private enterprise and market driven business 
were regaining confidence, and large-scale government-funded programs 
were becoming increasingly difficult to fund. Workers, activists, militants, 
street gangs, and consumers were becoming powerful social groups within 
the black community, participating in the economic conversation influencing 
public policy in the city of Chicago. Most of all, this was a world in which 
both the idea and the reality of business were becoming central to African 
American culture, while the production of economic outputs and goals was 
gradually supplanting Civil Rights as the principal focus of black popular 
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interest and commitment. In a world dominated by the economy, and an 
economy dominated by corporations, it is not surprising that Jackson began 
to embrace business-oriented assumptions and pursue economic interests. In 
Chicago, the redefinition of Breadbasket occurred quickly and at times 
almost virally, so much so that in 1971 when the transformation was well 
advanced, there was an increase in distance between Jackson and the rest of 
the S.C.L.C. leadership, because of this change in focus. The definitive break 
came in December 1971, over a question of funds and a power struggle 
between Jackson and S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph Abernathy. The program 
languished for another year in the hands of the S.C.L.C. and then was finally 
closed. Breadbasket in Chicago joined Jackson’s new project, Operation 
PUSH - People United to Save (later Serve) Humanity. 
While the early years of Breadbasket were dominated by the Black Church’s 
concerns for economic justice and economic rights, during its last years the 
program became a vehicle for pursuing economic power on behalf of the 
black community. In fact, Jackson located Breadbasket, as well as himself, at 
the convergence of the Black church-driven Civil Rights Movement and the 
activist-based Black Power campaigns in the economic arena. In Chicago, 
responding to the uncertainties of this changing world, Breadbasket wrapped 
itself in the mantle of the Civil Rights Movement, but showed only partial 
fidelity to the scope and activities that had shaped the original program. How 
and why Breadbasket changed its focus and agenda, and later joined its 
counterpart, Operation PUSH, which embraced a friendlier attitude to 
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capitalism as it became more solicitous of  black middle class, is the subject 
of this thesis.  
Background  
During the past three decades, a variety of important work has complicated 
the narrative of the freedom struggle by focusing on local people and 
communities, particularly outside the South. Scholars have produced a 
growing number of studies that focus on local activism, especially on the 
individual campaigns of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.11 
Academic works have been devoted to the main episodes of the history of 
“the short civil rights movement” (i.e., Montgomery Bus Boycott, Little Rock 
School Crisis, Freedom Riders, Birmingham, St. Augustine, Mississippi 
Freedom Summer, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, and Selma).12 
However, despite its success, Breadbasket still falls into one of those critical 
programs and campaigns, such as Albany (1962) and the March on 
Washington (1963), that have yet to be scrutinized in any great depth.13 The 
only author who has written extensively on Breadbasket is David Garrow, in 
Chicago 1966: Open Housing Marches, Summit Negotiations, and Operation 
Breadbasket, but he nevertheless has deepened only a part of the story 
covering the period 1965-66.14  
Because an authoritative history of Breadbasket has yet to be written, the 
available literature contains a limited amount of information, and a narrow 
range of interpretation relating to Breadbasket’s roots and development. 
Studies exist in which Breadbasket’s program is included as an element in a 
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broader narrative. Traditionally it is included in one of these three narratives: 
the history of the Chicago Freedom Movement and the Northern “long civil 
right movement” – a history that began in the 1930s and 1940s and 
continued at least through the 1970s; the biography of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and the related history of the S.C.L.C.; and finally, the biography of Jesse 
Jackson.  
Scholarship locates Breadbasket in the context of the history of the black 
community in Chicago, and eventually in the familiar “Martin Luther King to 
Harold Washington” narrative that was re-articulated after the election of 
Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States.15 Breadbasket was set 
in motion in Chicago as a program of the Chicago Freedom Movement. The 
Chicago Freedom Movement was the most ambitious Civil Rights 
mobilization ever launched in the North. The product of an alliance of the 
S.C.L.C. and the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations 
(CCCO—a coalition of Chicago Civil Rights groups), the Chicago Freedom 
Movement lasted from 1965 to 1967. It attracted national attention in the 
summer of 1966 when it launched a series of marches that exposed persistent 
housing discrimination in metropolitan Chicago. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
moved to Chicago and launched a campaign for open housing. He received a 
taste of Northern racism while leading marches in all-white neighborhoods 
that met with violent responses from the residents. The images of the “open 
housing” marches through the white neighborhoods of Cicero, the violent 
resistance to these marches, King being struck with a rock on August 5 in 
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Marquette Park on the Southwest Side (“Frankly,” he said, “I have never 
seen as much hatred and hostility on the part of so many people”), the 
meeting with Mayor Richard J. Daley and other city officials to hammer out a 
“Summit Agreement,” these images remain inculcated in the collective 
memory. King’s campaign led to an agreement with Richard Daley, who 
promised that the city would enforce fair housing laws. It never happened. 
Chicago was seen, and still remains in the historiography of the Civil Rights 
Movement, as the place of the housing discrimination campaign. This fact 
ensures the enduring identification of Chicago with one of the most difficult, 
battles for housing integration and the place where a humiliating defeat of 
the Civil Rights Movement occurred.16 Over the decades, this assessment has 
been the dominant narrative in the scholarly work on Chicago. The analysis 
of this alleged failure of the movement in Chicago has monopolized the 
attention of historians, and has probably diverted their attention from the 
dynamics of Breadbasket, which was perceived as a  minor project. For this 
reason, in the studies devoted to the Chicago campaign, references to 
Breadbasket are very limited. In fact, aside from the anthology edited by 
Garrow, Breadbasket is literally nothing more than a footnote in the history 
of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago.17  
Placing Breadbasket in the history of the Chicago Freedom Movement is 
quite reasonable. In fact, even if established in Atlanta and designed from the 
outset as a program of national scope, Breadbasket  experienced its most 
significant achievements and established credibility in Chicago. Breadbasket’s 
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object was not open housing; it was intentionally promoted as “a separate, 
but related program to the movement.”18 At the conclusion of the campaign, 
King left behind a young lieutenant named Rev. Jesse Jackson, who 
established Breadbasket on the South Side. In 1983, Harold Washington 
became Chicago’s first black mayor, serving until 1987, building an 
independent coalition including white independents and Latinos to challenge 
the Democratic machine. In part inspired by the 1983 win of Chicago’s first 
black mayor, a young Barack Obama came to the Windy City and settled 
down on the South Side of Chicago. In 2008, he became the first black 
president of the United States.19 
Much of Civil Rights historiography has focused on Martin Luther King Jr., 
the charismatic preacher, who has been the subject of a large number of 
studies. King was instrumental – together with Bayard Rustin, Ella Baker, 
Stanley Levison and approximately sixty other black ministers assembled in 
Atlanta – in forming the S.C.L.C. in 1957. The S.C.L.C. was established in 
order to coordinate non-violent protest against segregation, and King served 
as chairman of the organization from its inception until his assassination in 
1968. Since King and the S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in 1962, it is not a 
surprise that the program has been often placed in the wider context of 
King’s and S.C.L.C.’s history. However, in such a context Breadbasket has 
certainly received less consideration from scholarship than other S.C.L.C. 
programs and campaigns, particularly those conducted in the South in the 
first half of the 1960s, i.e., the Birmingham and Selma campaigns. Scholars of 
Dr. King, including prize-winning biographers Taylor Branch and David J. 
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Garrow, offer little to no analysis of the campaign itself.20 Taylor Branch’s 
trilogy on King mentions Breadbasket only eight times.21 The same can be 
said of studies that address the social and economic thought of Martin 
Luther King, in which Breadbasket is confined to a marginal role.22 While a 
number of studies provide perspectives on the S.C.L.C. and the Civil Rights 
Movement, very few accounts and memories of Breadbasket can be found in 
the autobiographies of figures that played an important role in the S.C.L.C.23 
References to Breadbasket usually increase when scholars focus on the 
history of King’s final and more radical years from 1965 to 1968. For 
example, David Garrow’s Bearing the Cross discusses Breadbasket for the first 
time when he acknowledges the 1965 annual report of King as S.C.L.C.’s 
chairman, and then only in passing.24 The connection between Breadbasket 
and King’s final years is part of the popular narrative that assumes that King 
focused on economic racial discrimination in the last part of his life, 
specifically after the Selma campaign, and especially after the Watts riots.25 It 
seems natural to connect Breadbasket – a program created with an economic 
purpose – with King’s increasing concerns about economy, capitalism and 
the poor. During that period, some scholars believe King’s focus shifted 
from Civil Rights to human rights and from desegregation and voting rights 
to economic inequality.26 The studies of King and the S.C.L.C. by Adam 
Fairclough and David Garrow provide the most extensive discussion on 
King’s stand against the Vietnam War to date, while Gerald D. McKnight’s 
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study covers King and the S.C.L.C.’s planned 1968 Poor People’s campaign.27 
However, none of them devotes specific attention to Breadbasket.  
Some scholars focus on King’s increasing sense of detachment and  
alienation from Jackson’s Breadbasket.28 Certainly King was enthusiastic 
about the program, thrilled by its results in terms of jobs, income, and 
contracts, but he nevertheless concluded that these results were too limited 
and insufficient to achieve real and universal economic justice. In other 
words, economic equality was too big a target to be accomplished through a 
program with limited resources like Breadbasket. Accordingly, the 
intervention of the federal government was not only desirable, but also 
needed in order to promote a paradigm shift from American liberalism to 
Swedish social democracy. Furthermore, King’s attention was directed to the 
poor rather than to the black middle class, which eventually became 
Breadbasket’s target. This distinction also helped to limit his confidence in 
the program.29 Breadbasket became a source of dialectic between King and 
Jackson. Garrow maps the main points of this debate with King arguing that 
Breadbasket was designed to improve the quality of life for working class 
blacks, as well as unemployed black people, and describes Jackson assuming 
the role of black business champion. However, Garrow does not investigate 
in detail the causes of this dialectic between the two leaders, and prefers to 
link it to differences of character, and to King’s doubts about Jackson’s 
personality and goals.30  
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Finally, some studies address Breadbasket as a major, outstanding and 
inescapable chapter in Jesse Jackson’s career. In fact, there is no Jackson 
biography that fails to mention Breadbasket in his early career. This is similar 
in magnitude to the famous episode of Jackson’s appearance on NBC’s 
Today Show wearing the same blood-stained turtleneck that he had worn the 
day before, while claiming that he had been the last person to talk to King, 
and had held the dying leader in his arms. Breadbasket has been often 
described as the beginning of Jackson’s career, and has served in the 
biographies on Jackson as a bildungsroman – a description of the intellectual 
and religious awakening of young Jesse. It is the fascinating chronicle of how 
he began to develop his skills as a powerbroker, to question white economic 
privilege, to challenge the S.C.L.C. leadership, and rebel against the 
Democratic machine in Chicago. He finally came of age, left the S.C.L.C., 
and pursued his ambitions as a national civil right leader.31 In such a classic 
narrative, Breadbasket became the practical vehicle that provided Jackson 
with the opportunity to build an economic and political base, while 
establishing the necessary network and credibility to become a Civil Rights 
leader at the national level. Because of his involvement with Breadbasket, 
Jackson rapidly became the most influential black leader in Chicago, and in 
1971, he even considered the possibility of challenging Richard J. Daley by 
running for mayor of the city. It is a powerful narrative, and not surprisingly, 
the major biographies of Jackson never fail to offer a reconstruction of the 
history of Breadbasket in Chicago.  
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In some scholarly studies, Breadbasket appears to be at times literally 
indistinguishable from Jackson. With the appointment of Jesse Jackson as the 
head of the Chicago office in 1966 in place of James Bevel, Breadbasket not 
only functioned as a virtually independent project run autonomously from 
the S.C.L.C. but was progressively shaped by his charismatic personality, 
powerful rhetorical skills, and apparently inexhaustible energy. Therefore, 
when Ralph David Abernathy – who had replaced King as chairman of 
S.C.L.C. – tried to restore the accountability of Breadbasket and the control 
of S.C.L.C. over the program, Jackson objected, left the S.C.L.C., and 
established his own organization, Operation PUSH. Breadbasket was deeply 
affected by the spin-off and survived only one more year. The schism 
between the S.C.L.C. and Jackson, the public controversy, and the fractured 
personal relations between the two remaining lieutenants of King’s 
organization left bitter feelings. Eventually, criticism and skepticism of the 
organization’s contributions to the collective public memory continued, and 
continue to affects scholars’ appreciation of the place of Breadbasket in the 
history of Civil Rights.32  
Historiographical Issues 
The Civil Rights Movement is continually undergoing a process of 
reinterpretation. Recently historians have started exploring new perspectives 
on African American activism, and are re-examining old views and evidence,  
including rethinking the timeline, the trajectory, and the nature of the Civil 
Rights Movement. Much of this new scholarship is built upon a revisionist 
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literature that has critiqued the traditional understanding of the Civil Rights 
movement as a social and cultural movement, while attempting to revisit an 
inviolate conception of Civil Rights and Black Power. This new scholarship 
is occurring during a period of emerging modern conservatism. This recent 
scholarship has expanded the traditional understanding of the Civil Rights 
movement to include economics and business, and has connected with other 
contemporary revisionist projects such as Black Power Studies. It also 
reaches beyond the borders of the traditional interpretation of liberal politics, 
seeking out the history of the modern conservative movement and its 
articulations in economics (economic thought) and management, illustrating 
the role of academics and corporate executives in promoting or impeding 
economic equality. Anyone proposing to write today about Breadbasket must 
recognize the emergence of these vigorous debates over the economic aims 
and the views of those involved in the Civil Rights Movement, the 
relationship between Civil Rights and Black Power, and the opposition of 
conservative forces in the realm of economics and business. Since this is a 
project that needs to incorporate the recent scholarship on how the Civil 
Rights movement has been shaped by economic aims, black liberation 
movements, and conservatism, it is appropriate to explain the ways in which 
this thesis does and does not come to terms with this scholarship.  
Until recently, the scholarship on the Civil Rights Movement has taken for 
granted that the movement was primarily cultural and political in character.33 
The Civil Rights Movement exists in the American imagination through a 
series of iconic images – ranging from a black preacher standing on the steps 
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of the Lincoln Memorial in front of an enormous crowd, to teenagers being 
hit by high-pressure water jets and attacked by police dogs – that powerfully 
evoke a sense of mission and redemption, cultural engagement, and political 
purpose. Unfortunately, these iconic images come with a price, that is, the 
economic goals, forces, and contexts of the movement have been relegated 
to a footnote. For example, Adam Fairclough repeatedly makes the point that 
blacks adopted non-violent actions by means of economic pressure. Sit-ins, 
protests, and other innovative methods of non-violent direct action exposed 
the economic weakness of the white business community in Southern towns 
and cities. The white business community was usually willing to compromise, 
because they were particularly vulnerable to economic retaliation of their 
black customers. This vital connection between the economic vulnerability of 
the white business community and the strategies of Civil Rights campaigns 
has been highlighted by several authors.34 For most of these authors, 
economic concerns were not goals, in and of themselves, but were 
instrumental to political and cultural goals: desegregation, voting rights, self-
respect and identity. A few authors have linked economic development to 
the Civil Rights Movement, especially in the North.35 Others have focused 
their research on job discrimination, access to jobs, and fair treatment in the 
workplace.36 However, almost none of them have taken the position that the 
movement was primarily an economic one.37 This is unfortunate, as a better 
understanding of the economic background would help to put the events of 
the Civil Rights Movement in context.38 When scrutinizing the literature, one 
finds that historians in the field of Civil Rights are rarely concerned about 
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their assumptions about the economic context, because, in most cases, the 
economic background is not explained by the author at all. Usually scholars 
tend to be brief in discussing the economic context of their stories, and most 
studies tacitly locate their narratives an artificially immutable economic 
context. In fact, most scholars accept the classic explanation that the post–
World War II economic expansion, also known as the postwar economic 
boom, or the long boom, was an uninterrupted period of economic 
prosperity that lasted until the early 1970s. The historian Eric Hobsbawm 
coined the term “Golden Age of capitalism,” to describe this period.39 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In the 1960s, the U.S. economy was 
in transition from growth to inflation. Examining the period after 1965, for 
example, economic growth slowed as a result of the exhaustion of the “inner 
expansion” of American capitalism. After a phase of tumultuous growth, the 
newly expanded areas of free enterprise (household goods, the entertainment 
industry and tourism), and branches of industrial production (cars, civilian 
aircraft and plastics) experienced the effects of market saturation. Further 
expansion possibilities for investment-friendly capital were simply lacking. It 
was a period during which the federal government abandoned any real 
interest in the traditional concept – based upon Keynesian ideas and 
priorities – of influencing the business cycle by addressing consumption 
rather than production. The dominant liberal policy, based on the belief that 
the key for a successful society is economic growth through high 
consumption, looked fiscally simplistic and was practically inert. This policy 
lost traction and ultimately ended in disarray. At the end of the 1960s, the 
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economic consequences of the Vietnam War complicated the situation 
because the U.S. government covered the escalating costs of the war and 
social reforms by inflating the dollar.40 This troubling, uncertain economic 
landscape, together with the “financialization” of American capitalism – the 
passage from a more traditional industrial economy to financial capitalism – 
is exactly the context in which Breadbasket achieved its greatest success.     
As for the importance of the economic context, historian Gavin Wright, one 
of the very few scholars who investigates Civil Rights as an economic 
movement, has established a clear link between the emergence of the New 
South and the success of the movement. He maintains that “The South 
began its convergence towards national per capita income levels around the 
time of World War II, a full generation prior to its emancipation in the 
1960s.” However, he adds that postwar regional economic convergence had 
a basis in long-term trends such as the “vigorous efforts in southern states to 
attract business through tax breaks, municipal bonds for plant construction, 
industrial development corporations, research parks, and expenditures on 
publicity far beyond those of other regions.”41 Numan Bartley writes, “In 
1940 the raison d’etre of Southern state governments was the protection of 
white supremacy and social stability; thirty years later their central purpose 
was the promotion of business and industrial development.”42 Of course, 
Bartely maintains, the South was trying to modernize economically while 
retaining “white supremacy and social stability.” However, when the forces 
of boosterism collided with the emerging Civil Rights Movement in the 
1950s and 1960s, Elizabeth Jacoway acknowledges, “white businessmen 
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across the South found themselves pushed – by the federal government and 
Civil Rights forces as well as by their own economic interests – and values – 
into becoming reluctant advocates of a new departure in southern race 
relations.”43 
The historic milieu of the economic institutions that shaped the intellectual 
debate in the 1960s also affected Breadbasket’s strategies with regard to job 
desegregation and economic power. Generations of liberal politicians, Civil 
Rights activists, labor unionists, corporate executives and managers – in 
confrontation or in alliance with moderate nationalists and Black Power 
militants – envisioned, refined and shaped the American social imagination. 
The right to gain a decent job had been a central concern of African 
Americans for decades, while accessing capital was also firmly rooted in the 
historic black struggle for economic advancement.44  Attention must be paid 
both to the enemies of fair employment practices, and to the pro-business 
conservatives that did not oppose the Civil Rights Movement simply to 
defend segregation. The sovereignty of the corporate executives in the 
workplace, and ultimately the principles of the free market and the 
independence of the enterprise from the influence of federal government 
must also be acknowledged.45 The truth is, far from being a decade of 
economic continuity, the 1960s was a period of radical change, in which the 
political landscape was dominated by a titanic struggle between a declining 
liberalism and an emerging modern conservatism. Labor unions were 
repositioning themselves in the light of the partisan realignment, and 
corporate executives were fighting to maintain or reassume control of the 
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American workplace. The intellectual debate was focused on the unlimited 
expectations of consumers and the limits of the federal government, as well 
as supporting an uncompromising stance against the interventionist state.  
Recent, well-researched studies have been investigating the long history of 
the Civil Rights Movement from an economic perspective, focusing on the 
struggle of blacks for economic justice, and showing that for black leaders, 
the fight was always about citizenship and economic advancement, as they 
really never separated “democracy” and “capitalism” the way historians had 
done in the past. These studies, especially over the last five years, have 
emphasized the centrality of economic goals to the larger Black Freedom 
Movement, and showed how a more nuanced view of the economic 
narratives of the Civil Rights Movement can be articulated. They have 
charted a new field of study at the intersection of Black Studies and 
economic history, exploring the myriad forms of economic strategies and 
projects, such as business development and economic advancement, self-help 
and ghetto economics, racial integration in the workplace and black 
capitalism. The variety of approaches used to promote economic 
independence firmly places them at the convergence of Civil Rights and 
Black Power.46 They urge scholars to take the Black Freedom Movement on 
board as economic history, and investigate how Civil Rights leaders and black 
activists pioneered new economic development strategies, often in concert 
with corporate executives and public officials. They pressed business leaders 
and corporations to provide jobs to black workers, partnered with the federal 
government on public policies aiming to support a wide range of economic 
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advancement, from black entrepreneurship to grassroots experiments in 
economic self-determination, as well as indigenous attempts to rebuild inner 
city markets in the wake of disinvestment. Several African American leaders 
engaged in fierce debates over the role of business and economic markets in 
creating economic justice and racial equality, and some of them ended by 
rejecting capitalism, while others embraced it.47  
Breadbasket belongs to this economic story. The economy was the center of 
gravity for Breadbasket, and economic issues are the main context of its 
story, as it becomes irrelevant when placed outside such an economic 
narrative. Once it is located in the context of the economics of the Civil 
Rights Movement, Breadbasket no longer needs to be captured strictly in 
biographies of such figures as Martin Luther King, Jr. or Rev. Jesse Jackson 
to be set on the national stage of American history. It no longer needs to be 
portrayed as the excuse for minor power struggles between charismatic 
leaders (King and Jackson, or Abernathy and Jackson). It stands on its own. 
The lack of treatment of the economic factors within Civil Rights scholarship 
has so far sentenced Breadbasket to irrelevance. Once the financial 
considerations are acknowledged as a driving force behind the Civil Rights 
Movement’s strategic initiatives, when the undocumented struggle for 
economic justice and power is revealed, it is much easier to locate 
Breadbasket alongside other economic campaigns at the center of the Civil 
Rights narrative.  
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Scholarly discussions of Breadbasket inevitably intersect with another 
important debate over the Civil Rights Movement and its connections with 
Black Power. Until recently, conventional Civil Rights narratives have tended 
to isolate the locus of the issues that framed the movement in the 1950s and 
1960s from the wider literature of the African American freedom struggle as 
a whole, and especially the Black Power movement. The histories of the Civil 
Rights and Black Power movements have been strongly influenced by the 
idea that the narrative of the 1960s runs along the intersection of politics and 
social structures. Consequently, scholars correctly envisioned insurmountable 
differences between Civil Rights and Black Power. In such a narrative, Black 
Power was portrayed as and understood to be the Civil Rights Movement’s 
“evil” twin, according to historian Peniel E. Joseph.48 Where the Civil Rights 
Movement was lauded for its strategy of non-violent civil disobedience and 
for exposing the immorality of racism, Black Power was condemned for its 
radical critique of capitalism, its institutional racism, its advocacy of armed 
self-defense, and its acceptance of black pride and black nationalism.49 There 
is a common bias in depicting the evolution of the Civil Rights Movement in 
the Black Power era. In fact, scholars mostly accepted as a given that the 
trajectory of the movement shifted over time, from a struggle for the 
achievement of the basic rights of citizenship and democracy to a revolt 
against capitalism. Take, for example, Clayborne Carson’s book In Struggle 
(1981). Carson focuses on the evolution of SNCC from its integrationist, 
non-violent, interracialism of the early 1960s to its advocacy of Black Power 
in the mid-1960s under Stokely Carmichael’s leadership. While Carson offers 
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a complete treatment of the transformation of SNCC, an organization that 
bridged and operated within the Civil Rights and Black Power eras, he still 
attributes its demise to its ill-fated turn toward black nationalism in the mid-
1960s.50 This traditional scholarship has contributed to the bifurcation of the 
relationship between Civil Rights and Black Power, with profound 
implications for the study of the black freedom struggle in the 1960s.  
There is an increasing amount of scholarship devoted to redefining Black 
Power as a positive force used to enhance African Americans’ identity and 
establish a new racial consciousness in the 1960s.51 Scholars have recently 
traced the evolution of Black Power over more than three decades, beginning 
with its origins in Black Nationalist politics, not just as a radical development 
in response to the moderate Civil Rights Movement, but also as a pragmatic 
reaction to the existence of racism, injustice and inequality found across the 
North as well as in the South. In his book Dark Days, Bright Nights, Joseph 
points out that Black Power showed two faces: one face was more radical, 
aggressive, militant, political in character, and revolutionary in nature. This is 
the classic picture - an alternative means of combating the racism that 
persisted in American society despite the efforts of African activists – amidst 
rhetoric of “any means necessary,” that to this day clings to the American 
social imagination. However, Professor Joseph explicitly mentions another 
side, in which “Black Power-era politicians such as Maynard Jackson and 
Harold Washington.... embraced the movement, but with a moderate 
perspective.”52  
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The Civil Rights Movement manifested both a moderate and a radical face. 
With a nostalgic view, the orthodox scholarly treatment promotes the idea 
that the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s was a pivotal force 
for social justice, where decent people used decent non-violent strategies to 
end Jim Crow segregation in the South and promote a major advance for 
racial equality in the North. However, this version covers the story 
insufficiently; it must be added that Martin Luther King’s strategy of non-
violent protest only partially disguised the resentment, frustration, and anger, 
which was always on the verge of  erupting, of the most radical wing of the 
movement.53 Among King’s lieutenants and allies, there were moderates such 
as Andrew Young and Ralph Abernathy, and radicals such as Julian Bond 
and James Bevan, and it is well known that King became increasingly radical 
in the last days of his life.54 He was not afraid, in the last years of his life, to 
denounce the Vietnam War as “an enemy of the poor,” and described the 
United States as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” He 
predicted that “the bombs that [Americans] are dropping in Vietnam will 
explode at home in inflation and unemployment.”55 He was careful to 
maintain a safe distance from the excesses of militant and radical groups such 
as the Black Panthers and fell short of embracing the rhetoric of Black 
Power.56 King considered protest and boycott as means for mobilizing black 
communities along liberal or socialist lines in defense of what he saw as 
continuous capitalistic exploitation.57 He urged a radical redistribution of 
wealth and political power in the United States in order to provide medical 
care, jobs, and education for all of the country’s people.  
36 
 
Challenging the traditional narratives of the “opposed twins”, scholars such 
as Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Peniel E. Joseph propose a much more 
engaging description of Civil Rights and Black Power. They are examples of 
the recent authors that aim to bridge the differences between Civil Rights 
and Black Power, and offer a new paradigm for understanding the origins 
and the intertwined legacy of the two movements. Gilmore is one of the 
historians who have recently begun the long overdue process of challenging 
the sanitized version of the struggle for Civil Rights. In her new book, Defying 
Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, she gives a fascinating account of the 
radical sources of the Civil Rights Movement that would shake U.S. society 
in the 1950s and 1960s.58 Rather than stressing the radical origins of the Civil 
Rights Movement, Joseph assumes the common origins of Civil Rights and 
Black Power movements. In his paper “The Black Power Movement: A State 
of the Field,” Joseph takes the case of Timothy Tyson’s Radio Free Dixie 
(1999), a political biography of Robert F. Williams. According to Tyson, the 
Civil Rights and Black Power movements “grew out of the same soil, 
confronted the same predicaments, and reflected the same quest for African 
American freedom.” Moreover, Joseph argues that Tyson found that 
“virtually all of the elements that we associate with ‘Black Power’ were 
already present in the small towns and rural communities of the South where 
‘the Civil Rights Movement’ was born.”59 New scholarship has produced 
important work that unquestionably reshapes the debate over the origins and 
legacy of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, giving serious 
consideration to the complex dynamics of the Black Freedom struggle. 
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Moreover, the assumption of the “intertwined twins” is perhaps the best way 
to explain how the various elements of the 1960s were fused together at the 
level of racial struggle, and articulate the history of how Black Power 
developed in the womb of Civil Rights. Based on this vague borderline 
between the Civil Right Movement and Black Power, even the orthodox 
scholarly treatment about a strict separation between integration and 
nationalism might be reconsidered. 
When the different articulations of Black Power and its outcomes are 
interrelated with the Civil Rights Movement – and this is true not only with 
regard to the precursors to the movement but also the descendants, 
especially when one considers the economic aspects and strategies beyond 
the traditional King years – it is easier to set the stage for a narrative that 
recasts Breadbasket during Jackson’s leadership. Within this context, 
Breadbasket revealed the convergence of the Civil Rights Movement and  
emerging black capitalism. The central figure here is, of course, Jesse 
Jackson. He emerges as the first black leader to borrow strategies from the 
Civil Rights Movement to foster the growth of black capitalism. Obscuring 
the borders between Civil Rights and black capitalism, Jackson pursued an 
agenda that both empowered the poor as well as the growing black 
entrepreneurial class. Consequently, it was not surprising that Breadbasket’s 
national director tried to develop a new perspective for the program. 
Jackson’s stroke of genius was to expand Breadbasket’s activities, moving 
beyond the aim of job desegregation to addressing issues such as access to 
finance, banking, development of brands, and corporate board memberships. 
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Jackson agreed with King that employment was a crucial target to reach, 
along the path to economic equality. However, his connections with urban 
ghetto life expanded his imagination to the point that he envisioned black-
owned banks, black-owned urban mortgage lending corporations, and black 
small business loans. He thought that if the Civil Rights Movement was really 
concerned about increasing the economic rights of black people, it would 
worry less about policymakers and more about finding a way to enable black 
capitalism to access affordable credit and low interest rate capital, eventually 
building the infrastructure of a black economy that might support home and 
car purchases, and any other consumer desires of American black families. 
He envisioned Breadbasket as an engine to promote black capitalism and 
accordingly sought to reorient the program and its operations. Increasingly, 
he began to incorporate the philosophies of black self-help and economic 
autonomy that were extensively adopted by Black Power activists.60 He 
pointed out that the connotation of Black Power in the media might be 
violence, but the fact is, Black Power is power-sharing.61 He was adamant in 
his definition of Black Power: It means “equity.”62  
Jackson’s hypothesis was very simple. If black people helped themselves, 
then black people would not be totally reliant on white America. However, if 
white people became part of the equation, then self-help plus bargaining 
power would lead to self-reliance, which ultimately would lead to what 
Jackson thought of as Black Power. Indeed, Jackson rediscovered the 
economic idea put forward by Booker T. Washington, that the best strategy 
for blacks is using the capital of the dominant, white community for the 
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economic improvement of the black economy. At the same time, he assumed 
a less conciliatory stance in race relations than Washington did, and – 
biographer Frady points out - he refused Washington’s appeal to white 
philanthropists, instead promoting the concept of “reciprocity.”63 
Accordingly, Jackson’s self-appointed mission was to shape and discipline the 
growing black awareness and pride in order to build black economic power. 
He pursued in the economic arena what politicians such as Maynard Jackson 
and Harold Washington were pursuing in politics, embracing the Black 
Power movement but with a moderate perspective. He remained visible in 
the sphere of Civil Rights, but framed Breadbasket as a Black Power vehicle, 
while simultaneously embracing capitalistic traditions in a quest for Civil 
Rights and social change.64 
Yet, Jackson is controversial in the eyes of most Civil Rights scholars, and 
this complexity does not facilitate an honest assessment of his role as 
Breadbasket’s leader. In the aftermath of King’s murder, he appeared self-
serving in interviews (wearing a turtleneck purportedly with King’s blood on 
it), twisting facts and trying to capitalize on the death of King. Some 
observers felt offended by his success in acquiring a net worth on the order 
of ten million dollars, as a leader of Breadbasket and then of the Civil Rights 
organization Rainbow/PUSH, which raised skepticism about the true 
motivation of his involvement in Civil Rights activism.65 Jackson’s conduct as 
Breadbasket’s leader received considerable scrutiny and criticism, and he was 
accused of moral shortcomings, including financial improprieties. Although 
the divergence between King and Jackson on Breadbasket has been 
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explained in terms of unaligned tempers and a clash of characters, Jackson’s 
integrity was openly questioned by King and some of his aides.66 This same 
clash occurred again in 1971, when tensions between Jackson and Ralph 
Abernathy, then S.C.L.C. chairman, reached a boiling point. Ralph Abernathy 
suspended Jackson from the S.C.L.C., citing “administrative improprieties 
and repeated acts of violation of organizational policy.”67 In summary, 
Jackson never enjoyed a special moral status as Civil Rights leader similar to 
Dr. King’s. These doubts about his real commitment to the spirit of the 
movement, and these criticisms of his excessive self-promotion, inevitably 
discourage a positive assessment of Jackson’s legacy as Civil Rights leader, 
including his role as Breadbasket’s director. He had a sort of credibility 
deficit, and suffered the constant, unmerciful comparison with Dr. King, 
despite the fact that, when King was killed in Memphis and Abernathy 
succeeded King as president of the S.C.L.C., it was Jackson who assumed the 
mantle as Black America’s top Civil Rights leader.68  
While Jackson’s own deficiencies are still apparent in the research on Jackson 
and his involvement with the Civil Rights Movement, his detractors have 
tried to use these controversies to detract from his Civil Rights record. As 
Breadbasket’s leader he has rarely received a balanced assessment that 
included consideration of the context in which he was working. In this thesis, 
Jackson is placed at the intersection of the Civil Rights and the Black Power 
Movements, where his ambiguous strategy, distinctly racial tone, and 
emphasis on conservative economics, can be reassessed. With this in mind, 
Jackson does not seem to betray the core tradition of the Civil Rights 
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Movement, but rather he can be viewed as incorporating its core values into 
a much wider platform. It becomes clear that Black Power and Civil Rights 
were reconcilable and eventually compatible. The economic context was in 
flux, and conservatism was emerging as a force, not just as a product of the 
explosion of black riots in urban centers. The disagreements between King 
and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies requires a more complex 
explanation, and can’t be simply defined in terms of a clash of ethics or a  
power struggle between egocentric characters.  
By examining the historical context of Jackson as Breadbasket’s leader, it is 
difficult to escape the impression that he was more in tune than King, with 
the country that emerged out of 1965. Nineteen sixty five was a 
transformative year that marked the birth of Black Power, the explosion of 
black riots in urban centers, and one of the greatest achievements of the Civil 
Rights Movement, the Voting Act. This period also included the gradual 
escalation of the Vietnam War, and the end of the Golden Age of American 
capitalism. Not only did Jackson lead Breadbasket at the convergence of Civil 
Rights Movement and Black Power, but he also embraced some conservative 
positions that were just starting to redefine the cultural debate. At the same 
time, he appeared to recognize the economic and cultural implications of the 
financialization phenomenon that was generating a new economic and 
business landscape.69 
When considering the history of modern conservatism, in the Fifties, not one 
but two social movements began taking their first steps, only to reach 
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maturity a decade later. One is the Black Freedom Movement; the other is 
the modern conservative movement. American conservatism has usually 
been portrayed as the champion of segregation, and white backlash as a 
reaction to black radicalism, a backlash that ultimately led to the election of 
Richard Nixon, and the end of liberalism as the dominant political and 
cultural tradition in the country. However, a new generation of historians has 
increasingly begun to view the 1960s as a decade of resurgent conservatism 
which included faith in a market-centered economy.70 Rather than provoking 
merely a backlash, black radicalism and white conservatism were battling for 
the soul of America. This is particularly true in the business arena, in which 
corporate executives, backed by business-friendly legislators, were pushing 
hard to regain full control of the workplace, hiring and promotion practices, 
as well as limiting the influence of unions, Civil Rights organizations, and the 
federal government. This conflict was about protecting segregation and racial 
discrimination, but also promoted the idea  that capitalism and management 
were  rational with regard to matters like efficiency, merit, and profit, and 
opposed to irrationality in decision-making, and race-thinking.   
Structure and Methodology 
This thesis addresses the complete history of Breadbasket from its 
beginnings in Atlanta to its end in Chicago. It consists of four chapters, along 
with an introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter One, “Civil Rights in the Workplace,” covers the historical 
background of Breadbasket, particularly the black struggle for integration in 
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the workplace and economic power. It sets the stage for the main thrust of 
this work, the recent (1940-1960) story of the search for racial integration in 
the workplace. Labor unions, Civil Rights organizations, and clergymen 
became activists, and through direct action, such as protests and boycotts, 
struggled to inject economic justice into American capitalism. In addition, the 
federal government played an active role during this period. On the other 
side, corporate executives and business-friendly conservatives engaged in a 
fiery offensive to retain control of the workplace and reduce the influence of 
the federal government, the employees and labor unions. Rather than 
framing the white backlash as simply a reaction to the black radicalism of the 
second part of the decade, this chapter sustains the view that the resurgent 
conservatism and faith in a market-centered economy was a major trend in 
the 1960s, which ultimately led to the election of Richard Nixon and his 
administration, and the end of liberalism as the dominant political and 
cultural tradition in the country. While describing the partial alignment 
between Civil Rights and Black Power in the economic realm, the chapter 
also provides a full description of the state of the economy, addressed 
through the argument that the basic structure of the economy changed 
during the 1960s. In the light of this reality, this thesis assumes that during 
the decade, the American economy and Civil Rights Movement underwent a 
major transformation, with the former having its sense of unlimited growth 
dissipated over the course of the decade, and the latter intersecting with the 
nascent Black Power Movement. 
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Chapter Two, “Breadbasket in Atlanta - 1962-66,” addresses the first part of 
the story of Breadbasket. Breadbasket was officially founded as a project of 
the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta on October 29, 1962, to “negotiate a more equitable 
employment practice,’’ as Dr. King will declare years later.71 Influenced by 
the example of Reverend Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia, the aim of the 
organization was to utilize the bargaining power of African American church 
leaders and their congregations to foster “selective buying” (boycotts) as a 
means to pressure white businesses to open up private sector jobs to blacks. 
In October 1962, King brought Leon Sullivan to Atlanta to meet local 
ministers and discuss replicating the program. As a result of this meeting, 
Breadbasket was born. Its mission was to organize black ministers to 
promote more employment opportunities for local African Americans, and it 
rapidly became the economic arm of the S.C.L.C. It was operated by 
Rev. Fred C. Bennette of Atlanta, and its first activities were in Atlanta and 
other Southern cities. 
Chapter Three, “Breadbasket in Chicago - 1966-72,” sketches Breadbasket 
under the leadership of Jesse Jackson. Breadbasket expanded to the Windy 
City in 1966 as part of S.C.L.C.’s Chicago Campaign. King called Chicago 
Theological Seminary student Jesse Jackson to head the Chicago chapter of 
Breadbasket. Jackson wholly reinvented it. In Chicago, Breadbasket 
expanded its scope and became very successful at getting major corporations 
with large presences in the black community to purchase goods and services 
from black contractors. Jackson became the national director of 
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Breadbasket’s programs in 1967. After King’s assassination in 1968, Jackson 
continued to lead the program. Going beyond jobs and patronage for black-
owned businesses, Chicago-based Breadbasket became a black cultural 
enterprise, focused around weekly Saturday workshops, and annual expos 
and events. Ultimately, Breadbasket became instrumental in building and 
protecting the economic autonomy of the black community in Chicago. In 
1971, tensions emerged between Jackson and S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph 
Abernathy, over the location of Breadbasket’s national headquarters, and 
these disagreements eventually lead to the withholding of funds. Jackson 
refused to relocate, rejected the allegations about the misuse of funds, and 
resigned from S.C.L.C. in December. A week later, he launched his own 
economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People 
United to Save Humanity). Breadbasket continued through the next year, 
before its eventual demise.  
Chapter Four, “Birth of a Leader,” examines Jesse Jackson’s basic ideas and 
his view of the ghetto economy and, black capitalism as Breadbasket’s leader.  
Portrayed in popular and scholarly books as lacking integrity and 
commitment to the cause of the disadvantaged, this chapter describes 
Jackson as recognizing the economic gulf between the haves and the have-
nots in the black community, as he actively worked to collect resources from 
local enterprises that would raise the level of the whole community. He 
envisioned different images for blacks, such as black as consumer or as 
entrepreneur, while offering new ideas and adapting existing resources and 
strategies to changing situations and processes. He pointed at the lack of 
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suitable conditions necessary to the development of black entrepreneurship. 
He promoted love of power, the desire to excel or to prove the equality or 
superiority of the black race, and pursued opportunities to open up 
capitalism to include blacks as consumers and entrepreneurs, as bankers and 
businesspeople.  
In all, Breadbasket survived about 10 years, from its launch in Atlanta during 
autumn 1962 to its end in Chicago in 1972, after the schism between the 
S.C.L.C. and Jesse Jackson. The main repositories for Breadbasket materials 
are not surprisingly in Atlanta and Chicago. In Atlanta there are four boxes 
dedicated to Breadbasket at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for 
Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta. In the same location, other information 
about the major players involved in the project can be found in the Records 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at the Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Center for Nonviolent Change, Inc., King Library and Archives, Atlanta. 
A major source of material for the investigation of the role that King played 
in the project is the Dr. Martin Luther, Jr. Papers at the Martin Luther King. 
Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, Inc., King Library and Archives, 
Atlanta. In Atlanta, at the Auburn Avenue Research Library, there are two 
boxes focused on the first Breadbasket executive director.  The collection of 
Fred C. Bennette covers the years 1960 to 1985. The collection contains 
photographs, news articles, and minutes, and other printed materials which 
document Fred C. Bennette’s involvement with the Civil Rights Movement 
in Atlanta. The Emory University Archives in Atlanta maintains three boxes 
(boxes 576-578) of Operation Breadbasket records, 1966-1991, as part of the 
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S.C.L.C. series, including a number of files pertaining to the regional 
campaigns and boycotts waged by Operation Breadbasket after its heyday. 
For additional speeches relating to Operation Breadbasket, see Series 
11: Martin Luther King Speaks and Series 19: Audiovisual (which contains 
Jackson, Joseph E. Lowery, and King speeches about Operation 
Breadbasket). Finally, files on Breadbasket are included in the Morehouse 
College, Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records at Robert W. Woodruff 
Library of the Atlanta University Center. These four archives, the Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, the Auburn Avenue 
Research Library, the Emory University Archives, and the Morehouse 
College Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection are the main sources for chapter 
two (“Breadbasket in Atlanta”).  
Chicago is an major source of information about Breadbasket under the 
leadership of Jackson. The Rainbow PUSH Coalition’s headquarter is like a 
Jesse Jackson museum, more a collection of artifacts rather than written 
sources, that embraces most of the activities of Jesse Jackson and his team, 
from the beginnings at Breadbasket to the present day, and this material is 
useful for contextualizing other historical materials. The Chicago Museum 
that hosts a permanent exhibition on the Chicago Freedom Movement is a 
major contributor to this research. Another source is the Afro-American 
Collection at the Central Library, Chicago. The Collection is one of the most 
important and extensive on the subject in the United States and is an 
invaluable source of information on the struggles of Blacks in Chicago. In 
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particular, the Reverend Addie Wyatt Collection, 1851-2010 contains several 
folders (folders 1-13 in Box 149, folder 15 in Box 148) that were relevant to 
this research. Reverend Wyatt attended the march on Washington and was a 
founding member of Operation Breadbasket. He would also serve as national 
secretary and as a board member of Breadbasket’s successor, Operation 
PUSH, founded by Rev. Jesse Jackson Sr. The Reverend Addie Wyatt 
Collection represents the legacy of service and activism exemplified by the 
lives of Reverend Addie and the late Rev. Claude Wyatt and have been 
available to the public for reference and research since 2010. The W. Alvin 
Pitcher Papers are hosted at the Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library. William Alvin Pitcher (1913-1996) spent 
much of his academic career at the University of Chicago and was deeply 
involved in civic life on the South Side of Chicago, working with 
Breadbasket.  He served on the staff of Breadbasket, working closely with 
Reverend Jesse Jackson, as coordinator for the Construction Spoke of the 
Breadbasket Commercial Association, a subsidiary group assisting black 
contractors and tradesmen. Series I includes 14 boxes (boxes 1-14) with 
several folders on Breadbasket, and Series VII includes folders in 3 boxes 
(96-8). These archives and collections are the major primary sources that are 
the basis for  chapter three (“Breadbasket in Chicago”).  
I was also lucky enough to acquire a collection of original photos and related 
notes on Breadbasket and Jesse Jackson in Chicago. They cover the period 
1968-72, and consist in a series of photos of Jackson at Breadbasket, in 
conversation with white corporate executives, and meetings and celebrations 
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at Breadbasket’s headquarters. They are used as primary sources in chapter 
four (“Birth of a Leader”). 
A valuable source of information was the national and local press, in 
particular the local press in Atlanta and Chicago. Most of the newspapers and 
magazines of the period are in the archives mentioned above. Particularly 
important were the interviews with Jackson by the national press in such 
publications as Time, Playboy, and Life.  I also found important sources of 
information in the Black press, especially Jet and Ebony.  
In terms of video sources, I reviewed all videos portraying Reverend Jesse 
Jackson, and his involvement in civil rights activism related, even indirectly, 
to the history of Breadbasket. Other video I viewed for this project included 
“King in Chicago,” and the interview with Rev. Willie T. Barrow, who has 
earned her nickname, the “Little Warrior,” through her never-ending pursuit 
of justice.  I watched the movie “Alice's Ordinary People”, a documentary 
about Alice Tregay. In 1966, when Dr. King came to Chicago she and her 
husband James Tregay, marched alongside Dr. King, often at great personal 
risk. It was at this time that Dr. King joined the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and 
the Reverend James Bevel to form Operation Breadbasket. Breadbasket 
fought racism on many fronts, but its main task was jobs for African 
Americans, particularly from those businesses drawing profits from the 
African American community. Under the leadership of Reverend Jackson, 
the months that Alice and her group of ordinary people spent picketing led 
to real change. But it was through her political education class, as a part of 
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Operation Breadbasket, that Alice had her most significant impact. Over a 
four year period, thousands were trained to work in independent political 
campaigns in her classes.  
Together with archives and video and written sources, another important 
source of information about Breadbasket has been oral stories from veterans 
of the campaign, especially a long interview with Vincent Harding. In 
alphabetical order, I contacted Robert Adams (Chief Operating Officer of 
the newly formed Martin Luther King III Institute for Social Justice & 
Human Rights); Lerone Bennett (former executive editor for Ebony 
Magazine); Dorothy Cotton (former Education Director of the S.C.L.C.); 
Aljosie Aldrich Knight (Harding’s friend); Fred Harris (former U.S. Senator 
(Oak) and member of Kerner Commission); Lester McKeever (managing 
principal of Washington, Pittman & McKeever LLC, the accounting firm of 
Breadbasket and S.C.L.C. in Chicago, and former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago). They showed different level of cooperation, from 
very helpful to simple courtesy. Although I planned to interview Rev. Jesse 
Jackson in Chicago, and I contacted him repeatedly, I failed in this endeavor. 
His profile is the result of the interviews with people – including Edward 
Taylor - who met him in different stages of his life. Other important sources 
can be found in the “Bibliography” section of this document. All of these 
sources helped to shape chapter one (“Civil Rights in the Workplace”).  
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Conclusion 
Breadbasket began in Atlanta and ended in Chicago, straddling both the 
Southern and the Northern struggle for Civil Rights. It exposed the 
commitment of the Black Church for economic justice, and showed the 
convergence of Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. The program dealt 
with economic issues, and was definitively affected by the changing mood of 
the economic milieu in the second half of the 1960s.  
Despite being downplayed in Civil Rights and Black Power historiography, 
Breadbasket was a S.C.L.C. program that achieved national recognition and 
some success in improving economic opportunities for blacks. It was also the 
only program that created a schism within King’s organization. For these 
reasons, it deserves attention and examination. Characters and events related 
to Breadbasket can be found in existing studies focused on the Chicago 
Freedom Movement and Black Chicago, Martin Luther King Jr. and the 
S.C.L.C., and Jesse Jackson. These studies, however, offer only fragmented 
reconstructions of the ten years of Breadbasket’s life, and they mainly 
concentrate on the second half of the history of the program. This material 
offers insights into Breadbasket in Chicago, leaving the earlier period in 
Atlanta barely touched.  
Less epic in character as a campaign than the Freedom Rides and not 
concentrated in one place like the Birmingham and Selma campaigns; 
Breadbasket is a more complicated story. It attracted both the sympathy and 
the skepticism of the leader of the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King, and 
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became instrumental in the ascension of Jackson on the national stage. 
Because of the interplay between the economic dynamics, the 
interdependence and interconnection among the diverse wings of the Black 
Freedom Movement, and  the civil engagement of the Black Church, 
Breadbasket does not seem to fit in the traditional narrative of the history of 
the Civil Rights movement, which concentrates on political and cultural 
issues, and assumes a strict separation between Civil Rights and Black Power. 
Placed in a different historical context, however, Breadbasket assumes greater 
significance than scholars have previously understood.  
The traditional narrative presents a linear view of the Civil Rights Movement, 
moving from the South to the North, expanding the scope of the movement 
from segregation to discrimination, and emphasizing the goal of political and 
economic integration as a “right.” Scholars identify the passage of two 
important pieces of legislations, the Civil Right Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, as turning points. This period is marked by the 
expansion of Civil Rights activities from the South to Northern cities, from 
the fight against de jure segregation to the one against de facto discrimination. 
This period included  increasing involvement by Martin Luther King, Jr., 
emphasizing economic justice, and  the rising radicalism of black people in 
urban settings. New scholarship, however, identifies 1965 as a moment of 
discontinuity. In January of that year, President Lyndon Johnson proclaimed 
that the country had “no irreconcilable conflicts,” and less than 12 months 
later, the country found itself deeply divided because of  episodes of racial 
violence exploding in the Watts area of Los Angeles. The landing of the first 
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battalion of marines in Vietnam occurred, Black Power appeared as a 
significant force for change, and there was a resurgence of social 
conservatism.72 Because of immense social the upheaval was occurring at this 
time, the traditional “from segregation-to-discrimination” narrative is not 
very useful when it comes to Breadbasket.  
Historians have recently re-framed the Civil Rights Movement within the 
context of an ongoing struggle for black freedom and economic equality, and 
sought to place the movement within the larger context of the Black 
Freedom Movement. They also have suggested that an emerging modern 
conservative movement had great influence on this period. The Civil Rights 
literature that deals with the implications of economics, the Black Power era, 
the intersection of Black Power and Civil Rights, and the involvement of 
conservatives in the economy, offer a more rounded historical view of 
Breadbasket. As a result of these studies and their new perspectives, it is 
possible to place Breadbasket at the convergence of the Black Church-driven 
Civil Rights Movement and the activist-based Black Power efforts in the 
economic arena. This allows for the rediscovery of Breadbasket as a pivotal 
program in the history of the Civil Rights Movement, while recognizing the 
role and legacy of Jackson as Breadbasket’s leader.  
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Chapter One: Civil Rights in the 
Workplace 
 
Introduction 
Breadbasket’s purpose was to expand access to jobs and to provide access to 
business and commercial opportunities to those who lived in the segregated 
South, or in the black ghettos in the urban North.73 The program had its 
roots in the enthusiasm created by an Executive Order issued by the 
Kennedy Administration, and by the success achieved by a boycott campaign 
in Philadelphia. Breadbasket’s leadership did not act in a vacuum; it 
continuously monitored the degree of employment of black workers both at 
national and local levels and put civil rights activism in that context. In 1967, 
for example, Breadbasket prepared a report investigating the economic 
forces that were perceived as causes for high black unemployment in the 
1960s, in spite of a booming economy.74 Since Breadbasket’s leadership paid 
so much attention to the economic context, and elaborated its strategies and 
vision based on the economic dynamics of the time, it seems worthwhile to 
continue in the same vein by attending to the consequences of the economic 
context  when approaching the history of the program.  
This chapter outlines the economic background and historical events that 
were instrumental in the birth of Breadbasket, and identifies its primary goals 
and activities throughout its existence. To provide a sufficiently wide 
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overview, this chapter traces the intellectual origins of Breadbasket to earlier 
efforts to promote racial inclusion in the workplace during the 1930s and 
1940s, which was mostly a product of the Civil Rights activism of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
black-conscious boycotts and more radical protests. The chapter also 
investigates how the alliance between Civil Rights leaders and labor unions 
worked during the 1950s and 1960s. This alliance produced mixed feelings 
and results, and provides a reinterpretation of the classic narrative of the 
fruitful alliance between Civil Rights and union labor. This is a  more 
nuanced description of the events being discussed.  
This chapter further addresses the executive orders and important legislation 
designed to reduce the job divide between black and white workers, and 
investigates how different strategies – fair employment and preferential 
treatment – were adopted and pursued by the Civil Rights Movement and 
other institutions. The chapter investigates boycotts as a Civil Rights strategy. 
Boycotts have been a weapon long used by protesters in search of economic 
justice, and they have been integral to the history of 20th century Civil Rights 
protests in urban North America. Finally, the chapter addresses the rise of 
pro-business conservatism, the unpredictable consequences of the ascent of 
affirmative action, and the convergence of black separatism and white 
conservatism in a number of areas that ultimately coalesced around the ideas 
of economic self-determination and black capitalism.  
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African Americans and Job Discrimination 
The opportunity to obtain a decent job has been a central concern of African 
Americans for decades.75 At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
few organizations, namely the NAACP, which was founded in 1909, the 
National Urban League (NUL),  which was established in 1910, and black 
leaders such as A. Philip Randolph, W.E.B. DuBois, Walter White, and 
Clarence Mitchell, declared fair opportunity for black workers a central 
concerns of their activism.76 Despite some advancement in the first decades 
of the century, white workers and labor unions maintained firm control of 
the workplace, enforcing job discrimination practices against blacks (and 
other minorities). It was more than just racism; it was a confluence of factors: 
tradition, nepotism, seniority, and defense of established interests. It was a 
sort of white labor monopoly. During the Great Depression, African 
Americans dealt with dramatic levels of unemployment.77 To unlock the job 
marketplace during the Great Depression and before the war, black activists 
pursued two different strategies: they asked for jobs specifically for blacks; 
and they demanded fair hiring and promotion policies.  
In the first case, black activists aimed to convince employers to reserve jobs 
for blacks. The idea of racial quotas had been already implemented by the 
federal government in the 1930s, as both the Tennessee Valley Authority and 
the Public Works Administration practiced a quota system that reserved jobs 
for blacks.78 The goal was pursued through diplomacy by the National Urban 
League officials, visiting companies intending to convince corporate 
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executives to hire a certain number of black workers. The goal was also 
addressed through boycott, protests, and actions of civil disobedience. The 
“Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement, which was successfully 
organized in Chicago in 1929, established the right to work on blacks’ status 
as consumers. The movement became a major form of black activism in 
cities across the country, and achieved important results in Philadelphia, 
Atlanta and New York. At times the adoption of an intimidating approach, 
that is, demanding that white store owners hire blacks in proportion to the 
black population in the area, or in proportion to their consumer power 
(patronage), was offered as an alternative to retaliatory boycotts.  
Living in segregated communities, blacks resented the presence in their 
neighborhoods of white-owned stores that refused to employ blacks or 
employed them only in menial positions. Plus, without laws barring racial 
discrimination in private industry, such discriminatory practices continued 
unabated. Not surprisingly, African Americans organized boycotts against 
white employers in black neighborhoods who sold to blacks but refused to 
hire them. In 1929, protestors picketing stores on Chicago’s South Side 
officially started the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement.79  The 
protest soon expanded to other cities such as Los Angeles, Cleveland and 
New York. Blacks in Brooklyn and Harlem initiated “Don’t Buy” campaigns 
against white stores under the leadership of the charismatic black minister 
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. The New Negro Alliance (NNA) in Washington, 
D.C. was founded in 1933 precisely to combat white-owned businesses in 
black neighborhoods that would not hire black employees. By 1940, the 
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organization had secured 5,106 jobs for blacks. In response to the organized 
or threatened boycotts against white-owned businesses, some white business 
people arranged for an injunction to stop the picketing. With the assistance 
of the NAACP, the NNA fought back – all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court, which in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. (1938), 
confirmed the constitutional right of boycotting. This decision became 
a landmark case in the struggle by African Americans against 
discriminatory hiring practices, and “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
groups multiplied throughout the nation. During the Great Depression, the 
emerging movement adopted mass protest and direct action tactics such as 
economic boycotts and picketing to force businesses to negotiate. Hence, the 
“Don’t Buy” pickets and boycotts became viable weapons that forced white-
owned stores in black communities to hire blacks in skilled and white-collar 
positions. As these campaigns grew in popularity during the Depression, they 
spread to more than 30 cities across the country, becoming one of the first 
black direct action movements of that era.80 While the early boycott 
campaigns became the prototype for the post world war II Civil Rights 
Movement, historian of black business Juliet Walker concludes that those 
campaigns increased black employment in white businesses, but were “less 
effective in helping black business.”81 The movement lost momentum at the 
beginning of the World War II.82  
Black leaders applied the founders’ principle of no taxation without 
representation, asking for equal employment opportunities, based on their 
status as taxpayers. Some Civil Rights activists pushed the point even further, 
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and claimed that their status as consumers entitled them to the same rights as 
their white counterparts. Despite some episodic collaboration with NNA, 
traditional Civil Rights groups such as the NAACP and the National Urban 
League remained reticent about the use of direct action tactics with regard to  
boycotts. These more traditional groups were reluctant to endorse the idea of 
quotas at all. These organizations were skeptical of the racial, divisive, “black 
only” requests for employment. They thought it would establish a win-lose 
game, a win for a black worker was a loss for a white worker, with the 
potential to foster additional racial animosity. They argued that “preferential 
treatment” was based on the assumption that American capitalism was 
inadequate to provide a sufficient number of jobs for all, and preferential 
treatment of Blacks would have created the opportunity for a white backlash. 
These moderate civil rights institutions preferred not to challenge white 
workers and employers, preferring to work together with labor unions and 
the federal government to promote social change and fair employment 
policies. Accordingly, they suggested shifting the conversation from 
preferential treatment to fair employment. The point was, rather than demanding 
jobs specifically for blacks, a more effective option was pursuing fair hiring 
and promotion procedures through anti-discrimination policies.  
In order to put pressure on a reticent federal government, civil rights leaders 
had the option to fight alone or to forge partnerships, and among the most 
important of these alliances were labor unions. However, the improvements 
for working people gained by labor, excluded minorities such as black and 
other non-white workers – including American Indians, Asians, Hispanics, 
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and women. Black people remained constantly discriminated against in the 
workplace as far as hiring, advancement, and wages were concerned, in spite 
of the progress made by the unions and their work with civil rights leaders 
and their affiliated groups. Conservative unions like the AFL were known as 
the most hostile to blacks. Progressive unions consistently showed prudence 
when working with blacks because they did not want to lose white members. 
Labor unions important in construction, plumbing, sheet metal fabrication, 
and electrical work obstinately excluded black workers from membership, 
and the main labor unions continued to be dominated by whites.83 The 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a remarkable exception as its 
leaders appealed to workers regardless of race, or level of skill in a particular 
trade. This approach was based on the belief that the security of any worker 
depended on the commitment of all. Although the CIO did not challenge 
workplace discrimination like the other unions, it  
provided black workers with powerful tools to tackle it: 
collective bargaining as a means to compel employers to agree 
to union demands, seniority to prevent arbitrary firings, 
grievance systems to appeal violations of workers’ right, and 
one of the country’s most powerful lobbying bodies 
committed to economic justice and an expand welfare state.84  
The CIO was a remarkable exception in the landscape of race-biased labor 
organizations. The attention to the precarious situation of black workers paid 
off. By 1943, some 400,000 black workers had joined the CIO. By 1945, 
black membership in labor unions had doubled to 1.25 million.85 
In September 1940, a coalition of civil rights and black labor union leaders 
including Walter White of the NAACP, T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban 
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League, and A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to discuss black 
participation in the armed forces, and employment in the defense industries.86 
The president made promises, but Randolph was skeptical. The coalition of 
civil rights and union leaders decided to march on the national’s capital to 
protest the racial discrimination that was commonly pursued by companies 
and unions engaged in war work on government contracts. The march on 
Washington also received the endorsement of the CIO, a labor organization 
which, once again, rejected the strategy of exclusionary and segregationist 
craft unionism. The march was cancelled when President Roosevelt, fearful 
that the demonstration could distract from military preparations, issued 
Executive Order No. 8802, which outlawed discrimination in the defense 
industries, and created a federal agency to enforce that order, the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC).87  Executive Order No. 8802 was 
the first presidential order to benefit blacks since Reconstruction, and it 
forbade discriminatory employment practices by unions and companies with 
government contracts, or engaged in war-related work. The establishment of 
the FEPC, and the labor shortage caused by the draft and booming military 
production created the opportunity for 2 million blacks to be employed in 
defense plants, and for another 200,000 to find employment in the federal 
government.88  
Randolph’s gambit produced substantial progress in the cause of workplace 
integration. Over the course of its six-year existence (1941-46), the wartime 
FEPC received 11,200 complaints of racial discrimination. The FEPC’s 
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enforcement options were constrained by a shortage of funds, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies, and the fact that the burden of proof relied on the individual 
to prove intentional discrimination.89 Despite these limits, the FEPC was able 
to proceed with hearings and investigations, interview corporate executives 
and discuss with them the option of ending segregation and promoting black 
workers, while making the point that discrimination was unfair and wrong. In 
the private sector, the FEPC was generally successful in enforcing non-
discrimination practices in the North, although it did not attempt to 
challenge segregation in the South. More importantly, it built the precedent 
that the federal government was on the side of those at a disadvantage and of 
those being discriminated against, making a desegregated workplace a 
palatable option, and quotas and boycotts a less attractive proposition.  
Beginning in mid-century, both strategies, quotas and fair employment, 
became interchangeable and were pursued simultaneously. During that 
period, a wide spectrum of economic and political alternatives, from moral 
persuasion to boycotts, were put in place in to open access to employment 
for African Americans. There was a concentrated effort on the part of Civil 
Rights leaders, labor unions, the federal government to integrate the 
workplace. They were supportive of, and sometimes advocates for, fair 
employment practice legislation through coalitions of interests, legal actions, 
and moral persuasion. In addition, the same Civil Rights leaders, alone or in 
cooperation with the black clergy, black nationalists and other radicals, 
promoted grass-roots protests and pursued preferential treatment strategies 
through a widespread use of boycotts meant to force employers to capitulate 
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and hire, promote and advance African Americans. A case in point is the 
S.C.L.C., which lobbied for Civil Rights legislation, fair employment 
practices, color-blind legislation, and simultaneously established Breadbasket, 
a color-conscious campaign, promoting vigorous boycott campaigns and 
mass protest to secure more and better jobs for African Americans. While 
the S.C.L.C. was committed to a tactical use of protest, among other 
strategies, more moderate Civil Rights organizations and leaders such as the 
NAACP, and eventually, Bayard Rustin in the late 1960s, promoted the idea 
that integration in the workplace would be better pursued through the 
traditional vehicle of coalition politics in conjunction with the labor 
movement.90  
Ascent and Decline of Fair Employment 
In the 1950s, labor and Civil Rights leaders shared the idea of  fair 
employment practices legislation, a set of laws prohibiting racial 
discrimination and promoting equal opportunity in the workplace, as well as 
the establishment of agencies responsible for enforcing those laws. They 
committed to move forward the fundamental assumptions and the 
underlying philosophy of the Executive Order No. 8802 and FEPC. They 
envisioned a federal legislation that might establish and enforce non-
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in the workplace, and equal 
treatment and fair employment both in the public and private sector. The 
problem was the existing low degree of democratization of the job market. In 
the aftermath of the conflict, there was a general confidence that black 
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people could benefit from the dramatic increase in affluence across all levels 
of society and from the improving strength of the economy. Fundamental 
changes were at work in the very fabric of American society and the 
economy was booming. The spectacular rate of economic growth opened up 
more and better-paid jobs to black people, and increased their social status 
and self-confidence. The whole job landscape was affected. In 1939, still 42.5 
percent of African Americans were employed in agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries. Twenty years later, it was only 12.5 percent. Blacks lost interest in 
these agricultural opportunities for employment, and placed their hopes on 
pursuing industrial work. In the 1940s and early 1950s, they left the South 
and migrated to the North to find industrial work in the booming 
manufacturing sector. As result, by 1970, only 53 percent of black people 
lived in the South compared to 77 percent in 1940.91 This massive migration 
did not necessarily provide employment opportunities for all. In 1950, 
African Americans numbered 15.8 million people, and 19 million a decade 
later. Unemployment was twice as high for blacks as for whites, and poverty 
afflicted 50 percent or more of blacks. The problem was that the U.S. 
economy was already involved in another major change: de-industrialization. 
The problem was a modification of job patterns.  
Automation was the single most influential factor in the de-industrialization 
of the American economy in the Fifties. Automation increased outputs and 
reduced labor cost, that is, reduced the number of workers. A closer 
investigation into the period following World War II reveals that 
manufacturing employment achieved its peak in the early 1950s, only to drop 
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rapidly from that point on, back down to pre-war levels by the end of the 
next decade. The American work force changed significantly in the post-
World War II period. During the 1950s, the number of workers providing 
services grew until it equaled and then surpassed the number who produced 
goods. It became fashionable to propose the advent of some sort of post-
industrial society, where corporations were depending less on manual labor 
and more on service and office-based workers. By 1956, a majority of U.S. 
workers held white-collar rather than blue-collar jobs. However, “white-
collar” was a vague description, not a standard definition. Among a total of 
27.2 million “white-collar” workers in 1960, 14.4 million were not 
professional or managerial workers, but were rather clerical staff and 
employees involved in sales. At the same time, blue-collar workers remained 
central to the economy of the 1950s, and only in the 1960s did the shift away 
from manufacturing jobs become evident. In fact, while the percentage of 
people defined by occupation as manual laborers declined over time, the raw 
number of laborers continued to increase, from 23.7 million in 1950, to 25.6 
million in 1960, to 29.1 million in 1970.92 While American jobs migrated away 
from manufacturing in urban centers, the industrial boom of the early 
twentieth century came to an end and, with it, the promise of high-paying 
jobs for unskilled laborers that had boosted urban population. Only a few 
decades earlier, millions of immigrants from Europe had benefited from the 
availability of unskilled, heavy-lifting jobs in the booming steel, railroads and 
mining industries. The early impact of automation (or cybernation) caused 
the decline of manufacturing employment and created a new job crisis for 
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workers without advanced education or vocational training. The decline of 
manufacturing employment by the late fifties and early sixties created a sense 
of desperation in urban black communities, and created an urgent need  for 
some sort of economic relief. Blacks moved to major urban centers at the 
same time when whites were moving out of the cities to the suburbs. “There 
is an irony in this for the Negro,” noted a Chicago Urban League forum 
speaker, years later: “He may be winning the right to get a job just the time 
when the job itself is disappearing.”93 In other words, work integration was 
coming at edge together with another important economic trend: 
deindustrialization.  
Black workers were regularly and consistently excluded from good jobs. 
When African Americans were employed, they were rarely in secure, 
remunerative jobs. When employed, black workers were employed in 
unskilled industrial and service activities, while white employers maintained a 
monopoly in sales, management and professional jobs. In the fifties, it was 
rare to see black professionals, black white-collars workers, or even skilled 
black blue-collars workers. In 1950, only 2.2 percent of black men and 5.7 
percent of black women worked as professionals, and nearly all of them were 
in black-owned businesses.94 African Americans were regularly assigned to 
less desirable job categories such as maid, cook and porter. Managers refused 
to hire blacks in sales and clerical positions because it often involved contact 
with – and inevitably the reaction of – white clientele, and white co-workers. 
For African Americans, it was a humiliating experience as well as a practical 
barrier to better jobs. To avoid what Herbert Hill, the labor director of 
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the NAACP, envisioned as “a permanent black underclass,” a group in 
“permanent unemployment” or underemployed, the solution was fair 
employment mandated by federal legislation designed to eliminate workplace 
discrimination, promote a better level of inclusion in the workplace, and 
offer equality of opportunity to black individuals. 
In the moderate, mainstream America of the fifties, black leaders resurrected 
alliances of Civil Rights organizations and labor unions initially created in the 
previous decade. Once again, the strategy was to build an alternative to the 
legal actions against state laws barring employment discrimination proposed 
by the NAACP, and apply pressure on the federal government to create 
legislation or Presidential Executive Orders designed to support this 
approach. In 1952, the CIO was instrumental in the creation of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) – an organization founded by 
A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy 
Wilkins of the NAACP; and Arnold Aronson, a leader of the National Jewish 
Community Relations Advisory Council, to promote equal opportunity and 
social justice in America. However, after its merger with the AFL in 1955, the 
CIO’s interest in black workers declined. Labor unions and the Civil Rights 
Movement did not always act in sync, and their alliance was marked by 
complexity and impermanency. For example, in 1957, Dr. King pointed out 
that “organized labor can be one of the most powerful instrument[s]” to 
achieve racial equality, only to note in 1961, the “weaknesses of our 
relationship” with labor unions. NALC leadership believed in union activism, 
and the NAACP stressed legal challenges and urged government to use its 
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power to promote and pursue equality of opportunity. In 1960, seventy-five 
black trade unions established the Negro American Labor Council (NALC), 
led by A. Philip Randolph. He invited the members of NALC to engage in 
practical actions to repair “the crisis of confidence between the Negro 
community and the labor community.”95 By 1960, the LCCR – the 
organization founded by Randolph, Wilkins, and Aronson, with the support 
of the CIO, represented more than 75 organizations and was the center of a 
potential labor–Civil Rights coalition capable of lobbying for a Civil Rights 
bill and promoting a social democratic agenda. In 1961, Randolph built 
another coalition of trade unions and Civil Rights leaders including  Percy 
Sutton, Louis Micheaux and the Nation of Islam minister, Malcolm X, to 
demand equal job opportunities.96  
In the early 1960s, Randolph’s strategy seemed on the verge of paying off 
dramatically. With the election of John F. Kennedy and the Democratic 
takeover of Congress in 1960, political momentum for Congressional 
legislation seemed at hand, and the futility of the action against state laws 
barring employment discrimination proposed by the NAACP and AFL-CIO 
seemed to be crystal clear.97 Moreover, economic growth looked relentless, 
fueling the most ambitious plans for race realignment and ubiquitous 
prosperity.  
In March 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10925 to 
create a Presidential Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. 
Kennedy’s order was based on precedents that included President 
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Roosevelt’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice and President 
Eisenhower’s Committee in Government Employment Policy, chaired by 
Vice President Nixon. Consequently, Vice President Johnson was asked to 
chair the newly established Committee. He privately advised Kennedy that 
the Eisenhower administration’s non-discrimination clause for governmental 
contractors should “be revised to impose not merely the negative obligation 
of avoiding discrimination but the affirmative duty to employ applicants.”98 
The term affirmative action resonated in the lexicon of the Civil Rights 
Movement in early 1960s, allied as was to phrases like positive effort and 
affirmative program. In fact, it was adopted for the very first time by Hobart 
Taylor, Jr., a young black lawyer from Houston, in a draft of this order 
written for Lyndon Johnson. However, under the language of Executive 
Order No. 10925, affirmative action did not mean compensatory actions or 
special  treatment of particular groups. It only meant positive action against 
race discrimination.99  
The CEEO surged to political prominence in the aftermath of the campaign 
in Birmingham, Alabama. In May 1963, the Justice Department figures 
counted 1,412 different demonstrations, nearly 800 boycotts, marches, and 
sit-ins in some 200 cities and town in the South.100 Major examples were the 
demonstrations for construction jobs promoted by NAACP branches in 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Newark, New York, and Pittsburgh. The NAACP 
protested against job discrimination in construction sites and building 
trades.101 In April and May of 1963, protests in Birmingham, Alabama, 
incited a brutal police reaction, which encouraged the Kennedy 
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administration to engage more deeply with Civil Rights issues. The attorney 
general, Robert Kennedy, sent Burke Marshall, his assistant attorney general 
for Civil Rights, to Birmingham to survey the situation. He complained that 
he did not find black employees in the federal offices in the city. On May 29, 
1963, when the CEEO met, Kennedy also acknowledged that only 15 out of 
2,000 federal employees in Birmingham were black, 1 percent in a city that 
was 37 percent black. On the same occasion, the attorney general protested 
that, with $3.5 billion in contracts, NASA had only two people working on 
equal employment. President Kennedy decided to expand the CEEO’s 
jurisdiction and include not only government contracts but also highway and 
other programs which were entitled to receive a portion of federal funds.102 
On June 11, President Kennedy called the Civil Rights bill a priority. “We 
face a moral crisis,” he told the nation in June 1963, “it is time to act in 
Congress.”103 His bill did not include a number of provisions deemed 
essential by Civil Rights leaders, such as ending discrimination in private 
employment, granting the Justice Department power to initiate desegregation 
or job discrimination lawsuits, and an FEPC provision.  
In the summer of 1963, a string of protests that included thousands of 
protesters in months-long campaigns to provide jobs to blacks, including 
organizations not involved in the Birmingham events such as NAACP and 
CORE, began advocating for full and nondiscriminatory employment and 
the vital right to earn money.104 The national business press took note. 
Fortune magazine predicted that “the problem of race relations may become a 
major – at times the major preoccupation of top management for a number 
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of years to come.” Business Week pointed out that businesspeople might 
recognize the increasing pressure applied by individuals and organizations for 
more jobs and better jobs for blacks. It added that the campaign was 
“comparable to the American worker’s drive to unionize as the turn of the 
century.”105 Many businesses decided that temperance and accommodation 
would have been a better option than disorder and turbulence. The case of 
Birmingham, in which corporate leaders tried to convince local governments 
to negotiate peacefully their difference with Civil Rights leaders, became a 
benchmark.106  
While the attempts to prevent boycotts and avoid retaliation by the black 
customers was a main cause for the small, local white-owned businesses to 
embrace “appeasement” (a diplomatic policy aimed at avoiding conflict by 
making concessions to an aggressor), a more genuine interest in racial 
integration in the corporate world was the explicit scope of executives and 
businesspeople in the same period. As pressure from Civil Rights 
organizations and the federal government increased in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, executives at the largest corporations began integrating their 
organization. They proclaimed that they were not responding to the pressure 
of Civil Rights activists, or to the incoming legislation of the federal 
government and the enforcing actions of its agencies, or “by the desire to be 
well-regarded,” but – according to historian Delton - rather as a moral 
obligation to do the right thing.107 More realistically, executives were claiming 
alignment to the philosophy of racial integration in the workplace, while 
performing fair employment free from the constraints of 
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government coercion, and ultimately maintaining control of their 
organizations.  
During the first half of the decade, a main concern for Civil Rights 
organizations was their relationship with the federal government, which 
increasingly revolved around racial issues. While most of these organizations 
considered it crucial to have access to the presidency and executive power, 
but some of them preferred to assume a more detached posture, deciding on 
a case by case basis if partnering with the federal was the best option in a 
particular situation. For example, the NACCP’s leader, Roy Wilkins, strongly 
believed that the federal government was an indispensable element of the 
civil rights project because it was responsible for the enforcement of fair 
employment practices legislation. The S.C.L.C. leader, Dr. King, assumed the 
position of non-alignment with the government, so that he could look at the 
federal government’s policies with a certain amount of distance, and be able 
to endorse governmental policies as he saw fit. Because the S.C.L.C. was 
perceived as largely responsible for the success of the Civil Right movement, 
or at least for the tone and direction of its campaigns, King’s strategy of non-
alignment with the federal government would greatly affect the whole 
movement.  
This ambivalent approach confused the relationship of Civil Rights groups 
with the federal government, especially regarding workplace integration 
issues. In December 1962, A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin had the 
idea to plan a march on Washington for economic justice, centered on 
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demands for an increased minimum wage and the passage of fair 
employment legislation. CORE, S.C.L.C. and other Civil Rights organizations 
approved the project, others such as NAACP and National Urban League 
did not. The idea received more traction when it was associated with the 
motto, “Jobs and Freedom,” that had the power to unify the Northern wing 
of the movement, which focused on employment, and the Southern wing, 
which prioritized desegregation. In the summer of 1963, the United Auto 
Workers president Walter Reuther joined Randolph and Rustin as the 
organizers of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.108 Departing 
from the “neutrality” of most other unions, the UAW actively involved itself 
in the organization of the event and proclaimed that “Civil Rights Plus Full 
Employment Equals Freedom.” On August 28, more than a quarter of a 
million Americans gathered in the nation’s capital to demand passage of the 
Civil Rights bill that was then pending in Congress, adoption of a $2-an-hour 
federal minimum wage, and amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, so 
that agricultural and domestic workers—the vast majority of them were 
black—would be included in the law’s wage and workplace protections. The 
march reflected Civil Rights advocates’ concern for economic justice as well 
as social equality and their awareness, in Reuther’s words, that “without a job 
and a paycheck,” triumph over Jim Crow would be “a largely abstract and 
empty victory.”109 It also represented the UAW conviction that the black 
freedom struggle could provide the kind of mass mobilization required to 
forge an enduring realignment in American politics. The Civil Rights 
Movement promised to deliver black votes that were needed to break the 
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hold of white supremacy in the South. The final goal was to undermine the 
alliance of conservative Republicans and segregationist southern Democrats 
that had frustrated efforts at reorganizing the nation’s economy and 
redistributing its abundance.110  The historic march on Washington on 
August 28, 1963 – nearly a quarter of a million attended the event – was a 
dramatic effort to influence Congress, when it seemed that a large coalition 
of Civil Rights activists, labor unions, and religious leaders was on the verge 
of successfully lobbying for full and fair employment.111  
The vision of full employment would eventually affect the view of Civil 
Rights leaders like King and other black leaders that focused their attention 
on the economic problems of working-class and unemployed African 
Americans. In fact, the economic growth and the rising expectation of 
economic justice in the 1960s instigated a profound shift in American culture 
that acted to promote workplace integration as never before. As a practical 
solution to job discrimination, Civil Rights leaders envisioned a mix of 
policies of fair employment and full employment, that is, a reformed and expanded 
role of government to promote the restructuring of the operation of 
American society – in the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., “a restructuring 
of the architecture of American society” – in order to provide a higher level 
of economic justice.112 Rather than “compensatory treatment,” Randolph 
argued that “special and preferential treatment, in the form of preparation in 
training and education to enable it (Negro labor) effectively to move 
forward.” The point also resonated with the New York Commission on 
Human Rights that included the option of “preferential treatment” of 
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“qualified” blacks “for a limited period.”113 An editor of Fortune magazine, 
Charles E. Silberman, considered it, “Inevitable in 1963 that Negro 
organizations would use their power to increase job opportunities for 
Negroes. Indeed, Negroes are not content with equal opportunity anymore; 
they are demanding preference, or ‘positive discrimination’ in their favor.”114 
He was right. The statement that detailed the compromise that ended 
protests in Birmingham (‘‘The Birmingham Truce Agreement,’’ 10 May 1963) 
explicitly mentioned an ongoing ‘‘program of upgrading Negro 
employment,’’ which meant awarding set numbers of jobs to eligible black 
applicants.115 
In 1963, the idea that some sort of “affirmative action” might be 
implemented was elaborated on by Civil Rights and labor leaders. In his book 
Why We Can’t Wait, King pointed out:  
The nation must not only radically readjust its attitude toward 
[African Americans] in the compelling present, but must 
incorporate in its planning some compensatory consideration 
for the handicaps [African Americans have] inherited from 
the past. It is impossible to create a formula for the future, 
which does not take into account that our society has done 
something special against [African Americans] for hundreds 
of years. How then can [African Americans] be absorbed into 
the mainstream of American life if we do not do something 
special for [them] now, in order to balance the equation and 
equip [them] to compete on a just and equal basis? Whenever 
this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for 
[African Americans] is raised, some of our friends recoil in 
horror. [African Americans] should be granted equality, they 
agree; but [they] should ask nothing more. On the surface, 
this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For it is obvious 
that if a [person] entered at the starting line in a race three 
hundred years after another [person], the [latter] would have 
to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his 
fellow runner.116 
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Job discrimination was a part of a ubiquitous, systematic, devastating 
economic inequality. It started at home, where black children were trapped in 
segregated neighborhoods with high rates of illness, and poor medical care 
and  it continued at school, where black students were receiving education 
that was not as good as their white counterparts. Black students were denied 
access to advanced education and training, and ultimately marginalized from 
the intellectual milieu – in this regard, the National Urban League stressed 
“the damaging effects of generations of deprivation and denial” on blacks.117 
The main barrier to defeating economic inequality was the perception of 
whites that equality had been already achieved. As reported by historian 
MacLean, in 1963, half of Southern whites and 45 percent of Northern 
whites stated that blacks already had “as good a chance” as whites “to get any 
kind of job for which they are qualified.”118 Of course, blacks were never 
qualified enough. During a 1962 study of Atlanta employers, a manager made 
clear that sales and service office jobs were destined to whites, and another 
stated that blacks were suitable only for production jobs.119 A black-excluding 
job system was perpetuating itself and creating the false perception that it 
was the natural order of things. The complexity and the magnitude of the job 
discrimination phenomenon created space for more extensive remedies. 
Randolph proposed the investment of billions of federal funds to sustain “a 
nationwide drive for massive public works,” providing “fair employment and 
full employment.” This was the so-called “Freedom Budget,” a proposal for 
a massive, systematic attack on all the causes of poverty. It called on the 
federal government to spend $185 billion over a ten-year period in housing, 
77 
 
education, guaranteed annual income, expanded medical care and social 
insurance. Most importantly, the funds would be used to eliminate 
unemployment, create jobs that would engage the poor in rebuilding their 
own neighborhoods, in the construction of homes, schools, mass transit, and 
hospitals, and in creating useful, socially supportive jobs such as teachers’ 
aides. The Freedom Budget was backed by a coalition of Civil Rights leaders 
such as Bayard Rustin, Whitney Young, James Farmer, John Lewis, Row 
Wilkins, and Martin Luther King, Jr., along with an assortment of labor 
unions, white liberals, radicals, religious groups, and other ethnic minorities. 
At the same time, the National Urban League demanded a domestic Marshall 
Plan. What was needed to overcome the preferential system that had 
benefited whites for generations was a “special effort.” Whitney Young, the 
national director of the National Urban League, conceded that “the concept 
of special effort for Negro citizens may be difficult for the majority of white 
citizens to accept.”120  
The notion of “special effort” (or Freedom Budget, or Domestic Marshall 
Plan) gained consensus mostly because in the United States the post-World 
War II period was one of economic prosperity. It was a time of low 
unemployment, increasing consumerism, and a positive attitude about the 
future. It was a time of national optimism, great expectations, faith in 
progress and the American Dream. It was a time of grace: Americans had 
triumphed over the Great Depression, Fascism and Nazism, won the war 
against Japan, and become members of the healthiest, wealthiest and happiest 
country in the world. America, they believed, was inevitably destined to win 
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the Cold War. A long period of consistent economic growth in the United 
States began at the end of World War II and ended in the late 1960s.121 The 
nation’s gross national product (GNP) rose from about $200,000 million in 
1940 to $300,000 million in 1950 and to more than $500,000 million in 
1960.122 At one point, in the late 1940s, the American economy accounted 
for 57 percent of the world’s steel production, 62 percent of the oil and 80 
percent of the cars produced worldwide. The United States had three-fourths 
of the planet’s gold reserves.123 The GNP grew in the 1940s – especially in 
the first half of the decade – and by 1950 it had increased 56.3 percent for 
the 1940s as a whole.124 The Fifties were, in the words of historian Patterson, 
“an age of astonishing material affluence.”125 The GNP rose constantly 
during this period, and by 1960 it had increased 37 percent over the 1950s as 
a whole. By 1960, the average American family income was 30 percent higher 
in purchasing power than in 1950. An amazing 61.9 percent of homes were 
owner-occupied in 1960, compared to 43.6 percent in 1940 and 55 percent in 
1950. By 1960, nearly 80 percent of American families had at least one car, 
and 15 percent had two or more. There were then 73.8 million cars 
registered, as opposed to 39.3 million a decade earlier.126 The Eisenhower 
administration carefully monitored and managed inflation through fiscal 
restraints, while unemployment remained at a very low level, between 4.1 and 
4.4 percent between 1955 and 1957 (in the recession year of 1958, however, 
unemployment suddenly skyrocketed to 6.8 percent).127 This prosperity 
accelerated even more rapidly in the “golden age” of the 1960s, when per 
capita income increased by 41 percent over the decade. Prices remained 
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stable until the late 1960s and unemployment stayed quite low, falling to 3.5 
percent in 1969. Poverty, as measured by the government, declined from 22 
percent of the population in 1960 to 12 percent in 1969.128 Fundamental 
during the “golden age” to sustaining and securing continued economic 
growth was the tax cut proposed by John Kennedy in 1963, which was then 
passed early the following year by his successor. The 1964 tax cut was 
designed to stimulate production, not consumption, as happened in the 
1980s. It was intended to increase the GNP, the number of jobs, disposable 
personal and family income, and corporate profits. It worked. The GNP 
increased by more than 10 percent in 1965 and disposable personal income 
by 12 percent in the year following. By December 1965, the unemployment 
rate was 4.1 percent; a month later it fell to 3.9 percent.129  
The post-War War II economy was booming and full employment seemed at 
hand. New York Herald Tribune columnist, Walter Lippmann described, in a 
nutshell, his understanding of the post-scarcity economics in regards to the 
1960s:   
A generation ago it would have been taken for granted that a 
war on poverty meant taxing money away from the haves and 
turning it over to the have not’s … But in this generation a 
revolutionary idea has taken hold. The size of the pie can be 
increased by intention.130  
For the very first time in the history of the country, the possibility of 
expanding job opportunities for African Americans can happen at no 
consequences for white workers. While Lippmann was not speaking about 
jobs and employment specifically, in his article he clearly defined the 
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fundamental assumption that lies behind the right of any American citizen to 
access jobs, and the transformation of American society from one of 
“have’s” and “have not’s” to one where the “have not’s” simply disappear. 
The equation appeared to have validity due to the previous quarter-century 
of extraordinary economic growth. Unlimited economic growth gave hope 
that the traditional Aristotelian notion of transfer of wealth from the 
“have’s” to the “have not’s” had simply been replaced with economic 
expansion in which “have not’s” become “have’s” without a transfer of 
wealth. Ultimately, the purpose of this economic growth was a society of 
“have’s” only, which was capable of providing access to full employment for 
all Americans.    
Despite the country’s amazing economic growth, the huge divide between 
the economic growth of the country and the stagnant level of employment of 
Black America remained a reality. While the economic cycle embraced the 
most extraordinary period of growth in the history of mankind, the disparity 
between the level of employment of white individuals and black individuals 
remained huge. African Americans continued to suffer from a high rate of 
unemployment despite the economic prosperity, and American people 
showed an increasing confidence in the government’s political solutions to 
economic problems. Since the Great Depression, the federal government had 
been actively involved in handling the economy, during the New Deal 
through a regulated form of capitalism, then – inspired by economist John 
Maynard Keynes – through a managerial government. With regard to this 
approach, Alan Brinkley has noted that:  
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In its pursuit of full employment, the government would not 
seek to regulate corporate institutions so much as it would try 
to influence the business cycle. It would not try to 
redistribute economic power and limit inequality so much as 
it would create a compensatory welfare system (what later 
generations would call a “safety net”) for those whom 
capitalism had failed. It would not reshape capitalist 
institutions. It would reshape the economic and social 
environment in which those institutions worked.131 
Brinkley explains how the federal government carefully moved from a 
regulatory strategy to  compensatory policy. For at least three generations of 
Americans, government direction of U.S. capitalism came to seem like 
common sense. They agreed that unemployment was not as an act of nature, 
but something that the government could prevent. There was a sincere belief 
that the high rate of unemployment during the Great Depression was a 
nightmare of the past. Politicians were expected to create full employment. 
According to the economic philosophy of the era, the federal government 
had the responsibility to make a substantial effort to close the massive gap 
between blacks and whites’ levels of employment. Full employment backed 
by the government was essential in pursuit of economic equality.132 
The vision of full employment backed by the government that labor union 
and Civil Right leaders shared in the first part of the Sixties did not survive 
1965. The same can be said of the social programs of the Great Society, the 
title of a 1919 book penned by social psychologist Graham Wallis that later 
became the hallmark of president Johnson’s commitment to the notion of 
government action to end racial discrimination, guarantee equal 
opportunities, and aid the disadvantaged. At the beginning of that year, the 
United States seemed on the cusp of an economic golden age. By the end of 
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1965, the U.S. economy was in a state of inflation; that is, industrial 
capitalists were unable to expand production without undertaking major 
capital investments that would expand industry’s physical ability to produce. 
As the American economy was slowing due to the escalating costs of the war 
in Vietnam and the social reforms of the Great Society, further expansion of 
government-driven employment was simply improbable. The level of 
economic growth was not enough to sustain the domestic programs 
envisioned by the Great Society coupled with the increasing expense of 
funding a foreign conflict in Vietnam. The Great Society ran out of fuel as 
the government ran out of funds, creating a federal deficit that contributed 
significantly to rising inflation and interest rates. President Johnson had 
declined the option to increase taxes and the result was an increase of 4.5 
percent in consumer prices, followed by a policy of price stability. In 1966, 
the Johnson administration was forced to divert funds from welfare to 
warfare, and the decision was made to cut all federal expenditures on 
structures and equipment. In 1967, there were clear signals of an economic 
downturn, “slowdown in capital investment, less residential construction, flat 
industrial production, disappointing retail sales and lower corporate 
profits.”133 Johnson could not help but propose a temporary 6 percent 
surcharge on corporate and individual income taxes, as well as proposing a 
restoration of the 7 percent investment tax credit, give these circumstances. 
These decisions were not only unpopular, more importantly, they failed to 
restore public confidence, reduce inflation, and balance the federal budget. 
Soon, the economy entered into the so-called mini-recession of 1966-67. 
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This was only the beginning of a spectacular, unpredictable change in the 
economic cycle. A confused and at times violent debate about whether to 
concentrate the economic resources of the federal government on pursuing 
social justice or on foreign military policy became common during this 
period. King sided against funding the Vietnam War. He famously predicted 
that “the bombs that [Americans] are dropping in Vietnam will explode at 
home in inflation and unemployment.”134 His prediction was correct, 
however, inflation and unemployment were not only the consequences of the 
war. While American capitalism was in a middle of an epochal shift, from an 
industrial economy to financial capitalism, attention and interest was diverted 
from employment and labor. By the end of 1965, an inflationary cycle was 
beginning to redefine the economic scene, marking the birth of the 
tumultuous era now known as “financialization.” Since a major element of 
financialization was consumer credit (especially credit cards, the use of which 
began to grow rapidly in the late 1960s), access to credit became a major 
concern for some Civil Rights leaders.135 While the extension of credit was 
mostly driven by the Civil Rights movement that portrayed consumer credit 
as a basic right that should be applied as broadly as possible, the federal 
government expanded its own visions of the Great Society, and planned to 
extend its programs to include the mortgage industry. In the light of this 
reality, it is clear that the most distressing effect of rising inflation during this 
period was the threat to the serenity and security of the mortgage-paying 
middle class. While annual consumer credit for housing and cars escalated, in 
1966 the Federal Reserve Board moved to tighten credit. Credit became 
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unavailable or it was available only at extravagant interest rates, and the U.S. 
economy experienced a credit-crunch—a situation where the demand for 
credit exceeds the supply.  
Despite being unrealistic in practice, the vision of full employment would 
eventually affect the view of Civil Rights leaders who looked at the economic 
problems of working-class and unemployed African Americans. These 
unrealistic expectations would provoke frustration that would end in general 
dissatisfaction and promote a surge of radicalism. The mark of partial failure 
was the result of unmatched expectations, the swing of long term economic 
cycles, and the emergence of a deepening ambivalence of the American 
public toward national politics. The federal government faced increasing 
criticism from the American people, who would become less inclined to pay 
taxes, and allow the investments that welfare required. Ultimately, the rise of 
modern conservatism fragmented the already fragile coalition between labor 
unions and Civil Rights, and transformed the role of government. Over time, 
a conservative coalition inside and outside Congress opposed and weakened 
fair employment legislation and its effects, while labor unions faced declining 
influence in the political realm. Historian Chen points out that problems 
between unions and Civil Rights organizations also emerged due to “a 
debilitating surge of antiradicalism among labor liberals” and “the decline of 
interracial unionism.”136 When Civil Rights leaders and religious leaders tried 
to open up the building trades to black workers, the unions did not 
commit.137 In the North, the target was the construction industry, a bastion 
of racial exclusion. Construction was worth more than $100 billion in 
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revenues, paid the nation’s highest wages for blue-collar work, and depended 
extensively on government funds. Moreover, big construction projects 
tended to be in urban locations rather than in the newly suburbanized 
manufacturing areas. However, here the unions were part of the problem, 
not the solution. In St. Louis, as in other cities, black leaders turned 
increasingly to the government, and not to labor unions, for help. Chen 
argues that “Gradual acquiescence ... to a two-party political system” 
weakened the connection of blacks with the unions and Civil Rights 
organizations, while “the systematic purge of Left-led unions from the CIO 
and the subsequent would weaken and disempowering the practical effects of 
the fair employment legislation issued in 1964.”138 
Indeed, the most valuable result of the Civil Rights Movement, the Civil 
Rights Act (technically, the Mansfield-Dicksen-Humphrey-Kuchel 
amendment), approved in 1964, was at stake. It stated in Title VII the 
principle of equality of opportunity in employment, and made explicitly clear 
that employers were not obliged to redress racial imbalances caused by past 
discriminatory practices. The general counsel of the Congress on Racial 
Equality (CORE), Carl Rachlin, explained that in Title VII “preferential 
treatment to right past wrong is not required.”139 Title VII also created the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to replace a similar 
commission created by executive order under President Kennedy and chaired 
by then-Vice President Johnson. During the Senate debate, Republican Sen. 
Everett Dirksen endorsed the creation of an EEOC, in order to limit the 
action of the Justice Department, and made sure that the federal government 
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was called in only if  local agencies proved themselves unable to handle job 
discrimination complaints. Congress also stripped out of this section the 
authority of the EEOC to file suit on its own behalf (a power gained in 1972) 
and issue “cease and desist” orders. This forced individuals to go to court to 
defend their rights in instances where discriminatory behavior persisted.140 
Basically, as Herbert Hill argued, “Title VII is not self-enforcing.” And yet, 
Title VII provided the right to sue for fair treatment.  
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the creation of the EEOC and 
the related Secretary of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance (OFCC), an epic shift occurred, as they helped to recognize 
inequality, and provided mechanisms for correcting it. In fact, Title VII had 
awarded blacks the right to sue for fair job employment, and EEOC and 
OFCC had encouraging workers to apply for jobs, and supported them in 
case of resistance. Lawsuits became a concrete threat for corporate 
executives, together with boycotts and other acts of protest. Activists in the 
South organized black consumers to stop shopping in downtown stores until 
they hired black cashiers and workers. However, despite its historical 
importance and the practical results achieved in the integration of the 
workplace, Title VII was rapidly succeeded by affirmation action, another 
policy promoted by the federal government.  
Affirmative Action and Rise of Conservative Business 
Although unions and Civil Rights organizations were the first to articulate a 
tentative concept of affirmative action as preferential treatment, its 
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emergence has more to do – although unintentionally – with the conservative 
coalition inside and outside of Congress opposing and weakening fair 
employment legislation. The origins of affirmative action policies in 
employment were reinterpreted by historian Anthony Chen.141 The 
remarkable affluence of the 1960s created a social context of ever greater 
expectations. Millions of middle-class Americans already enjoyed rising level 
of prosperity in the 1950s. And yet, trapped as they were by a vision of 
inevitable economic progress, they came to expect, in the 1960s, an even 
more comfortable life and professional success, “that featured high-speed air 
travel, credit card transactions, and generous expense accounts.”142 People, 
who had enjoyed the spectacular economic boom of the 1950s, were 
nevertheless ready by the 1960s, to look at the previous decade as only 
partially satisfactory. An unprecedented faith in social and technological 
progress, the same progress that was occurring in the employment of African 
Americans in urban Northern America, allowed Americans to increase their 
expectations. Americans came to consider it a right to be a part of the 
affluent society. As never before in human history, Americans felt that there 
were no limits to personal gratification, social advancement, and economic 
prosperity. Economic growth and affluence, it was thought at the time, 
would work to  further erode the economic, racial and religious divisions in 
American society. This thought was shared and sustained by the Johnson 
administration and the Great Society programs.  
During the economically successful years of the mid-1960s, despite apparent 
progress, government compliance committees, and grassroots activism, 
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corporate obstruction was growing. Government enforcement was notably 
feeble during this period, and consensus among liberal intellectuals persisted 
that fair employment and equal opportunity legislation and practices could be 
pursued with moderation. In order to avoid a backlash by political 
conservatives, a political and economic bloc of corporate business, small-
government intellectuals and conservative Republicans resisted creation of 
legislation aimed at controlling the workplace. They challenged the idea of a 
centralized, federal government driven-system for enforcing fair employment 
and equal treatment in the workplace.143 After the frustrating years of the 
Great Depression, they thought the time had come to restore confidence in 
the markets and the private sector. They intended to liberate markets from 
government control, and maintain economic inequality as a natural, inevitable 
effect of capitalism.  
Well before the spread of market values in the 1970s, an intellectual 
counterrevolution had taken place in the 1950s. Decades before the phrases 
“free market economy” and “free enterprise” entered popular parlance, 
hundreds of legislators, businesspeople, and executives – mostly business-
friendly conservatives – made it a common cause to promote an economic 
system that provided individuals the opportunity to make their own 
economic decisions free of government constraints, for the sake of private 
profit. Resurgent business hegemony took place in the country after the end 
of World War II. The Republican Party and the business community fought 
to block or reverse expansion of the New Deal and the corporate privileges 
they had lost during the Depression years. They intended to re-establish 
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managerial autonomy and corporate political hegemony in the workplace. 
The primary belief of the pro-business conservative movement was that the 
market, not the government, was the center of gravity of American 
capitalism.  
Roosevelt’s sudden death and the war’s end in 1945 left the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee, established with Executive Order No. 
8802, in limbo. Between 1946 and 1948, a confusing legislative debate 
occurred around the permanence of the FEPC. Congress was split over how 
best to address the issue and debated whether to extend the FEPC for a few 
years, make it a permanent commission, or to not renew its charter. Congress 
never enacted FEPC into law and ultimately the FEPC died in 1946, while 
two further bills calling for a permanent FEPC also failed. In February 1948, 
President Harry Truman submitted a Civil Rights package to Congress, 
including a permanent FEPC, and also proposed the creation of several 
federal offices devoted to issues such as fair employment practices and 
voting rights. Instead of addressing Civil Rights on a case-by-case basis, 
Truman wanted to address Civil Rights on a national level. This provoked a 
storm of criticism from Southern Democrats, and after the elections of 1948 
Truman declined to press Congress to enact Civil Rights legislation.144 In 
1948, President Truman called again for a permanent FEPC and the 
conservative coalition in a Democratic-controlled Congress prevented it.145 
Frustrated by the uselessness of the state laws barring employment 
discrimination, the NAACP pressed the government to take executive action 
to deny federal contracts to employers who discriminated, based on the 
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precedent of Executive Order No. 8802 and the FEPC. This was a 
reasonable political target because in cases related to federal contracts, 
private property rights could not be raised The legal system defined the rules 
of the industrial order, and so employers understood their freedom of 
contract as an extension of the nation’s founding commitment to the rights 
of property. This understanding of private property rights was directly 
challenged by the request for fair employment and equal access to jobs.146 
Federal contracts were a big political target also because they involved nearly 
a third of the country’s business. Harry Truman embraced the cause and in 
1950 the House would approve a permanent FEPC bill. However, southern 
senators filibustered and the bill failed. Five states enacted and enforced their 
own FEPC laws: New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut and 
Washington. Finally, in late 1951, Truman established the President’s 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO). Despite these 
achievements, corporations mainly ignored appeals for change, and the 
PCEEO did nothing to enforce them. Few corporations voluntarily adopted 
fairer employment practices. At the core of this disagreement was the 
rejection of the federal government’s ability to influence in the economy, 
which executives saw as undermining, rather than serving, the public interest. 
The belief was that individualistic executives were better able, than 
bureaucrats and politicians to build more efficient businesses and liberate 
human creativity while doing so. At the top of these executives’ agenda, 
along with the preservation of their managerial autonomy from meddling by 
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fair employment practices legislation, was attacking the influence of labor 
unions in the marketplace.  
In 1947, Republicans gained a majority in both chambers of Congress and 
passed the landmark Taft–Hartley Act, a response by the business 
community to the post-World War II labor upsurge of 1946. The Taft–
Hartley Act was seen as a means of demobilizing the labor movement by 
imposing limits on labor’s ability to strike and boycott, and by 
prohibiting radicals (socialists, communists, and left wing radicals in 
general) from joining the leadership of labor unions. Following World War 
II and the rise of the Soviet Union, many Americans feared that Communism 
would triumph throughout the entire world and eventually become a direct 
threat to the U.S. government. The Cold War put labor on the defensive. 
The rising concern about communism turned out to be a liability for labor 
radicalism. Radical unions’ leaders came under attack, and became 
increasingly vulnerable to accusations of anti-patriotism. By 1952, the 
Republican Party had control of the presidency as well as both houses of 
Congress. As economic historian Philips-Fein points out, “For the first time 
in twenty years, friends of business dominated government in 
Washington.”147 The effects of this shift in Washington would become 
evident in the following years. Increasingly anxious to protect labor unions 
from federal investigation, and to detach themselves from the accusation of 
acting as agents of a foreign state, leaders of the CIO pushed out radical 
members who might pose a threat under the current political climate. Driven 
by the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the CIO distanced itself from 
92 
 
communists, purged its ranks, and expelled more than 1 million members. In 
1955, the more progressive CIO merged with its longtime rival, the AFL, 
into the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), a coalition of autonomous labor unions in the 
United States. While the AFL was founded by socialists, it later adopted a 
more conservative philosophy of “business unionism” that emphasized 
unions’ contribution to businesses’ profits and to national economic growth. 
The business unionist approach also focused on skilled workers’ immediate 
job-related interests, while ignoring larger political issues. Both the AFL and 
CIO regarded the Eisenhower administration as essentially antagonistic to 
the interests of organized labor. 
During the McCarthy era, the idea of economic equality became synonymous 
with disloyalty, subversion or treason. Radicals and activists on the political 
left tried to expand social and economic citizenship into new areas of 
American society. New segments of the nation were accused of being 
communists or communist sympathizers, involved in anti-American 
activities.148 During the Eisenhower Administration, the Senate created the 
Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management (also 
known as the McClellan Committee), and directed it to study the extent of 
criminal or other improper practices within labor unions. The McClellan 
Committee was also instrumental in the issuing of the Landrum-Griffin Act 
in 1959, that was designed to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions’.  
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Labor unions achieved their peak in the mid-1950s – when they represented 
about one fourth of all workers – and then they fell into a slow but 
irreversible decline of political and social power.149 The decline happened 
despite the fact that almost two and a half times more Americans joined the 
labor force between 1965 and 1980 than between 1950 and 1965.150 Labor 
unions that partnered with the Civil Rights organizations in late 1950s and 
early 1960s were already in decline, and were under attack for communist 
penetration, under pressure over union leadership corruption allegations, and 
facing a decline in number of members and political influence. Several forces 
drove labor unions toward this end, among them the increasing percentage 
of white-collar workers, who were less interested than manufacturing 
workers in joining the unions. Although a few unions that represented retail 
clerks, service employees, and communication workers expanded in the 
1960s, most did not.151 In addition, many employers moved away from the 
more unionized Northeast and Midwest to the non-union South and the less 
unionized West.152 Since the 1950s, labor leaders had been showing little 
interest in representing unskilled and semi-skilled workers, mobilizing low-
paid workers, or advancing unions in the South.153   
American executives’ efforts to limit unions ran second only to their dislike 
for antidiscrimination legislation. They claimed such legislation was an 
intolerable intrusion into the traditional prerogatives of management over 
hiring, promoting and firing, as well as a direct attack on the authority of 
corporate executives. They claimed it was a violation of one of the most 
protected values of American capitalism, the notion of merit and business as 
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a meritocracy.154 According to this notion, the workplace is a color-blind 
institution. People succeed or fail, are promoted or fired; move up or out, 
according to the principles of scientific management, a rational technique for 
efficiency. The labor scholar, David Roediger, who researches the 
relationship between labor management and the formation of racial identities 
in the United States, holds the opposite view. Despite the claims of merit as 
an indisputable value, the history of management in the United States has 
been an uninterrupted attempt by management to control the workers. 
Managers explicitly ranked racial groups, both in terms of which type of 
labor they were best suited for, and in terms of their relative value compared 
to others. White executives relied on such alleged racial knowledge to 
manage workers, and believed that the “lesser races” could only benefit from 
their tutelage. These views were woven into managerial strategies and 
promoted white supremacy, not only ideologically but also in practical 
everyday processes used in many workplaces. Even in factories governed by 
scientific management, the impulse to play the races against each other, and 
to slot workers into jobs categorized by race, were powerful management 
tools used to enforce discipline, lower wages, keep workers in dangerous 
jobs, and undermine working-class solidarity.155 The myth of merit at work 
has never had any substantial foundation; it simply serves to allow executives 
and businesspeople to maintain control of the workplace.  
Despite labor unions’ focus on establishing job rights protected by contracts, 
the efforts of the federal government and the Civil Rights organizations to 
end the monopoly of whites on managerial roles, and the exclusion of 
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African American workers from better jobs, there was a final, epic challenge 
to employers’ authority, and to their power to hire and promote according to 
internal, corporate criteria. The history of the slow and imperfect reception 
of Title VII in labor management remains a testament of the strength and 
stubbornness of corporate executives in defending their prerogatives.  
How affirmative action became the landmark integration policy of the era, 
rather than fair employment practices legislation, is a remarkable example of 
unintended consequences. Interests converged between the federal 
government and Civil Rights groups during the Johnson Administration, in 
spite of the ideological and moral distance between the liberalism of the time 
and the marginal reactionary forces of the conservative movement. This is 
only part of the story;  the distance between liberals and conservatives, as far 
as the governance of capitalism is concerned, was probably shorter than the 
distance between liberals and Civil Rights leaders, as the events in post-1965 
confirm. It was true that liberals aimed to support and protect consumers 
and promote mass consumption, while conservatives believed in 
safeguarding producers and encouraging savings. They strongly, vibrantly and 
at times virulently disagreed with each other on the nature and the moral 
foundations of compensatory measures. Surprisingly, they did not disagree 
on a crucial fact - that America may be a land of equal opportunity, but surely 
not of equal result. The latter would be, to use a catch phrase of that period, 
“socialism” or worse. Liberals like President Johnson never really agreed with 
civil rights leaders, such as King, on the fact that capitalism was wrong, and 
the problems of poverty and minority unemployment might be solved – in 
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Kind’s words - with “public service employment for those less able to 
compete in the labor market” and income guarantees for those unable to 
“participate in the job economy.”156 What King was envisioning was an 
equality of outputs. In contrast, liberals strongly believed that capitalism was 
fundamentally sound and only in need of specific reforms and adjustments in 
order to provide opportunity to everyone. According to scholar Patterson, 
The essence of Great Society liberalism was that government 
had the tools and the resources to help people help 
themselves. It sought to advance equality of opportunity, not 
to establish greater equality of social condition.157  
The system was in place to provide opportunity, and therefore, the right to 
work was meant to be the right to have the same opportunity as anyone else 
to be hired, promoted, and obtain a better salary. In other words, there was a 
vast consensus on what constituted equality in the 1960s. However, for the 
large majority of the politicians and businesspeople – both conservative and 
liberal – this meant equality of opportunities not equality of outcome. This is 
not to say that conservatives and liberals shared the same values, but rather 
that they emphasized different expressions of the basic tension in the 
American system between the constitutional guarantees of liberty and 
equality. Though equal under the law, Americans were conspicuously unequal 
in many other ways, the most obvious being inequality of income. According 
to Judith Shklar, a political philosopher, income is – together with voting – 
one of the twin pillars of American citizenship.158 Consequently, work was 
the main road to a better life, including more social options, better benefits, 
and more economic security. It was also the gateway to the American dream, 
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that is, the belief that those who work hard and honestly, whatever their 
status, could provide themselves with a better future, and increase the 
prospects of their children. Capitalism was not supposed to reduce the gap 
between the “have’s” and the “have not’s” because this gap reflects 
differences in effort and innate skill – according to conservatives – or 
different advantages and disadvantages of birth – according to liberals. 
Nobody was supposed to correct this gap, according to conservatives; 
government was eventually supposed to do so, according to liberals. A 
crucial premise of liberalism, in fact, was that Americans did not all start at 
more or less the same place, and therefore, do not share the same 
opportunities to succeed in life. In other words, not everyone has the same 
chance to succeed, that is, to get a job, to be promoted, to increase his or her 
salary. Not everyone fails on his or her own merits. This leads to various 
forms of economic inequality: employment inequality, career inequality, 
income inequality. That’s why there is a permanent tension between the 
desire to honor excellence and the need to protect the disadvantaged. 
However, this line of thought, when accepted, quite inevitably led to the 
inadequacies of the color-blind fair employment strategy, and the demand for 
proportional, preferential employment policies. This was the logic on which  
affirmative action was based.   
In July 1965, President Johnson suddenly seemed to be moving beyond the 
original goal and promises of the Great Society, that is, equality of 
opportunity, and endorsing equality of results.  
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You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now 
you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and 
choose the leaders as you please. You do not take a person 
who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, 
bring him up to the starting line and then say, ‘You are free to 
compete with all of the others,’ and still justly believe that you 
have been completely fair. 
Declaring this to be the next and more profound stage of the battle for Civil 
Rights, the president declared before his audience at Howard University in 
his commencement address that 
It is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our 
citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates … 
We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just 
legal equality but human ability, not just equality as a right 
and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.159 
Two months later, he issued Executive Order No. 11246, which stated that 
contractors should  
Take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are 
employed, and that employees are treated during 
employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex 
(as amended in 1967), or national origins.160  
What exactly did President Johnson mean in his speech at Howard 
University? Did he really envision racial equality as equality of result, or was 
his aim to remove racial discrimination and provide equality of opportunity? 
He envisioned the latter. However, the law itself did not appear to clarify 
these questions.161 The problem was that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act proclaimed preferential treatment and quotas illegal; however, as Hugh 
Davis Graham has pointed out, how would affirmative action have been 
possible without preferences or quotas?162 The EEOC lacked the resources 
to process individual complaints – which by April 1966 were more than 
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5,000, rising to 77,000 by 1975. Chaired by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., the 
former president’s son, the agency became receptive to alternative options. 
Two months after the EEOC began work, the labor secretary of the NAACP 
called on the commission to investigate “the entire southern textile 
manufacturing industry.” The new agency received 869 complaints from 
North Carolina, the industry’s center. These complaints forced the EEOC to 
conduct its first public hearing in Charlotte, North Carolina in January 1967, 
on the textile industry which was  by far the largest manufacturing employer 
in the South.163 In the same year, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
(OFCC), established a year before within the Labor Department, chose ten 
large textile companies for a pilot program to enforce equal employment 
among government contractors.164  
The EEOC dispatched racial reporting forms to all the employers and unions 
under its jurisdiction, collected the forms, created a massive data center on 
racial patterns of employment, and used these statistics to deduce 
discriminatory acts rather than investigating individual complaints of 
discrimination. Thanks to these statistics the agency was able to pressure 
companies and whole industries.165 Gradually, affirmative action shifted from 
a public policy to protect individuals from discrimination, to correcting the 
effects of past racial discrimination against minority groups. In 1968, 
President Johnson issued an executive order to request federal contractors to 
recruit and hire qualified minority job applicants; the same year the Labor 
Department elaborated on Executive Order No. 11246 and demanded that 
major contractors prepare ethnic censuses of potential workers, develop 
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“specific goals and timetables for the prompt achievement of full and equal 
employment opportunity,” and adopt a “written affirmative action 
compliance program.” As James Patterson has noted,  
There were guidelines that still focused on enhancing 
employment opportunity for disadvantaged individuals. They 
did not establish quotas for groups, and they were yet to be 
implemented. Still, a trend toward governmental enforcement 
of equal rights seemed clear.166  
Only slowly did the outlines and implications of affirmative action become 
evident over the next decade or so.167  
Nixon, a Republican with a more liberal record on Civil Rights and black 
support than Adlai Stevenson or John Kennedy in the l950s, began surfing 
the waves of partisan realignment, as liberal-conservative political lines 
became simply unsustainable. Historian of Civil Rights Movement David 
Chappell argues that:  
Nixon’s political masterstroke was affirmative action. 
Initiated by LBJ and strongly supported by M.L. King, the 
policy was soon abandoned by LBJ because it clearly violated 
the l964 Civil Rights act.168  
Historian Katznelson adds that during the Nixon administration, action 
against  
specific, intentional acts of discrimination was supplanted by 
policies that gave advantages, even actual points, to 
membership in a specific racial group. Compensatory policies 
were adopted where black individuals could be chosen even if 
white applicants had more appropriate qualifications judged 
by customary measures.169  
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The Nixon administration also enforced the Philadelphia Plan, first drafted 
by Department of Labor in 1967, which required that minority workers in 
the construction trades be hired in proportion to their percentage in the local 
labor force.170 The goals were modest: the percentage of minority employees 
affected by the Philadelphia Plan was projected to begin at four to six 
percent for the employer's 1970 work force, and increase to a high of 20 
percent in each trade after four years. All were to be hired to only fill new 
vacancies; no white workers were to be displaced.171 Nevertheless, the white 
backlash against government bureaucracies, Civil Rights, and race relations 
skyrocketed. Construction unions and contractors joined forces to oppose 
what they called “reverse discrimination.” The Philadelphia Plan was 
instrumental in reaching the ultimate goal of the Nixon administration was to 
generate a split between labor unions and Civil Rights leaders. However, the 
Philadelphia Plan also created little progress for black workers.172 An 
increasing percentage of whites started to believe that affirmative action 
meant quotas, and quotas exceeded equal opportunity. As events in the 
following years showed, Americans became increasingly less sympathetic to 
the “rights narrative,” the demand of rights-conscious groups for the “right” 
to economic equality, employment, or special entitlements. And yet, the 
1970s were marked by an increasing adoption of the affirmative action. In 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company in 1971, for example, the Supreme Court found 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied not only to intentional acts of job 
discrimination but also to recruitment procedures. The decision marked an 
important constitutional turning point because it shifted the burden of proof 
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from individuals to employers.173 In the 1970s, the United States became a 
more racially inclusive and less equalitarian society.174 
However, the government became less committed in correcting cases of job 
discrimination. The resistance from contractors and unions to integration in 
the workplace continued, and government did little to correct it. The Nixon 
administration blocked adequate funding, and also blocked the enforcement 
powers for the EEOC and the OFCC. In 1972, the entire New York regional 
OFCC office consisted of three people. The same year, The New York Times 
reported that “no public construction project anywhere in the country has 
even been cancelled because of civil-rights violations, as required under 
Federal law, although dozens of courts have documented violations.” During 
the presidential election, more than one in two union households voted for 
Nixon’s re-election. The appointment of Peter Brennan, who had previously 
been the president of both the Building and Construction Trades Council of 
Greater New York and the Building and Construction Trades Council of 
New York, and a strong opponent of affirmative action measures to increase 
the number of minority construction workers, as Secretary of Labor, was the 
culmination of a political turnaround.175 
Although in the Sixties the federal government remained a major player in 
fighting job discrimination, its goal gradually shifted. In the early 1960s the 
primary focus of its strategy for racial integration in the workplace was fair 
employment. Later on the political discourse became more militant and 
aggressive, and ultimately turned the color-blind, universal intent of the Civil 
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Rights Movement, and of the Civil Right Act, into color-conscious policies 
promoting court-sanctioned affirmative action to achieve legislation covering 
and prosecuting job discrimination.176 Initially, the unusual character of the 
policy regime governing the regulation of affirmative action was not openly 
quota-driven but ultimately became a sort of preferential treatment. 
Preferential Treatment and Black Power 
Despite increasing job opportunities made available through the military and 
the federal government in the 1940s, it was thought that a disciplined attack 
designed to finally reach economic equality was possible. However, loyalty to 
the country during wartime was more important that racial advancement. 
This made grass-roots participation and aggressive social actions in matters 
involving employment opportunities be perceived as illegal, or at least 
inappropriate and unpatriotic. The trend continued after the war, because 
economic advancement and the fear of being discredited as a communist 
during the McCarthy era had convinced black leaders to avoid direct action, 
to distance themselves from protests and radicalism, and to dissociate 
themselves from Marxists, communists and radical black leaders on the left 
politically.177 The responsibility to fight voting segregation in the South and 
employment and housing discrimination in the North was based on the 
litigation and lobbying skills of the NAACP. By 1953, twelve states and thirty 
cities had adopted fair employment laws of varying effectiveness.178 The 381 
days of the Montgomery bus boycott and the final victory of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., and his Montgomery Improvement Association was a huge 
turnaround, instrumental in moving the fight for Civil Rights from the 
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courtrooms into the streets. The Montgomery struggle demonstrated the 
unlimited possibilities of “organized collective action as an effective agent of 
social change.”179  
More importantly, increasing racial consciousness, combined with a new 
assertiveness among activists, gave additional prominence to boycotts and 
protests as viable Civil Rights strategies. The events in Montgomery became 
the blueprint for a series of local social protests and grassroots activism that 
became instrumental in promoting job opportunities for black workers. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, a variety of organizations were working 
actively to fight job discrimination and promote fair employment. CORE re-
launched the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign of the 
Depression, boycotting employers in North Carolina, California, and New 
York, and urged them to hire black workers. In Philadelphia, the Reverend 
Leon Sullivan of the Zion Baptist Church recognized the limitations of 
addressing job discrimination primarily through legislation, and in 1958 
promoted campaigns based on “selective patronage.” Inspired by the sit-ins 
in the South, Sullivan and his clergy allies envisioned programs to increase 
economic justice, organized boycotts against Sunoco-Gas, Breyer’s Ice 
Cream, and Tastykakes, and demanded these companies to hire a number of 
blacks in specific roles. The threat of boycotts was the top reason companies 
were hiring African Americans into traditionally white jobs, according to Jack 
Gourlay. He wrote a guide at that time to help companies deal with “Negro 
demonstrations and boycotts.” There was no reason, he concluded in his 
guide, to think your company could avoid a boycott.180 In 1959, protestors 
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who walked a picket line outside of Brandt’s Liquors on 145th Street in 
Harlem aspired to open up jobs in a predominantly black neighborhood. 
Like the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns of the 1930s, these 
protesters boycotted white-owned retailers that were restricting black liquor 
salesmen to designated establishments.181 Northern CORE chapters began 
adopting selective patronage’s boycott techniques in the early 1960s. In 1961, 
CORE activists mounted a boycott of Brooklyn’s Sealtest Dairy. A year later, 
Ebinger’s Bakery was the target of a boycott. These boycotts were very 
similar to the selective patronage program developed in Philadelphia. In 
1962, King’s S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in Atlanta based on the same 
principles, and supported strikes and protests across the entire South. The 
National Urban League focused on employment development, job training 
and placement, and in 1963, instituted its National Skills Bank in Los Angeles 
that trained workers and developed their skills for jobs in industry. Another 
function of the Skills Bank was to build a list of skilled negroes and members 
of other minority groups and give local employers access to these lists.  
In the 1960s, while organizations that preferred a legal or political approach 
to Civil Rights abhorred protests in the streets, more assertive organizations 
adopted consumer boycotts as a weapon for activists who demanded 
employers change their hiring practices. Boycotts and protests were pursuing 
color-conscious employment policies, employment based upon race, not just 
fair employment practices. Often the same moderate civil rights leaders, who 
pursued color-blind antidiscrimination policies in Washington in alliance with 
liberals and unions, showed their more radical inclination toward direct 
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action though boycotts and protest. While they assumed a moderate stance 
and sought to gain fair employment for all, they also militantly demanded 
jobs for blacks. Their ambiguity was rooted in frustration with the federal 
government and self-proclaimed progressive political and business leaders, 
who had demonstrated in the recent past nothing more than a rhetorical 
commitment to equal employment opportunity. Although consumer 
boycotts remained color-conscious vehicles of integration, their goals shifted 
during the 1960s. What started as a Civil Rights campaign to expand 
employment opportunities for African Americans by forcing employers to 
adopt nondiscrimination practices, quickly became a form of affirmative 
action. In fact, boycotters based their specific color conscious hiring requests 
upon the concept of preference. Then, in order to quantify their demands, 
Civil Rights activists instituted a criteria of flexible racial proportionalism. An 
increase in the employment of racial minorities was seen as a demonstration 
of good will, the adoption of nondiscrimination practices as a new beginning, 
and in the case of  a more demanding request, that is, a specific numbers of 
hires that leading to more substantive racial integration in the workplace. 
This could lead finally to compensatory hiring. In other words, result-
oriented strategies for promoting racially conscious hiring and promotion 
practices might end in preferential treatment, quotas, or compensatory action 
as compensation for past discrimination.  
The transition from color-blind policies to color-conscious strategies 
accelerated in August 1965 with the eruption of violence in the Los Angeles 
community of Watts. Hundreds of riots followed. When the Department of 
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Justice’s community relations field staff investigated the reasons for these 
disorders, unemployment, under-employment and low-pay emerged as main 
sources of anger. Civil Rights leaders such as Randolph and King both 
recommended that President Johnson “make work available for those in the 
ghetto” and to “provide a job for every person who needs work,” that is, full 
employment.182 Very soon, after the Watts riots however, the racial 
revolution exploded. Between 1965 and 1968, records show 250 African 
Americans died, more than 8,000 were wounded, and some 50,000 were 
arrested in the nearly 300 race riots that took place.183 After Watts, the west 
side of Chicago erupted in August 1965. A year later, National Guard troops 
protected the streets of Chicago, Cleveland, Dayton, Milwaukee and San 
Francisco. In 1967, violence erupted in Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, New 
Haven, Providence, Wilmington, Cambridge, Maryland, and hundreds of 
other cities.184 Sitkoff notes that “Ghetto blacks rioted to enter the 
mainstream of,” American society. “They rioted to protest the pervasiveness 
and depth of white racism.”185 At the same time, Civil Rights organizations 
such as CORE and the SNCC changed their leadership – respectively with 
Floyd McKissick and Stokely Carmichael – and transformed their primary 
goal from desegregation to self-determination. In the post-1965 era, color-
conscious employment policies were considered moderate, and historically 
linked to the right for fair employment practices, while the purpose of 
boycotts shifted to self-determination. An increasing number of activists, 
organizations, and communities began engaging in grassroots activities that 
empowered black communities and gave them control of their own destiny. 
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As Stokely Carmichael put it, “Power is the only thing respected in this 
world, and we must get it at any cost.”186 Black militants in radical groups 
came to see boycotts and protests as the means for mobilizing black 
communities and developing a non-capitalist economic structure. Black 
activists in more moderate organizations came to recognize boycotts and 
protests as vehicles for promoting economic development and building black 
capitalism.  
During the Nixon Administration, a short but unambiguous convergence of 
interests between black capitalism and pro-business conservatism emerged, 
as black separatism and white conservatism joined together around the idea 
of economic self-determination. While black militants and activists saw self-
determination as an expression of racial pride, all-black institutions, and 
economic independence, white conservatives associated it with ideals of self-
reliance, private enterprise, and individualism. In short, black capitalism and 
affirmative action (regardless of whatever notion of “proportion” it ended 
adopting), played down the importance of integration and color-blind 
strategies, and replaced nondiscrimination and anti-poverty programs as 
effective strategies to promote racial coexistence.  
Conclusion 
The late scholar Manning Marable famously noted that the Civil Rights 
movement lacked a clear and concise economic agenda.187 However, at least 
as far as employment is concerned, this opinion goes too far. During the two 
critical decades of the 1950s and 1960s, an articulate set of strategies and 
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activities which included a wide range of activities including alliances with 
labor unions, protests and boycotts against private businesses, the formation 
of partnerships with the federal government. Other methods that were 
pursued included application of pressure on the government, civil rights 
activism to the promotion of federal legislation with the goal of  more and 
better jobs to black workers. These efforts were instrumental in promoting 
federal government action and ultimately resulted in anti-discrimination laws, 
in particular, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and other manifestations of 
affirmative action. Affirmative action legislation in 1965 permanently 
changed the legal landscape of the workplace. Initially promoted by the 
Johnson Administration and modified by other interested parties inside and 
outside the government, affirmative action primarily promoted the “right to 
work” by  changing hiring policies, and consequently increasing the concrete 
chances for African Americans to be less discriminated against. Through 
these acts of “corrective justice,” affirmative action was practically able to 
increase the opportunity for gaining fair employment by minorities.188  
However, instead of lauding the federal government’s commitment to 
promoting the reforms of the hiring and promotion practices they had always 
considered essential, Civil Rights leaders lamented what they then considered 
a failure. They criticized the Johnson Administration for having turned its 
attention to the Vietnam War and abandoned the poor, the unemployed, and 
the underemployed, and as a result, these Civil Rights leaders were in turn 
treated by Johnson with increasing distance and mistrust. King, in particular, 
fully embraced the goal of full employment and felt frustrated when he 
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realized, in the last two years of his life, that his concern was not shared by 
the Johnson Administration. Surely King was right to be disappointed, as 
Johnson had several times openly spoken about full employment as a 
practical possibility. And yet King was wrong, because in their pursuit of full 
employment, liberals and President Johnson believed that full employment 
comes naturally with economic growth, while the eventual surplus generated 
by growth may be allocated in order to offer opportunities to those whom 
capitalism had failed. Johnson did not plan to interfere with the internal 
dynamics of capitalism, but rather to focus on economic growth. It was 
social progress without the specific intent to reform capitalism.  
The federal government never really believed in regulating corporate 
organizations and the restructuring of capitalism but did emphasize 
influencing the economic cycle. Although they misunderstood the intention 
of the government in managing the economy, King and other Civil Rights 
leaders correctly recognized the limitations of addressing job discrimination 
primarily through legislation. Civil rights leaders promoted campaigns and 
programs to increase economic justice, such as Breadbasket, and supported 
strikes and protests such as the garbage workers in Memphis, Tennessee, 
where King was eventually assassinated. The criticism from Marable and 
others fails to recognize the immense amount of progress made by the work 
of Civil Rights leaders in pressuring the federal government to expand its 
efforts for the urban poor and the economically disadvantaged, as well as to 
pressure the business community to open the job market to minorities.  
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The reform of the job market and the regulation of  discrimination practices 
in the workplace was a result of the failures of acclimated alliances and 
unintended consequences of legislation issued by the federal government in 
the 1960s. The alliance between Civil Rights leaders and labor unions, the 
latter already in decline, in transition from a strictly liberal orthodoxy to two-
party political dynamics, did not help. Not surprisingly, the struggle between 
preferential treatment and fair employment as the most effective strategy to 
deliver more and better jobs to black workers ended with the success of the 
former, although in unpredictable way. Unlike boycotts and protests, 
preferential treatment became a piece of federal legislation, instigating a 
profound shift in American law and culture that greatly accelerated 
workplace integration, with implications far beyond what even the Civil 
Rights leaders, themselves, had imagined. It is also interesting that, despite 
the classical, color-blind narrative empathetically embraced by the Civil 
Rights movement and, especially by Dr. King, it was in effect, a color-
conscious strategy that ultimately succeeded, both on the legislative floor and 
in the streets. Approaching workplace integration from a color-conscious 
perspective, Civil Rights leaders found a common ground not only with 
liberals and the federal government, but also with the most moderate wing of 
the Black Freedom Movement.  
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Chapter Two: Breadbasket in 
Atlanta (1962-66) 
 
Introduction 
Breadbasket was officially founded in Atlanta in 1962 to “negotiate a more 
equitable employment practice.’’189 It was modeled after a selective patronage 
program developed four years earlier in Philadelphia. Leon Sullivan, a Baptist 
minister, started boycotts of various businesses that did not hire blacks. In 
affiliation with other ministers, he referred to this practice as “Selective 
Patronage.” When The New York Times and Fortune magazine brought the 
program to greater public attention on a national scale, it came to the 
attention of Martin Luther King. In October 1962, King brought Sullivan to 
Atlanta to meet local ministers and discuss adopting the program. He hoped 
that Atlanta’s ministers could replicate what Sullivan and his colleagues had 
done in Philadelphia. Breadbasket emerged from that meeting. Its mission 
was to “negotiate a more equitable employment practice” on behalf of 
African Americans. The organization was successful in Atlanta as well as  in 
Georgia, and by 1967 had won 5,000 jobs, equal to $22 million a year in new 
income for the black community.190  
In this chapter, the initial successes of the program in Georgia are framed as 
part of what historian David L. Chappell has recently describes as 
“something called Prophetic religion.” Chappell has defined “Prophetic 
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religion” narrowly, identifying it with (a few) prophetic black leaders who 
rejected classic liberalism based on voluntary, gradual progress, and the 
spread of education and economic development. God’s will would undo the 
evils of segregation and disfranchisement. These prophetic Civil Rights 
leaders often rebelled against the duly constituted leaders of their 
denominations and displayed public contempt for worldly comforts, 
recognition and “success,” which were the source of inspiration for their 
followers, the hidden force for solidarity and self-sacrifice.  
The first phase of Breadbasket is the history of prophetic figures who 
assumed the same posture as the Hebrew prophets (“speaking truth to  
power”, so to speak), shared the same pessimism about the general purpose 
of the institutions of the society in which they served, and showed the same 
skepticism about society’s pretensions to justice. They did not merely attack 
the culture of their oppressors, they separated themselves from that culture 
and society – including their families, and their Baptist fellows. Standing 
apart from one’s own community is crucial to the prophetic life. Not 
surprisingly, it is a religious practice that situates people in the world and yet 
maintains those people as separate from the world. Prophets are in the world 
but do not belong to the world (John 17:11-16). Finally, these clergymen 
understood that Prophetic religion is contrapuntal. Prophetic religion 
accompanies religious crisis as it locates itself at the limes, at the border of 
time and space.191 It appears during crisis, in periods of transition from one 
era to another. It is a religion of prophets, a church of charismatic ministry.  
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Origins of Breadbasket 
At 11 am, on Thursday, May 19, 1966, Reverend J.E. Ross stood up before 
the members of the local chapter of the S.C.L.C. Breadbasket.192 The group 
was composed of black ministers – Rev. D.H. Jackson, host of the meeting; 
Rev. G.D. Grier, Jr., Rev. Otis Smith, Rev. E.P. Yorpp, Rev. B.W. Chambers, 
Rev. E.M. Davis, Rev. Ralph M. Allen, Rev. Fred C. Lofton, Rev, C.M. 
Alexander, Rev. J. C. Ward, Rev. J.P. Collins, Rev. M.B. Jordan, Rev. P. 
Harold Fray, Rev. Howard Creecy Sr., Rev. Fred Bennette, and of course, 
Rev. Ross – the only exception being Ms. E.T. Kehrer, Southern Director for 
the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department.193 The meeting was at the Gaines 
Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, a nice 
little church with a facade of red bricks that exudes an air of antiquity and 
character.194 Located in the southern part of the small town – less than 
10,000 residents, more than half African Americans – in South Georgia, the 
church was in the countryside, surrounded by few buildings, not far from 
downtown. Reverend Ross lived the opposite side of town, exactly two miles 
away.195 Most of the other ministers were from Atlanta and small cities in 
Georgia, including Augusta, Albany, Columbus and Macon. Every two 
weeks, the group of pastors in charge of Breadbasket reunited in a church in 
a different city in Georgia. This peripatetic behavior was quite unusual for 
clergymen, and definitively added a special flavor to their ministry. In fact, 
the black preachers worked at the local level, as well as at the level of the 
individual community church, as they operated closest to their people in this 
way. They preferred to concentrate on their local parish rather than at the 
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level of larger constituencies. When they committed time and energy in 
building and maintaining a bigger project, they normally devoted only a 
fraction of their time to it.196 That is why the preachers involved in 
Breadbasket were a unique group, bound together due to their special calling 
through this project. 
They all stood up, ready to begin their devotions with What a Friend We Have 
in Jesus.197 On this particular day, Reverend Ross proposed a departure from 
the classic text. He proposed lyrics he had written to be sung to the tune of 
What a Friend We Have in Jesus, instead of the conventional lyrics. The lyrics, a 
less a sentimental hymn, was a hymn to beg Jesus to provide merciful relief 
to a son and mother who were living apart.198 Gone was the comforting tone 
of the hymn. The new text was a little more bitter and militant. It mentioned 
words like “army,” “fighting,” “enemies,” and “kill,” although 
metaphorically.199 The music was still in the original key of F Major, but the 
new text had changed the general feeling of the song. “Citizens we have 
come together – the group started – Something we have to understand.” The 
hymn resounded in the chapel for a few minutes, and slowly, the group 
completed its task. “We must work to kill the mean crimes. For we must 
inherit this land.” After this last call for commitment and engagement, the 
group took a seat.  
First, Rev. Ross led the whole group in prayer. Then, he led the group in 
singing, “What a Fellowship.” Once again the walls of the church resounded 
with prayer and praise. This time the tone was peaceful and hopeful. “What a 
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fellowship, what a joy divine, leaning on the everlasting arms; what 
blessedness, what a peace is mine, leaning on the everlasting arms.”200 At the 
end, the group stood in silence, waiting for the service to continue. Next was 
the reading of the first verse of Psalm 133, followed by a reading from the 
Scriptures. Following the reading from the Scriptures, they sang a hymn 
universally known as a blessings of brotherly unity, “Behold, how good and 
how pleasant it is / for brethren to dwell together in unity!” The verse is 
often quoted in Latin to express the sense of brotherhood, unity and 
community. Ecce quam bonum et quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum. As the 
Biblical scholar Dummerlow points out, the hymn is an exquisite gem, 
“describing the blessings of unity was especially suitable as a Pilgrim Song, 
when rich and poor, priest and peasant would fraternize on their pilgrimage 
to Jerusalem.”201 Most biblical commentaries point out that “brethren” is 
usually understood as referring to our relatives, which it does; but it also can 
be used to describe a group of people with something special in 
common.  Why is unity among a group of people so important? Why is unity 
among believers so important? Because theologically it supposes a covenant, a 
nation of “brothers” that worship together in Jerusalem.202 
After blessing the brotherly unity in the church, the pastors then celebrated 
their unity of intent. They sang the militant hymn, “Citizens that have come 
together,” and prepared their minds and bodies for the possibility of 
redemptive sufferance, after having prayed and worshipped the Lord 
together, making His presence as tangible and evident as it could be. After 
having celebrated the joy of divine fellowship together, and shared the feeling 
117 
 
of a blessed election; after all that, reading the first verse of Psalm 133, surely 
helped the group of pastors show the depth of their commitment, as well as 
confirming the bonds that bound them together. They were thus encouraged 
to embark on the next step of their campaign for economic justice on earth. 
In the first part of their meeting at Gaines Chapel African Methodist 
Episcopal Church of Waycross, the pastors reaffirmed their call to ministry 
through worship, prayer and hymns.  
At that point, the “call man,” Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., of Fort Street 
Methodist Church in Atlanta, was asked to chair the group. In the simple 
organization of S.C.L.C. Breadbasket, the “call man” played a key-role. He 
was the chairman of the meeting. Breadbasket was a program established by 
the S.C.L.C. to fight job discrimination against African Americans. Its goal 
was initially to promote equal employment opportunities for African-
American workers in Atlanta. It then focused on expanding its operations 
throughout the whole state of Georgia. The program mobilized buying 
campaigns to force businesses and corporations to hire minorities. 
The idea of Breadbasket came to King and his aides as a confluence of two 
events. The first was a conference in Macon, Georgia organized by Fisk 
University (Nashville, Tennessee) that was meant to answer questions that 
came up as a result of the new governmental regulations in employment, and  
second, Reverend Leon Sullivan’s highly successful “Selective Patronage 
Program” in Philadelphia, a boycott campaign focusing on creating more and 
better jobs for black people. On March 6, 1961, President John F. Kennedy 
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signed Executive Order 10925, requiring government contractors to 
“take affirmative action [emphasized in the original text] to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”203 It also 
established the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(CEEO), an agency created to prevent racial discrimination by corporations 
holding government contracts. President John F. Kennedy appointed Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson as chairman of this agency, as well as having 
Johnson act as leader for other agencies. The attorney general, Robert F. 
Kennedy, and the secretary of labor, Arthur Goldberg, were also members of 
the CEEO. The committee was an experimental body, the first official 
federal commission to address racial discrimination in the workplace; later it 
became the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as 
established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among the CEEO’s activities, 
two programs created the highest expectations: Plans for Progress, an 
agreement with 85 firms holding government contracts, and Plans for Fair 
Practices, a pact with 117 international unions and 300 local AFL-CIO 
affiliates. Plans for Progress was the brainchild of Robert Troutman, an 
attorney and President Kennedy’s close friend from Atlanta. The idea was to 
win the active support of a list of large corporations for ending racial 
discrimination in hiring practices. Kennedy seemed enthusiastic about the 
plan. “I think this can be one of the most important things we will be able to 
do this term,” he wrote to his vice president.204  
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The anti-discrimination rules stated by this Executive Order immediately 
influenced government contractors and subcontractors. They were requested 
to not “discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment 
because of race, creed, color, or national origin.” The contractors had 
consequently the responsibility to take affirmative action with regard to 
employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment 
advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of 
compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The 
contractor also had to agree to post notices setting forth the provisions of 
this nondiscrimination clause, educate employees that all qualified applicants 
will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, creed, 
color or national origin, send each labor union or representative of workers a 
copy of this notice and advise employees of the contractor’s commitments 
under this section. Employers were obligated to post copies of the notice in 
conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment. 
Sanctions and penalties for the contractor’s non-compliance with the 
nondiscrimination clauses of this Executive Order were clearly stated: 
government contracts may be cancelled in whole or in part and the 
contractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts.205  
One of the immediate effects of the Executive Order was the proliferation in 
various sections of the country of agencies that contacted with companies 
holding federal government contracts, offering assistance to executives in 
desegregating their working forces. A Quaker organization with offices in 
Atlanta, the American Friends Service Committee, was one of those agencies 
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offering assistance in applying the new executive order. It also offered other 
services to corporate clients, including a list of highly skilled candidates for 
jobs in companies that had adopted a policy of employment solely based on 
merit, regardless of race. “We note – informed a letter from the Committee – 
that some companies … have had and are having difficulty in finding 
qualified applicants,” which is why the Committee was contacting the 
Personnel Departments of these companies, making referrals of black job 
candidates ready to be employed in skilled, technical,  and professional jobs. 
The Committee was in touch with counselors and placement officers in 
colleges and high schools, and tapped in to an extensive network of key 
persons and organizations in the black community. Assistance to those 
companies was free of charge. “We seek neither financial remuneration nor 
publicity for our services. We offer them because we are convinced of the 
basic morality and economic validity of employing people on the basis of 
their ability to perform rather than upon the basis of their race, religion, or 
place or origin.”206 
While the interest around the potential effects of the Executive Order was 
rising, Fisk University (Nashville, Tennessee) decided to organize a Working 
Conference on Equal Job Opportunities in Macon, Georgia, in order to 
answer the growing number of questions that were arising as a result of the 
new governmental regulations related to employment. “Getting the Job 
Done,” was the title of the conference sponsored by the Georgia Council on 
Human Relations and the American Friends Service Committee and under 
the direction of Dr. Vivian W. Henderson, professor at the Department of 
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Economics at Fisk University. The conference took place exactly a year after 
President Kennedy’s Executive Order. The keynote speaker was John I. 
Binkley, Director of Education, President’s Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunities. The last part of the conference was dedicated to 
the new opportunities available to companies hiring in private businesses 
outside of government contracting. Among the participants were 
representatives of the National and the Atlanta Urban League, Morehouse 
College,  and Atlanta University.207 The S.C.L.C. took note of the conference 
and compiled a list of the federal government contractors in Atlanta, 
Georgia. The list consisted of about 20 names, including Lockheed Aircraft 
(in Marietta, Georgia), Henry C. Beck Construction for Power, AAA Electric 
Construction and Engineering, William B. Corbin Table Food Preparation, 
among others.208 
The “Selective Patronage Program” was initiated in Philadelphia by black 
ministers a year before the Executive Order. It was established to create 
more and better jobs for black people, beginning locally and then on a 
national scale. The “Selective Patronage Program” created innovative 
methods based on the classic boycott tactic which blossomed in the mid-
Thirties. While traditional boycott methods in the “Selective Patronage 
Program” had been directed against all white merchants, in Philadelphia it 
was directed at only one company at a time. Since March 1960, when the 
program started, over 20 companies had been affected and more than 1,000 
new white-collar jobs for black people had been won. Ministers groups in 
Baltimore, Detroit, Atlantic City, Boston, Providence, New Haven, 
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Chattanooga, Wilmington, and Atlanta had started selective consumer 
campaigns in the months following the campaign in March, 1960. The 
program was considered successful as it had forced several companies to hire 
and promote black employees. For the most part, the ministers found that 
fighting more than one company in an industry unnecessary. The others 
learned by example.209 The pastors were more concerned about the quality of 
the jobs than their number, and were battling to win what they called 
“sensitive jobs,” junior executive and supervisory posts. Besides, more 
qualified black people had applied for qualified jobs after the boycott had 
started, and shown more confidence in their skills and competences.   
In March 1960, fifteen black ministers met in Philadelphia and decided that 
the permanent unemployment of young black people was creating a situation 
of emergency and required immediate action. The black clergy decided to 
enlist black buying power in the fight for jobs.210 Leon Sullivan would argue 
later that “thousands of Negro boys and girls were walking the streets of 
Philadelphia, unable to obtain jobs, but white boys and girls who had 
graduated from the same high schools were working.” In an interview with 
The New York Times two years later, Leon Sullivan remembered the genesis of 
the program: “some of us were picketing the five-and-ten to support the 
lunch counter sit-ins in the South, when we realized that the North and East 
had problems that were just as acute.”211 In May 1960, a few months later, 
400 ministers in Philadelphia started persuading one company after another  
to employ and up-grade the jobs of more black people in their employ. 
Boycotting one company after the other, the ministers believed, would make 
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things simple and no protestor, pastor, or even target, would be confused. It 
was a change from the old strategy, as previously boycotts had encompassed 
entire business districts. Black leaders had adopted boycotts to force 
businesses in Southern cities to employ black people and desegregate store 
facilities. Another main difference between the Philadelphia boycott and the 
previous campaigns in the South resided in its technique. There was no need 
to march or hold sit-ins or other public demonstrations, and consequently, it 
was less likely to lead to violence and police action.  
Ministers in Philadelphia called their campaign of persuasion “Selective 
Patronage Program.” This program consisted of three phases. In the first 
phase, a delegation of ministers, about four and five, called on whatever 
company the group of pastors decided to approach and politely inquired how 
many black people were employed and in what jobs. The management of the 
company then released this information, but the ministers had already 
gathered the information, unofficially. The information was usually provided 
by people inside the company. To make their work easier, the ministers 
addressed one industry at the time. In this way, they were able to collect the 
information, compare the different corporate employment policies, the total 
number of employees, and the number of the black employees. They could 
investigate how many black workers were employed in each department, and 
compare the salaries earned by a white worker with the salary earned by a 
black employee. The first meeting was always exploratory, but after a week or 
two a second meeting was requested. It was at this second meeting that 
ministers became specific about what they wanted.212 According to the 
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ministers, the initial request was merely a way for the company to show its 
concern and commitment for race equality. The ministers set a date for their 
request to be met and asked for assurances that nondiscriminatory policies 
would be enforced.213 At this point, the corporate management was left alone 
to decide how it preferred to deal with the requests. Executives could decide 
to accept the requests and hire the new black employees or argue that these 
new hires were really not needed, and complain that the company already had 
tens or hundreds of black employees. In this second case, the clergy would 
move from negotiation to protest. After explaining the discouraging situation 
of black employment, ministers urged their parishioners to start selective 
buying tactics against that company.  
The boycott itself proceeded in two or three phases, according to the level of 
resistance of the executives to the requests of the clergy. The first phase 
involved a simple announcement from pulpits by the ministers making the 
requests, suggesting use of the selective patronage tactics against that 
company. This phase normally lasted three weeks. The second phase, usually 
lasting two weeks, was marked by stronger urging from the pulpit coupled 
with wider community participation. Signs were placed in beauty and barber 
shops, and in some cities like Atlanta, also in social and civic clubs. The third 
and final phase involved the use of hand-outs and other publicity devices. It 
was at this point that the maximum cooperation of the black community was 
reached.214 
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The first company to be targeted by ministers in Philadelphia with the 
Selective Patronage Movement was Tastykake, a Philadelphia-based bakery 
still in existence today.  The boycott lasted a single summer and seriously 
hurt Tastykake. The company depended on the sales generated by changes in 
people’s diets in the summer and kids out of school. Blacks made up 20% of 
Philadelphia's population and Tastykake’s executives could not deny they 
needed that 20% of the local market to stay afloat.  To end the boycott, the 
management agreed to meet the demands set by Sullivan and his colleagues.  
These demands included hiring African-Americans as drivers and white 
collars to work in office positions. The second company to be targeted was 
Tasty Baking Company, a bakery that sold cakes and pies. In the summer of 
1960, a delegation of ministers, lead by Rev. Leon Sullivan asked the 
management to hire two black salesmen, two black clerical workers, and 
three to four young black women in the icing department, where the workers 
had traditionally been all white. Not surprisingly, at Tasty Baking the salaries 
for the sales and office jobs were higher than in the other parts of the 
organization and in traditionally all-white departments. Mr. Pass and Mr. 
Kaiser, the personnel manager and the president of the company, 
respectively, tried unsuccessfully to explain that the Tasty Baking Company 
already had hundreds of black employees, and there was no need for more 
salesmen or clerical workers. The pastors made it clear, politely but firmly, 
that they hoped these people could be hired within two weeks. The new 
employees suggested by the ministers were not hired within two weeks, and 
the pastors told their congregations not to buy any products from Tasty 
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Baking Company until further notice. The boycott lasted two months and 
was a source of social pressure and economic difficulty for the company. 
Printed advertisements suddenly appeared in coffee bars, beauty parlors and 
barbershops. In the end, the company employed two black salesmen, two 
clerical workers, and a few young women in the ice department.215 
In the Fall, a delegation of the Selective Patronage Program contacted the 
Pepsi-Cola Company. Negotiations were in place in September, but in this 
case, the management felt manipulated and decided to resist. On October 2, 
a boycott was called for from 400 pulpits. Two days later, the spokesman of 
the delegation received a telegram stating that Pepsi-Cola had already hired 
the requested black people. The boycott was actually called off two weeks 
later, because it was a policy of the ministers not no end a boycott until the 
new employees were actually at work. In December 1960, during the period 
of peak usage of heating oil, Gulf Oil was cautiously approached by Rev. 
Joshua E. Licorish, of Zion Methodist Church, the spokesman for a 
delegation of the Selective Patronage Program. The management showed no 
interest in meeting with the delegation. After three weeks, with no 
appointment having been arranged, a boycott of Gulf products was called for 
on Sunday. The day after, clients started calling the switchboards at Gulf and 
asking to cancel their oil contracts. The corporate management immediately 
displayed an efficient damage control plan. The requests were accepted, 
candidates were interviewed and the entire hiring process was complete in a 
week. The reaction of the management was instantaneous and so amazingly 
efficient that the whole boycott lasted only a week.  
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And yet, this was not the end of the story. To avoid possible retaliations 
against the new employees, the ministers included a without-cause clause in 
the contract to protect new employees from potentially being  laid off. This 
clause was part of the stipulation between the ministers and the management. 
However, union officials saw this clause as conflicting with seniority 
provisions in Gulf’s union contract. Union officials met with the ministers 
and explained that they were sympathetic with their aims but not when they 
collided with union bargaining. A first attempt to compromise was to ask the 
new employees to join the union. Three black truck drivers had been hired 
and after 30 days they joined the union. However, this was not enough to 
avoid the collision between the ministers and the union officers. The union 
representatives made it abundantly clear that when seasonal layoffs had 
begun, drivers with less seniority would be laid off first. Union officers and 
ministers were pursuing the same purposes - to employ as many people as 
possible, to provide a salary to every family, to help as many young people as 
possible to find a job and have a decent life. In addition, they faced another 
threat – technology change was rapidly moving unskilled workers out of 
market. The challenge was more dangerous for the black community, as most 
of the black workers were unskilled.  
The next target of Selected Patronage was Sun Oil, known in its consumer 
business as Sunoco. It provided gas and oil for trucks and cars, and Sun fuel 
oil to heat homes. On March 19, 1961, the congregations of 400 ministers 
were called on to start the boycott. The confrontation between the ministers 
and the management of Sun Oil had begun at the end of January, when Rev. 
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Alfred G. Dunston, pastor of the Wesley A.M.E. Zion Church, the 
spokesman of the Selective Patronage program with Sun Oil, phoned the 
company and requested a meeting. The meeting readily arranged for 
February 3. Management was confident that no trouble could come from this 
meeting. In fact, a year before, the management had asked the Reverend 
Leon Sullivan and Dr. Jerome Holland, president of Hampton Institute, to 
advise it in setting up a program for increased black employment in white-
collar jobs. At that time, Sun Oil had hired two black clerks. The company 
had records of hundreds of black employees at its Marcus Hook refinery, 
some in responsible supervisory jobs. The management had just decided to 
include three black colleges in its yearly talent search. Executives felt they 
were protected against any chance of retaliation. This was not how the 
ministers looked at the situation. They were not interested in the number of 
black employees working in the refinery. They were much more interested in 
the black workers in positions of responsibility, with  higher salaries. “You 
hired two Negro clerks a year ago, but none since,” they said. “Two in an 
office force of 1,500 isn’t much, is it? And you have no Negroes driving 
trucks. And even though you plan to include Negroes in your talent search, 
you haven’t actually hired any.”216 
The executives protested, they had already hundreds of black people working 
for the company, their reply fallen on deaf ears. The ministers were 
interested not in the unskilled, low-paid jobs, but in specific jobs. The real 
purpose of the Selective Patronage Program was not just to provide jobs to 
black people, or desegregate employment and personnel policies. The jobs 
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that the ministers wanted to open up were what they called “sensitive” jobs. 
These jobs were very junior executive and supervisory posts, clerical and 
stenographic positions, jobs as skilled manual workers and as salesmen. In 
other words, jobs in which people come into close personal association with 
other people, and use the same lunchrooms and restrooms. Although 
Philadelphia had a population of 534,000 black people, nearly 27 percent of 
the entire city’s population, the ministers estimated that only 1 percent or less 
of the black population held some sort of “sensitive” jobs.217 These 
“sensitive” jobs were not only jobs with a higher salary; they were also jobs 
with the potential to provide employees with self-esteem, opportunities for a 
successful career, and hope of a better life. They were jobs that might prove 
that black people had the competence needed to conduct managerial 
activities, and establish young blacks with college educations as  an added 
resource for leadership. More than anything else, they were jobs that would 
offer black junior executives the opportunity to be in charge of white people. 
These young black executives would gain respect within the black 
community and provide credibility to the whole black community. Those 
black people who became junior executives might act as benchmarks for 
other young blacks; offering a living example, a possible target, and a success 
story for other young blacks. It was accidental that the Selective Patronage 
Program focused on promotion as well as employment. Promotion was the 
gateway to break the invisible barrier that blocked black people from the 
roles of command in the corporate world, and that locked them out of the 
real power of management. When it comes to promotion practices, it is not 
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accurate to align the Selective Patronage Program with a traditional civil 
rights campaign, as the pastors were not simply trying to exercise the right of 
the black population to be employed. What this program really envisioned 
was a corporate world where black and white could work together at the 
bottom as well as at the top of the hierarchy, where people could make 
money, and have successful careers based on merit rather than the color of 
their skin. However strange it may seem, these ideal results were pursued 
through a type of coercion.218  
Sun management must have thought they were struck by a bombshell. At 
that time, business had fallen off, and costs had to be kept as low as possible. 
Managers had to move more slowly when it came to costs, but were now 
going ahead as quickly as they could to match the request of the ministers. At 
the second meeting, two weeks later, the ministers made their proposal clear. 
They wanted Sun to hire 24 black employees: 19 additional office workers, 
three permanent truck drivers, and a motor-products salesman and all the 
new employees must be hired within two weeks. Management’s reaction was 
even more dramatic at this meeting than at the previous meeting. They 
claimed that it wasn’t possible, not even within a month. They would not be 
able to offer 19 new jobs in the office anytime soon. The also pointed out 
they were just about to lay off 35 truck drivers as soon as the heating season 
ended, and couldn’t be expected to hire new employees at that time. The 
ministers replied that 21 black employees (19 new hires, plus the 2 workers 
already in place) in an office setting already employing 1,500 is not much to 
ask. The Urban League could supply the new employees, if the company was 
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not ready to or was unable to so by itself. The ministers could even supply 
candidates if asked. The bottom line was that all the workers requested had 
to be hired on the time line put forward by the ministers. This was not the 
end of the negotiation. The terms of the agreement were discussed, and the 
ministers accepted Sun’s stand that the company could not take on new truck 
drivers when it was about to lay some off. The ministers would settle for  
having three blacks who were already employed by Sun upgraded in their job 
descriptions and duties to truck driver three. As far as the 19 new employees 
for clerical jobs were concerned, the hiring process was a little more 
complicated. By March 16, the last meeting before the boycott deadline, Sun 
had interviewed 19 black applicants and hired one of them. The others, the 
management said, did not have the necessary qualifications. The Sun 
managers had also hired one black salesman, and upgraded one worker from 
mechanic to truck driver. They had not asked the ministers to provide a list 
of potential candidates, but they had been in touch with the Urban League in 
this regard. As of late April, Sun had hired about half the people requested by 
the ministers. There were seven more black women in the home office, two 
more black salesmen, and three drivers had been upgraded from work in the 
garage and the refinery. The company did not release any information about 
the loss of revenues due to the boycott, as a spokesman for the firm said it 
was difficult to estimate. However, the ministers estimated that Sun was 
losing some $7,000 a week, while the annual salaries of the clerical workers 
that were requested by the ministers were around $130,000 a year.219 Given 
132 
 
these figures, the boycott would have cost the company more than the total 
amount of the investment required for adding clerical workers.  
After Sun Oil, the Selective Patronage Program targeted other industries. 
Since March 1960, when the program began locally, until January 1963, when 
it achieved national recognition, it had involved a total of 20 companies. 
Eight companies had been boycotted for a period up to 11 weeks. They were 
Tasty Baking Company, Pepsi Cola, Gulf Oil, Sun Oil, Breyers Ice Cream 
division of National Dairy Products Corp, Metropolitan Bottling Co., 
Evening Bulletin (a daily newspaper), and A&P, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. George Schermer, executive director of The Philadelphia Commission 
on Human Relations (PCHR) and an expert on race relations, supported the 
action of the ministers, and claimed that they had “increased job 
opportunities for a significant number of Negroes.”220 
Of course, boycotts were not inevitable. Ministers preferred negotiation; in 
fact, they successful negotiated (and did not boycott) with Bind Bread, 
Freihofer Bread, Coca-Cola, and Seven-Up, Esso, Cities Service, Atlantic, 
Mobile. Thanks to these negotiations, several banks and insurance companies 
employed black people in “sensitive” jobs for the first time. Other firms had 
seen the threat headed in their direction and had begun hiring more black 
people. These firms found the ministers’ requests reasonable, and they agreed 
to their demands as soon as they were contacted by the ministers who were 
using Selective Patronage. None of these companies had to cope with a 
boycott.221 Some of the Philadelphia-area companies that had been boycott 
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targets conceded that, in retrospect, they weren’t entirely unhappy about the 
final result. At Atlantic Corporation, not to be confused with A&P, managers 
acknowledged that they were pleased with the quality of work of the black 
employees and the positive quality of  office morale.222 Several executives 
noted that more qualified black job seekers were applying for positions than 
formerly. The reason for this increase in applicants may have been  because 
of changing perceptions. Now young and ambitious black candidates were 
no longer afraid to get turned down. An oil company reported that following 
a boycott, it had begun to hire more black people in Philadelphia, as well as 
in other cities. The same oil company also had reported that sales had been 
stronger after the boycott than they were before it. This was a sign that the 
black ministers and their congregations did not create resentment.223 Among 
these companies, Atlantic had been frequently mentioned by ministers as an 
example of how smoothly their projects went when everyone co-operated. 
The company, which already had some black employees in clerical and 
executive roles before the ministers came to call, increased the number of 
black employees in white-collar jobs, including a chemist, a psychologist, and 
a former football hero in a sales position. It was not a coincidence that the 
number of jobs requested for new black employees from Sun Oil was nearly 
equivalent to the number of the white-collar positions held by black people 
at Atlantic. Both Sun and Atlantic were based in Philadelphia, and each of 
them had about 1,500 people working in its home office; the two companies 
seemed comparable.224 Part of the reason for these easy victories was the 
modest nature of ministers’ demands. In December 1962, a boycott was 
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called against the 150 A&P stores in the Philadelphia-area until the chain had 
employed six black office workers, 40 additional black store employees and 
20 meat and produce workers. The ministers also demanded that A&P 
change practices that allegedly prevented the advancement of black 
warehouse workers. According to scholar Hannah Lees, the reasoning 
behind the six black office workers was simple, “a committee of ministers 
visited A&P’s offices and found the company had 250 employees in its main 
office here, all white. We figure 10% of the nation’s population is Negro but 
that it would be unreasonable to demand 25 Negroes he hired. We think 12 
would be fair.” Then they added: “but we’re only asking half that, just as a 
token to show A&P won’t discriminate in the future.”225 
These details offer an inside perspective on the program. The ministers really 
thought they were involved in a mission to bring justice to the corporate 
world, not just create a few more jobs to black families. Since the beginning, 
when 15 pastors had envisioned the program, the ministers considered 
themselves “the only moral organized network of communication” in the 
black community. The program received its moral imperative straight from 
the mass involvement of the black community, and its authority from the 
moral principle of justice. For these ministers, this was a Biblical, spiritual 
movement. They were adamant with their congregations, saying that “we 
cannot in good conscience remain quiet while our people patronize 
companies that discriminate against our people”226 The remark about “good 
conscience” was a clear reference to their moral commitment to justice, and 
it resounded again and again in the later incarnations of the program. 
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Another significant detail is the mention of “our people,” which was not 
simple a reference to black people, but a Biblical quote. It comes from 
Exodus 5, when Moses faces the pharaoh  and orders him to “let my people 
go.”). The pastors were facing the white-owned and managed companies as 
Moses challenged the Egyptians, asking them to act justly. The ministers felt 
that God was backing them, just as He did when Moses was before the 
Pharaoh. The Selected Patronage program was designed to pursue justice, 
and was conducted without resentment or prejudice, but managed with the 
clear purpose to pursue a fair game. Frequently, the ministers made clear that 
they did not want to hurt the companies they were boycotting. “We aren’t 
mad at anybody. We just want to see our boys and girls in decent jobs.”227 
The founders of the Selective Patronage Program realized that its success 
would depend on the ministers’ ability to persuade their congregations to 
stop buying a given product and eventually pass the word among non-
churchgoers. In fact, the opposite would have been true. Despite the claim 
from some sources that a large portion of the black community of  500,000 
in Philadelphia had some connection with the program, the ministers 
involved in the program came out with a more reasonable estimate of a 
quarter of a million. Certainly, the fraternal organizations, social clubs, 
insurance agents, bartenders, beauticians, the NAACP, and the black 
newspapers were lined up solidly behind the ministers. However, some black 
businesses had been hurt by the boycotts, and some black people just did not 
approve of the strategy. It is fair to say that not the whole black community 
was necessarily behind the Selective Patronage Program and the clergy who 
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promoted it. Eventually, the number of black consumers might increase or 
decrease if the ministers were charged and taken to court.228 Usually, three 
weeks were needed for the full effect of Selective Patronage to be felt. 
Sometimes, then the target was a big company with a lot of resources to 
absorb the financial consequences of a boycott, it took longer. A campaign 
against Breyers, the ice-cream company, was faltering until the ministers 
discovered that its products were sold in the public schools. Black students 
were enlisted, and the campaign was won. The ability to identify the 
weakness of the target was matched by the standing and moral authority of 
each minister with his congregation. In order to protect such moral authority, 
the founders of the program decided to appears as if they were not taking 
order from anybody, a minister or a civil rights leader, but eventually from 
God himself; they did not use a formal organization, by-laws, officers, 
treasury, dues, staff. “Selective patronage,” insofar as the congregation of a 
particular church is concerned, could be invoked and revoked only by its 
minister. In the eyes of each congregation, its minister was the leader of the 
program.229  
The Selective Patronage Program in Philadelphia was operated by 400 
ministers, who chose to protect themselves from the threat of lawsuits, and 
in general, from risks and liabilities. The names of the ministers who called 
on the various companies were a matter of public record, but there was a 
different delegation with a different spokesman for each company. No one 
could say who among the ministers belonged to the organizing committee, 
which had no chairman and always met at a different place. Also, the 
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membership of the organizing committee shifted. This type of organization 
was used by the Program in case of potential legal retaliation. The Tasty 
Baking Company consulted both the Chamber of Commerce and its own 
lawyers to see if there was any way to stop the boycott. The conclusion was 
that it was pretty hard to bring a group of unorganized ministers to court. 
Eventually, there was not a clear subject for a lawsuit. However, finding 
someone to suit was as difficult as finding a reason to suit. In fact, 
controversial and arbitrary as the Selective Patronage Program might seem, 
there wasn’t anything illegal or even unethical about it. The ministers were 
simply exercising their democratic right to advise their friends about what to 
buy and what not to buy. Even if they could to be taken to court, this action 
probably would not have helped Tasty’s position within the black 
community. The managers and lawyers of Tasty would have been surprised 
to discover why the apparently unorganized ministers intentionally organized 
themselves this way. The reason was not only to avoid potential liabilities, 
but also to protect themselves from an even more dangerous risk, the 
temptation of power. “Power corrupts, you know the old saying,” said one of 
the ministers. The ministers knew very well that a consistent complaint of 
both liberals and conservatives had been that the black community did not 
do enough for itself, did not exercise enough leadership in solving its own 
problems. These black ministers were certainly exercising leadership, but 
always with the concern that influence can open the door to something 
worse – the temptation of power, and consequently the corruption of the 
soul. This was the reason they did not develop an overt organization with 
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leaders and factions, but pursued a crusade without an official army.  Because 
“we haven’t any heroes to feed on that power, we haven’t any leaders or 
bosses. And we aren’t going to have any. As long as we can make out 
without them, we’ll do fine.”230 Despite black leaders who claimed they had 
no formal leader, national publications (Fortune and The New York Times) 
identified Selective Patronage Program as Reverend Sullivan’s brainchild.   
The ministers were using their buying power and influence to pressure these 
companies into hiring employees they may not have needed at the time. 
Legal repercussions might have included damages due to  slanderous actions 
or attempts to win injunctions against the ministers on the grounds that they 
constitute a conspiracy to retrain trade. To prevent this possibility they 
refrained from using the word “boycott” from the pulpit. In addition, they 
did not literally ask their congregations to boycott the company they were in 
negotiations with, but preferred to make a more vague statement. “I am not 
going to buy any more products from that company until they start hiring 
our people. But it’s up to you to decide whether to do something in this drive 
for Negro freedom.”231 Another main criticism of the Selective Patronage 
Program centered on the rigid deadlines set by the ministers and the lack of 
concern for company problems. The ministers were used to saying, “That’s 
your problem.” However, the ministers’ position on this issue was that if they 
had waited for any of these companies to need that many black employees, 
they would have waited a long time. The ministers pointed out that some 
3,000 young black men and women graduated from Philadelphia high 
schools every year and usually took the jobs that nobody else wanted because 
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they were the last to be chosen. Many of these young people, the ministers 
admitted, were not as highly qualified as they should have been, but even the 
qualified ones had to fight the preconceived idea that they were not qualified. 
This was the moral foundation of their battle and the cornerstone of the 
Selective Patronage Program. On the other hand, nothing illegal was found 
in the corporate hiring policies. The Philadelphia Commission on Human 
Relations (PCHR), a city agency charged with policing the state’s Fair 
Employment Practices Law, investigated the Tasty boycott at the request of 
the Chamber of Commerce and found no illegal discrimination but no 
evidence of positive integration either.232  
Breadbasket Begins 
On Sunday, April 9, 1961, ministers in Philadelphia began the first part of 
what they called the second phase of the Selective Patronage Program which 
was to spread their boycott strategy progressively, first across the state and 
then across the country.233 A few months later, The New York Times reported 
that black clergy were “quietly building a national network to employ 
Negroes’ purchasing power systematically to force concerns that discriminate 
in hiring and promotion to mend their way.”234 The program was supposed 
to be established in every major city with a black population large enough to 
make its buying power felt by local firms. New York City was one of the first 
cities to host the program. The first boycott started in early November 1961. 
In Baltimore, Rev. Robert T. Newbold, chairman of a year-old ministers’ 
movement, reported seven companies had met demands ahead of the 
ministers’ deadline. One company that was balking at the demands of the 
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program was about to be boycotted. After journeying to Philadelphia to 
study the local program, three Detroit ministers organized a boycott 
campaign there. Within a few months, Border Co., the dairy products firm, 
and a local baking company had been boycotted in Detroit.235 Other cities 
ready to host the program were Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and 
Wilmington, and Atlanta, where the program was supposed to start in 
November. In Atlanta in late 1962, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had 
envisioned a multi-city, if not a national, boycott of companies thought to 
discriminate against black people in hiring.236  
When Reverend Sullivan announced his trip to Atlanta, on October 24, 1962, 
King, as President of the S.C.L.C., and Ralph D. Abernathy, as Chairman of 
Operation Bread Basket (at the time, the two words were still separated) sent 
an invitation to a select group of black ministers for a luncheon meeting in 
the dining room at B.B. Beamons’ Restaurant in Atlanta, October 29. Thirty 
leaders from the Atlanta area, Benjamin E. Mays, Julian Bond, Martin Luther 
King, Sr., Andrew Young, and Fred C. Bennette, among the others, were 
invited by letter and phone. In anticipation of this meeting, Reverend John 
Middleton, president of the Atlanta chapter of S.C.L.C., announced 
employment discrimination was the new target of racial bias. He declared 
that the first target-industry would be named at Allen Temple A.M.E. 
Church, in which Reverend Sullivan was scheduled to present an address the 
29th at 8 p.m. Middleton also claimed the new project received full support 
from the national office of S.C.L.C., and finally that Rev. Albernathy had 
been appointed as chairman of the project. The meeting, sponsored by the 
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Atlanta chapter of S.C.L.C. and scheduled on October 29, was built around 
the presence of Reverend Sullivan, “the architect of the Philadelphia 
Selective Buying program which resulted in the employment of over a 
thousand Negroes in white collar jobs”237 
In the previous two months, Abernathy and other pastors conducted a study 
on job discrimination in the Atlanta area discovering that “many, many 
industries with a high percentage of Negro patronage … hire Negro for 
menial tasks only or not at all.” Abernathy and Sullivan wrote a statement 
just before the event, “if we buy their product then we want some job.”238 
The event at Allen Temple A.M.E. Church was preceded by a series of 
meetings during the day to familiarize key leaders and organizations in 
Atlanta with the details of the program. The ministers heard of the poor 
results of negotiations toward “equalization of employment” by a committee 
of black businessmen over the previous two years that resulted in little else 
than promises to do better.239 “This program can only be successful with 
broad community support and especially the cooperation of the clergy,” 
emphasized Abernathy.240   
At the luncheon, Rev. Sullivan graciously conceded that the idea of the 
boycott originated in Montgomery, Alabama. The Montgomery Bus Boycott 
had officially started on December 1, 1955, when the black citizens of 
Montgomery, Alabama decided that they would boycott the city buses until 
they could sit anywhere they wanted, instead of being relegated to the back 
when a white person boarded. During the boycott, the group leading the 
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boycott program that called itself the Montgomery Improvement 
Association,  met with officials and lawyers from the bus company, as well as 
the city commissioners, to present a moderate desegregation plan. During the 
year-long boycott, however, some members of Montgomery’s business 
community became frustrated with the Montgomery Improvement 
Association for costing them thousands of dollars because blacks were less 
likely to shop in downtown stores. Although they were as opposed to 
integration as other white Montgomery residents, they realized that the 
boycott was bad for business, and therefore wanted the boycott to end. They 
formed a group called the Men of Montgomery and tried negotiating directly 
with the boycotters. Eventually, however, these discussions broke down, and 
the boycott continued. 
The Montgomery Boycott was an event of greater scale and historical 
relevance than the Selective Patronage Program. Focusing not on the 
outputs, but rather on the nature and aim of the two programs, they were 
subtly different from one another. The latter was a voluntary, self-promoted 
and premature example of affirmative action. It implicitly showed the idea of 
self-development that became prominent later, during the age of Black 
Power. The former was a voluntary, self-promoted and self-organized 
boycott, specifically interested in promoting human dignity and self-respect 
based on race, in response to the indignity inflicted on black citizens by 
limiting where they could sit on a bus. There was no seek of practical 
advantage or final return from the boycott in Montgomery other than a sense 
of self-esteem, pride and the good feeling that naturally and inevitably come 
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together when a downtrodden group becomes a winner in a race conflict in 
the deep South. Although Sullivan had been concerned with respect and 
dignity, he showed a more practical, concrete point of view. His main goal 
had been to assure black men not pride but a source of income, not more 
self-esteem but more jobs. Even when Sullivan had been focused on 
“sensitive” jobs, his intention was not merely to provide pride and respect to 
the black community, but to offer opportunity to a few ambitious young 
well-trained blacks. His approach was less universal, more specific and more 
tangible. Another difference between the two campaigns was in the area of 
casualties and damages. The Montgomery Boycott produced negative 
economic effects for the bus companies, but this was definitely a secondary 
effect of the campaign. The Selective Patronage Program had been 
established to produce economic retaliation. Economic damage was part of 
the program, it stayed at its very core, and was included in the plan as a way 
to obtain results.  
However, the Montgomery boycott had been inspirational in another sense, 
in that it added black clergy to the existing Civil Rights leadership (union 
labors, black activists, white liberals). Soon after the end of the Montgomery 
protest, black clergymen began to draft similar campaigns in Tallahassee, 
Florida, Birmingham, Alabama,  and Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.241 In 
February 1957, King was appointed president of the S.C.L.C., and the 
preaching of nonviolent resistance and protest became mainstream in the 
struggle for racial equality. Not surprisingly, Aldon Morris, author of the 
seminal The Origins of the Civil Rights Movements, refers to the S.C.L.C. as a 
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church-related protest organization.242 The S.C.L.C. leveraged the 
infrastructure of the Black Church on behalf of local movements that 
emerged across the South during the late 1950s, linking them into a region-
wide organization of organizations.243 The involvement of the Black Church 
in the African America freedom movement provided an infrastructure of 
leaders economically independent, a mass of supporters, financial resources, 
and support for logistics. But more importantly, the Black Church offered 
moral capital and a justification for civil disobedience. As American society is 
“based on law, rather than on passion and power,” at least according to 
historian Chappell, and has always had difficulties “in coping with political 
movements that challenge its most basic assumptions,” the clergy provided a 
Bible-based commitment to a cause as an impeccable moral justification to 
break the law.244 As King has stated after a bomb had exploded in front of 
his house (January 30, 1956), “What we are doing is just and God is with 
us.”245 The alignment of the movement with Christian values was a way to 
profess faith and to acknowledge a religious identity and also a means to 
protect the activists from the accusation of being communist.246 Years later, a 
close aide of King, Andrew Young, would have explained that “everything 
we did was considered Communist. I think almost to survive we tended to 
phrase everything in religious terms and to avoid issues that smacked of 
economic change.”247 In other words, King and the other religious leaders 
were able to shift the conversation from passivity and accommodation, 
which had become equivalent to cooperation with evil to protest and 
resistance, which became synonyms for good will and justice. They 
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transformed a wrong into a virtue and a right into a sin. It was a remarkable 
turnaround. 
Breadbasket Grows 
Thirty ministers representing five Ministerial Unions met soon after the 
launch of Operation Bread Basket at the Tabernacle Baptist Church to 
continue plans for establishing the program. Four hundred black ministers 
sponsored the program on November 7. Ministers of twelve denominations 
pledged to work together in a manner similar to that employed by the black 
clergy in Philadelphia, to “no longer cooperate (sic!) with practices of 
employment which were essentially evil.” Rev. Abernathy served in the 
capacity of “call man” (or chairman) for the meetings of the Priority 
Committee providing direction to the project. Decisions were made at 
weekly meetings of the Priority Committee and the strategy for the coming 
negotiations were hashed out. Abernathy was assisted in his task by Rev. 
John Middleton and Rev. J.D. Grier.248 The ministers stated that they “cannot 
remain silent while our members (of the Church) are victimized by such 
unfair and immoral practices.” “The time has now come – they added – for 
us to act vecause (sic) God does not will for any of his children to be cast 
into an inferior role simply because of the color he gave them.”249 The initial 
concern focused on black girls with one or two years of college training 
working as maids and black young men with college diplomas, sorting mail at 
the Post Office, or other such menial labor. The ministers were also worried 
about the hundreds of black youth dropping out of school every year in 
disgust, even if they were trained, because they were not able to get decent 
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jobs beyond the level of menial servitude. On their first visit to Colonial 
Bakery, they found that there were 55 black employees in a work force of 
275. The black employees were confined to jobs in the sanitation and dish 
washing departments, with one or two in the garage and shipping 
departments. A negotiation committee of seven members (six pastors and 
Dr. Hattie McCoy Hightower) met, for a second time, with the management 
of Colonial Bakery in the first half of November. The negotiation committee 
was acting on behalf of the priority committee. It was the priority committee 
that suggested the number of new black employees to Colonial Bakery, and 
what those roles should be. Specifically, they  asked for 18 additional black 
hires - six in the offices, eight in the production department, and four in the 
distribution and stale bread department. The management of Colonial Bakery 
accepted the request without further negotiations.250 
For the Atlanta Baking Company, maker of Betsy Ross and Sunbeam Breads, 
the Negotiation Committee followed the same process. The Atlanta Baking 
Company employed a total of 215 workers but only 70 of them were black. 
None of them worked in the offices or as route salesmen. Consequently, the 
negotiation committee of Breadbasket asked for eight new jobs, one at the 
office and seven in the sales department. At Southern Bakery, 70 black 
people were employed out of a total of 235 employees. Similarly, black 
workers had no access to the offices or the sales department. Breadbasket 
asked management to consider hiring 15 new black employees, four in the 
office and sales department, and the rest in the production, maintenance, and 
relay departments. The management was granted a two-week period to reply 
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to the proposal in writing. The ministers also negotiated with Merita Bakery, 
which at the time was employing only 30 black people out of a total work 
force of more than 200 employees. Their intention was to gain 16 new jobs 
for black workers.251  
While Breadbasket’s operations were growing and the list of potential targets 
was increasing, the organization set up its internal roles and rules. 
Breadbasket was initially directed by Fred C. Bennette, Jr., who was a 
personal friend of the King family, and also served as interim pastor (1964-
1965) of the Mount Welcome Baptist Church which was then located in the 
Pittsburg community of Atlanta. The S.C.L.C. had been considered the 
operational arm of the Black Church.252 The leadership of the program, 
Bennette, Abernathy, Middleton, and the other clergymen, came from the 
ranks of the Black Church which as a practical matter, provided the 
infrastructure, paid the bills, and brought people in to manage the program. 
The Black Church played a monumental role in the initial phase of the 
operations of Breadbasket. Since Breadbasket was modeled on the Selective 
Patronage Program, it adopted the same rules, the same process, and the 
same philosophy. A sort of to-do list was prepared and distributed to 
ministers involved with Breadbasket. Starting with the assumption that 
“unfair employment practices” posed a moral issue, these were the 
instructions:  
1. In speaking of the movement, use “Selective Buying” instead of 
boycott. 
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2. To avoid questions about the leaders of the movement, no 
special person or persons are leaders. Every minister is a leader.  
3. Make no statements to the press, including press releases. Refer 
all requests for news statements to the Call Men. 
4. Be sure the information which you follow comes from the 
Priority Committee. Written notices will be mailed at regular 
times.  
5. Make no contacts with companies but report any contacts made 
by companies to you to the Priority Committee.  
6. Please attend all meetings when called or notified. 
7. Urge your congregation to apply for jobs when openings are 
made known.  
8. Keep notices before your congregations weekly by making 
announcements from the pulpit and including inserts in the 
church bulletin. For example: “Watch for notices on Operation 
Breadbasket. For information, contact your minister.253 
Breadbasket was shaped as a program to acquire and up-grade current jobs 
of black citizens in the bread industries (it would enlarge its scope later). At 
Highland Bakery, 32 black people were employed out of a total of 149. 
Twenty-five of them were working in the production department. The 
negotiation committee of Breadbasket asked for eight new hires, six in 
offices and the sales department, and two in production.254 Established to 
promote nondiscrimination practices in the workplace, Breadbasket 
inevitably shifted into promoting the practice of preferential treatment.  
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Something went wrong with the negotiations with Colonial Bakery, as on 
November 30, 1962, all ministers were urged to participate in a meeting at 
West Mitchell Street C.M.E. Church at 575 W. Mitchell St. They were invited 
to “hear the final report of the Negotiating Committee and decide whether 
or not we can in good conscience, continue to buy Colonial Bread or 
whether we must tell our congregations to buy some other kind of bread 
until Colonial begins a fair hiring policy.” The resistance of the corporate 
management did not last long. Already in January 1963, the company had 
agreed to promote 18 black employees into jobs not previously held by black 
workers, providing a combined income of $80,000.255 Negotiations were 
more successful with Southern Bakery. On February 10, 1963, the company 
had accepted all the employment requests of Breadbasket and 400 black 
ministers announced the news to their congregations and asked them to 
cancel plans for a selective buying campaign. The company agreed to 
promote 15 black employees into new positions. This was the second time a 
company had met all of Breadbasket’s requests.256 Negotiations were also 
successful with Atlanta Baking Company. Not only the management of the 
corporation accept the request to hire eight new black employees, one at the 
office and seven in the sales department, it also granted the Negotiation 
Committee’s request and desegregated restroom and lunchroom facilities and 
also agreed to a non-discriminatory hiring policy in the future.257 According 
to Rev. Grier, “many people in Atlanta will rest better because of this 
agreement. The management of Atlanta Bakery can go to bed with a 
tremendous burden lifted from their conscience, and eight Negro families 
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will sleep with the assurance that their children will have an opportunity for a 
wholesome upbringing.”258 The Rev. J.D. Grier of Fort Street Methodist 
Church reported on the successful negotiation with the corporation. The 
nine members of the Negotiation Committee were delighted – he said – that 
they were able to help the management of the company to realize its 
responsibility to its black customers.  
Slowly, Breadbasket increased traction, and a few months later, in March 
1963, the total number of additional jobs for black people had already 
reached 65. More surprising was the amount of  additional income added to 
the black community - $275,000.00. Five bakeries Merita Bakery, Southern, 
Sunbeam, Highland, and Colonial had accepted the requests to employ black 
workers. The list of jobs were included shipping and sales departments, as 
well as in engineering and office positions. New employees in the sales 
department were entitled to a salary of more than $6,000, while the 
employees in the shipping department were earning almost half of that.259 
This acceptance did not come without resistance on the part of the bakeries, 
and mobilization on the part of Breadbasket. Four hundred ministers from 
Atlanta and the vicinity were involved in the  selective patronage of Highland 
Bakery, Inc. in January 1963. The Negotiation Committee of Breadbasket 
had tried to obtain improved job opportunities for black workers for five 
weeks, but apparently the company refused to collaborate in the employment 
of qualified black workers. Actually, the management replied to the request 
for hiring eight people that one black worker had been already hired and 
another one upgraded to a better job, and that further requests for changes 
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would be met with fewer jobs for black workers. The Negotiation 
Committee considered this result unsatisfactory and concluded that it had 
been unable to reach an agreement. The pastors involved in the negotiation 
reportedly told the bakery firm officials that “we do not feel that we are 
asking too much for this company to hire more Negroes, since they come 
into our community and sell their products and furnish baking goods to 
chain stores that are patronized by Negroes. We only ask that they respect us 
as they respect our dollars.”260 Contemporary ministers were informed about 
the situation, and asked to invite their congregations to join Breadbasket and 
stop “buying bread, cookies and cakes” in a place where they cannot get a 
job without discrimination.” The inevitable consequence was to ask black 
people to not buy from Highland, as the company “does not treat Negros 
fairly about jobs; they have been asked to do so; they have refused.” 
Apparently the invitation was widely accepted and Highland surrounded. A 
meeting was called at the end of the month to update both the black 
ministers and their congregations about Highland and incoming negotiations 
with other bakeries, and also to ask for an offering from ministers’ churches 
to help pay off some of the expenses of the program.261 Finally, a selected 
delegation of ministers picketed the Highland Bakery for a couple of hours.262 
Although these initial successes were outstanding, the ministers made it clear 
that they did not look upon these results as the solution of the discrimination 
problem in hiring and promoting that black people faced in Atlanta. “Rather 
– one minister explained – we see these (results) as minimal requests. Their 
fulfillment demonstrates the good-will of the companies at this point but we 
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will continue our efforts for equal employment of all races.”263 Dr. Abernathy 
added that “we can only consider this a beginning.” The black community “is 
in a desperate situation as far as employment is concerned. With automation 
and its effects on the unskilled worker, the Negro must not continually be 
deprived of job opportunity and advancement. The unemployment situation 
is critical enough as it is, and for it to assume a strictly racial character might 
be a dilemma serious enough to shatter the very foundations of democracy. 
We cannot let this happen to our people or to our country.”264 The scope 
was limited in size primarily because resources were very limited. 
Breadbasket’s operations were made by a peripatetic network of pastors, no 
more than fifty ministers always busy in meetings, lunches and dinners, 
permanently engaged in discussion of strategies, boycotts and negotiations. 
The flux of communications, letters, announcements and press releases was 
constant. The excitement of the involved clergy was high, and so was the 
motivation to be part of this project, coupled with a serious, disciplined 
organizational posture, as the method used in this project was crucial. For 
example, the communications to the companies were following a precise 
order: the draft, the typed copy, the revised typed copy of the invitation 
letter. Then the amended revised typed copy, the list of recipients, and the 
new list of recipients with the revised addresses and phone numbers.265 
Breadbasket’s scope was limited in size also because the black preachers did 
not share a business mindset. They did not count new black employees by 
thousands of jobs and new income for black families by millions of dollars. 
In a time of economic growth and affluence, a few new people employed 
153 
 
might not seem enough to make a difference. These pastors, however, shared 
a different, specific mindset. As every new convert to Christianity is 
important, so every job counts. This religious attitude was evident in their 
dialogues with white managers, during meetings discussing the possibility of 
more jobs for black workers. The notes from these meetings show that, in a 
time of material prosperity, economic justice and racial equality was not a 
generally accepted value. In the first half of the Sixties, Atlanta was in a 
period of unique growth and development; the city was rapidly becoming a 
leader among the nation’s Sunbelt cities. The metropolitan Atlanta 
population was increasing by 30,000 a year. The central problem was that 
blacks were not sharing proportionally in Georgia’s civic boom. The average 
income of a black family in Atlanta was less than half of the average white 
family’s $6,350. Atlanta’s 200,000 Blacks represented 40% of the population 
but lived on 24% of the residential land.266 Consequently, the preachers 
involved in Breadbasket preferred avoiding triumphal rhetoric, knowing too 
well the other side of the economic growth, the desperation and defeat and 
poverty of the African Americans. The notes of these meeting between white 
corporate executives and black ministers also showed the degree of 
misunderstanding between the two sides, the level of verbal abuse from one 
side, and patience on the other. The black ministers had needed to immerse 
themselves in the study of payroll policy and financial forecast, decide on 
business strategies and corporate protocols, and stop short of rejecting 
explicit expressions of superiority. They had moments when they saw 
themselves as working for Breadbasket in vain; they had moments when they 
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knew how desperately black men and families needed their help. And yet 
there was a sort of disciplined passion, a religious hope in the ultimate aim of 
the program, and a hardened faith in God’s will. From this perspective, 
Breadbasket and its boycotts were considered a means of moral persuasion. 
Despite the lack of resources and business mindset, Breadbasket slowly 
expanded from Atlanta to the rest of Georgia: Albany, Augusta, Camilla, 
Columbus, Dawson, Macon, Riceboro, Sylvania, Tifton, and Waycross. It 
also tried to cross the border and operate in Alabama (Birmingham), South 
Carolina (Greensville), and Virginia (Petersburg). For a couple of years, a 
chapter of Breadbasket was active in Tallahassee, selecting targets and 
maintaining a connection with the main office in Atlanta.267  
The Selective Patronage Program and Breadbasket presented significant 
similarities and differences. The most important similarity was that they both 
did not try to target federal government contractors. They did not leverage 
the Executive Order 10925, and preferred instead to focus their attention on 
companies – no matter the size, international, national or local – with a 
strong local base. Another similarity is that for both programs – as King said 
once – “it is all a matter of the margin of profit and loss over against the 
buying of the Negro community.”268 Plus, both programs were not limited in 
scope. Initially Breadbasket decided to challenge one type of food producer - 
the bakery, and only later expanded its activities to other fresh food grocery 
chains. In a report written in April 1965, Breadbasket Executive Director 
Fred Bennette assesses the state of the art of the program. While reviewing 
the history of the program, from inception to date, he reported that in 
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February 1965, Breadbasket had started negotiating with Ford Motor 
Company, and 115 workers were hired, representing an increase of $525,000 
per year in salaries. The agreement also guaranteed a minimum wage of $100 
per week, a decent amount at that time (for example, janitors were making 
$2.82 an hour, working at night). Also, important department store chains 
such as Rich’s, Davidson’s, Sears, and Kessler’s were approached by 
Breadbasket, and more than 250 people were hired or  had their positions 
upgraded. Variety store chains such as K-Mart, Kress, HL Green, 
Newberry’s, and John Bargain Stores also agreed to hire and promote black 
workers. Coca Cola and other soft drinks companies finally agreed to the 
hiring of 11 black workers as driver salesmen - workers who drove and acted 
as salesmen, a well paid and respectful job - and in the case of Pepsi Cola, the 
increase in income went completely to black employees. Following the path 
of Selective Patronage, Breadbasket also contacted Gulf Oil and signed an 
agreement for hiring three sale representatives which included the use of an 
automobile, while meetings at Avon Cosmetics’ headquarter in New York 
and with Bell Telephone were scheduled to continue pressing for more and 
better jobs. Selective Patronage was less overtly religious in its approach. The 
program targeted one company after another, and one industry after another, 
gas and oil, soft drinks, cakes and pies. It was the power of buying of the 
black community that was used as leverage more than anything else. 
While the two programs shared the same strategies and goals with both 
Sullivan and King fighting against discrimination in the workplace, what was 
emphasized was quite different. The Selective Patronage Program was 
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ultimately a program for the creation of human capital, as it dealt with the 
problems of the blacks with special reference to the training, utilization, and 
deployment of human potential, as well as the emphasizing the importance 
of advanced training. The program paid attention to the role of black 
educational institutions in the formation of human potential, in the same way 
Booker T. Washington had stressed intermediate-level manpower needs in 
his educational philosophy of vocational and technical education. In fact, 
Rev. Sullivan soon moved the Selective Patronage Program from boycotts to 
training activities, realizing that convincing corporations to hire black 
employees was only the beginning – and not the end – of his job. Once 
hired, people needed to be trained. Even better, to be hired at higher levels 
than they  usually they – i.e., office assistants, administrators, etc. – they 
needed training in advance. Although the companies might be forced to hire 
black people through a range of sources of persuasion, they would have 
welcomed these new employees if they thought the new employees were well 
educated enough to feel at home in a corporate environment, and to know 
the rudiments of the job they were going to do. Rev. Sullivan himself became 
a board member of GM, the car manufacturing giant. The move resonated 
naturally. The ultimate success of the boycott activity was to incorporate into 
internal corporate processes that it was the norm to hire people without 
discrimination. In other words, the final goal of the boycotts was to make 
minority hiring an established rule, a permanent posture of Human 
Resources strategies. Once this goal was achieved, boycotts became obsolete. 
Civil Rights leaders and corporate executives moved from confrontation to 
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cooperation, and it was reasonable that they looked to keep their dialogue 
going. With this continuing aim, the Board of Directors was the perfect place 
for Rev. Sullivan. It was far enough removed from daily practice of the 
company to give its members a detached perspective on the situation, and 
allowed the board to retain the responsibility for the major decisions that 
affected the life and the future of the company. It was a small group of 
people who shared the privilege of managing corporate governance, and it 
also provided an opportunity for Civil Rights leaders to have direct access to 
information and exercise control over decision-making in progress. However, 
Reverend Sullivan was instantaneously transformed into an insider by 
moving onto the Board of GM. This was not the path chosen by 
Breadbasket. During its history of protests, boycotts and negotiations in 
Atlanta, and also when the program went national, Breadbasket insisted on 
remaining outside the perimeter of the corporate world. It was successful 
enough to force the corporations it approached, and sometimes harassed, to 
hire black people. Later, it escalated its spectrum of activities but always 
maintained a distinct character, not necessary radical, though confrontational. 
While Breadbasket never wooed corporate executives, it frequently allied 
itself with labor unions. Bennette reported boycotts, marches and protests in 
cooperation with labor unions for the sake of labor and Civil Rights 
advancement. Breadbasket coordinated a mass march in Atlanta, Albany, and 
Columbus, and formed an Alliance for Social Economic and Political 
progress with labor unions such as AFL-CIO (local and state branches), the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Laundry Workers, International 
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Labor Union, ICWU, the AFC-CIO Civil Rights Department, the Printing 
Pressmen Union (locally), Worker’s Circle, the State Country, the Municipal 
Imperial Union, and many others. The purpose of these alliances was 
primarily to coordinate activities of labor and Civil Rights organizations in 
order to provide training for job employment and other capacities.269 During 
1965, the S.C.L.C., Breadbasket, and the unions, worked together for months 
against the Scripto plant in Georgia, in which 700 employee out of 900 were 
blacks. The case is an exemplar as Scripto was one of the country’s leading 
manufacturers of pens, pencils and cigarette lighters, and involved leaders 
such as Hosea Williams, Reverend C.T Vivian, and Randolph Blackwell 
(S.C.L.C. Director of Political Education, Director of Affiliates, and Program 
Director). The case is an exemplar also because the boycott was initially local 
but became national within a few days, and the activism was not motivated 
by the intention to increase employment opportunities for black workers but 
to counter an abusive attitude pursued by the company’s management. For 
example, when an election was held by Scripto employees to determine if 
they wanted to be represented by a union, and the employees decided to 
support the union, the company filed a legal objection based on the 
argument that the black employees were not in their sober mind. The 
company argued that black workers were carried away because of the 
bombing in Birmingham and the March on Washington. Their minds, the 
company contended, were confused because black ministers were preaching 
from their pulpits that if the employees were for the authorization of the 
union, and they did not sign the authorization paperwork, then they were 
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branded as “Uncle Toms.”270 Breadbasket also built direct relationships with 
state representatives and pursued federal and state jobs. In January 1965, 
Bennette met Georgia Governor Carl E. Sanders and asked for jobs for black 
workers as department heads as well as on boards, agencies and committees. 
During the same period, Breadbasket held a conference with Mrs. Bruce 
Schaefer, director of the State Department of Family and Children Services, 
Georgia, to appoint blacks to the advisory board, and to the Anti-Poverty 
Program at the state level.271  
Gradually Breadbasket enlarged its scope, from job hiring to job promotion, 
and finally became, effectively, the economic arm of the S.C.L.C. Whenever 
an economic aim was at stake, the S.C.L.C. engaged Breadbasket as its 
economic arm, usually alone, but sometimes in cooperation with other 
religious institutions, but rarely with labor unions. In fact, locally, 
Breadbasket pursued the same type of relationships with labor unions that 
the S.C.L.C. maintained at the national level. King and the leadership of the 
S.C.L.C. still believed that Civil Rights organizations, labor unions, and 
eventually the federal government – once forced to take action – could bring 
justice to black people and make a difference in the economic realm. Of 
course, at the local level, the S.C.L.C. was free to assume a more aggressive 
posture and be more antagonistic with the state bureaucracy and corporate 
executives. In spite of the somewhat antagonistic stance taken by the 
S.C.L.C., the meetings and conferences with the Georgia state representatives 
do show a positive intention and constructive approach. Breadbasket’s 
decision to try to build common ground with politicians indicates a desire to 
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progress with its work, in spite of the segregationist tendencies shown by 
those politicians. On the other hand, the fight with corporate executives was 
brutal. Before committing to hire and promote 60 black workers, Sears used 
the issue of race against Dr. King and Breadbasket. On April 28, 1965, 
speaking at the third biennial Institute on Corporate Law in Atlanta, Robert 
Wood, counsel for the company’s southern territory and a long-time leader in 
community relations work in Atlanta, accused Breadbasket of unfair labor 
practices under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Wood said that a literal 
interpretation of the law would result in the program (he also mentioned the 
S.C.L.C. and Dr. King by name) being defined as an employment agency. As 
an employment agency, Breadbasket would be prohibited from seeking 
employment for persons on the basis of race. He added that, at least 
theoretically, an executive who had been approached with demands to hire 
blacks, could appeal to the Fair Employment Opportunities Commission 
against unfair labor practices and, if unsatisfied there, could institute a court 
suit as an injured party. Wood ignited a tense debate at the conference and in 
the media after his remark, given that – when a literal interpretation was 
applied to the definition in 701-C – virtually every Civil Rights organization 
in the country would be classified as an employment agency, since all were 
concerned in varying degrees with securing employment for black workers. 
Worse, as employment agencies, they were expressly forbidden by section 
703-B of Title VII, “to classify or refer for employment any individual on the 
basis of his [sic!] race.”272 Although Sears did not follow up on Wood’s 
remark with a lawsuit, the comment was powerful enough to put 
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Breadbasket on the defensive, as it was able to connect the race-conscious 
character of Breadbasket and the color-blind attitude of Title VII, and use 
the historic Civil Rights Act against the movement itself. This incident 
showed the S.C.L.C.’s internal contradiction between the universalistic 
approach adopted at the national level and race-conscious local activism. The 
bottom line in 1965 was that the rights-based strategy of the S.C.L.C. was 
caught in a paradoxical situation and demonstrated signs of exhaustion as a 
result.  
The paradoxical situation was even more marked as Breadbasket never 
showed independence from the S.C.L.C. or assumed autonomous 
governance. The same pastors who were engaged with Breadbasket were also 
involved in other branches and activities of the S.C.L.C.. The S.C.L.C. 
executive team, King and eventually Abernathy and Andy Young, were also 
active in Breadbasket, or at least in supervising it. Bennette was working part-
time with Breadbasket, and part-time with his congregation, and he 
occasionally acted as Dr. King’s personal body guard. Breadbasket crossed 
the borders of Florida and Alabama, but never really became a national 
program, or even a program that covered the whole South. Although 
Bennette claimed that Breadbasket had built liaisons outside Georgia, the 
program remained confined to the Peach State. Its achievements were 
important, but not big enough to make a real difference in black 
unemployment. It provided new jobs but only a small number, and the effect 
on corporate workplaces was nominal at best. Not surprisingly, the program 
never reached the front pages of the national newspapers and received 
162 
 
coverage only at the local level. When exported to the North, it was a far-
from successful program. Breadbasket was the S.C.L.C.’s only real economic 
program; full of promise, but still in its infancy after four years in operation.  
The clergymen were brave enough to challenge the executives, risk lawsuits, 
and accept the consequences, but they were not in search of power, only 
justice. They wanted to promote equality by convincing the corporate world 
to do the right thing, stop discriminating, and act according to the Scriptures. 
Their motivation was practical, but not substantial enough, as they preferred 
to remain at a symbolic level, promoting a “redeeming the soul of corporate 
America” type of mission, which was deeply influenced by the social gospel 
and prophetic religion. Consequently, as a color-conscious program, 
Breadbasket never acted militantly, never showed the nerve required to move 
the program to the next level, and didn’t manage to meet these expectations 
with practical results. It is not the case that King, despite his constant and 
public appreciation of Breadbasket, still believed that unemployment could 
only be eradicated by the federal government through a huge infusion of 
capital. Therefore, by the spring of 1966, the black clergymen involved in 
Breadbasket still constituted an itinerant group, traveling the state of Georgia 
by car, and setting up Breadbasket campaigns and offices in cities and 
counties. They were engaged in more than just protests against racial 
injustice, as they also developed their own particular set of emotional 
valuation and expression inspired by the biblical tradition of prophetic 
religion. Rather than adopting the traditional escapist posture of the Black 
Church, the predominantly other-worldly outlook of the black clergy, they 
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shared their sense of connection with the biblical story, and the 
eschatological vision of the black community of a better world in this life. 
They believed that the Kingdom of God can’t be in heaven if it is not also on 
earth. 
Prophetic Religion 
Back at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church 
of Waycross, the call man, Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., took his place at the 
center of the group and called for the reading of the minutes of the previous 
meeting. The previous meeting had been held in Augusta, on April 21, at the 
Williams Memorial Christian Methodist Episcopal (C.M.E.) Church.273 In the 
previous meeting, the long liturgy of the first hymn, the prayer, and the 
second hymn had been accomplished. Finally, the first verse of psalm 133 
had been read and Reverend J.E. Ross had provided the related sermon. The 
sermon was not written, and Rev. Ross had simply elaborated on the basis of 
his familiarity with the Scriptures.  
The minutes were read and approved with minor corrections. Then, different 
pastors – Rev. Otis Smith, Rev. Ross (Waycross), and Rev. Bennette, among 
others – presented the updates of Breadbasket in different cities: Augusta, 
Albany, Waycross, Macon, and Atlanta. Five or more black people would be 
employed in Augusta, three in Albany (and another two received Social 
Security), four in Macon, and finally no new jobs in Atlanta, but several other 
bits of good news. No news from Waycross, Columbus, Jesup, and 
Savannah. The level of employment of black workers at companies like 
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Standard Oil, the Southern Bell Telephone Co., Georgia Power Co., Atlanta 
Gas Light Co., Georgia Telecom Co., Georgia Department of Welfare, and 
finally the Georgia State office for Employment and the Marine Corps 
Logistics Base in Albany were reviewed. The gap between the total number 
of employees and the number of black employees in the same companies had 
been revealed and discussed. At the end of discussion, Rev. Bennette had 
tried to capture the feeling of the whole group. Bennette was tall and 
naturally muscular. Previously, he had taken advantage of his size to act as an 
improvised body guard for his friend Martin Luther King, Jr., and defended 
him from potential attacks from the crowd or from harassment from the 
police during events and marches.274 However, despite his size, which might 
be intimidating to some, Bennette was gifted with an open, friendly, sunny 
smile, and his presence radiated peace and solidarity. He stood up and talked 
passionately about the moral implications of the job he and the other pastors 
were doing through Breadbasket. In his speech, he had created a connection 
between the black adults who found a job and the aspirations of young black 
people, who were still at school or hoped to one day work. He built a link 
between visibility and inspiration, the visibility of a society where job 
discrimination was erased, or at least reduced. Black people can be employed 
and have careers, receive decent salaries, raise families in desegregated 
neighborhoods, live in nice houses, send their kids to school, offering them 
new possibilities, and finally provide a source of inspiration. What he and the 
other pastors were doing was not just providing some work opportunities to 
a few African American men, they were trying to offer hope, provide 
165 
 
leadership and build a different mindset. The second link between 
identification and aspiration is directly related to the idea that the next 
generation have the hope and ambition to move forward from the hardships 
endured by their parents, that young people can leave poor, rural 
neighborhoods and urban ghettos, and build a life of economic stability and 
racial integration. Facing job segregation, and the pain of racial harassment, 
young blacks shared the  need to identify with engaged, hardworking, savvy 
black parents. Having a job was good for blacks, not only because it provided 
a salary and ultimately economic health to their families, but also because it 
reinforced their dignity and self-esteem. A job made black people feel more 
comfortable about the availability of opportunities for them in society, as 
well as encouraging them to be self-confident, hopeful of a better future, and 
better integrated into the American mainstream. 
Most of the people at the meeting had a dual commitment; they were pastors 
at their congregations, and they were Civil Rights activists. As pastors, they 
were involved in pastoral work, maintenance of social and economic 
infrastructures, and provided for the spiritual, and some personal needs of 
the members of their congregations. As Civil Rights activists, they were 
involved in boycotts for the sake of job desegregation. They had two loves: 
the church and the Civil Rights Movement. In fact, their involvement in the 
Civil Rights Movement was an extension of their call to the ministry. They 
agreed with Martin Luther King, Jr., when he proclaimed that “our church is 
becoming militant, stressing the social gospel as well as a gospel of personal 
salvation.”275 They saw their practical, concrete efforts to pressure white-
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owned and managed companies to hire black people through the eyes of the 
Bible. Divine Providence was at work to restore health to the earth, and a 
prophetic religion deals in realities. In fact, their commitment was not based 
on some sort of secular ethical vision or a liberal faith in human and social 
progress. They did not simply feel they needed to be on the right side of 
history. It was not the rightness of their actions that made them so 
exceptionally sure of the final triumph against injustice and racism. It was 
their Christian faith, the granitic conviction that God was on their side 
because, as King had pointed out years earlier, “God is on the side of truth 
and love and justice.”276 With God on their side, the redemptive aim of the 
movement was guaranteed. The walls of discrimination that divided blacks 
from the American dream would fall like the walls of Jericho after Joshua‘s 
Israelite army marched around the city blowing their trumpets: “Joshua fit 
the battle of Jericho, and walls came a-tumblin’ down.”277 The movement 
was a “divine gift,” the theological locus of God’s work in history.278  
“God is working in history to bring about this new age,” King stated in 1956 
during the Montgomery Improvement Association campaign.279 This new 
age, the fall of the “old order” and the emergence of the “new age,” was a 
kairological moment, the time when God acts (Mark 1:15, the kairos is 
fulfilled). It is when God breaks into human history, and the chronological, 
linear sequence of time is disrupted, that something special happens. It is a 
“time of urgent and providential election,” the appointed time in the purpose 
of God, a “moment of grace” that gives a sense of urgency and commitment 
to the lives of Christians.280 They did not share the hope that voluntary, 
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gradual progress and the spread of education and economic development 
would ever undo the evils of segregation and disfranchisement. They had 
identified themselves with “prophetic religion,” that is, with (a few) prophetic 
black leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., who rejected the liberal view that 
moderation would inevitably gain racial justice.281 In fact, Prophetic religion is 
contrapuntal and accompanies religious crisis. It appears during crisis, in 
periods of transition from one age to another.  
Prophetic religion is a religion of prophets and a church of charismatic 
ministry. These prophetic Civil Rights leaders had embraced public contempt 
while rejecting worldly comforts, recognition and “success,” and this was a 
source of inspiration for their followers, and the hidden force of solidarity 
and self-sacrifice. As prophetic figures, they had assumed the same posture as 
the Hebrew prophets, shared the same pessimism about the general tendency 
of the institutions of the society in which they lived, and the same skepticism 
of their society’s pretensions to justice. They did not merely attack the 
culture of their oppressors. They had to separate themselves from their 
society—often from their families and churches. To stand apart from one’s 
own community is crucial to the Prophetic life. Not surprisingly, the 
prophetic Civil Rights leaders distanced themselves from mainstream society 
as well as from the institutional church.282 They might not have intentionally 
embraced a “charismatic opposed to institutional” viewpoint in which the 
charismatic ministry stands as the justice seeking arm of the church, and the 
institutional ministry as a moderate, accommodating, even false, failed and 
unchristian force in the church, but they felt short.283  
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Of course, they belong to the same Black Church that, since the beginning, 
has been the primary community institution owned and controlled by blacks 
themselves. This was a safe island of organized economic and social life in a 
hostile world dominated by white supremacy combined with abusive racism. 
In fact, traditional black preachers typically preach about heaven and propose 
a “compensatory” service, the church as a spiritual retreat, or alternatively, a 
community-centered institution, which became a refuge in a hostile, 
segregated, and racist social environment.284 Historically, black preachers had 
appeared more interested in discussing Scripture’s passages than in talking 
about civic or political issues. They embraced a basically nonmilitant 
orientation of the church that dismisses political action and – according to 
the célèbre scholar Frazier - accepted “the sufferings and injustices of this 
world as temporary and transient.”285 Black preachers were used to dealing 
with an unjust, racist world and to pointing out that the world is sick, not 
their congregations. Of course, they sought funds for their families and 
congregations, because they believed you can’t have people isolated on these 
lonely islands of poverty in this sea of prosperity.286 However, they sought 
funds using the classic posture of the apostles. That is, that you first seek the 
Kingdom of God and all these things will be given unto you. On the 
contrary, these preachers at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross 
rejected the traditional reluctance of black ministers to place themselves in 
opposition to the white power structure and accepted the risks of retaliation. 
They shared the view of the Black Church as a dynamic agency for social 
change and the fundamental belief of the absolute invulnerability of the black 
169 
 
people as people of God.287 Rather than promoting an otherworldly 
withdrawal, they felt the calling to protect the souls of their congregation’s 
members, and save the world from racism, poverty, and war. They rebelled 
against the duly constituted leaders of their denomination.288 E. Franklin 
Frazier’s conclusions about the relationship of the Black Church to American 
society (he called the Black Church a “nation within a nation”) would 
resonate, with regard to the relationship of the group of pastors who were 
also involved with Breadbasket and the Black Church as a whole.289  
As the meeting at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church was approaching the 
end, the call man, Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., had called Rev. Howard Creecy, 
Sr., pastor of the Month Moriah Baptist Church in Atlanta, to deliver the 
sermon. With Reverend G.H. Williams of Macon presiding, Rev. Creecy 
slowly read verses 34-40 from chapter 27 of the Book of Genesis: “And 
when Esau heard the words of his father, he cried with a great and exceeding 
bitter cry, and said unto his father, Bless me, even me also, O my father.” It 
is a story of human deceit and the creative power of the word of God. In 
Chapter 27, the promises of the land of Canaan had come down to Isaac, 
who was now about 135 years of age. He had not duly considered the Divine 
word concerning his two sons, that Esau (the elder) should serve Jacob (the 
younger), but resolved to give all the honor and power that were in the 
promise to Esau. Jacob, with a trick, got the blessing. When Esau understood 
that Jacob received the blessing in his stead, he cried with great bitterness. 
Isaac, when he became aware of the deceitfulness of his son, trembled 
exceedingly. Soon after, he recovered and confirmed the blessing he had 
170 
 
given to Jacob, saying, I have blessed him, and he shall be blessed. “And 
Isaac his father answered and said unto him, Behold, thy dwelling shall be the 
fatness of the earth, and of the dew of heaven from above; / and by thy 
sword shalt thou live, / and shalt serve thy brother: and it shall come to pass 
when thou shalt have the dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off 
thy neck.”290 It is a shocking resolution to Western ears, used as they were to 
judge an act, such as a stolen blessing, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, and 
consequently inclined to invalidate Isaac’s blessing by virtue of a legal 
argument.291  
The people at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross were 
pastors. They shared the same clerical mode of emotional expression. 
Consequently, that shaped the encounter with Breadbasket as a liturgical 
session and a spiritual retreat rather than as an ordinary business meeting. 
The Scriptures, the chants, the dialogues, had functioned in the meeting – 
and in all the previous meetings – as part of the narrative process of 
identification. The prayerful reading of selected verses of the Psalms and the 
homilies helped the preachers to identify themselves with the feelings and 
thoughts of the psalmist, and to grasp the very core of these human 
emotions. The group inevitably succumbed to their common bond with the 
psalmist and an emotional community suddenly emerged from it.292 In fact, 
celebration was at least as much an emotional context as a cultural one.293 
Through this meeting and previous meetings of Breadbasket, the community 
of clergy had been developing a common feeling, sharing the same emotions, 
and expressing the same commitment.294 They had attempted to create a 
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symbolic, interpretative framework for addressing their emotions. In fact, if 
they felt the tension and the pressure of the movement and expressed signs 
of emotional breakdown, it was because they shared the same frustrations as 
segregated enterprises - the wiretapping of their phones by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the pain of the rumors of King’s extramarital affairs 
(which had just surfaced in the previous months), and the on-going fear of 
possibly being killed.295 
Through this process, they developed a collective identity as “men of 
God.”296 In public, they had commanding voices and could easily silence a 
room. They could project sincerity and energy at the same time, and shared 
the same concerns, such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and 
sheltering the homeless. But what had made the pastors at the Gaines 
Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross different from the other ministers was 
their prophetic posture. In fact, social movements are discursively 
constructed states of consciousness. In the case of Breadbasket, the main 
point, and the only point that matters, was that the God was with the 
movement.297 To place their meeting in theological prospective, the 
preachers’ task was to create a “total experience” of the presence of God. 
The whole aim of the meeting was to help preachers bring the Word to life 
and have an experience of the Word, and feel the presence of Jesus in their 
hearts.298 It was this precise, specific, undisputed certainty of the Presence 
that had made this community of pastors (and the individuals within their 
own home churches) define social engagement as a crusade, and assess it as a 
call to a prophetic understanding of their vocation. It was the sense of 
172 
 
connection with the biblical story of the Hebrew prophets that had 
permeated the movement’s consciousness and built the consequent 
prophetic identity.  
Their prayers, speeches, and sermons were intentionally and repeatedly 
framed in the biblical narrative. Biblical episodes like the stolen blessing 
functioned as an archetypical events that resonate not only for the Hebrews, 
but also with African American clergy. Black preachers were sympathetic to 
the extra-judicial solution of Isaac because they identified themselves with 
God’s chosen people. Like the Israelites under the harsh rule of Pharaoh, 
African Americans had suffered under the unjust laws of the whites. The 
elements of correspondence between the ancient Israelites and the pastors 
working with Breadbasket had been pushed to the limits by their prophetic 
attitude. Kairological time is sacred time that replaces chronological time. 
Consequently, Scriptures, sermons, and songs “emotionally transported them 
into experiences that transcended the boundaries of geography and 
chronology,” as scholar Selby points out.299 
Though a discursively created religious experience, the preachers at the 
Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross were able to activate a 
sophisticated and powerful emotional engine that aroused them from 
lethargy, drained their anguish, and healed their wounds. Thanks to the 
elaborate body of prayers, Biblical verses, and homilies, they successfully 
built “a feeling of divinely granted protection” that provided an emotional 
reserve of positive feelings in the context of physical threat and psychological 
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sufferance.300 Since they framed their present experience of tension and pain 
within a redemptive religious myth, they made themselves ready to engage in 
social action. Once they convinced themselves of the presence of the Divine, 
their uncertainty was gone. God was aware of their commitment and would 
have never left them alone. With God on their side, they were not afraid 
anymore.  
The whole meeting was a celebration of religious confidence in God’s 
providence (Rom. 8:28). Its main aim was to sustain spiritual growth and 
help the group of pastors to be calm and trust God in times of hard travail. 
Scriptures and sermons and chants were pursued not so much for theological 
knowledge or rational validation but for the spiritual power that radiates out 
of the officiant and into listeners’ gut-level trust under stress.301 The group of 
preachers wished to be used by the Spirit to pursue a life modeled by Jesus 
Christ. Consequently, the encounter with the Bible was a collective, shared, 
living experience that inspired the members of the group to reinforce their 
trusting obedience in God’s will and maintain some form of Spirit-guided 
discipline.302  
Conclusion 
The next meeting was arranged at the Reverend Fred C. Lofton’s First 
African Baptist Church, 901 Fifth Ave., Columbus, Georgia, on June 30, 
1966, at 11 a.m.303 However, an event of historical magnitude happened in 
the period between the meeting of Breadbasket in Waycross and the one in 
Columbus. On June 16, 1966, Stokely Carmichael made his famous Black 
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Power speech. As a consequence, soon thereafter the tempo of change 
became too fast for the black clergy. The rush of daily events would have not 
allowed calm and experienced ministers to apply their practical and tested 
responses. On July 11, 1966, less than a month later, Gerard Reed, Chairman 
of the SCLC’s Employment Committee, recognized that “the black Muslims 
are growing in strength every day, and just last week Atlantans [sic] read 
about the Black Power thrust in our city. Does Atlanta really believe that it 
can continue ‘business as usual’ while these movements grow more 
powerful?”304 Like a pendulum, history was rapidly swinging to the more 
radical side. On September 6, the city was at the edge of a race riot for the 
first time since September 22, 1906. Firemen were on strike. Anti-Vietnam 
War pickets and firefighters pickets marched in front of the City Hall. That 
very same day, a white policeman shot a suspected car thief who was black, 
because he resisted arrest and fled. Within hours, houses started burning in 
Summerhill, and Carmichael urged blacks to “tear this place up.” Sixteen 
people were hospitalized and 75 arrested.305 The black clergy sought to use 
ministerial skills to mobilize blacks, and theology to win over whites. 
However, these kinds of religious appeal were no longer socially appealing in 
the late Sixties, because an increasing segment of society, coming from both 
blacks and whites, had become less receptive to moral pronouncements, and 
were more concerned about black consciousness and white colorblindness.306 
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Chapter Three: Breadbasket in 
Chicago (1966-72) 
 
Introduction 
King’s Chicago Freedom Movement was intended to demonstrate the 
viability of the Civil Rights Movement outside the South. S.C.L.C. 
announced the campaign in January 1966, which would begin by challenging 
the city’s racial housing discrimination. As the clergy was not uniformly 
supportive of the Chicago Freedom Movement, Breadbasket would be a 
concession by several ministers who wanted to pursue a program under their 
own supervision. Inspired by the previous victories in the South, King and 
the S.C.L.C. folded the Breadbasket program into its attempt to bring the 
Civil Rights Movement north to Chicago, where it was planning a 
comprehensive campaign for black equality. It was in Chicago where 
Breadbasket would rise to prominence under the leadership of Jesse Jackson, 
an S.C.L.C. veteran, Chicago Theological Seminary student, and associate 
pastor at Fellowship Baptist Church, who would become Breadbasket’s 
director and spokesman. Jackson literally transformed Breadbasket.  
This chapter describes Chicago-based Breadbasket from its inception in 1966 
to its end in 1971. In Chicago, Breadbasket expanded its scope and activities 
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and became very successful at persuading white-owned chains with large 
presences in the black community to purchase goods and services from black 
contractors. Jackson became the national director of Breadbasket’s programs 
in 1967 with King’s public congratulations: “We came to the realization that 
Jesse Jackson was the man to run Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, but we 
had no idea what a good job he would do.”307  After King’s assassination in 
1968, Jackson continued to lead the program and moved Breadbasket 
beyond jobs and patronage for black-owned businesses. Chicago-based 
Breadbasket became a black cultural enterprise, focused around Saturday 
workshops, annual expos, and other events. Ultimately, Breadbasket became 
instrumental in building and protecting the economic autonomy of the black 
community in Chicago. In 1971, tensions emerged between Jackson and 
S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph Abernathy, over the location of Breadbasket’s 
national headquarters and the eventual withholding of funds. Jackson refused 
to relocate, rejected the allegations on the misuse of funds, and resigned 
from S.C.L.C. in December. A week later he launched his own economic 
empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People United to Save 
Humanity). Breadbasket continued through the next year, before its eventual 
demise.  
Origins 
In Chicago in January 1966, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the S.C.L.C. 
announced a campaign to end the practice of racial discrimination in housing. 
In alliance with the Coordinating Council of Community  
177 
 
Organizations (CCCO), the S.C.L.C. formed the Chicago Freedom 
Movement under the leadership of Bernard LaFayette and James Bevel. 
Simultaneously a second initiative was taking shape in Chicago, a local 
chapter of S.C.L.C.’s four-year-old Breadbasket program was at also work.308 
Although the Atlanta ministers who comprised the initial unit had won an 
impressive series of black employment gains from local industries, Director 
Rev. Fred Bennette had been slow to pursue the coast-to-coast expansion of 
the program Martin Luther King envisioned, and after four years, 
Breadbasket was still relegated to the South. Bennette was the Director of 
Breadbasket from the beginning. The Breadbasket plan particularly appealed 
to Jesse Jackson, a ministerial student and Chicago staffer who had had his 
first exposure to S.C.L.C. when Breadbasket began its Chicago activities in 
1965 as a biracial committee composed of 50 percent black and 50 percent 
white membership. Among the members were Jesse Jackson and a Texan 
named David Wallace, a fellow student of Jackson’s at Chicago Theological 
Seminary. Later they were joined by two other clergymen, Gary Massoni and 
Alvin Pitcher, both associated with the seminary, as a student and as a 
teacher, respectively.309 Later the team would include Mozella Duncan, 
Brenda LeMay, Rev. Calvin Morris, and Rev. Ms. Willie Barrow.310 Aided by 
advice from Al Pitcher, one of his divinity school professors, Jackson 
pursued the Breadbasket idea when he found many black clergy unreceptive 
to the protest campaign Bevel was promoting. “It was clear that the ministers 
preferred a separate, but related program to the movement,” Jackson 
explained. “The introduction of Breadbasket into Chicago,” Jackson’s closest 
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colleague, Gary Massoni later said, “was at first something of a concession to 
several ministers who agreed with the overall goals of the movement, but 
who wanted to pursue a program under their own supervision rather than 
merge into the mass actions being projected.”311  
In other words, the clergy was not  uniformly  supportive of the Chicago 
Freedom Movement. Joseph Jackson, the head of the largest black 
denomination, the National Baptist Convention, and the pastor of Olivet 
Baptist Church in Chicago, was vividly against it. The story is well known. 
Jackson bitterly opposed King’s civil-disobedience campaign and so 
vigorously quashed liberal opposition and left them with no support within 
his denomination. As a result, King and a group of ministers from the 
National Baptist Convention in 1961 formed the Progressive Baptist 
Convention. Baldwin assumes that “the so-called power struggle between 
progressives who backed King and conservatives who sided with Jackson … 
is commonly viewed as the source of the schism.”312 The divergence between 
King and Jackson was not only a struggle for power or between different 
political options – progressives and conservatives – it was also a theological 
dispute between two pastors on the interpretation and relevance of the social 
gospel. Jackson stubbornly rejected the implications of the social gospel, and 
publicly denounced King for his interventionist posture. According to 
Jackson, “The progress of the race lies not in continued street 
demonstrations, and the liberation of an oppressed people shall not come by 
acts of revenge and retaliation but by the constructive use of all available 
opportunities and a creative expansion of the circumstances of the past into 
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stepping stones to higher things.”313 King made his point in his Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail, justice is more valuable than order because it lies on the truth, 
and the law must be accepted and followed only if it is right.314 Their 
confrontational relationship was, in part, a testament to the diversity of 
opinion that existed among the ministers of the Black Church regarding the 
appropriate role for the church in securing social change. The involvement of 
the church in social justice was at the core of their ecclesiastic dilemma. 
Interestingly enough, the Rev. Joseph H. Jackson and the Rev. King, Jr., 
shared the same theological premises, that the present Black Church must 
recall the old-fashioned suffering servant image from Isaiah. “The difference 
between Negro Christians and white Christians,” said Jackson, “is the 
meaning of the cross of Jesus Christ. Our forefathers were cross-bearers. 
They believed in it.”315 King assumed that the same option of nonviolence 
was a metaphor, concretely embedded in the flow of life as well as in the 
history of the church, of the redemptive suffering of Christ. However, this 
shared image was not sufficient to establish a common ecclesiology. There 
was more than a generation gap between Jackson and King. Jackson was a 
product of the Cold War. In his view, patriotism and religion sustained each 
other. He was a proud Republican and one of the few black leaders to 
endorse Richard Nixon (with little effect) in the presidential election in 1968; 
outspokenly dedicated to “law and order,” he won the “Patriot of the Year” 
award from Ultra-Right-wing Billy James Hargis in 1968. Jackson earnestly 
preached national unity. “The most important thing now,” he says, “is to 
save the nation, in order to save the individual citizen, and the race.” In his 
180 
 
view, the Civil Rights struggle was not always disruptive of that unity; he 
proposed nuances. Christianity, he argued, permits protest against unjust laws 
but not rebellion against civil order. However, there were no doubts that 
King’s Civil Rights leadership was disruptive enough. “It was supposed to be 
a struggle for first-class citizenship, not for getting Whitey,” Jackson 
maintains. “Those who wanted their rights are being sold another bill of 
goods now. There are Negroes who believe their mission is to destroy 
America.”316 In Jackson’s opinion, the real nature of the Black Church was 
priestly, and he saw himself as the high priest. As a conscious member of the 
American establishment, he was a church-state alliance advocate. He was an 
insider. The high priest could not take care any longer of the spiritual needs 
of his congregation without also being concerned with the unity, the health, 
and the good order of the nation. A divided nation would also mean a 
divided church. The “external” and the “internal” aspects of ecclesiastical life 
were inseparable. The “internal” priestly and sacramental life of the Black 
Church depended upon the vitality of the government, which had to be 
enervated and sustained by the spiritual strength of the church. Government 
and church had to cooperate and sustain each other in harmony. 
Consequently, he supported and assisted the government and assigned to 
himself the role of protector of the nation unity. Unity, race integration and 
order were the essential elements of Jackson’s thought, and they stand 
inseparable from the interest and the responsibilities of the Black Church. 
Jackson’s ecclesiology was simple, the church is an instrument in the running 
of society. He charged the Black Church with civic responsibilities such as 
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maintaining order and observing the law. In his view, church and 
government have to run together, and become entwined. He probably 
believed this to be part of his divinely authorized function. With this 
prospective, led by an authoritarian clergy, and at ease with the temporal 
power of the government, the Black Church’s organizational structure could 
solidify into the shape of the nation.  
King assumed an interventionist posture. The church has the responsibility 
to intervene in the public affairs, and engage herself in the public 
conversation when justice was missing and when the people of God were 
suffering. King was well aware of the social history of the Black Church as 
well as being concerned about social change. But his primary intent was 
theological; he wanted to do God’s will. He tried to outline a different 
mission for the Black Church based on her historical theology rather than a 
sociological theory. He was an outsider. He presided over the limes, the 
boundary between church and government, raising his voice when he 
perceived that he and the nation were living through a kairos, a “time of 
urgency and providential election.” The famous “urgency of now” is the 
“providential time,” the moment of grace that may bring justice on earth or 
pass without effect. It was the kairos that gives a sense of urgency to King’s 
calls for national renewal, universal brotherhood, and social justice, and 
places him apart from the other Civil Rights leaders (including Jackson). This 
sense of urgency provided him with the mantle of prophecy and offered him 
the opportunity for martyrdom. The divergences in ecclesiology between 
Jackson and King were mirrored by the strong support or the intentional 
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passivity of the black clergy with regard to the Civil Rights activities, 
specifically those of the Chicago Freedom Movement. Breadbasket was a 
program led by the church in the South that had a limited scope of providing 
job opportunities to black workers, especially the ones requiring limited skills. 
Although a boycott-based program, it was less confrontational than the 
housing desegregation campaign and, more importantly, not so high-profile. 
It could offer the opportunity for the clergymen to get involved with the 
movement without jeopardizing their reputations or their ties with the rest of 
ecclesiastic community. This is the ecclesiological and social context that 
existed when Breadbasket in Chicago was founded.317   
Jackson arranged for King to promote Breadbasket at a mid-November 
meeting of city pastors. That this speech was King’s only major address in 
Chicago in the fall of 1965 and was delivered at a gathering of Baptist 
ministers hosted by Clay Evans, attested to his desire for support from the 
Black Church. Jackson had talked throughout the fall with Rev. Clay Evans, 
president of the Chicago Baptist Ministers Conference, about how the city’s 
hundreds of black pastors could be drawn into the Freedom Movement. To 
reach out further to the black religious leadership, King met with a core 
group of clergy, including William L. Lambert of Great Mount Hope Baptist 
church, Frank Sims of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, and John Porter of the 
Christ Methodist Church. King found considerable interest, felt encouraged, 
and authorized Jackson to proceed. King assumed a leading role in 
cultivating ministerial support for a Chicago version of Breadbasket. The 
Southern movement, King knew, relied heavily on the leadership of black 
183 
 
ministers. By contrast, even though black (and white) clergy and 
denomination-based organizations had made great contributions to the 
Chicago struggle for justice, the leading figures on the local Civil Rights scene 
were not men of the cloth. Al Raby, for example, was a teacher, and Bill 
Berry was a race relations professional.  
On February 11, 1966, King ran a meeting to recruit over two hundred black 
ministers that marked the kickoff of Breadbasket in Chicago.318 The address 
was well received and in the subsequent days a group of forty clergymen set 
up committees to gather racial employment statistics from four industries – 
bakeries, milk companies, soft drink bottlers, and soup companies – 
suspected of employing too few blacks relative to the heavy minority 
patronage of their products. The work of these committees marked the 
definitive emergence of Chicago’s Breadbasket. Although formally an overall 
steering committee composed of ministers active in the program governed 
Breadbasket, Jesse Jackson, by this time an associate pastor at Clay Evans’s 
church, coordinated the group’s efforts. In effect, he became the director of 
Breadbasket and its spokesperson. Caretaker of an important source of 
institutional power, Jackson now joined the front ranks of Chicago Civil 
Rights leaders.319 In the aftermath of the kickoff meeting for Chicago’s 
Breadbasket, whose initial objective was to abolish racist hiring practices by 
employers in African American neighborhoods, a multicultural and multi-
denominational collection of 200 clergy attended, and it was from this group 
that the project’s leadership emerged. Forty of these religious leaders stayed 
afterward to meet in committees that would investigate hiring practices in 
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four areas of the food industry: bread, milk, soft drinks and soup. The 
committees would survey companies serving the black community and then 
reconvene to plot a course of action. Jackson became one of the 
organization’s coordinators during this process.320 
The tactics of Breadbasket in Chicago were largely based on the previous 
experiences in the South, and were generally carried out in the same way. The 
Breadbasket team looked for companies that did a significant amount of 
business in the black community and determined if they employed blacks in 
numbers proportionate to the percentage of the population. But they were 
interested in more than mere figures. They wanted to know at what levels 
within the companies blacks were employed and, even more importantly, 
how well blacks were paid in comparison with whites. In order to determine 
the answers to these questions they sent a letter of inquiry and followed up 
with personal investigations as they discovered early on that white corporate 
executives would often provide misleading data in order to avoid 
confrontation. Next, they paid a call on the company managers, interspersing 
their conversation with prayers and denunciations of undeniable corporate 
sins. After surrendering, a High Low (or “Hi-Lo”) Food executive told the 
audience that “If at any time, any store, whether it be a High Low or any of 
the competitors, do something which the public feels, especially the 
community feels, is against the community, then I for one firmly believe that 
the store ought to fail by lack of support.” That’s quite a remarkable 
statement for a corporate executive to make, and quite an exceptional 
demonstration of power for a community organization to show. Notably, 
185 
 
High Low’s surrender came after pursuing an injunction against Breadbasket 
picketing. The attempted court action ended up in public apostasy.321 
Chicago reporter Barbara Reynolds reports that they would even determine 
beforehand which two callers would play the role of “hatchet men,” the 
irascible pair who could never be satisfied no matter what the company 
promised or affirmed. The technique quickly brought the harassed officials to 
the bargaining table with the apparently saner, more reasonable blacks, who 
were invariably those most adept at driving the hardest bargain and 
employing calming and smoothing speech. Of course, more than occasionally 
they ran into a hard-nosed corporate executive whose attitude was more or 
less, “Hell, no, I won’t give in to those bastards. They won’t tell me how to 
run my business.” They were the ones who were targeted by the picket lines, 
the leaflets, the firebrand sermons, and – most terrifying of all – the boycotts. 
Sales graphs plunged off the charts, the word got back to the directors, and 
very soon a board meeting was called. Eventually, the same irate executive 
found his way to Breadbasket headquarters, to be introduced to the Rev. 
Jesse Jackson in order to tell the crowd what a terrible racist he had been and 
that his only wish was to cooperate with the Rev. Jesse Jackson to make 
amends for his and his company’s past sins. After capitulation, a formal 
agreement would be signed, spelling out all the terms of the covenant 
between Breadbasket and the corporation. Initially, flushed with a series of 
easy victories, the Breadbasket team rushed on to the next conquest, never 
questioning whether or not the last company officials to make oral promises 
were as good as their word. When somebody finally bothered to check, they 
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found out that very few of the jobs and promotions promised during the 
negotiations between Breadbasket and the corporation ever went on the 
payroll. In fact, one reporter checked back with Breadbasket’s initial target 
after four years and found that it had delivered on less than 25 percent of the 
jobs promised – a record that was no better or worse than the other 
companies that made agreements. Soon, everything was put into writing.322 
Breadbasket targeted businesses that dealt primarily or exclusively with black 
clients. Its leadership realized that although white merchants had a bigger – 
and vastly more affluent – white market to cushion the potential blow of the 
black consumer boycotts, Chicago’s 1 million black consumers spent $1.5 
billion on goods and services every year, and were more than enough to 
damage the company’s financial results.323 Breadbasket used the 
organizational strength of the Black Church for support and as leverage. 
Ministers helped Breadbasket collect employment statistics from businesses 
operating, vending, or supplying stores in black areas. If it was discovered 
that black people were underemployed or relegated to non-executive roles, 
Breadbasket opened talks with the management those companies. If 
management would not negotiate, the ministers pursued retaliatory action. 
They organized pickets at stores, boycotts of the products of parent 
companies, and alerted their parishioners to the discriminatory practices of 
these local businesses. On Sundays, churches became media centers 
informing Chicago’s African American community which stores to avoid.324 
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Beginnings in Chicago 
With the Black Church behind it, Breadbasket quickly took hold in Chicago. 
An important part of its strategy was to target companies that specialized in 
fresh food, as they were the most vulnerable to relatively short boycotts. The 
average commercial life of milk, bread, fruit and vegetables is a few days. The 
effects of these boycotts therefore happened nearly in real time as targeted 
companies quickly felt the sting. As they capitulated, black pastors negotiated 
with corporate management and signed agreements that pledged expanded 
employment and promotional opportunities for African Americans in 
exchange for an end to the protests, and a promise to help these companies 
recover their lost credibility. Importantly, these campaigns showed that the 
efforts of relatively few people for a relatively short time could make a big 
impact. In the ﬁrst fifteen months of its Chicago operation, mostly under 
Jackson’s leadership, Breadbasket created 2,000 new jobs worth $15 million a 
year in new income to the African American community. King called 
Breadbasket the “most spectacularly successful program” of his Chicago 
movement.325  
Breadbasket’s first target was Country Delight Inc., a local dairy that 
employed no blacks, but was based in black neighborhoods on Chicago’s 
South Side. Jackson asked the Reverend Hiram Crawford to lead the initial 
confrontation with company officials. Barbara Reynolds reports the dialogue 
between black preacher Hiram Crawford and a Country Delight 
representative:  
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Official: Who do you people think you are? I don’t let union 
officials tell me how to run my company and I am not 
about to let a bunch of Negro preachers tell me what to 
do. What do you think this is? … This is a business not 
a playground.  
Crawford: We are not here to argue but to find out the sins of 
your corporation so we might work together to solve 
some of the evils of this society.  
Official: You must be kidding.  
Crawford: We are very serious. When we walked in here we did 
not see any black secretaries, key punch or computer 
operators, or clerk typists.  
Official: We do ‘em, they are in the back.  
Crawford: You mean sweeping floors?  
Official: Yeah, but they are earning a decent living. I know all 
about you people. You do not want to work. My 
brother-in-law, who was a contractor, hired some 
colored people once to get them off welfare. You know 
what they did? They worked for two weeks and quit 
because they said they could earn more on welfare. That 
experience taught me a lesson. You people are lazy. 
You don’t want to work. You want welfare.326 
Of course, it was not only the prejudice against black workers, seen as 
unskilled, lazy and unreliable, but also the control of the workplace that was 
at stake. White corporate executives had to pass through a painful process 
and discuss with black clergymen their internal hiring practices. Not 
surprisingly, the initial discussion with the head of Country Delight Inc., 
ended in a standoff. The following Sunday, a hundred black preachers took 
to their pulpits and instructed their congregations to boycott Country Delight 
products. During the four-day Easter weekend, Country Delight lost more 
than half a million dollars as black consumers left cartons of milk, butter and 
cream to sour on the shelves. Within a matter of days, the company called 
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Jackson to capitulate, offering 44 jobs to blacks. It was a modest beginning, 
but its implications were enormous. Jackson’s method worked.327 
Breadbasket had won its first battle. Word traveled fast though the corporate 
community. Even before the first black employees could be trained and sent 
out in the dairy trucks, other dairy companies serving black areas in Chicago 
called Jackson to negotiate.328 In the following months, the ministers of 
Breadbasket won 75 new jobs from two dairy firms they had targeted, 
Borden and Hawthorn-Mellody, and were on the verge of a forty-four job 
settlement with a third, Wanzer Dairy.329 On July 22, 1966, Jesse Jackson 
reported to S.C.L.C.’s executive board that Breadbasket had completed its 
fifth successful negotiation, this time with Bowman Dairy for 45 jobs for 
blacks with an annual payroll of $350,000. This brought Breadbasket’s total 
to 224 jobs with an annual payroll of $1,800,000. King commented that this 
was the movement’s “most concrete program, one with tangible results,” and 
the “public needs to know about it. Why is the white press holding back?” he 
asked. The ensuing discussion focused on the inadequacies of the Tribune’s 
Civil Rights coverage, with Jackson suggesting a boycott of that paper.330 
In July and August 1966, Breadbasket continued to register victories, even 
though its director Jesse Jackson, who acted as Northern director while Fred 
Bennette was still the Southern director, moonlighted as a leader of open-
housing marches. In late July, Breadbasket switched its target from dairy 
firms to soft drink bottlers. Jackson and his aides did their homework, and 
went around to corporate offices armed with charts and diagrams that 
demonstrated the importance of black consumers, threatening a boycott if 
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the companies didn’t pledge to hire more black employees. Before the 
summer was over, with temperatures in the 80s, all three major suppliers – 
Pepsi, Coke, and 7UP – agreed.331 Jackson was on a roll. In the fall, with the 
open-housing protest over, Breadbasket enlarged its staff and broadened its 
aims. Instead of confronting distributors, it now challenged supermarkets 
patronized by blacks, demanding that the stores stock black-made products 
and channel some of their assets into black-owned banks.332  
Jackson felt encouraged by the previous successes to extend Breadbasket’s 
goals and expand its operational scope. Instead of merely hitting distributors, 
Breadbasket directly challenged supermarket chains that summer. It no 
longer just demanded jobs but also pressured major companies to extend 
business ties with the black community. Breadbasket promoted patronage for 
black-owned businesses as a means of persuading whites to purchase goods 
and services from black contractors or deposit funds in black-owned banks. 
Breadbasket leaders believed that blacks needed jobs, contracts and capital to 
compete in the market.333 The strategy change revealed an understanding of 
the operations of supermarket chains. Supermarkets are similar to stores that 
sell primarily dairy products. In fact they suffer a higher level of 
vulnerability. This is not so much in the short life of the product—fresh food 
only represents a small percentage of their portfolio—as in the structure of 
the business model. The supermarket model is very similar to that of banks; 
they make profits through cash management. The store collects money from 
customers now and pays suppliers later. To increase liquidity, it sometimes 
has to reduce prices. Lower prices lead to increased sales. It is obvious that if 
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prices are to remain low, then costs (labor in particular) must also be kept 
low. Supermarket chains therefore try to balance costs and revenue streams 
to create an uninterrupted daily flow of money running through the 
operation’s circulatory system. The company can then withdraw a small 
portion of this as investment capital that will be used to make the company’s 
profit while the remaining part circulates through the daily operation. An 
abrupt cessation of the flow of revenue in the form of a boycott can be 
devastating to companies where cash management has the full responsibility 
to produce profits. Without reliable revenue streams, supermarkets can’t pay 
suppliers, who stop delivering. The store’s stock is depleted and customers 
go elsewhere. The company may be able to sustain itself for a few days or 
weeks, depending on its size. The larger the company is, the less effect a 
boycott will on it. The more cash available to the company, the longer the 
protest has to last. Breadbasket targeted businesses in industries where the 
margin of profitability was small. In those situations, even if black customers 
were only a fraction of the total, they could still determine the success or 
failure of the firm. Breadbasket’s strategy tended to capitalize on “the 
disproportionate effect of a concentrated minority force applied to the 
fractions of decisive margin in an otherwise impossible larger equation.”334 
Jackson was careful to choose targets where he had the leverage to win, for 
example, grocery chains that depended on black customers. The first of these 
was Hi-Lo stores, a white-owned grocery chain that operated primarily in 
black neighborhoods. After winning an agreement from management to 
provide 184 new jobs for blacks, including positions as store managers, 
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Jackson presented a new demand, that Hi-Lo guarantee shelf space for 
products made by minority-owned businesses.335 The shift in strategy was 
immediately reflected in the internal documents: 
Operation Breadbasket seek not only to open a few jobs, but 
to challenge institutional or corporate arrangements that are 
exploitive by virtue of the structural racism they sustain; 
especially is this the case with respect to allocation of jobs 
and monopoly of the existent markets for trade.336 
What products did Jackson push? Those made by a handful of black 
businessmen, who had supported his projects and were paying for his 
operation. At his Saturday morning meetings, Jackson would exhort the 
crowd to buy Joe Louis Milk and Grove Fresh orange juice, inventing 
rhyming jingles as he warmed up and engaged the crowd. Before he was 
done, Hi-Lo not only stocked those products but other products created by 
blacks, such as Archie’s Mumbo Barbecue Sauce, Staff of Life Bread, and 
King Solomon Deodorant.337 “He gets dollars from white corporations to 
help his black buddies who in turn contributed to his organization,” charged 
Barbara Reynolds.338 Jackson publicly acknowledged the quid pro quo 
relationship with the black business community in Chicago. In response to 
criticism that he was “tithing” black businessmen in exchange for his services 
as an intermediary, Jackson said, “Absolutely. It’s like a tax. You pay taxes to 
the government for your services, don’t you?... We are all family here, but 
you have to pay to play. You cannot ride to freedom free in Pharaoh’s 
chariot.”339 
Jackson’s “boycott for business” approach generated controversy within the 
Civil Rights Movement itself. The Reverend Hiram Crawford, who was 
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instrumental in energizing the Chicago black clergy to support the 
Breadbasket boycotts, grew disenchanted with Jackson and accused him of 
cutting a secret deal with the businessmen behind the backs of the black 
pastors. “Dr. Martin Luther King and Jesse Jackson were introduced to black 
businessmen in Chicago at the old H&H restaurant on 51st street in 1966,” 
he wrote. “The wound which I received was to discover later that Rev. Jesse 
Jackson and George Jones of the Joe Louis Milk Co. had been holding 
private meetings” and that Jackson “had collected pledges” from him in 
exchange for Breadbasket boycotts. “I brought this to the attention of the 
general body of Breadbasket and revealed money had been raised without 
our knowledge or consent.”340 Despite these disagreements, when King 
convened a two-day executive staff meeting in Atlanta to discuss possible 
fund-raising strategies, new responsibilities for searching out money had 
been delegated to Jesse Jackson, whose Chicago Breadbasket program had 
won sizable job gains from soft drink firms and grocery store chains. Jackson 
had hopes of branching out in new directions, and Breadbasket’s most recent 
agreement – with High Low, a string of fifty supermarkets – reflected the 
possibilities. Beyond a commitment to hire 183 black workers, each of its 
fourteen ghetto stores (20 percent of Hi-Lo’s business) agreed to open 
accounts at the black-owned Seaway National Bank. High Low also promised 
to open accounts at another black bank and to stock the products – e.g. Joe 
Louis Milk, Parker House sausage, Stewart Bleach – of six black 
manufacturing firms. In this way, Jackson argued, Breadbasket’s goal could 
be expanded into a far-reaching program for economic development of black 
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communities. In addition, he suggested by bringing together progressive 
private investors and government-supported housing-improvement 
programs, S.C.L.C. could pursue redevelopment of the black communities’ 
housing stock. Jackson said that National Tea Company, another grocery 
chain, was the next target, but he claimed that there was a “blackout in the 
newspapers” on Breadbasket.341 An impressed King – who several weeks 
earlier had doubled Jackson’s S.C.L.C. salary from $3,000 to $6,000 – voiced 
praise for his creative proposals.342 
Banks, finance and credit were regarded as playing a key role in Breadbasket’s 
vision of the advancement of the black community. Already in May 1966, 
Jackson made his point in an internal report to Andrew Young:  
Another problem that Operation Breadbasket is discussing is 
the problem to securing decent finance and credit (…) We 
can find a bank such a Seaway National Bank, which is Negro 
owned and directed, as well as sympathetic to the Negro 
financial and credit problem, and make that into a major 
bank. We could do that by a mass transference of funds of 
churches and members of the congregations from downtown 
white owned banks to one, maybe two banks. In that way we 
can create a major Negro financial institution that will be a 
source of economic activity for investment, decent credit, and 
loans that Negroes in the slums now have no access to for 
creative venture.343  
The original idea soon evolved. While the goal of one or two black-owned 
financial institutions remained, the source of funds would become black 
businesspeople, rather than churchmen and congregations. To this end, the 
program actively sought to obtain deposits for the Seaway National Bank and 
the Independence Bank of Chicago, predominantly black banks that were 
founded in the mid-Sixties. A business owner’s committee was formed to 
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urge black entrepreneurs, bankers, and professionals to use the black-owned 
banks and savings and loan associations. On December 31, 1966, Seaway 
National had total resources of $7.4 million and the Independence Bank of 
Chicago $6.1 million. A year later, the figures were $12.6 million and $9.0 
million respectively, for a combined increase in assets of 60 percent. The 
president of Seaway National, Howard Algar, stated that of his bank’s $5.2 
million increase in deposits around 10 percent came either directly or 
indirectly through the efforts of Breadbasket. He also pointed out that 
Seaway had recently made a $500,000 rehabilitation loan to a black mortgage 
banker. In the same period, Illinois State Treasurer Adlai Stevenson III 
deposited state funds in Seaway National, Independence Bank of Chicago 
and in other three savings and loan associations, which he described as 
“serving the extraordinary needs of Negro neighborhoods.” He 
acknowledged Jesse Jackson and Breadbasket as a source of encouragement. 
The banks were reported to have received $300,000 each in state deposits.344 
Later, the source of funds would become white-owned companies under the 
threat of boycotts.  
Jackson showed a clear fascination for, and an evident appreciation of 
financial capitalism. “I keep telling you that capitalism without capital is just 
plain ism – and can’t live off ism.” He tried to convince consumers and 
businesspeople, clergymen and families, to take their money out of the banks 
in Chicago downtown (the white-owned banks outside the ghetto) and put it 
in black banks in the ghetto. He recognized that it was asking them to “go 
through an entire psychological revolution,” as black people did not trust 
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black banks, and had this prejudice that black banks were natural candidates 
for insolvency and bankruptcy, and that was actually not just a prejudice, but 
a matter of fact. Jackson also made the point that not only black politicians, 
but also key black business actors and emerging entrepreneurs had their 
money in white banks downtown, and this fact, that their economic base was 
outside of the ghetto, was the reason Chicago’s black leadership was 
insensitive to the needs of the black community.345  
At the steering committee meeting of December 13, 1966, Jesse Jackson 
reported that agreements with Nation Tea and Del Farms had produced 383 
new jobs. The supermarket chain also agreed to market the products of 
fifteen black-owned enterprises and to transfer the accounts of their stores 
located in the ghetto to Seaway and Independence banks, both of which were 
black-owned. “One of the most significant projects we can do this winter,” 
he said, “is a bank-in movement, asking concerned whites to put money in 
Negro banks. The money could extend their lending power. The whole 
money market could change.” The other problem on Jackson’s mind was 
training programs. He wanted something independent of Breadbasket. “The 
Urban League,” he said, “needs a full department” to train people for 
Breadbasket-negotiated jobs. Breadbasket, he said, had “turned into an 
economic movement.” It was “understaffed” and needed “help and 
suggestions.” The Urban League representatives agreed to see about adding 
staff “to coordinate, recruit, place, and follow-up on Breadbasket jobs.” 
Another of Breadbasket’s ventures was a project called Operation Love that 
was apparently subject to misunderstanding as a result of its name. It had 
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been presented as a proposal for Coca-Cola to sponsor. Rumors immediately 
spread that Breadbasket was demanding money, presumably under threat of 
demonstrations. The object was to raise some $5 million for new Negro 
businesses. About $260,000 was targeted for a media campaign to promote 
change in the presentation of blacks. Jackson tried to clarify the nature of 
Operation Love, but the relation of the steering committee to this project 
was not clear. The project soon collapsed.346 
Jackson moved Breadbasket to the next level when he launched a boycott 
against the national food chain Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P), 
which operated 40 stores in Chicago’s black ghetto. It was Breadbaskets’ 
shining hour that put it on the map, and Jackson considered it one of his 
main successes. It was the biggest settlement with a chain in a single city, and 
set a precedent for other food chain negotiations across the country, even if, 
according to Hurly Green, Jackson was not personally involved. “Willie 
Barrow actually led the boycott (…) she was out there every day for 16 
weeks.”347 A&P was no easy win, as Jackson’s other targets had been. This 
was a national chain, and it had deep pockets. When Breadbasket took on 
A&P, its stores were everywhere in America’s inner cities. In fact, A&P was 
so pervasive that the company had run afoul of the Sherman Antitrust 
legislation.348 Although the black ministers used their pulpits to exhort the 
faithful to boycott A&P, profit from other parts of the country steeled 
company management against giving in to Jackson’s demands. For 16 weeks 
Jackson’s picketers surrounded A&P stores on the South Side of Chicago. 
A&P gave up after sixteen weeks of boycotts. The A&P agreement was 
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especially significant because in addition to a guarantee of 286 jobs, some of 
them executive and managerial positions, Jackson forced A&P to stock a 
total of 25 products from black manufacturers. A&P also conceded to the 
use of black service companies such as exterminators, garbage collectors, and 
janitorial firms. Later Jackson capitalized on the agreement with the A&P 
Company, which provided a total 770 new jobs to blacks at  the end of the 
year, and celebrated the success of Breadbasket.349 Monthly meetings 
between representatives of A&P and the Breadbasket team were designed to 
assure the company was not shirking its agreements. On a personal level, 
sensitivity seminars attended by A&P executives attempted to awaken 
management to the existence and effects of racial prejudice.350 Breadbasket 
was achieving spectacular results. Its leadership contacted one major 
supermarket chain after another in Chicago, including the National Team 
Company, Jewel Foods, A&P, and High Low Food, whose fifty 
supermarkets included fourteen locations in black neighborhoods. One by 
one the big chains, surrendered to Breadbasket requests.351 So swift was 
Breadbasket’s progress that in late 1966 King promoted the young Jackson to 
an executive position in S.C.L.C.352 
Negotiations with other chains proved more problematic. Many did not meet 
the job requests, while new talks stalled with both Walgreens drug stores and 
Red Rooster food stores. The latter was a particularly bad actor only found in 
the poorest neighborhoods, and accused of disguising bad meat and other 
offenses.353 The Red Rooster food stores were notorious for the poor quality 
of their products and their high prices. The Chicago city authorities, not 
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famous for cracking down on lapses in hygiene, had fined them 32 times for 
flagrant violations, from selling spoiled meat to short weighting.354 Moreover, 
they were unlike Jackson’s other targets, because in fact, they had black 
employees, some of them prominent in the chain’s management. Despite this 
resistance, Red Rooster’s management eventually caved. The price of 
Jackson’s boycott was unusual; he demanded, for unknown reasons, that the 
company increase its payroll by hiring 22 members of the Black Stone 
Rangers, the one of the biggest and most violent street gangs from the South 
Side.355 
On March 9-10, 1967, three new departments were created inside S.C.L.C.. 
Among them was a labor and economic affairs department to be headed by 
Jesse Jackson that would expand Breadbasket into a national program.356 It 
seemed that Dr. King’s plan that had previously been tabled, to scale 
Breadbasket up, was finally at hand. A few months later, on July 9, 1967, 
King was back in Chicago, not to push for open housing but to head a two-
day conference aimed at turning Breadbasket into a nationwide program. In 
front of 150 black churchmen from 42 major cities throughout the country, it 
was stated during the conference that in Chicago alone, Breadbasket had won 
2,200 jobs worth more than $15 million in annual income for blacks.357 
Breadbasket was the success story of the Chicago campaign. King drew 
headlines, however, for his supportive statements about the progress in 
Chicago. It was King’s way of explaining why there were and would be no 
massive demonstrations that summer in Chicago. “Our weapon is 
noncooperation with economic injustice,” he explained. That was the new 
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thrust, and Breadbasket was the vehicle.358 King also announced 
Breadbasket’s biggest pact so far, an agreement with the Jewel food store 
chain that provided for 512 new jobs, shelf space for black manufacturers’ 
products, and expanded company patronage of black firms.359 
More than a hundred black ministers from a score of major cities attended 
the session at the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Breadbasket’s leaders, 
such as Jesse Jackson, spoke about how an expanded effort could win 
thousands of jobs for blacks by targeting companies like General Motors, 
Kellogg, Kraft and Del Monte in locations all around the country. King 
claimed that a program of national magnitude would mean more than 60,000 
new jobs annually for black people and millions of dollars deposited in black 
banking and savings and loan institutions.360 King’s statements reflected his 
increasingly harsh view of America’s shortcomings, and a rare wistfulness 
about the past. “Most whites are not committed to equal opportunities for 
Negroes,” he told one interviewer, while informing the Breadbasket 
conference that “America has been, and she continues to be, largely a racist 
society … Maybe something is wrong with our economic system the way it’s 
presently going.” King noted that in democratic socialist societies such as 
Sweden there was no poverty, no unemployment and no slums. “There 
comes a time when any system must be re-evaluated,” said King, and 
America’s time was at hand.  
The movement must address itself to restructuring the whole 
of American society. The problems we are dealing with … are 
not going to be solved until there is a radical redistribution of 
economic and political power.361  
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King reminded 150 ministers that corporations might yield concessions 
under pressure, but they were still the primary culprits in perpetuating urban 
poverty. In one of his most radical statements, made again before a black 
activist audience, King criticized corporate power and not just policy failure. 
Negroes living in slums faced “economic exploitation.” King stated that  
American industry and business, as part as the broader power 
structure, is in a large part responsible for the economic 
malady which grips and crushes down people in the ghetto.362 
At a July 12 Breadbasket meeting, King demanded that his audience 
rigorously question the capitalist economy, preaching that, “the earth is the 
Lord’s and the fullness thereof.” He claimed that a minister’s first concern 
should be with the “least of these.” So as they negotiated with businessmen 
for jobs, they should pressure corporate leaders to “set aside profit for the 
greater good” and advocate “restructuring of our whole society.” King had 
always seen the need to work with black businessmen who professed a 
commitment to race advancement. Black unity and collective economic 
advancement still trumped any overt advocacy of class conflict. But privately, 
King agreed with William (Bill) Rutherford, S.C.L.C.’s new executive director 
that to replace “white bastards with black bastards” as exploiters of black 
workers would be a cruel joke.363 
Breadbasket was achieving success in Chicago and Cleveland. King journeyed 
to Cleveland, where he announced a Breadbasket agreement with Sealtest. 
The agreement was about a number of jobs, which would bring almost five 
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hundred thousand dollars of new income to the Negro community a year. 
Along with the demand for jobs, King said,  
We also demand that you put money in the Negro savings 
and loan association and that you take ads, advertise, in the 
Cleveland Call & Post, the Negro newspaper.  
Along with the new jobs, Sealtest deposited thousands of dollars in the black 
bank of Cleveland and started taking ads in the Negro newspaper in that 
city.364 King made two more visits to Cleveland, where he was pleased with 
Andrew Young’s evaluation of the project, that it was off to “a very 
successful beginning.” Breadbasket had focused on local milk companies, 
and James Orange was working with several tenant’s unions in Hough.365 
Breadbasket never achieved national recognition; despite the fact that steps 
were made to increase it’s the infrastructure, for example, by involving black 
students in the program – that “the Negro student is an important 
commodity in Operation Breadbasket,” is mentioned in an internal memo, an 
explicit reminiscence of Birmingham. In the following years, especially after 
Dr. King’s assassination, the program made efforts to expand in size and 
scopes outside Chicago, and yet remaining a local program.366 Breadbasket 
opened up new operations in other cities, but Jackson was more interested in 
building his political and economic base in Chicago, instead of flying from 
one city to another to build a national network of Breadbasket’s operations. 
At that time, Chicago was a vibrant black economic environment, home of 
an emerging black entrepreneurial class, a large and depressed ghetto 
economy, and an increasing amount of poor and unemployed people. It had 
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everything to keep Jackson busy, but his disinterest in making Breadbasket 
into a national organization, and his Chicago-centric strategy were some of 
the reasons for the eventual ending of the program.  
Controversies  
The original contact between the S.C.L.C. and local gangs was established by 
another mentor of Jackson’s, James Bevel. When Bevel went to Chicago in 
1966 as King’s advance man for S.C.L.C.’s ill-fated national opening of the 
housing campaign, he was program director of the Westside Christian Parish, 
where he had extensive dealings with gangs, recalcitrant political leaders, and 
a rapidly growing antagonism between older, more moderate black leaders, 
on the one hand, and young militants on the other. Bevel, who probably 
conducted as many non-violence seminars as any other single activist, used 
his skills in demanding that the Black Stone Rangers and other local gangs 
(such as the Gangster Disciples and the Vice Lords) eschew violence as an 
avenue toward social change. He even went so far as to show a film on the 
1965 Watts riot in an attempt to forestall violent confrontations with 
Chicago’s police during demonstrations. Though they respected Bevel, the 
young people of Chicago were not as receptive to Bevel’s message as other 
southern audiences. Then, King met the Black Stone Rangers’ leadership. 
Gary Massoni remembers that “When we first came here in 1966 with Dr. 
King, the idea of the urban gangs was a phenomenon we had not known in 
the South. (…) Clearly there was no such underground movement of gangs 
that we later found to be very connected to the higher-up Mafia. It was not 
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innocent children, but real, real stuff.” Dr. King thought he could redeem 
them, Jackson says. More than a hundred members of Chicago’s most 
notorious street gangs convened in a downtown hotel on a June afternoon in 
1966. Martin Luther King, Jr. sat with them. His Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference had sponsored the meeting. At the gang summit, Dr. 
King asked Chicago’s gangs to channel their energies into nonviolent protest 
against poverty and inequality. King and his allies in the Chicago community 
hoped to mobilize the gangs toward nonviolent direct action in service of the 
Chicago Freedom Movement. And they hoped to turn them away from the 
fratricidal violence that had recently begun tearing through the city’s black 
neighborhoods, where gunfire had become a soundtrack to the daily lives of 
many residents. 395 people had been murdered the previous year -- many of 
them in gang wars, almost all of them with guns. 367 “People said Dr. King 
was naïve about his capacity to change them. It was in this context – the 
Black Stone Rangers, the Disciples – that we got to know Jeff Fort,” Massoni 
says. At that point, Fort was the undisputed leader of the Black Stone 
Rangers.368 Dr. King’s interest with street gangs was not limited to Chicago. 
During the last years of his life, he met street gangs in many cities, including 
Los Angeles and Oakland among the others. His nonviolent message was 
always recognized, usually listened to, and less often well received.369 It was 
part of the S.C.L.C. vocation to try to establish a dialogue with the militant 
wings of the poor, and to try to change their hearts.  
Connections between Breadbasket and Black Stone Rangers are well 
documented. For example, Leonard Dickerson (a.k.a. Leonard Sengali) was 
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the local Black Stone Rangers leader on 46th Street. For example,  Dickerson 
was driving Jackson to the Stones’ clubhouse at 4630 Greenwood, where 
Jackson had bought an old church. “They were driving east on 47th Street, 
just east of Drexel, when somebody opened fire on the car,” says retired 
Chicago police detective Richard Kolovitz. Neither Dickerson nor Jackson 
was hurt in the spray of bullets. Jackson still recalls the shooting. “It was a 
very tense period. The post-King period was full of riots … lots of threats. 
Civil Rights leaders and ministers had to have bodyguards (because of) 
threats by gang members on their church.”370 However, it is only when Noah 
Robinson Jr. joined Breadbasket that the liaison between Breadbasket and 
the Blackstone Rangers was formally established. Less than one year after 
Jesse Jackson was born, Noah Robinson’s wife gave birth to a son they 
named Noah R. Robinson Jr..  Jackson and his younger half-brother attended 
the same schools as Noah Robinson, but he and his half brother returned 
home to separated households every evening. Noah Robinson Jr. graduated 
with an MBA from the prestigious Wharton School at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1969, and set up his own management consulting firm in 
Philadelphia that was hailed by Fortune magazine as “one of the most 
successfully and enthusiastically supported programs of its kind in the 
nation.”371 Noah also wanted to help Jesse, and reportedly turned down 
thirty-two job offers, preferring to join Jackson at Breadbasket in 1969. For a 
short time Robinson took over Breadbasket on behalf of the S.C.L.C. after 
Jackson left, then devoted himself full time to running the Breadbasket 
Commercial Association (BCA), the private company he set up with some 
206 
 
associates of Jackson’s, to run Black Expo.372 Noah’s brief association with 
the S.C.L.C. in 1971 gave him legitimacy and helped to win a $155,000 per 
year grant from the federal Office of Minority Business Enterprise to train 
minorities in setting up and operating their own businesses.373 Then Noah 
entered into a closer relationship with Black Stone Rangers. He was arrested 
and sentenced to life in prison. Glenn Bone III, now pastor of Good Seed 
Ministries in Chicago, says that “everybody knew he (Noah Robinson) was 
into drugs and gangs,” he recalls.374 However, no connection between Noah 
Robinson’s illegal activities and Jesse Jackson’s step-brother, and Breadbasket 
was ever proved.  
Together with allegations of a direct connection with criminals, another 
source of controversy for Jackson was Breadbasket’s new strategy. Jackson 
envisioned the program not only as a boycott-based campaign to promote 
integration in the workplace, but also as a development agency to promote 
the black community and entrepreneurship. The shift from job hiring to 
economic development occurred as part of the planning by Breadbasket’s 
leadership smoothly at first, and continued to progress. It mirrored a 
complex and wider evolution taking place in the black community, as well as 
in the larger economic setting. Jackson was aware of the multiple forces at 
work inside the Black Freedom Movement and was also developing his own 
vision. He consistently tried to play a unifying role between integrationists 
and separationists, blaming nobody, and enlarging his network of allies. In a 
few years, he was able to provide a very sophisticated analysis of the race 
divide and proposed an innovative, integrationist approach to American 
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capitalism. He clearly identified the potential of creating a connection 
between the ghetto economy and black business, and was committed to 
making this possible connection work.375 However, his innovative approach 
while it was still being formed,  did not attract King’s approval. To his credit, 
Jackson never criticized King, publicly or in private, always consistent in his 
strategy to be seen as King’s only natural heir.  
As for King, he was not immediately skeptical; at the beginning, King was 
simply enthusiastic about Breadbasket. Breadbasket was S.C.L.C.’s first effort 
to address the crisis of joblessness that, according to historian Jackson, 
“became King’s principal preoccupation” in the mid-1960s.376 One of 
S.C.L.C.’s social programs became King’s central concern during his last 
years; the unemployment and low wages that produced poverty. King was 
supportive of the shift from “job discrimination” to “stimulate Negro 
businesses, financial institutions and services.” As reported in internal 
Breadbasket  notes, he agreed that Breadbasket would open “markets in large 
chain stores to Negro products and services” and persuade large companies 
to bank at black-owned banks, enabling black companies to win, for the first 
time, important service contracts, in the construction industry, for 
example.377 He credited Jackson with Breadbasket’s success. Jackson 
managed Breadbasket in Chicago and built an impressive network of 120 
ministers and more than 100 businessmen who took the original idea in the 
direction of black capitalism.378 Describing the slums as an American 
bantustan, an “underdeveloped nation” with abundant labor and insufficient 
capital, Jackson summoned the nation to “provide the bootless with boots” 
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in the form of jobs, and to teach “those with boots to pull themselves up” 
through business development. Breadbasket won support from several 
Chicago trade unions as it challenged and boycotted Country Delight and 
High Low Foods, and waged a successful sixteen-week campaign against 
A&P with forty stores in the black community. Not only that, Breadbasket 
helped black hospital workers, teachers, and bus drivers during local strikes. 
King called Jackson “a great dreamer and the great implementer of dreams” 
for winning jobs in white firms and for “building the economic base through 
Negro business.”379 
Behind mutual compliments and public expressions of esteem, Breadbasket 
leadership was divided between two conflicting visions, Jackson’s black 
capitalism, and King’s social democratic welfare. “We were very aware of 
some of the contradictions, and ambivalent about it,” Morris remembered, 
but other staffers could see that King had “grave doubts” about 
Breadbasket’s goals. This is, when Rutherford raised the issue with King 
about replacing “‘white bastards with black bastards.’ ‘If the whole thrust of 
assuring oneself profit is to exploit whoever’s there, what the hell are we 
doing with black people, trying to put them in the same odious position 
where you have to exploit someone else to turn your profit?’ King replied, 
‘Bill, there’s so much to be done that people are not ready to do right now.’” 
Rutherford understood King’s point. “Obviously we’ve got to have some 
form of socialism, but America’s not ready to hear it yet.” Rutherford 
appreciated that King’s unhappiness with Jackson went beyond spirit and 
ideology.  
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He didn’t trust Jesse, he didn’t even like Jesse … If you ask 
me if there was any suspicion about Jesse’s motives and even 
devotion to the movement, I would say categorically yes, 
there was – considerable. And we talked about it.380 
The divergence between King and Jackson was explained in terms of a clash 
of characters. King assigned a special mission to Bill Rutherford when 
Rutherford became S.C.L.C. executive director.  
He said, ‘The second thing I want you to do is, Jesse 
Jackson’s so independent, I either want him in S.C.L.C. or 
out – you go whichever way you want to, but one way or the 
other, he’s a part of S.C.L.C. or he’s not a part of S.C.L.C.  
Breadbasket was achieving success in Chicago and Cleveland, but Jackson 
was viewed as an outsider, an egotistical self-promoter by many S.C.L.C. 
staffers. Later that year, in Chicago, James Bevel had taken Jackson under his 
wing, and put him on S.C.L.C.’s staff. “Bevel was the real genius of that 
period,” Jackson remembered, “one of the most creative thinkers I’ve ever 
been exposed to.” Just as Bevel’s eccentricities and single-mindedness rubbed 
many colleagues the wrong way, Jackson’s aggressive efforts to expand 
Breadbasket into a nation-wide program for fostering black capitalism also 
troubled many S.C.L.C. activists. Although part of the tension was rooted in 
the Atlanta staffers’ desire to keep a tight rein on Chicago-based programs, 
much of the trouble stemmed from a distrust of Jackson’s personal motives. 
“Jesse was really an outsider in a way, striving very hard to get in, to be 
accepted, to be respected,” recalled Calvin Morris, who became associate 
director of Breadbasket during that winter. “The doubt about Jesse is what is 
it for, is it for Jesse or for the movement?” Stanley Levison said to Coretta 
King six months later, “[I] know on this Martin had many deep doubts.” 
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Bevel often defended Jackson, telling King, “He’s just crude ‘cause he’s 
young.” King disagreed, saying, “NO, he’s ambitious,” and voiced his unease 
to close friends. “Jesse had irritating ways,” King’s Chicago confidant 
Chauncey Eskridge explained. “I don’t think we cared much for him.” Those 
sympathetic to Jackson saw the dynamics differently. “Martin had problems 
with Jesse because Jesse would ask questions, “but others perceived a 
fundamental spiritual difference between the two men. “Martin saw it in 
Jesse,” one former S.C.L.C. executive recalled. “He used to tell Jesse, ‘Jesse, 
you have no love.’” However, their divergence was also rooted in a 
generation gap, different priorities, and dissimilar strategies.  
Jackson’s drift toward black capitalism troubled King, he thought it failed to 
address black poverty, labor exploitation, and political exclusion. King told a 
March 1967 meeting of Breadbasket in Chicago that a white man who 
preached black capital accumulation to poor people reminded him of 
somebody “telling you to lift yourself up by your bootstraps” while he was 
standing on your foot. As the movement advocated guaranteed incomes, 
programs like Breadbasket could provide a means of self-help.381 King “was 
quite rough on Jesse,” Andrew Young remembered, because he believed that 
adequate jobs would have to come through the public sector, while 
“Breadbasket was essentially a private sector program.” King never 
championed the cause of minority small businesses, as did people as diverse 
as Floyd McKissick (who was a supporter of Black Power and turned the 
Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE, into a more radical movement, while 
still endorsing Nixon in 1968), Robert Kennedy, and Richard Nixon. In 
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September, King met the Chicago owner of a gift shop facing bankruptcy., 
The entrepreneur asked King for help in requesting funds from the Small 
Business Administration to make up the shortfall of capital. When King 
declined, she thanked him for his participation in the “fight for jobs,” but 
insisted, “if we do not now begin the establishment of businesses, we may 
very well find that in another 100 years we will be no better off in our fight 
for economic power and human dignity.”382 
Breadbasket after King 
What most clearly characterized the intellectual landscape of the black 
movement in Chicago in the second half of the 1960s was an exceptionally 
wide range of approaches, perspectives and goals. Some were rooted in the 
tradition of the Civil Rights Movement, others in the experiences of more 
radical, militant groups, with still others in-between. The intellectual life of 
Black Chicago was particularly diverse and fluid. The era was explosive, the 
racial struggle difficult and ongoing, and the passion great enough to permit 
the coexistence of many different agendas within the black community. 
While some black leaders tried to emphasize the differences, others – like 
Jackson – worked to unify the different fragments of the movement.  
Jackson, unlike King, had emphasized the originality, the uniqueness, the 
overwhelming importance of being black. King shied away from the kind of 
Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism that attracted more militant leaders 
such as Stokely Carmichael. But as soon as King was dead, Jackson began to 
move Breadbasket in that direction, and his results were electrifying. His first 
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innovation came in 1968, the year of King’s death, with the inauguration of 
what he called “Black Christmas,” which was both a seasonal celebration and 
a hard-nosed economic venture. Born of a desire in other leaders to punish 
white businessmen by boycotting their businesses at Christmastime, Black 
Christmas was a more positive and more pragmatic alternative. In a sense, it 
was the black version of the Macy’s parade that had become an important 
introduction to holiday season on television. Instead of watching Mickey 
Mouse and Santa Claus cavort in faraway New York, blacks in Chicago 
would put on their own parade, with their own floats, their own bands, their 
own beauty queens, their own jovial advertisements. And black businesses 
also set up a “Breadbasket Black Christmas Center.” But the event was not 
pure merriment, any more than it was mere commercialism. There was 
something else present as well – a new symbolism, the beginnings of an 
attempt to change the traditional iconography of Christmas, to give it a 
distinctly and exclusively black meaning. This element is perhaps the best 
example of Jesse Jackson’s imagination at work, his genius in the invention of 
new images and rituals, an essential element in the transformation of any 
society. For instead of Santa Claus – who according to Jackson was too old, 
fat and white – Jackson featured at Black Christmas a new character known 
as “Black Soul Saint,” who, according to Jackson, came from the South Pole 
rather than the North Pole and lingered along the equator sufficiently to turn 
up wearing a dashiki of black, with yellow, red, and green trimmings, the 
colors of the flag of Ghana. Henceforth, the Soul Saint would preside over 
the season of Christmas, a black figure whose gifts were not toys or sugar 
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plums but “love, justice, peace, and power.” Christmas underwent a magical 
transformation that year in Chicago, becoming an ethnic holiday with 
overtones of the political. The Black Christmas parade was headed by a 
horse-drawn wagon, symbolizing “the poverty of the nation’s masses.” And 
since that time Black Christmas has been held annually in Chicago, and each 
year its symbolism and its message further emphasize the separateness of 
blacks from the white community, a message which Jackson himself has only 
infrequently proclaimed within earshot of the national press. Following the 
success of Black Christmas, Jackson and Breadbasket introduced Black 
Easter, as a follow-up celebration based on the Christian calendar. Like Black 
Christmas, Black Easter was an attempt to “capture” the holiday for blacks, 
to free it from white domination, to separate it from its traditional 
association. Instead of Soul Saint, Jackson used a simpler, more poignant 
symbol for the idea of resurrection - a black lamb, which both suggested 
Christ the Lamb of God, and identified Him with the proverbial creature cast 
out from the rest of the flock because of his color. Black Easter also featured 
a black passion play written and directed by a black woman, a drama which 
equated the passion of Christ with the suffering of the black people. And as 
if to emphasize further the more recent historical meaning of the celebration, 
floats were named after dead black heroes like W.E.B. Dubois, Malcolm X, 
Medger Evers, and of course, Martin Luther King, Jr. Yet Jackson did not 
forget the more pragmatic responsibilities of Breadbasket, such as his 
emphasis on buying Easter gifts at black businesses. “If we are proud to be 
black,” he said, “we can spend our money where we are.” And in 1969 Easter 
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bonnets and Easter suits were bought on the south and west sides rather 
than in white-owned stores in the Loop. 
Then came Black Expo, perhaps Jackson’s most famous commercial idea. 
The concept that produced Black Expo was nothing new in the business 
world. In retrospect it seems like an idea that anyone might have dreamed 
up. After all, every industry has its annual market, where those in the trade 
buy booths, display their wares and services, and compete for their share of 
the business. Retailers meet wholesalers. Cards are exchanged. Deals struck. 
But it took Jesse Jackson to take this marketing idea – as old as the medieval 
fair – and apply it to the problems of black business in a white–dominated 
economy. Black Expo was an annual trade fair for black businesses, both 
local and national, as well as a general celebration of black capitalism, 
complete with parties, concerts by black artists, an exhibition of paintings 
and sculptures by black artists, and other attractions associated with 
economic expositions. Central to this splendid spectacle were the business 
booths themselves, predominately (though not exclusively) black-owned. 
White exhibitors were invited and allowed to set up in limited numbers, but 
they paid many times the amount that black exhibitors paid, and there were 
those who grumbled that it was more like tribute than rent. In spite of this, 
they came because they were convinced that it was a way of insuring 
themselves against future boycotts of one kind or another, some came 
because they knew it was an excellent way to pick up a share of the money 
spent in ever-increasing amounts by black consumers. In the case of Black 
Christmas and Black Easter, the theme of each Black Expo was openly 
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ethnocentric; in 1969 it was “From Chains to Change”; in 1970 “Rhythm 
Ain’t All We Got”; in 1971 “See the Dream Coming True”; in 1972 “Save 
the Children” and so on. The Expo spoke to blacks of their own blackness as 
it promoted economic opportunity, and in many ways it was the triumph of 
Jesse Jackson’s entrepreneurial genius. It was synthesis of two ideas that 
became so perfectly wedded that Black Expo seemed likely to outlast all his 
other efforts in Chicago.383 
At this point, Jackson was framing himself as a champion of black capitalism. 
In the evolution of his vision, and that of other black leaders’, a role was 
played by the poor results of the Poor People’s Campaign. Historian Mantler 
Gordon writes that Jackson tried to frame the Poor People’s Campaign more 
directly within the increasingly popular concept of black capitalism, which 
was championed by the Black Power advocates,  and also because the Poor 
People’s Campaign experience reinforced his understanding that the time for 
an effective dialogue with liberal politics were over. Gordon points out that 
the hundreds of Chicagoans who participated in the campaign – the most 
from one city – witnessed firsthand the limited assistance Congress was 
willing to provide. Thus, they returned to the city more open to the more 
aggressive strategy offered by Breadbasket. It is possible that Jackson, who 
was among them, took note of the disastrous end of the King’s last campaign 
in Washington, a campaign that he led reluctantly. However, it is also 
possible that Chicago was simply the right place to absorb the influence of 
Black Power and the other radical forces at work within the black urban 
community. In addition, Jackson was a generation younger that King, and 
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more sensitive to the post-1965 cultural and economic climate. People saw 
the Chicago operation as the embodiment of Civil Rights’ ideals, claimed 
Calvin Morris, Breadbasket’s associate director. “It unleashed a kind of new 
spirit of boldness here,” Morris said, adding, “One of my regrets was our 
inability to really have the kind of apparatus to put those kind of people to 
work and hold them. We were just swamped with people. Breadbasket 
meetings, Saturday mornings, just exploded.”384 Yet, the size of the mission, 
erasing poverty, and the availability of resources, did not match. In 1968,  
black leaders were struggling between two frustrating options: requiring the 
assistance of a federal government increasingly disinterested in their destiny, 
or promoting self-developing programs that were affected by an endemic 
scarcity of resources. This is the context in which Jackson envisioned a 
further step for Breadbasket, not simply engineering black capitalism, but 
assuring economic autonomy to the black community in Chicago.  
In 1970, in the first four years of activities, Breadbasket had effectively 
coerced 15 companies in Chicago’s heavily black South Side into opening up 
5,000 new jobs for blacks. The organization was led by Jackson, the associate 
director, Rev. Calvin Morris, and the Rev. Mrs. Willie P. Barrow, a minister. 
In addition, Jackson discouraged whites’ participation in the leadership of 
Breadbasket. He pointed out that blacks “need and want to encourage the 
technical and financial aids of whites,” but discouraged whites participation 
because blacks should make their own decisions.385 Outside Chicago, 
Breadbasket had set up other operations in eight cities, including Los 
Angeles, Milwaukee, Indianapolis, Brooklyn, Houston and Cleveland. 
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Sometimes boycotts were broadened to include political action. In Cleveland, 
for example, a Breadbasket group (Cannonball Adderley, Nat Adderley, Joe 
Zawinul, Walter Booker, and Roy McCundy) was sent, accompanied by some 
600 black teenagers, into black areas at 5 a.m. on Election Day, November 
1969. They raised such a racket that thousands of irate residents awoke, just 
to be told to vote early in the morning for the incumbent black mayor Carl 
B. Stokes.386 In 1969, Breadbasket negotiated with the supermarkets in the 
ghetto to put products from the Southwest Alabama Farmers’ Cooperative 
on the shelves or face boycotts, as black Alabama farmers had found that 
they were unable to find markets for their products in their home state. In 
this case, Breadbasket acted as an agent for the Southwest Alabama Farmers’ 
Cooperative.387  
In summary, the expanding number of targets coupled with lack of resources, 
an erratic agenda, and a mounting ambition to pursue new strategies 
destroyed Breadbasket’s focus. A collateral effect was that not all companies 
complied with their agreements with Breadbasket. A review concluded that 
the A&P food chain had been one of the worst in meeting its agreements. In 
a coordinated effort on July 6, 1968, white and black Breadbasket supporters 
began picketing their neighborhood A&P stores in inner-city and suburban 
areas, eventually bringing executives – according to Gary Massoni - back to 
the table to negotiate “the most comprehensive covenant Breadbasket had 
ever designed,” agreeing to hire black businessmen to oversee closely the 
company’s training and employment programs from the inside.388 In general, 
Breadbasket faced a consistently serious problem with checking the post-
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agreement follow-through of corporate executives, who learned how to 
capitulate early – to reduce the boycotts effect – and then forgot their 
commitments as soon as they signed them.  
The end of Breadbasket coincided with the growth of the Black Expo. The 
exhibition was a media, cultural, and financial success. Under the 
arrangement with the S.C.L.C., Jackson was to remit 25 percent of the Black 
Expo proceeds to Atlanta. But the accounts he submitted to Ralph 
Abernathy, then the vice president at large of S.C.L.C., were spotty at best. 
For the first year’s operation, he remitted $60,000. But in 1970, that amount 
dropped to a mere $11,000.389 In 1971, the last year of Jackson’s association 
with the S.C.L.C., Jackson claimed that more than 700,000 people visited 
Black Expo in 1971, where the daily admission fee cost a dollar for adults 
and 50 cents for children. Another 66,000 people attended six nights of 
entertainment, paying $4 each. Almost all of this money was paid in cash. In 
addition, hundreds of exhibitors paid substantial fees for their stands, many 
of them upwards to $10,000 each. Yet, Jackson reported just over $500,000 
in gross receipts for the entire event, an amount so paltry that he had to have 
Black Expo bookkeepers present at a news conference, where reporters 
hammered them as their tried to explain away the paucity of receipts with 
elaborate charts.390 Jackson himself would later claim that in his generosity he 
had let in half the visitors for free. Biographer Barbara Reynolds, quoting 
show promoter International Amphitheatre, expressed serious doubt that any 
more than 20,000 people per day had attended, bringing the total attendance 
to 100,000.391 But Hermene Hartman, who helped plan the Black Expos, 
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recalls that the events were so popular that they were deluged with visitors.392 
This still did not explain the huge discrepancy between the amount shown by 
the receipts and the amount Black Expo had earned, according to Jackson. A 
Chicago judge later slapped a contempt of court motion on Jackson for 
failing to produce financial records demanded by the promoter, who 
remained unpaid.393 According to Hurley Green, who stopped ghostwriting 
for Jackson in 1971 to become the editor of the Chicago Defender, “Jesse made 
a deal with the Black Stone Rangers.”394 When Jackson was counting the cash 
from the ticket sales, a group of young toughs burst into his office with 
sawed-off shotguns. “They were members of the Black Stone Rangers,” 
Green says. Five people were in the room with Jackson when the gang 
members burst in. One was Hermene Hartman.395 The presence of the 
members of the Black Stone Rangers at the Exhibition once again fueled 
rumors about a potential connection between black street gangs and 
Breadbasket.  
By combing through state records, Chicago Tribune reporter Angela Parker 
discovered that on September 29, 1970, Jackson and his friends had 
incorporated Black Expo as a nonprofit foundation, totally independent of 
the S.C.L.C., and then as a corporation on September 14, 1971.396 As a 
further shield from the S.C.L.C., they established two other corporations, 
Black Expo Inc. and the Breadbasket Commercial Association.397 The Tribune 
charged that both moves were made “under the direction of the Rev. Jesse L. 
Jackson, national director of Breadbasket, without the knowledge or approval 
of Dr. Abernathy or S.C.L.C.’s board of directors.” On the board of 
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directors of Black Expo Inc. were Jackson’s most trusted associates. In 
addition to Reverend Clay Evans, the board included Chicago businessmen 
Celion Herderson, George Jones, Thomas Todd, and Al Johnson, a Cadillac 
dealer who was helping to bankroll Jackson’s personal lifestyle.398 “We 
secretly incorporated BCA (Breadbasket Commercial Association) as a 
separate entity from Breadbasket,” Robinson told Jackson biographer 
Barbara Reynolds. “We were not pushing the name because we didn’t want 
S.C.L.C. to know about it, because Jesse thought he might have to leave and 
he wanted BCA to be underground, so we could get up and run if we had to. 
When we decided to make the break out the door, we would have a 
concerted effort because the businessmen would underwrite the new 
movement.” Abernathy summoned Jackson and Robinson to Atlanta in 
April 1971 suspecting that something was amiss. “All during the meeting 
with Abernathy, I heard later, Jesse denied that BCA existed,” Robinson told 
Barbara Reynolds.399 
Parker’s editors at the Tribune flew her down to Atlanta on November 27, 
1971, to show Abernathy the evidence of Jackson’s betrayal and get his 
comments. Abernathy was stunned as he went through the documents. “This 
is most unusual,” Abernathy told Parker.  
I find it difficult to believe. Although there may not have 
been any mishandling of funds by this move, if it is still true, 
it is wrong and should not have been incorporated without 
approval and knowledge of the board of directors and the 
S.C.L.C. president. … If it is true, the Rev. Jesse Jackson had 
no right to direct the founding of either a foundation or a 
corporation – no department has that right under the policies 
of the national organization. It cannot make any legal move 
221 
 
without the approval of the president and the board of 
directors of the national office, we cannot at this time allow a 
department to get out of line, it can hurt the entire 
organization.400  
At first, Abernathy phoned Jackson, summoning him to Atlanta to explain 
his actions. When Jackson refused, Abernathy and his board flew to Chicago 
and set up shop in the Marriot Hotel near O’Hare Airport on December 3, 
1971. Jackson alerted the press, who came in abundance. Once the news 
cameras were turning, Jackson supporters packed the hotel lobby carrying 
picket signs that said, “Don’t get Messy with Jesse.”401 
Although Jackson showed up with a briefcase full of documents to make his 
case, Abernathy kept him outside the conference room for three full hours. 
Twice Jackson attempted to force his way in, but he was tossed out. Finally, 
after a long, tense meeting, Jackson stormed out into the crowd of reporters. 
For perhaps the only time in his life, he brushed them off with a curt “no 
comment.” Abernathy emerged shortly afterwards to announce that the 
S.C.L.C. had suspended, with pay, Jackson for sixty days “for administrative 
improprieties and repeats acts of violation of organizational policy,” and had 
forbidden him to take part of any S.C.L.C. activities during that time. He also 
pledged that the S.C.L.C. board would conduct a detailed investigation of the 
Black Expo finances.402 That Saturday, Jackson appeared at the weekly 
“prayer meeting” of Breadbasket, introduced no longer as an S.C.L.C. staff 
member but as a guest speaker. He denied outright Abernathy’s accusation 
that he had acted without the consent of the S.C.L.C. executive board and 
took a swipe at the Internal Revenue Service, which he said has been looking 
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at our books for months: “My record needs no defense. We don’t owe the 
IRS anything, but in case we do, we’re going to pay.”403 Then he went after 
Angela Parker, the Chicago Tribune reporter who had exposed his corruption 
to Abernathy. Addressing Parker, who was among the reporters in the room, 
Jackson said:  
Dr. Abernathy is not the problem or the issue. The issue is 
that last Friday a black woman reporter left Chicago with her 
mission being to separate great black men. She took a plan 
from the Tribune Tower to Atlanta. Now we know who our 
enemy is.404  
Barbara Reynolds notes that the crowd greeted Parker with “a hail of boos,” 
and Jackson went on for a full fifteen minutes, railing about “the treachery of 
black women.”405 At one point, Jackson compared Parker to the woman who 
stabbed Dr. King in New York in the early 1960s, a remark that produced 
“thunderous applause” from the audience.406 Within hours, pickets arrived to 
surround Angela Parker’s apartment.407 Jackson didn’t waste time plotting his 
next move. Just days after Abernathy had publicly rebuked him, Jackson fired 
off a contemptuous letter, resigning from the S.C.L.C.. “Since the time has 
come when I cannot any longer give my active service to the organization,” 
Jackson wrote, “I consider sixty days too long for this vital work to be 
endangered by my leave of absence and hereby submit my resignation 
effective Friday, December 17, 1971.” He signed the letter, “Jesse Louis 
Jackson, The Country Preacher.”408 
 
Jackson unveiled his S.C.L.C. resignation letter at an emotional press 
conference the next Saturday, attended by 3,000 supporters. “I need air. I 
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need to grow,” he said, vowing to begin his own organization. “Whatever its 
name shall be, we are going to organize and to keep on pushing.”409 Furious 
at Jackson’s tactics, Abernathy issued a scathing rebuke in the name of the 
S.C.L.C. board.  
We will not accept the resignation of the Reverend Jesse L. 
Jackson until he gives an accounting of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars and explain the operation of Black 
Expo. Mr. Jackson must clean his house before he leaves. I 
never thought it would come to the point that a brother 
would quit and walk out on the movement started by the late 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., rather than to deal forthrightly 
with the issues.410  
Jackson eventually hired an accounting firm, Washington, Pittman & 
McKeever, to go through the Black Expo ‘71 books and transfer the S.C.L.C. 
share of the take to Atlanta. But even after this audit, which was remitted to 
the S.C.L.C. board the following April, it showed several anomalies that were 
never resolved, including a $100,000 loan from Stax Record Company in 
Memphis, Tennessee. It was unclear whether Jackson ever repaid the loan.411 
The controversy was not to be simply settled. S.C.L.C.’s executive director, 
Stoney Cooks, pointed out that in 1969, Breadbasket contributed about 
$85,000 to S.C.L.C., but he added S.C.L.C. contributed almost twice that 
amount to Breadbasket the same year. “Any money that came in [to S.C.L.C.] 
from Chicago was merely the Operation Breadbasket staff trying to pay its 
own way”.412 However, Jackson pointed out that too much money, 
particularly from Black Expo, was funneled from Chicago back to Atlanta.413 
Other sources explained that Breadbasket in Chicago was the main fount of 
funds of the parent body, the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta. Internal paperwork shows 
224 
 
that there was a constant flux of financial information between Chicago and 
Atlanta. Jackson usually corresponded with Bill Rutherford, the S.C.L.C. 
executive director, but also with Andy Young, Ralph Abernathy, and Dr. 
King with regard to funds. Initially, Atlanta was financially sustaining 
Chicago’s Breadbasket, and Jackson had to request not only the funds to 
operate but also the authorization for the use of these funds. The operational 
costs of the program were rising together with the amount going to salaries. 
While Jackson saw his salary rising, he tried to enlarge Breadbasket’s staff 
and provide decent salaries for his aids. An example of this would be that a 
national research director’s yearly salary quickly moved from $4,500 to 
$8,000.  
What happened later is not very clear, as the available documents do not 
provide a complete assessment of the financial situation between 
Breadbasket in Chicago and the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta. However, it is likely that 
the increasing success of Black Expo changed the balance of power between 
the two potential heirs of Dr. King. Chicago suddenly became a contributor 
to Atlanta, although Stoney Cooks contested this affirmation. After the 
assassination of King, fund raising was becoming more difficult for S.C.L.C., 
while Breadbasket in Chicago was booming in terms of revenues and 
contributions.In the end, it was likely that the subsidiary, Breadbasket, which 
was completely owned and controlled by S.C.L.C., was financially 
contributing the controlling entity, the S.C.L.C.414 In this context, it would 
not be surprising if Jackson, acknowledging the possibility of financial 
independence, decided to built Breadbasket’s financial autonomy by cheating 
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the headquarters in Atlanta, and diverting some revenues to a local entity. Of 
course, other options were available at the time. For example, Jackson could 
have resigned, to establish his own organization in the late 1960s. Another 
alternative could have been pursued by Abernathy when he realized that the 
balance of power between the subsidiary and the controlling entity had 
changed. He could have given Jackson financial autonomy, and renegotiated 
the relationship between Breadbasket and the S.C.L.C. Both alternatives 
would have been very painful for Jackson and Abernathy. Jackson preferred 
to maintain his role inside the S.C.L.C. and where progressively built his base, 
eventually gaining  financial autonomy, while waiting for the right 
opportunity or reason to leave. Abernathy preferred to maintain his role as 
the chairman of the S.C.L.C. without recognizing that the S.C.L.C.’s financial 
resources were increasingly dependent on Jackson. It is likely that Abernathy 
held the unrealistic idea that Jackson would accept his subordinate role and 
continue to finance the S.C.L.C., while continuing to support Abernathy’s 
position as the head of the organization. In the end, it was an unstable 
relationship and   destined to end, either  when Jackson was ready to leave or 
when Abernathy was ready to accept the situation. This situation was 
resolved when Jackson resigned.  
On December 12, the day after he announced his resignation, Jackson called 
a group of former Breadbasket supporters to the Commodore Hotel in New 
York to gather public pledges of loyalty and renewed support. Among the 
crowd were singers Aretha Franklin and Roberta Flack, black politicians Carl 
Stokes and Richard Hatcher, black reporters and publishers, and even a 
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member of the S.C.L.C. board, W.A. Saunders. Also in the crowd were some 
of Jackson’s black business supporters, including Chicago Cadillac dealer Al 
Johnson.415 At a public ceremony, Jackson signed the papers to establish his 
new organization on December 18, 1971. On Christmas Day, Jackson 
announced the birth of his own organization: People United to Save 
Humanity (PUSH).416 With Jackson’s resignation, Breadbasket eventually 
collapsed.417 
Jackson’s departure from the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket was considered the 
final straw ending a long-standing feud between Jackson and Abernathy, with 
Jackson being on the losing side of the dispute. But the widow of Dr. King, 
Coretta, disagreed. She immediately made  it clear that  
Having worked with him [Jackson] in the past, individually, 
and in my capacity as resident of the Martin Luther King 
Center, I will continue to do so, just as I feel I will also be 
working with the Rev. Abernathy and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference. 
In addition, Andrew Young, who ran unsuccessfully for Congress the 
previous year, did not dramatize the split and did not take part. “Usually – he 
said – you end up with two strong churches. I hope that this is the case with 
S.C.L.C. and Operation PUSH.”418 Jackson pointed out that he was the last 
member of the executive staff of the S.C.L.C. after the assassination of Dr. 
King. Bernard Lafayette, Andrew Young, James Bevel and Hosea Williams, 
all left their executive positions before him. He noted that he had received 
suggestions earlier, that he should have left the S.C.L.C. a long time before 
because of the strains between himself and Rev. Abernathy. He made clear 
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that Operation PUSH was an expansion from S.C.L.C., not a split. He called 
his departure from the S.C.L.C. an amicable divorce.419 Abernathy went on to 
say:  
It’s right of every individual in Chicago, or across the nation, 
to support Rev. Jackson – to support him because he’s a fine 
wonderful person.  
His last remark made even clearer the ideological differences between him 
and Jackson. The S.C.L.C. would work to provide alternatives which could 
be pursued in the “political arena, the economic arena, and in organizing the 
working poor and building the black community [the emphasis is mine].”420 
Also, the black press like Jet, preferred to “spend no time debating whether 
their support should remain with S.C.L.C. or shift to PUSH,” since it was 
assumed that  
both PUSH and S.C.L.C. will be about the business of 
continuing efforts to make real the dream of the late Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., that, someday, all Black folks will be 
free.421  
Finally, Jackson was partially protected from public stigma by the social 
capital he had built in his years of activism on behalf of the black community. 
His uncompromising loyalty to the black cause made him less vulnerable to 
harsh criticism for his departure from Breadbasket. “Whether we are called 
Operation Breadbasket or Black Panthers or niggers, we know who the 
enemy is.”422 As Jackson himself pointed out, “every black man who has won 
the loyalty of his community has indicated some expression of defiance for 
the white man.”423 
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Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the story of Breadbasket in Chicago. Jackson became 
the national director of Breadbasket’s programs in 1967. After King’s 
assassination in 1968, Jackson continued to lead the program, until 
December 1971, when he refused to move Breadbasket from Chicago to 
Atlanta, and resigned from the S.C.L.C.. A week later, he launched his own 
economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH. Ostensibly, 
Breadbasket in Chicago provided jobs for low-income black people by 
threatening boycotts of white-owned and white-managed businesses in black 
neighborhoods. Jackson expanded the scope of the program, and sought to 
work out deals by which businesses agreed to hire blacks to work in stores in 
black ghettos, to end discriminatory practices, to deposit some of their 
money in black banks, to use the services of black contractors, black 
agencies, and black advertising firms. However, in Jackson’s Breadbasket 
(and later in PUSH) there was a change of attitude, a clearer focus on black 
capitalism and business than in King’s. PUSH took the place of Breadbasket, 
and soon became both a social agent of dignity and economic leadership, and 
an indispensable tool for wealth creation and economic autonomy. PUSH 
was a symbol of the new economic climate, a move toward independence, 
and a vehicle of identity and self-expression. PUSH was important to the 
next chapter in the story of the African American freedom struggle from 
economic rights to Black Power.  
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Chapter Four: Birth of a Leader 
 
Introduction 
Breadbasket is not simply the story of the transformation of a Civil Rights 
program, but also a story of intellectual adaptation. Originating in Atlanta, it 
was at the end of the decade in Chicago under the leadership of Jesse 
Jackson that the organization made its strongest gains. This chapter addresses 
the reasons Breadbasket, established to fight economic discrimination against 
African Americans, became an important part of the black capitalism 
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Jackson moved Breadbasket 
beyond traditional Civil Rights platforms of desegregation and voting rights 
and addressed issues such as black employment and access to capital. He 
placed Breadbasket at the center of black capitalism in Chicago, the nation’s 
most vibrant black economy. By the time of King’s assassination, Jackson 
was already Breadbasket’s national director and had energized the 
organization’s standard repertoire, fighting for economic opportunities for 
black people. Jackson negotiated with white-owned businesses to hire 
African Americans to work in stores located in black areas, deposit funds in 
black-owned banks, and enlist the services of black contractors, agencies, and 
advertising firms. Breadbasket changed its nature under Jackson’s leadership. 
Although difficult to quantify, under Jackson the organization had an 
intensity and energy that had not previously existed. Jackson embodied the 
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cultural moment focused on black consciousness far more than King did, 
and stressed “power” rather than “rights.” He claimed that “the Civil Rights 
movement is a lifetime struggle for power” – and connected Breadbasket to a 
much wider range of community organizations.424 In 1969, The New York 
Times wrote that Jackson “sounds a little like the late Reverend Martin Luther 
King and a little like a Black Panther.”425 Finally, Jackson was not as critical 
of capitalism as King, and openly embraced a more conservative view of 
capitalism for the sake of black liberation.426 The story of Breadbasket in 
Chicago under Jackson’s leadership suggests that during the Black Power era 
the entrepreneur moved alongside the radical as an iconic image and source 
of socio-cultural change. 
A Militant Preacher  
On January 15, 1971, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, national director of 
Breadbasket, was the principal speaker at a program in the old Capital 
Theatre, located at 7941 South Halsted, Chicago. It was one of several 
services in the city marking Dr. Martin Luther King’s birthday. The 6,000-
seat movie theatre, recently purchased by Breadbasket, had been renamed 
Dr. King’s Workshop, in memory of the leader of the Civil Rights 
Movement. The Reverend Curtis Melson led members of Breadbasket in a 
song and a raised right fist salute to the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
When Rev. Jackson presented his eulogy, he praised Dr. King as a man who 
became “a world authority” despite “crippling circumstances.” Then Jackson 
elaborated on his initial remark by saying that King was a man who “had 
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everything against him. He was black. He was short. He was from the South-
Georgia.” But, according to Jackson, Dr. King overcame all these challenges 
and met them proudly.427  
“He was black. He was short. He was from the South-Georgia” – unusual 
words to commemorate a leader who was allowed to go to the mountaintop. 
Jackson was preaching. What he meant, what he wanted to say, was that King 
seemed to be an improbable leader, struggling as he did with his own 
finiteness. He suffered a number of limitations such as physical constraints 
(“He was short”) along with his race, which was uncommon at the time for 
an American leader (“He was black”). Rev. Jackson also inserted references 
to the Gospel, where he mentioned the place of Dr. King’s birth (“He was 
from the South-Georgia”). This was proverbial, and similar to the  reference 
in John to  Jesus’ own origins (“Nazareth! Can anything good come from 
there?” (John 1:46)). It seemed highly unlikely that the Messiah would come 
from a place like that. Yet, despite his finitude, King was a great man because 
he was a man of God. That’s how he convinced the people in Montgomery 
“not to ride the buses.” That’s why he was successful in “all of those sit-ins 
and marches,”428 because God was with him. It matters not where a man 
comes from, or where he was born, or how tall he is, or the color of his skin, 
provided he be authorized by God, and qualified for His work. This is what 
Jackson meant.429 Yet, his words were surprising. Apparently, Jackson did not 
need to be affected by the same racial and physical limitations as King to be a 
man qualified for His work. Jackson was 220 pounds of muscle rippling 
through a six-foot, two inch frame with a billowing Afro,  with a demeanor 
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of a handsome, proud black man. As such, it needs to be emphasized, he was 
proud of being black. When he spoke of King, race was part of the 
“crippling circumstances.” But when he spoke of himself, race was part of 
his assets: “I am black – beautiful – proud – I must be respected.”430 He sells 
pride as he is preaching.431 Jackson was clearly embracing a different 
rhetorical code than King. He was pursuing a specific rhetorical strategy.  
His rhetorical strategy was based on the tradition of the Black Church, 
although with a bitter taste. In his early career as a civil right leader and a 
pastor, Jackson’s activism was shaped by his strong convictions about the 
crucial role played by social issues related to the advancement of racial 
justice. In an internal document, there is passage that links theological 
questions and social concerns that, although not written by Jackson himself, 
undoubtedly received his approval.  
Theology is not and cannot be a “… study of those things 
pertaining to God … “ alone (…) Theology is also social and 
ethical in content (…) Given this understanding, Operation 
Breadbasket is engaged, at least in part, in a theological 
task.432  
In the same document, it is clarified that:  
…any theological task with respect to Operation Breadbasket it 
is to offer some perspective for altering the very context of 
some social realities.433 
The document also states that:  
…a covenant translates Black Power into black cooperation 
so that black firms can demand the type of consideration in 
bidding. 434 
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In other words, the rise of the Black Power did not coincide with the 
extinguishing of the involvement of the clergy in Civil Rights but with a 
different stance of prophetic religion, a profound transformation that led to a 
more racial self-conscious practice. Certainly, when it comes to Jackson, his 
prophetic stance is difficult to be identify because of the racial tone of his 
preaching style. If compared with King’s, Jackson’s sermons in the late 1960s 
clearly projected an ecclesiastical vision, and are shaped with a different 
rhetorical scope that resonated, but not necessary identified, with the Black 
Theology of Liberation.435 According to James Cone, “The rise of Black 
Power created a decisive turning point in black religious thought. Black 
Power forced black clergy to raise the theological question about the relation 
between black faith and white religion,” but it is safe to say that not every 
clergymen answered in the same way.436 Plus, this transformation from rural 
to urban social landscape did not happen without consequences, and the 
history of Breadbasket is a testament to the dramatic, somewhat painful 
evolution from the traditional civil involvement of black preachers in the 
South to a more militant black priesthood in the North. In fact, Breadbasket 
covers a period of ten years, from 1962 to 1972, and was operated for its 
entire existence by Black Church ministers. It was led by black clergy in 
Atlanta and in Chicago. The only difference is in Atlanta and in the South, the 
pastors had to deal with local Civil Rights leaders and campaigns, while in 
Chicago they dealt with black politicians, gangsters, and nationalistic 
militants.  
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Before concluding that prophetic religion was gone by the Breadbasket 
relocated to Chicago, a deeper assessment of Jackson as a pastor is needed. 
Jackson merged the tradition of the pastors who led the Civil Rights 
Movement with the wave of radicals who looked to the economy as the new 
political terrain of social change and racial pride. While the Black Theology 
of Liberation stresses racial consciousness, its core lies in its methodology. It 
emphasizes praxis and social analysis, especially of racism, as tools to aid in 
understanding why the social, economic and political orders are arranged as 
they are.437 Jackson envisioned himself at the intersection of religion and 
social activism, inventing a new profile of a pastor; a clergyman who was 
involved in the social issues and economic troubles of his community not as 
an extension of his ministry, but as a core response to his call. In a 
communication with Andrew Young, he stated that:  
The church stands out as a crucial institution in the campaign 
to end slums (…) Our approach to the church is one of 
opening it up and releasing the seeds of renewal and power 
that are presently encapsulated within its walls. Ministers need 
training to awaken their sensibilities to root issues. Then they 
should learn the sensible use of the potential power at their 
disposal for bringing about creative change in the city.438  
The church had power, the church was power, she just needed to be 
awakened to her power, to recognize her mission on earth, and to learn how 
to use this power. As a result, Jackson built a church (a congregation, an 
ecclesiastical community) around a movement – literally, since the theatre 
that was Breadbasket’s headquarters was converted into a place of worship 
every Saturday morning at 10 a.m. - rather than the other way around, as 
King did.439 Breadbasket was ultimately the congregation Jackson built 
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around a social program, and racial protest. A female civil rights worker from 
Mississippi, upon visiting one Saturday morning session, called it “my kind of 
church.”440 Breadbasket was a movement as well as an ecclesiastical 
community, and the template of Operation PUSH, a Civil Rights 
organization that is headquartered in a real church. Historians have only 
begun to explore the Black Church’s activism after the mid-1960s. When the 
movement shifted North, becoming involved in an urban and more 
secularized landscape, and when King’s vision shifted from the integration of 
black people into existing societal structures to a more radical and systemic 
transformation of society, prophetic religion did not lose traction in the 
midst of a decidedly secular, white Christian America. Jackson worked hard 
to maintain the influence of the Black Church.441 Gradually, the role once 
played by moderate clergymen was taken over by the Black Power 
nationalists, and the message of integration, nonviolence, and brotherhood of 
black preachers was rapidly challenged by the more militant call for the 
liberation of the oppressed.  
For Jackson, economic justice was not only an ethical principle or a basis for 
social advancement, but the one of the prerequisite to full humanity and  a 
basic part to help people become fully functioning human beings. Here lies 
the difference between Jackson’s and King’s vocation. “In the quiet recesses 
of my heart,” Martin Luther King, Jr. often said, “I am fundamentally a 
clergyman, a Baptist preacher.”442 Of course, only Jackson knows what is in 
the very recesses of his own heart. But his early career as Breadbasket’s 
leader shows a much less quiet posture than King’s. He did not seem to 
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enjoy the same private, intimate conversations with God; he rather preferred 
to encounter God on the social battlefield. Much less of a reluctant leader 
than King, Jackson showed that he was a passionate, vocal, engaged soul in 
sync with the Zeitgeist, and seemed to enjoy the social engagement, the game, 
power, and the direct involvement in economic issues. He was a social 
activist preacher, with a special – but not exclusive – attachment to the black 
middle class. For him, social activism, economic justice, and priesthood were 
intermingled. Consequently, rather than “a conscience of a community,” the 
church for Jackson was a militant community in search of common good. As 
stated in internal documents, “Operation Breadbasket seeks to build a 
community.”443 She (the church) took the side of the oppressed without 
rejecting the oppressors.444  
From Rights to Power  
After the assassination of Dr. King, analysts and commentators noticed that 
Jackson went from a more subdued wardrobe of dark, vested suits to his 
Day-Glo designer dashikis and black leather vests; a symbol of rebellion and 
existentialism.445 When Playboy’s Associate Articles Editor, Arthur 
Kretchmer, was sent to the old Capital Theatre to conduct an interview with 
Jackson, he noted that “he was dressed, like a Mod black emperor, in a 
brilliantly colored dashiki, bell-bottom jeans and high-top country shoes.”446 
Around his neck he always was a gold-plated medallion of Dr. King. Jackson 
adopted the male fashion of wearing a medallion but with a more discrete 
open-collar shirt.447 When invited to talk at Harvard University’s Eliot House 
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in the winter of 1970, he changed the medallion, and instead wore another 
huge medallion bearing an image of U.S. Olympic track stars John Carlos and 
Tommie Smith, whose clenched fists were raised high in their defiant Black 
Power salute at Mexico City.448  
Jackson was not afraid to raise his own fist in the air. In Watts, on August 20, 
1972, wearing the black radical uniform – multicolored dashiki, bushy 
sideburns and medallion – he gave the invocation in front of more than 
100,000 people at the Los Angeles Coliseum. He then urged the audience to 
raise their right fists in the air and repeat while he recited his poem, “I Am 
Somebody.” People stood and raised their fists in the air. Photos from the 
event featured Rev. Jackson and Al Bell, Executive Vice President and Board 
Chairman of Stax Records, giving clenched first salutes during the playing of 
“Lift Ev’ry Voice and Sing,” often referred to as the “Black National 
Anthem,” at the opening ceremonies of Wattstax, a seven-hour festival.449 
During the brief invocation, Jackson carefully delivered a message of 
consciousness and self-determination:  
Today is a day of black awareness. Today is a day of black 
people taking care of black people’s business […] When we 
are together we have power.” In Watts we’ve shifted from 
burn, baby, burn, into learn, baby, learn, […] We have shifted 
from bed bugs and big ticks to community control and 
politics.450  
Between December 1970 and February 1971, Jackson expressed a desire to 
run for mayor of Chicago as an independent. He announced that he was 
“certainly serious about the mayoral race,” and he “may run for mayor.”451  
Two weeks after his eulogy in memory of Dr. King, on January 27, 1971, at 
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the old Capital Theatre, Jackson announced that he will “try to qualify” for 
the mayoral primary election.452 He flirted publicly with the idea for months 
beforehand. Just the fact that he was dealing with the possibility was enough 
to have the media interested. Eventually, he decided not to enter the mayoral 
race in Chicago and destroyed prospects of a complicated political 
confrontation. Not that many felt Jackson could defeat Mayor Richard Daley. 
After all, Daley rode to an easy fifth term mayoral victory in 1971 carrying 78 
percent of the vote. A decade later, however, the Chicago Machine fell apart, 
and Harold Washington emerged as the victor in the three-way primary 
election.453 If Jackson had decided otherwise, he would have become part of 
new generation of black people running for public office, and joined what 
Professor Joseph calls the “Black Power-era politicians such as Maynard 
Jackson and Harold Washington,” who “embraced the movement, but with a 
moderate perspective.”454 Politics was a secondary area of strength for 
Jackson during that period. Jackson considered himself more of a national 
leader than someone only interested in Chicago politics.455 When he finally 
ran for President of the United States it was a different period, well beyond 
the Black Power era (1966-1975).456 It was “I am somebody” no more. It was 
primarily “never surrender. Keep hope alive.” During the Reagan era, hope 
had replaced pride.  
Jackson has been described as someone who was engaged in raising the black 
consciousness.457 Along with many other black leaders in the late 1960s, he 
jumped on the trend of cultural nationalism. He did not simply adopt a 
dashiki, Afro hairstyle, and a medallion; he literally rethought events from a 
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black angle.458 Although his immense rhetorical skills have received universal 
recognition, Jackson was not a towering figure in the realm of black culture 
and consciousness during the Black Power era. He did not attempt to 
transform the way black people thought about themselves. For example, he 
did not try to change the psyche of the blacks, or decolonize the black mind 
as Malcolm X did.459 He was missing the intellectual stamina needed to deal 
with the fundamental archetypes of the black community. Apparently 
Jackson acknowledged this fact and qualified himself as a “moral 
engineer.”460 He preferred to offer psychological relief and heal damaged 
souls, like every good preacher does. He enjoyed empowering black people’s 
hearts, rather than digging deeper into their minds.461 From an internal 
document, Breadbasket dealt with the memory, as “community is sustained 
partly by memory – thus the leadership of Operation Breadbasket continually 
reminds the participants of where we as black people have come.”462 
We can find a more concrete connection between Jackson and Black Power 
in Jackson’s search for economic power. As he acknowledged, it’s not 
eloquence, it’s power, that provides respect.463 Jackson’s self-appointed 
mission was to shape and discipline the growing black awareness and pride in 
order to build black economic power. “Say it loudly, I’m black and I’m proud 
and I drink Joe Louis milk.”464 Time correspondent Jacob Simms placed 
Jackson’s strength in “his use of evangelistic fervor to achieve pragmatic 
ends.”465 Biographer Barbara Reynolds also pointed this out, writing about 
his “use of rhetorical inspiration to fire up the ordinary people into Buy 
Black consumers, as well as economic foot soldiers.”466 When he was asked 
240 
 
in the early 1970s what his occupation was, Jackson modestly answered that 
“you can be an orator or an organizer. I am an organizer.” Actually, he was a 
blend of both.467 He had learned from his mentor, Dr. King, about “how to 
organize local communities, how to use the press to give visibility to an issue, 
and to force confrontation through national attention.”468 He applied this 
experience to Breadbasket.  
King’s Economic Views 
King was embracing the cause of the disadvantaged, and stretching the 
principle of “rights” to the point of social democracy and perhaps beyond. 
Jackson was championing black advancement and promoting black 
capitalism as a meeting point between Black Power and modern 
conservatism. King and Jackson were reacting differently to the same 
tumultuous post-1965 era. Their differences mirrored a complex evolution 
taking place in the black community and in the larger economic climate. In 
the last years of his life, refining his reflection on the true nature of American 
capitalism, King’s main concern was the poor: 
There are forty million poor people here. And one day we 
must ask the question, Why are there forty million poor 
people in America? And when you begin to ask that question, 
you are raising questions about the economic system, about a 
broader distribution of wealth. When you ask that question, 
you begin to question the capitalist economy.469  
In this passage, King clearly connected the existence of the poor with the 
nature of the economic system. Previously King had simply pointed the 
finger toward capitalism for its inappropriate effect on the person – the 
extreme individualism – rather than the social injustice it caused through its 
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intrinsic operational mechanisms. Now he claimed that the economic system 
of the United States, capitalism itself, should be called into question. But he 
did not stop there. He identified the major element of the economic system 
that needed to be reformed, the distribution of wealth. King did not explain 
how this “broader distribution of wealth” could be accomplished, but it is 
very likely that he regarded the government as the primary agent, at least 
partially in charge of the distribution of wealth.470 In King’s mind, great 
wealth was available; what was missing was it’s just distribution. King was 
increasingly embracing a social democratic economic agenda. In his view, 
America was enjoying growth and potentially unlimited economic prosperity, 
and it was a specific responsibility of the federal government to make sure 
that the distribution of this wealth was accomplished with justice. From his 
perspective, poverty was a remediable inconvenience, as the economic means 
were abundant, and the possibility to make poverty obsolete was concrete.  It 
was only a matter of political will.   
In his view, American capitalism produced injustice because it distributed 
wealth unfairly. According to this premise, it was the responsibility of the 
government to introduce corrections to mitigate the dangerous and 
predictable economic effects of capitalism. How was it possible that the 
wealthiest nation in the world could accept the persistent existence of slums 
and ghettos? How was it possible that the government could continue 
spending for war, when there is rampant poverty in the urban neighborhoods 
in the North, as well as in the rural villages in the South? When King realized 
that it was not in Lyndon Johnson’s plans to stop the war in Vietnam and 
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keep his promise alive for a Great Society, he began accepting the inevitable 
conclusion that the federal government was part of the problem rather than 
the solution. He broke with Johnson and appealed for a regeneration of the 
whole nation. Addressing the drama of poverty helped him to expand his 
view about the moral fiber of his country, and to see how only a structural 
renewal of the fabric of the nation might save it from collapse. This is a story 
that leads some scholars to talk about King as a “radical” in the last period of 
his life – especially after the Voting Act and Watts riots – compared with a 
more “moderate” King in his earlier years of Civil Rights activism.471  
However, there is more to say about King’s economic thought. King spent 
his adulthood in the long era of prosperity. In the post-war years, America 
was an affluent society. In 1967, King stated that it did not cost America  
anything to desegregate lunch counters and transportation, implicitly claiming 
that the time had come for the country to pay a price for economic 
integration. King’s strategy was focused on wealth distribution, and did not 
focus on wealth production. Not coincidentally, King came to promote the 
idea of a guaranteed annual income. This guaranteed income would have 
assigned a role to blacks alongside whites in the construction of national 
wealth. It would have reduced economic inequalities and assured everyone, 
blacks and whites, the right to a minimal self-sustenance. This support would 
not only defeat poverty, but would also ensure the dignity and self-esteem of 
new workers, expanding the boundaries of capitalism, creating new 
consumers. “Early in the century” – King stated – “this proposal would have 
been greeted with ridicule and denunciation as destructive of initiative and 
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responsibility,” but now it made much more sense, due to the historic period 
of economic growth and the prevailing economic ideology of welfare.472 The 
Constitution states that all men are equal, and so the liberal ideal continued 
to assert that all people have the right to work and gain a decent salary.473 
King expressed a mechanistic as well as bureaucratic view of capitalism. 
Capitalism is a mechanism that must be governed by a bureaucracy. Of 
course, there is economic inequality in America; this gap is not intrinsic in the 
economic system itself but due to the behavior of its leadership. These 
leaders are pursuing the segregation in the sphere of labor and 
business. Therefore, the people with the most influence over the workings of 
the capitalist system are the target of the civil right movement. Wealth is 
available, and what is missing is a just distribution of it. This unequal 
distribution may be treated not by appealing to courts of law, but by dealing 
with the hearts of people and the values that should guide them.474 Therefore, 
his vision targeted capitalism’s most powerful executives. 
In 1967, King shared his view of the economy, presenting the economy as a 
social reality, a space where people and enterprises pursue social purposes. In 
King’s mind, the corporation performed a social mission. It played a social 
role; that is why it should return to society in equal measure whatever it took 
from society. In other words, he looked at business as an entity that could 
offer jobs, advancement, and other social benefits. Even the ultimate goal of 
the corporation, i.e., profit, was subject to the higher aims of society. This is 
the reason companies should return profits, at least in part, to the community 
where the profits were generated. ‘‘Many retail businesses and consumer-
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goods industries,’’ King explained, ‘‘deplete the ghetto by selling to Negroes 
without returning to the community any of the proﬁts through fair hiring 
practices.’’475 He refined his idea of a privately funded welfare system by 
insisting that the mission as well as the nature of the company was social, as 
it should reflect the society to which it belonged. For this reason, if the 
company generated a profit through black customers, those same black 
customers (at least figuratively) should have earned the right to work for 
that company. In his view, private sector firms played a role similar to that of 
government agencies in the public arena. They pursue economic justice, and 
ensure the redistribution of wealth. He maintained that this should be their 
goal, but in practice they often did the opposite. Breadbasket acted as a 
corrective. In King’s perspective, as the marches against Jim Crow broke the 
law, but were legitimized and justified by the Constitution, and by a higher 
moral law, likewise the pickets and boycotts were meant to “put justice in 
business.”476   
King also believed that unequal distribution of wealth would be ultimately 
addressed not by appealing to courts of law, but by dealing with people’s 
hearts and values. From King’s viewpoint, corporations such as High Low 
Food were a vehicle for racial integration, rather than businesses focusing on 
making money. The enterprise was interpreted as a social entity, not as a 
profit-driven project. That’s why the agreement proposed by Breadbasket 
lacked any reference to the labor costs of the new hires, and their financial 
impact on the balance sheet. In fact, if profitability does not increase because 
of new hiring, the new hire ends up being a source of increasing costs. The 
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low profit margins in the supermarket industry produce constant financial 
pressure, and since supermarkets are labor intensive, supermarket chains 
keep personnel costs low by standardizing operations at the store level. To 
inflict an unplanned increase in labor and training costs could be lethal for a 
supermarket chain, as happened with the Red Rooster chain of food stores, 
which had to file for bankruptcy after it was targeted by Breadbasket. King 
also expressed a peculiar view of the role of management. In 1967, he 
demanded that his ministers go to the top managers to negotiate for jobs and 
then asked them to “set aside profit for the greater good” and promote a 
better world. Management would never really cooperate with this idea 
because its goal was to maximize profit (as well as maintain control of the 
organization).  
King saw business as an activity that could offer jobs, advancement and 
other social benefits. It had a social obligation to return to society in equal 
measure whatever it took from society. Even the profit goal was subject to 
these higher aims, so companies should return profits to communities 
wherever they were generated. “Many retail businesses and consumer-goods 
industries,” King explained, “deplete the ghetto by selling to Negroes 
without returning to the community any of the proﬁts through fair hiring 
practices.” If the company generated profits through black customers, those 
same black customers (at least figuratively) have earned the right to work for 
the company.477 King felt, however, that over time, Breadbasket could bring 
capitalism closer to his overall vision of the economy as a fair space where 
people and enterprises pursued mutually beneficial purposes. “The 
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fundamental premise of Breadbasket is a simple one,” he said at a press 
conference. “Negroes need not patronize a business which denies them jobs, 
or advancement, [or] plain courtesy.” 
The list of Breadbasket’s accomplishments of was growing, and the project 
was becoming national in scope, but it was still too small to address the larger 
crisis of unemployment. Breadbasket’s scope was limited to gaining a piece 
of the pie, based on the idea of an organization of black consumers 
leveraging purchasing power to influence the management decisions of firms 
owned by whites, or even “monopolies of white contractors.”478 This is the 
connecting ring in the chain of thought that moved King from Breadbasket 
to Poor People’s Campaign. Demonstrating an increasingly sophisticated 
class-based – rather than race-based – analysis, King aimed to transform the 
African American freedom struggle into a larger multiethnic coalition to 
liberate all oppressed people in the United States. Later, King crystallized his 
ideas of economic justice in the Poor People’s Campaign. The Poor People’s 
Campaign asked the federal government to prioritize helping the poor with a 
$30 billion anti-poverty package that included a commitment to full 
employment, a guaranteed annual income measure and more low-income 
housing. The campaign would also re-establish the doctrine of non-violence 
as a viable strategy moving towards social justice. The importance of this 
point was heightened in the context of the urban rebellions – and the 
emerging Black Power movement – that kept erupting in the summers from 
1965 on.  The Poor People’s Campaign was a product of King’s crystal clear 
vision of a large, economically conscious, non-violent, multiethnic coalition 
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of the poor and their allies. A historian of black business, Juliet Walker, 
points out that King’s shift away from Civil Rights and toward black poverty 
after 1967 led him to criticize the structural racial injustice of American 
capitalism, as well as to depreciate black capitalism as a basis for 
empowerment. Simultaneously, he asked blacks to seek work in white 
establishments. Attacking institutional racism while downplaying black 
business as an avenue of progress put him, she notes, “to both the right and 
left of mainstream black economic nationalism in the late 1960s.”479 
A Moderate Black Power Leader 
Living on the city’s South Side, in a comfortably affluent section of Jackson 
Park Highlands, Rev. Jesse Jackson must ultimately have realized, working 
side by side with black militants, preachers, gangs, Civil Rights activists, and 
sharing their frustrations on the slow path to racial equality, that by the time 
of the assassination of Dr. King the first phase of Breadbasket had largely 
come to an end. There was the on-going emphasis of the integration of 
blacks in to predominantly white workplaces, occasional boycott initiatives, 
some of real importance, and sporadic triumphs in the years that followed. 
At that time, despite the rise in unemployment among African Americans, 
Rev. Jesse Jackson must have decided that the “urgency of now” was making 
it inevitable that Breadbasket move to embrace a greater task than just 
employment. Breadbasket’s engagement with economic justice could not be 
confined only to jobs.480 The program had sufficient credibility, and its leader 
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the audacity to pursue a far bigger goal, and commit to a much wider idea -
building a bridge between the ghetto economy and American capitalism.  
Particularly in Chicago, 1968 was a pivotal time for an expression of 
opposition to the so-called “old system.” Jackson was a product of this 
counterculture as much as of the Civil Rights Movement. He expressed this 
solidarity, both with his hairstyle and with his approach, which was the 
challenging, confrontational, protesting attitude of his generation towards the 
old system.481 Jackson’s biographers, and historians of Breadbasket, tell 
extravagant stories about the meetings between white top managers and 
black radicals. It was not only a clash of cultures, but also of generations, 
represented by Black Nationalism and the hippie counterculture coming up 
against the custodians of the treasure of American capitalism.482 And yet the 
old system was changing. Radicals protested against authority, the 
hierarchical structure of power, the effects of the generation gap, and 
expressed frustration at the slow pace of reform. At the same time, they 
feared the end of the age of prosperity and expansive government, which 
were two of the most enduring legacies of the post-World War II economic 
boom. In 1967, the U.S. economy was already showing signs of some minor 
economic problems, although not enough to indicate the end of the age of 
prosperity, growth and welfare that had characterized the two decades after 
World War II. Richard Nixon was still focused on politics, rather than 
economics, especially working on the idea of building a Republican majority 
around a new conservative bloc in the South. In this way, he hoped to solve 
and bypass the problem posed by George Wallace, the Alabama governor 
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who also wanted to run for president of the United States. A year later, 
Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis, and Nixon became the 
U.S. president. Soon after the Tet Offensive of January 1968, the United 
States economy entered a depressive phase. That same year, the Federal 
Reserve increased the interest rate to 5.5%, the highest since the Great 
Depression. Inflation was growing at a rate of 4 percent per year, and was 
soon to become the main problem for American households.483  
This was only the beginning of a spectacular, unpredictable change in the 
economic cycle. Within a couple of years, the direct convertibility of dollars 
to gold was abandoned because of attacks on the U.S. currency by 
international speculators. Two years later, the Yom Kippur War provoked 
the first energy crisis in the country. It was a time of economic and social 
troubles. Nixon did not attack the welfare system and did not indulge in 
racist tendencies. But nevertheless, he changed the face of welfare by 
decentralizing it. He promoted affirmative action, but at the same time 
pursued his project of a new coalition to hold together the conservative 
South and the white working-class of the North. What Jackson encapsulates 
is this ambivalence, the growing skepticism of young people and minorities 
towards institutions in general, together with the feeling that an era of social 
justice and economic equality was over.  The derailment of liberal America and 
the reduction of its welfare programs meant that communities needed to 
focus on their own resources. 484 As he pointed out, “welfare [alone] is a form 
of humiliation.”485 
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Jackson was a post-1965 black leader, significantly influenced by the 
counterculture of the mid- to late-1960s, and the growth of the feeling that 
liberalism had failed. His clothing, hair-style and rhetorical style made clear 
his connections with the former, but it was this failure of liberalism that 
played an enduring influence on his activity as a Civil Rights leader. Jackson’s 
attitude incorporated distrust of the federal government and authority in 
general, with a fear of the inevitable crisis facing the welfare state. Jackson 
agreed with King that government played a crucial role in eliminating 
economic discrimination, but gifted with a better understanding than King of 
where the economy was heading. He positioned himself opposite King (and 
Ralph Abernathy), who continued to overestimate the potential of American 
capitalism, blaming the unjust system instead of recognizing it was just not 
powerful enough to satisfy everybody. Jackson wondered who, with the 
coalition of liberals, laborites and minorities in derailment, was willing to pay 
to provide high-paying jobs, well-equipped schools, and affordable housing 
to black people. The coalition of liberals, laborites and minorities who might 
promote this agenda of economic development no longer existed. More 
specifically, Jackson did not really believe that blacks were part of what he 
called “the power structure,” the business-labor-government that “meet 
downtown” and decide for all.486 Moreover, Jackson had to bear in mind that 
the effects of a failed war and an economic crisis threatened to permanently 
undermine social cohesion, and therefore race relations. Contemporary 
political, economic, and cultural realities forced Jackson to compensate for 
the declining appeal of government-funded welfare with an increasing 
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attention to business as a way to ignite economic development inside the 
African American community. This was definitely a different view than 
King’s (and Abernathy’s), who still believed in the compensatory role of the 
government, and the possibility of an alliance between the Civil Rights 
Movement and labor unions.  
Already in 1967, a Breadbasket internal document discussed the different 
economic policy options at hand, especially resurgent free-market economics, 
which was called for the occasion, “the post-New Deal-Keynesian capitalist 
system.” The document also contained a penetrating analysis of Keynesian 
economics, in which the role of government in the economy is understood 
not as regulative – in King’s fashion – but rather as a partner to business – in 
Lyndon Johnson’s fashion. The document states that  
Government relates its spending to the otherwise 
uncertainties of the market (…) but basically not to redirect 
and restructure, the market.487  
The fact is, King’s vision of a full-blown welfare state seemed unlikely with 
the presidency in Nixon’s hands, and the Johnson Administration’s Great 
Society programs under attack. Nonetheless, the white establishment seemed 
willing to pay to provide high-paying jobs, well-equipped schools, and 
affordable housing to black people. Jackson liberated himself from the vision 
of an economic wealth made available to everybody; a Utopian society with 
no poor. Jackson also understood that the decline of the affluent society, and 
the emerging economic concerns, largely associated with the increasing costs 
of the Vietnam War, forced the black community to learn how to reduce 
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their economic dependence on white liberals, as well as central government, 
increasing their autonomy.488 
While Jackson’s attitude incorporated distrust of the federal government and 
authority in general, he was also carefully listening to the rising voices of 
despair from the ghetto. More than the desire to end poverty, black families 
yearned to be consumers in an affluent society, and in the final years of the 
Age of Prosperity, credit became as important for black families as income. 
Accessing consumer credit was based on the premise of solvency – the 
concrete probability, and the personal will to meet one’s own obligations. 
The illusion of permanent economic growth and the right of participation in 
the American Dream made solvency a concrete possibility, and credit, a 
reasonable desire. After World War II, an increase in income and wealth, 
coupled with the expansion of product quantity and diversity became 
available to a growing percentage of the American population, who had 
access to consumer credit. This was a sort of “democratization” of financial 
services.489  As more people were able to get mortgages and purchase homes, 
buy products from retail chains and higher end products such as 
automobiles, a consumer nation developed. Access to credit was the gateway 
to consumption, the modern passport to the American Dream. Borrowing 
money became easier for the ordinary suburbanite and the middle class in 
general. Access to credit became a fiat proof of citizenship, a respected status 
symbol, and an economic advantage, while the persistent belief remained that 
economic growth and the increasing level of salaries guaranteed solvency.  In 
other words, credit had enlarged consumer’s options by providing liquidity 
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and economic prosperity, and protected borrowers against the risks of 
insolvency.  However, it was a privilege largely reserved for white males only, 
and women and minorities were, for the most part, excluded.   
By the late 1960s, the Great Society combined with the Civil Rights 
Movement had successfully created a context in which consumer credit could 
be seen as a right. Martin Luther King, in 1966, at the S.C.L.C., targeted 
Chicago’s dual housing market, and staged open-housing marches in all-white 
city neighborhoods and suburbs. The dual housing market was the reason for 
the white suburbanites to turn against their black neighbors, but the reality 
was that whites could live anywhere they could afford, while African 
Americans and other minorities faced restricted access, especially to the most 
exclusive suburbs. In 1967, Johnson had appointed the Commission on Civil 
Disorders, known as the Kerner Commission after its chair, Governor Otto 
Kerner, Jr. of Illinois. The Commission was to investigate the causes of the 
race riots that had been spreading across the country since 1965, the sources 
of black urban violence, and to provide recommendations for the future. The 
Kerner report concluded that white racism was the main cause of urban 
violence. The remedy was to simply reduce the race divide. That is, stop de-
facto racial discrimination, and invest billions in housing programs in order 
to break up residential segregation. The commission’s recommendations 
were adamant that it would be the federal government that would have to be 
the source of reducing this racial divide by “opening suburban residential 
areas to Negroes and encouraging them to move closer to industrial 
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centers…;” it also recommended an effort to de-radicalize urban blacks by 
giving greater access to credit at a fair price.490 President Johnson ignored the 
report and rejected the Kerner Commission’s recommendations. In April 
1968, one month after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. President 
Johnson took a different path and signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title 
VIII of the Act introduced fair housing policies and outlawed discrimination 
in the rental or purchase of homes, and across a broad range of other 
housing-related transactions, such as advertising, mortgage lending, 
homeowner’s insurance and zoning. This bill opened up new residential areas 
to the rising African-American middle class that aspired to move into the 
suburbs.   
Another conclusion of the Commission was that black residents burned 
stores in the ghetto during the riots because they did not own them. 
According to the Commission, the reasons behind vandalism against 
properties during the riots were fundamentally tied to the desire for 
retaliation against exploitation, as well as credit abuse. The Commission 
emphasized several issues: the high rate of unemployment, a lack of business 
ownership, “the exploitation of disadvantaged consumers.”491 The Washington 
Post accurately reported that when D.C. rioters broke into many stores, they 
burned the credit records before they stole the merchandise. Rather than an 
explosion of consumer desire, the riots were an opportunity to cancel the 
debts with perceived usurious lenders. “Burn those damn records!” was 
reported in the Washington Post.492 Also Time Magazine gave visibility to the 
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story of a mother advising her son during a riot, to “Burn those damn 
records,” with reference to the books that held the records of debts of 
neighborhood residents, including hers.493  
Jackson’s Breadbasket joined the campaign for the extension of credit to 
blacks and portrayed consumer credit as a basic right that should be applied 
to the black minority. Breadbasket openly mentioned “credit gougers, 
entrepreneurial markups and price inflated-short selling on all types of good 
of services,” while Jackson was making the point in an interview in Playboy.494  
The companies [like GM] will lend us the money to buy cars, 
which leads to profits for them only. They could lend us the 
money to buy agencies [dealerships], but they won’t, because 
that would let us profit also. 
 Accordingly, Jackson felt that consumer credit to blacks was an economic 
area that black lenders must control.  
General Motors, you will not sell cars in the black community 
unless you guarantee us [Operation Breadbasket] a franchise 
[dealership] here next year and help us finance it.495  
He added that the Government was involved with lending. It was supposed 
to lend capital to black businessmen “according to the soundness of the 
idea.”496 Jackson agreed with King that employment was a crucial target, 
along the troubling path of economic discrimination. Nevertheless, he 
realized that more than merely desiring to end poverty, black families yearned 
to be a part of the affluence that was so visible in America during the 1960s. 
Blacks were seeing themselves as participants in a consumer society. They did 
not contest capitalism, only exclusion from it.497 During the “golden age of 
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capitalism,” mortgages and car financing were easy to obtain for white 
people, but nearly impossible for black people.498 In a consumer society 
based on credit, even stable salaries did not assure black families the option 
to purchase a house or a car. In the daily life of Chicago’s South Side, credit 
cards were unknown, mortgage requests were constantly declined, and credit 
access at ghetto retailers was expensive.499 “Urban retailers, unable to resell 
their customers’ debts, charged higher prices both for cash and for credit 
purchases.”500 Moreover, inequality in accessing credit was an issue not only 
for  poor blacks in the ghettos, but also for the black bourgeoisie and those 
who aspired to move into the suburbs. Jackson realized better than King that 
employment discrimination came together with credit discrimination. 
Therefore, fighting the former without taking care of the latter was pointless. 
Examining the intersection of income and credit in everyday life, Jackson 
examined the financial realities of black families and tried to make modern 
lending possible for them. He recognized that America was at the edge of a 
massive shift toward financialization. Most notably, that consumer credit was 
becoming more profitable than financing manufacturing investments. 
Jackson’s connections with urban ghetto life guided his vision of black-
owned banks, black-owned urban mortgage lending, and small business 
loans. Historically, most black enterprises had been small, undercapitalized, 
and in constant danger of insolvency.501 He acknowledged the underlying 
reality of the inner city black economy. Insular, depredated, with no financial 
resources to approach the consumer, isolated from the larger mainstream of 
257 
 
American capitalism, black business was blocked off from the affluent 
society. Jackson wanted to construct a bridge between the ghetto economy 
and American capitalism. During the first half of the 20th century, black 
entrepreneurs had focused on black customers. Such a strategy seemed to be 
a fruitful expedient for self-help. Jackson acknowledged that for black 
entrepreneurs working inside a market based primarily on members of their 
own race was a disadvantage. The black economy was not big enough to 
procure enough resources to promote economic growth for black businesses. 
Economic justice across racial lines sounded like a more reasonable and 
effective slogan than “buy black.” Rather, he envisioned for black business 
access to  white financial resources as a possibility to promote growth.502 
Somehow, he thought, money had to be diverted from white corporations, 
banks, retailers, and transferred to black businesses. He adopted the 
metaphor of the “island:” 
The ghetto is an island. Every decision on the island is made 
by white people (…) Black people control nothing in the 
ghetto. The island has to exist in a capitalist system without 
any capital. Any area of capitalism without a circular flow of 
capital is a slum (…) many whites have made kind overtures 
but nothing has been done systematically to start capital 
flowing into the island. Even the War on Poverty does not 
bank here. 503 
Black-owned banks with sufficient funds and huge deposits might provide 
the access to credit that white-owned banks denied. In addition, since the 
relationship between a borrower and a lender involved many additional areas 
of the economy, such as home builders, car dealers, publishers, consumer 
goods, manufacturers needed to sustain and encourage the black 
community’s entrée into the larger consumer society. Because the Civil 
258 
 
Rights Movement was primarily concerned about increasing the stake of 
black people in American capitalism, Jackson believed more emphasis should 
be placed on access to affordable credit. The priority was building the 
infrastructure of a black economy that might support home and car 
purchases, in addition to any other consumer products desired by American 
black families.504  
Like King, Jackson recognized the inherent tension between race and 
capitalism, but rather than trying to change the latter, he worked hard to 
make the former more accommodating. He made it clear that he had not 
“changed the hearts of the executives,” only “the behaviors of the 
corporations.”505 He proclaimed that justice is the opportunity to share the 
benefits of capitalism with the whole nation. In this context, Breadbasket 
revealed the convergence of the Civil Rights Movement and emerging black 
capitalism. It was a remarkable merger, considering that black business 
people were used to being self-centered, and had “previously viewed the Civil 
Rights Movement as their enemy.” Moreover, it was the very first time that 
black insurance salesmen, building contractors, lawyers and numerous others 
who had previously been estranged entrepreneurs had come together under 
Breadbasket’s umbrella. Every Saturday, at 8 a.m., before the “prayer 
meeting,” a “businessmen’s meeting” was scheduled, in which 75- 100 people 
usually spent two hours together; the first hour of the meeting was fraternal, 
and consisting simply of breakfast and conversation, the second hour 
consisted of reporting and discussing Breadbasket’s progress.506 “These 
people have never been together,” Jackson pointed out, and bringing all 
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these people together was one of his primary goals. He was the first black 
leader to borrow strategies from the Civil Rights Movement to foster the 
growth of black capitalism. Blurring the borders between the Civil Rights 
Movement and black capitalism, Jackson pursued an agenda that empowered 
the poor as well as the emerging black entrepreneurial class. While he did not 
forget to demand public policies for the advancement of the poor people of 
the ghetto – [If I was the mayor of a major American city] “I would declare 
the poor communities in a state of emergency and (…) set up tents on the 
streets” – he focused his action on the empowerment and funding of 
minority-run businesses.507 Unlike King, who never fought for minority-
owned small business, Jackson looked toward entrepreneurship as a key 
route to African American empowerment. Increasingly, he began to 
incorporate the philosophies of black self-help and economic independence 
common to Black Power. Thus he finally came to accept the concept of 
Black Power as a rationale for black capitalism, as well as the development of 
new relationships between black businesspeople and corporate America.508 In 
April 1968, Jackson discussed Breadbasket in a long newspaper interview that 
was friendly to his aims, as a project paralleling Black Power in its battle to 
achieve economic independence for the ghetto community. 509   
Jackson articulated his “quiet” and “moderate” understanding of Black 
Power ideology colloquially during the Saturday-morning meetings at 
Breadbasket. The lobby of the Capital Theatre was filled with tables 
displaying black merchandise, and the auditorium itself was festooned with 
signs exhorting the gathering to “Buy Black Products” and “Use Black 
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Services.” For over an hour, Jackson usually delivered a passionate sermon 
filled with street talk, down-home slang and quotations from the Bible.510 It 
was during these sermons that he emphasized his view of community self-
help organizations, improvement of communities, the pursuit of self-reliance, 
and economic and political independence from white authority. According to 
Jackson, a call to arms without a call to responsibility would pave the way for 
racial separation and open the door to white backlash. He tried to balance his 
appeal for privately funded welfare with a sense of pride and self-
esteem. Along with correcting an inclination to passivity, he tried to build a 
new social posture. The keywords were “self-determination” and “self-
respect.” Breadbasket became a vehicle to procure resources to foster 
economic growth for black businesses, build job opportunities, and reduce 
poverty. It also became a cultural force under Jackson, focused around the 
weekly Saturday workshops that drew thousands to hear him preach. His 
message was that the African American community had to reduce its 
economic dependence on white liberals and the federal government by 
increasing its autonomy. Jackson’s leadership redefined Breadbasket’s 
relationship with whites. What might have seemed an expression of 
generosity or private welfare paid by whites became instead, a merchant 
exchange. Jackson would speak of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a 
relationship between equals. In Jackson’s model, the hiring of black workers, 
use of black firms and contractors, and investment in black banks was 
framed not in terms of social justice but rather as interdependence, an 
exchange of goods, services, and monies between equals.511 The black 
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community had to learn how to reduce their economic dependence on white 
liberals as well as the central government and increase their autonomy. They 
had to definitively change the relationship with whites. What might have 
seemed an expression of generosity, or  private welfare paid by whites, had to 
instead, become a merchant exchange. Not coincidently, Jackson often talked 
of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a relationship between equals. He 
pointed out that the connotation of Black Power in the media might be 
violence, but in fact, Black Power is power sharing. It is equity.512 “We want 
ownership, we want our share, we want investment,” became his mantra in 
the following two decades.513  
As Breadbasket’s leader, Jackson had, at times, been portrayed as a black 
conservative, since he championed minority entrepreneurship and the 
conservative values of self-reliance, private enterprise, and individualism, but 
this is poor history.514 Jackson never asserted that federal court decisions and 
Civil Rights legislation had created a color-blind society that made the 
perpetuation of self-help or ethnic-uplift strategies obsolete, and affirmative 
action practices socially unacceptable. On the contrary, he claimed that the 
permanence of a color-conscious American capitalism was an obstacle to 
racial integration, adding that the request for a stake in the American 
economy was not only reasonable, but also preferable to economic 
separatism. This is one of the primary differences between Jackson and 
Richard Nixon - the latter insisted upon maintaining law and order above all 
else and considered economic separatism a source of potential social 
troubles. As a consequence, he  proposed funds to promote black capitalism 
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as an antidote to the possibility of social disorder. The former insisted upon 
alleviating “dependency” above all else and considered economic separatism 
a viable option, while requesting fund to promote black capitalism as a 
vehicle of racial economic integration and a tool for dismantling race-based 
corporate monopolies. Jackson did not urge white businessmen to inject 
credit,  risk capital or create contracts within the black economy because it 
was the lesser of two evils, but rather because it was the best option.  
Jackson has been also described as a black conservative cause his fascination 
with free-market economy and doctrines of free enterprise, rather than 
welfare. However, in the late 1960s, the pro-integrationist position was 
considered more moderate that it was in the early 1960s, and less historically 
linked with the federal government’s compensatory policies. While Jackson 
did not share the dissatisfaction of many African Americans, who rejected 
the Civil Rights Movement’s strategy based on nonviolence, interracial 
coalitions, and government measures to alleviate poverty and achieve 
integration, Jackson had mixed feelings about federal programs, 
acknowledging that “expanding the pie” was not an option because in the 
late 1960s economic expansion had slowed down. This was particularly 
apparent because a highly specialized technical manufacturing sector needed 
skilled personnel. More precisely, Jackson merged Black Power and modern 
conservatism, since he was a champion of capitalism, and was a more color-
conscious activist than King and Abernathy of the SC.L.C..  
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He never embraced the rhetoric of “any means necessary,” which persists to 
this day, and clings to the American social imagination, as far as Black Power 
is concerned. He did not choose violence first, and he pointed out that there 
was a pragmatic case for nonviolence.515 He pointed out “the futility of 
thinking in exclusively white-black terms,” as “black is not always good, just 
as white is not always bad.”516 He never joined the separatist wing of the 
movement, saying, “We’re already separated – and blacks did not do the 
separating – and we do not have the power to do the integrating.” He held 
the belief that blacks were forced to stay separate, “so the question becomes 
whether we remain separate and dependent or separate and independent.”517 
According to Jackson, independence was a consequence of separation, not a 
goal in itself. Meanwhile, Jackson blurred the traditional distinction between 
integration and nationalism. In doing so, he also blurred the borderline 
between the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power.518 The traditional 
narrative points out, while Civil Rights leaders such as the Rev. Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., fought for racial integration and redistribution of wealth, 
other black leaders such as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael emphasized 
separatism and self-determination. The Nation of Islam built an organization 
that was also a vehicle of black uplift and self-help. The black Muslims also 
emphasized the creation of black businesses in the context of Black 
Nationalism and separatism. However, Black Power does not necessarily 
imply separatism, while it definitively promotes self-determination.519 As 
Jackson clarified, “that’s my kind of Black Nationalism - blacks helping one 
another on a national scale.”520 At the same time, the Civil Rights Movement 
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does not necessary imply distribution of wealth while it definitely implies 
integration. At the turn of the century, Booker T. Washington – a black icon 
Jackson has been frequently associated with – and his followers emphasized 
racial solidarity, economic self-sufficiency, and black self-help, with the 
perspective of assimilation. Self-determination can work for both strategies 
of integration and separatism.521 Jackson represented this connection 
between integration and self-determination. He pursued a strategy of 
integration through self-determination.   
He definitively championed “control” (power) - “ultimately, the black ghetto 
must be controlled by black people.” He did not want the white-owned, 
white-managed companies to leave the ghetto  but  wanted them dismissing 
their “colonial” attitude, their strategies of “exploitation.” He wanted them to 
recognize the new set of rules at work in the ghetto, submit to an informal 
yet effective black-controlled governing body,  which would be eventually 
embedded in Breadbasket, and accept being charged for the privilege of 
working in the ghetto, and selling to black consumer. He wanted to limit 
white-owned and white-managed companies’ operational independence, 
force them to recognize a sort of black national sovereignty in the ghetto 
community, and still maintain themselves as operative. It was like building 
invisible boundaries around the ghetto and activating a reverse-tax zone 
policy for foreign ventures and business. However, Jackson did not plan on 
killing the companies (Red Rooster was an exception), just squeezing them. It 
was a power struggle for the sake of conquering economic power, specifically 
the control of the ghetto economy. It was a power struggle, not a religious 
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conversion. As Jackson recognized, “We are not trying to talk to people, but 
rather to institutions. Only power speaks to power. What we need is not 
individual genius, but organized power.”522 It was a remarkable clarity of 
vision for young man only 25 years old, although he was also gifted with a 
highly creative mind and persuasive rhetoric.  
It was at this point that the urban legend of Jackson as a powerbroker 
emerged.523 Jackson sought to reorient Breadbasket and its operations. He 
stated with perfect clarity that 
The essential purpose of Breadbasket is to have blacks 
control the basic resources of their community. We want to 
control the banks, the trades, the building constructions and 
the education of our children. This desire on our part is a 
defensive strategy evolved in order to stop whites from 
controlling our community and removing the profits and 
income that belong to black people. Our programs are 
dictated by the private-enterprise economy in which we find 
ourselves.524 
It is not surprising that Breadbasket’s national director tried to develop a new 
perspective for the program. Breadbasket was at the center of a dense 
network of relationships acting as agent; it convinced white-managed 
companies to deposit money in banks owned by blacks. Banks can then grant 
loans to black people in the ghetto, and in particular to their 
businesses. Within this complex system of relationships among 
organizations, the problem Jesse Jackson faced in the late 1960s was how to 
bring together different forms of black capitalism. He envisioned 
Breadbasket as an engine to promote black capitalism because he saw the 
multiplicity of connections between financial capitalism and consumer 
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capitalism and applied this vision to his community. In 1969, Breadbasket 
launched Black Expo, a successful professional trade fair, to bring black 
companies and white clients together. This and others projects placed 
Jackson and Breadbasket at the crossroads of  heterodox forms of black 
capitalism. These included black street gangs such as the Black Stone 
Rangers, the more recently created ideological Black Nationalism groups, 
such as the Nation of Islam and the Black Panthers, and finally the new black 
entrepreneurial class, a few black businessmen who were willing to expand 
beyond the narrow confines of the black community.  King never envisioned 
anything more – and nothing less – than a coalition of integrationist 
institutions. Although Core remembers that in the last days of his life, King 
talked about “temporary segregation” (25 March 1968), he concedes that he 
never abrogated his perspective of an integrated society.525 In contrast, the 
ultimate goal of Jesse Jackson was the building of a broad and unprecedented 
coalition across the lines of Black Nationalism and integration. “My job is 
(…) to preach unity,” he said.526 He envisioned Breadbasket as encouraging 
“the kind of confrontation and interaction between people who share 
different vocations,” according to “the injunction of the Apostles that “there 
is neither Jew nor Greek, Scythian or Barbarian, bond nor free … but all are 
one.”527 He envisioned a broad-based pluralistic united front, spearheaded by 
Breadbasket, which would mobilize integrationist organizations, non-political 
organizations, civic groups. The whole coalition would operate under the 
banner of building black empowerment, human dignity, economic 
development, and political mobilization. He already envisioned the Nation of 
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Islam playing a role cooperatively with integrationist organizations. He 
anticipated, 20 years ahead of time, his two presidential campaigns. Already 
in the late 1960s, Jackson foresaw, even while he was in the S.C.L.C., a black 
progressive strategy to unify black people across ideological, class, and 
denominational religious lines, Christians, as well as Muslims, and build a 
strong movement for justice and empowerment. In an anonymous internal 
memo, Breadbasket already in 1967 is depicted as a program that has the 
potential to “solidifying the Civil Rights movement (…) gaining 
unquestionable leadership for SCLC in the Civil Rights movement”, while 
providing “support from various facets of the Negro community.”528   
Through Breadbasket, Jackson tried to create a common consciousness 
among differing fragments of black community. Chicago was the perfect 
place, as during the late 1960s and early 1970s it was home to a multitude of 
economic ventures and business initiatives that connected Black Nationalism, 
business, and welfare. It hosted an impressive series of programs that 
promoted economic opportunity to the African American community, 
especially its growing middle class. Chicago became arguably the national 
center of black business with the largest and strongest financial base of any 
African American community in the United States. Jackson leveraged  the 
entrepreneurial inclination of young urban African Americans who had a 
growing desire for business ownership. He also coordinated community 
boycotts to address economic segregation in large corporations and called 
upon the federal government to aid the disadvantaged and unemployed 
people of the slums.  
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Jackson embraced both protest and production as central tenets of 
Breadbasket’s purpose, in an attempt to integrate Civil Rights with black 
capitalism. He maintained a welfare approach while supporting black capital 
accumulation. On one hand, he built partnerships with several Chicago trade 
unions, challenged grocery and supermarket chains to hire more blacks, and 
supported the local strikes of black hospital workers, teachers, and bus 
drivers. On the other, he celebrated the rise of black capitalism with his 
annual black exhibitions. He organized parties, concerts and spectacles 
centered on the idea of blackness as an economic opportunity. Jackson 
stressed that black equity must stay inside the African American community. 
He always maintained a foot in both camps, welfare and capitalism, but 
gradually shifted Breadbasket’s priorities from creating jobs for poor black 
people to supporting small, black-owned companies.   
Not surprisingly, Breadbasket and Jackson eventually parted ways. 
Breadbasket had liberal origins, and despite its innovations and successes, it 
still operated under the presumption of a growing economy, the continuing 
expansion of welfare, and Keynesian logic. In this context, government was 
responsible for providing adequate jobs to reduce black poverty and labor 
exploitation. Breadbasket’s aim was to force the government to do exactly 
that. Jackson took note, however, not only of the down-turn of economic 
prosperity, but also of the emergence of a conservative political climate. The 
rising ideology of self-help required the construction of infrastructures that 
would facilitate the emergence of a black middle class. Jackson broke with 
the S.C.L.C. over the organization’s decision to relocate Breadbasket back to 
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Atlanta at the end of 1971, and resigned his position as Breadbasket’s 
national director. Shortly thereafter he launched his own economic 
empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People United to Save 
Humanity). 
Conclusion 
The dap – the Black Power handshake – as an expression of solidarity 
between  blacks, was de rigueur when “brothers” met. However, in September 
29, 1971, Jackson exchanged a “Black Power handshake” with Chicago’s 
Mayor Richard Daley.529 Jackson initiated the Black Power handshake when 
he met the Mayor and the latter responded, presumably as a gesture of good 
will. Obviously, Jackson did not want to enlist Richard Daley in the 
movement. However, he unintentionally achieved the opposite, he de-
ideologized the Black Power handshake. This is how we can look at Jessie 
Jackson during the roaring years of the Black Power, as a pragmatic black 
leader at home in any part of the black movement, promoting unity despite 
ideological differences. “When we are together, we have power,” he said at 
Watts. Therefore, there is a bit of Black Power in Jackson as well as in Dr. 
King. It is in his search for black economic power, however, that we can find 
the real, concrete connection between Jackson and Black Power. 
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Breadbasket: A New History 
 
Introduction 
Breadbasket is a history of transformation in a decade of radical change. In 
the critical period from 1962 to 1972, the emergence of black radicalism and 
modern conservatism exposed the limits of the Civil Rights Movement’s 
strategies for workplace integration and economic equality, and imposed as 
inevitable a shift from “right” to “power” as the operational principle of 
action. Labor union leaders, liberal and conservative politicians, black 
moderates, radicals, and corporate executives were linked in a struggle for 
economic power in an economic system where the rules of the game had 
changed. This chapter traces the detailed connections between African 
Americans’ involvement in integration of the workplace and Breadbasket’s 
metamorphosis, from “right” to “power,” identifying 1965 as a point of 
inflection, and revisiting the economic views of King and Jacksons and the 
causes of their disagreements. In fact, Breadbasket reflects the ongoing 
general conversation of integration of the workplace and black economic 
power within the S.C.L.C. leadership. While these topics, economic justice 
and Breadbasket, are usually treated separately, this chapter not only offers a 
unified economic view of the period but also reassess controversies and 
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events that punctuated Breadbasket’s colorful history of operational 
evolution and intellectual adaptation.  
Revisiting King and the Struggle for Jobs 
Over the last twenty-five years, historians have produced several fine studies 
on the key events that affected racial integration in the workplace in the 
1950s and 1960s. To date, most historical attention has focused on the 
struggle to secure equal rights legislation in the workplace, specifically the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Executive Order that encourages 
affirmative action as we know it. Some standard biographies and studies on 
King’s engagement with economic justice dispute if he was a radical or a 
moderate, and when he eventually became radicalized. Rightly identified as 
the most significant leader of the Civil Right movement, King was 
instrumental in ending legal segregation within  quite a short period of time, 
and became the conscience of the nation. It is important to realize, however, 
that relevant social and economic forces were already at work in that period, 
and institutions and organizations were fighting the “good fight” on both 
sides, to reduce or increase the influence of the federal government in the 
workplace. The efforts of the federal government and its allies to establish 
hiring and promotion practices that do not depend on the corporation’s 
internal rules, but are set by law has been investigated at length. Less 
attention has been received on the “other side,” the business-friendly 
conservatives and corporate executives that opposed this trend and fought to 
retain control of the workplace after World War II. While claiming to restore 
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merit as the basic principle of American enterprise and in pursuit of 
efficiency, corporate executives explicitly ranked racial groups, deciding who 
was best suited for the best jobs, by profiling workers. The executives 
ultimately merged managerial strategies and white supremacy for the sake of 
control of the workplace.  
Within the liberal coalition of Civil Rights, labor unions, and political liberals 
aiming to increase black employment opportunities, different options and 
sensibilities were at work. Some leaders – King among them – kept their 
options open, and pursued a dialogue with liberal politicians while boycotting 
private corporations. It did not help that a gigantic disagreement between 
equality of opportunity and equality of results did not surface in the debate 
until the eleventh hour, in the second part of the 1960s. It was when the 
Johnson administration shifted its goals, quietly dealing with the Vietnam war 
and leaving the dreams of the Great Society behind to become a vague 
memory. The long arc of liberalism was coming to an end, and a master 
politician,  Richard Nixon, was surfing the waves of partisan realignment, 
making liberal-conservative lines indistinguishable. It did not help that labor 
unions were already declining in terms of membership and influence, 
showing gradual acquiescence to a two-party political system and attention to 
the increasing conservative voice of the white low skilled workers. Examining 
this context is important, because it helps explain the resistance of white 
executives to change. Seeing the inconsistencies inside the liberal coalition, 
white executives felt authorized to resist integration in the workplace. The 
Civil Rights Act did not match the great expectations with which it was 
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welcomed; in fact, the national Civil Rights legislation was not designed to 
overcome the legacy of legal and practical racial segregation and 
discrimination, but was intended as a more modest attempt to assure that 
that these practices were coming to an end.   
Looking at the economic landscape in the 1960s, and at the ramifications of 
the different economic dynamics at work, it is easy to see why full 
employment, main strategy for pursuing integration in the workplace, had 
never been a viable option. In fact, the exhaustion of the long post-war 
economic cycle and the effects of automation undermined the effects of the 
Civil Rights legislation and efforts to remedy racial inequality in the 
workplace. Inflation was rising as a result of increasing federal deficits. The 
Johnson administration, then,  the Nixon administration later embraced fiscal 
prudence, and dealt with the costs of the Vietnam War. They compressed 
social programs, in an attempt to mitigate the budget deficits, while the 
Federal Reserve was increasing interest rates in an attempt to curb inflation. 
The unemployment that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s due to the rise in 
the use of technology was not unexpected, as economists had already 
predicted automation-induced unemployment in the 1930s, although 
misunderstanding its effects. Manufacturing job loss was explained as 
inexorable, and part of a greater trend away from manufacturing to services. 
America was becoming a “post-industrial economy,” moving beyond 
commodity-based production and entering into a new phase of evolution, a 
more advanced economy based on knowledge and services. Although the 
history of the shift from manufacturing jobs to service jobs is complex 
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(manufacturing employment had a peak in the late 1970s and a regular 
decline thereafter), it is a matter of fact that growth in services began 
accelerating in the 1960s and has not stopped since. While economic growth 
increased per capita income in the 1960s, the average number of hours per 
manufacturing work week declined, making the effects of deindustrialization 
for unskilled workers  devastating.  
In the critical period from 1965 to 1968, the emergence of a new economic 
cycle exposed the limits of federal government’s programs that were based 
on the implicit premise of  unstoppable economic growth. As there was a 
clear and transparent connection between economic growth and integration 
of African Americans in the economic realm, King concentrated his criticism 
on the Vietnam War. He thought that by ending the war, the federal 
government could liberate resources to be used to create opportunities for 
blacks and integrate them into the economic structure of American society. 
He acknowledged the increasing influence the war on the economy as it 
progressed, and the immediate effects of policy responses that shifted the 
government’s focus. He also correctly recognized the impact of the war on 
the economic system, and how the economy was increasingly affected by the 
war. However, the secretive attitude of  the Johnson Administration and its 
decision to keep the true costs of the war secret from the American public 
and from the government’s economic advisors prevented King from 
identifying the real costs and the economic effects of the war on integration 
strategies and goals.  
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In his The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War, scholar of economics, 
Anthony Campagna, shows that important microeconomic trends, in primis 
the first OPEC oil embargo, can be traced, in part, to the inflationary 
consequences of American economic policies during and after the Vietnam 
War. He also suggests that the mismanagement of the macro-economy and 
the misuse (or non-use) of fiscal policy by the Johnson administration ended 
up in the eventual shift from liberal Keynesian economics to the period of 
post-war stagflation and conservative monetary policy à la Milton Friedman. 
In reality, this shift was already in place before the war. While an earlier 
generation of economists revisited their market-centered worldviews 
following the New Deal, postwar economic thought was marked by an 
increasingly consistent social philosophy that suggested significant 
constraints to government intervention in the economy. It was in the 1960s 
that Friedman and his contemporaries developed a more solid defense of the 
unfettered market and a monumental shift to monetarism, the economic 
theory that would take the place of Keynesianism in the 1970s. Their 
arguments provided a rhetorical foundation for the resurgent conservatism 
of Barry Goldwater, and inspired much of the political and economic agenda 
of the United States in the ensuing decades.530 The fact is, the 1960s can be 
understood as a decade of conservatism, as much as one of liberalism.  
King seemed unaware of the challenge posed by inflation to consumer credit 
and, in general, to the economic cycle; neither did he apparently acknowledge 
the transformation of capitalism from manufacturing to the provision of 
services. He also ignored the incoming shift from Keynesianism to 
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monetarism. According King, economic inequality could be cured through a 
massive distribution of wealth. Tired of the ineffectiveness of the federal 
government in fighting economic inequality, King challenged what he 
considered white America’s racial prejudice toward black people. In his view, 
economic opportunities for African Americans were at hand thanks to the 
post-war economic boom. Consequently, by ending the war in Vietnam, the 
federal government would create the opportunity to redirect its efforts to 
correcting economic injustice. At the core of King’s economic thought was 
the distribution of wealth, not of power. Here lies the difference between 
King and Black Power. However, as the distribution of wealth was not an 
option at hand, King began to criticize the basic values of American 
capitalism and its prejudice against economic distribution. The fabric of  
American capitalism was at stake. In the last years of his life, King envisioned 
a new economic system based on the poor, minorities, and the unemployed 
and finally came  to denounce a failure of capitalism. In his view, the federal 
government would compensate for the effects of economic injustice that was 
produced by capitalism or, even better, take over managing capitalism itself, 
and eventually reform it. He failed to recognize the limits of the federal 
government, the deteriorating economic context, and the rise of modern 
conservatism that emphasized a business-friendly culture.  
Several biographers have identified openly with King and his idea of a 
reformed, social democratic form of capitalism. Others historians have 
reshaped King as a radical with regard to economics, who articulated a non-
capitalist vision for Black America. In many ways, the ambiguity of this 
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scholarship that has only begun to explore King’s economic thought after the 
mid-1960s. At that time, the option of a poor, marginal, vulnerable and 
needs-driven economic system was unpopular in the same black community, 
which these ideas were intended to help. There was much lively discussion 
over the merits and flaws of capitalism and non-capitalist strategies to 
revitalize the economic status of African Americans. The debate between  
the two options, capitalism and non-capitalist alternatives, crossed the line 
between in African American history between integration and nationalism. 
While nationalism seems to align better with non-capitalist economic 
strategies such as self-help and economic self-determination, and integration 
aligns more closely with capitalism, hybrid and mixed surrogates were also 
investigated. King assumed a hybrid position, calling capitalism to self-
reform, while venting frustration to his close advisors and lieutenants over 
his dream of a different economic system.  
Reconsidering Breadbasket 
If King was the ultimate defender of derelicts and the poor, Jackson was the 
militant voice of black consciousness and pride. Not surprisingly, this basic 
difference between the two leaders influenced the narrative of Breadbasket. 
In the last months of his life, King repeatedly clashed with Jackson. He 
accused Jackson of pursuing a personal agenda and supporting black 
capitalists rather than the black poor.531 If the first accusation was the reason 
for their last disagreement which occurred just a couple of days before King’s 
assassination, it is the second that was most devastating and left more 
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enduring damage. At the point when King was building an interracial 
coalition to press the federal government to end the war in Vietnam and to 
provide the poor with an improved chance to better themselves, Jackson was 
working with black entrepreneurs and bankers to advance black business and 
empower black capitalism. King “was quite rough on Jesse,” Andrew Young 
remembered, because he believed that adequate jobs would have to come 
through the public sector, while “Breadbasket was essentially a private sector 
program.”532  
Scholarship traditionally portrays Breadbasket as a program born in Atlanta 
that achieved success in Chicago. But Breadbasket was more than that. When 
Breadbasket moved to Chicago, it lost its way and innocence. It was no 
longer purely a Civil Rights campaign, but an economic advancement 
program for an emerging black middle class including finance and 
businesspeople, entrepreneurs and media moguls. Actually, it was re-modeled 
as a vehicle for self-advancement, an opportunity for self-promotion by 
Jackson, the self-appointed heir of King. It is no surprise that the literature 
on Breadbasket is usually included in Jackson’s biography. The program 
became Jackson-centric and abandoned the mainstream narrative of the 
S.C.L.C. and the history of the Civil Rights movement. Not only did 
Breadbasket change its scope, from black workers to black entrepreneurs, 
but it also became a perfect vehicle for the Napoleonic ambitions of the 
young civil right activist. Finally, it became the reason for the split inside the 
S.C.L.C. between Jackson and a group of King’s most intimate lieutenants. 
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The bottom line is that Breadbasket is a history of disappointments and 
betrayals, of diversion and opportunism.  
The dominant narrative that emphasizes the clash of character between the 
two leaders only scratches the surface of the ideological differences between 
King and Jackson. Breadbasket remains a far more complex story needing to 
be articulated. While it maintained its color-conscious attitude, it changed it’s 
character and aims, from economic Civil Rights to black economic power. In 
its decade-long history from 1962 to 1972, the program dealt with the effects 
of the shift from the Great Society’s liberalism to modern conservatism, 
from economic growth to rising inflation, from boycotts to riots. It is easy to 
see Breadbasket as one campaign among many others, but it can also be seen 
as a microcosm, a single program that contains most of the ingredients and 
dynamics of an era.  
Rather than a narrative of derailment, a narrative of transformation seems 
more suitable to Breadbasket. It is impossible to escape the 
impression that Breadbasket changed when Jackson replaced Rev. Fred C. 
Bennette as the national leader of the program. The difference between 
Bennette’s Breadbasket and Jackson’s could not be greater. The former was 
led by an executive team of pastors that met once a week, shared  leadership, 
and avoided the media, while fighting the good fight to provide employment 
and job advancement opportunities to black families. When they met 
corporate executives, they talked about love and justice, sins and forgiving. 
They were serving the cause, without keeping anything for themselves – 
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money, privileges, notoriety – and relying on their congregations for funds 
and support. The latter was a chaotic organization run by a charismatic, 
undisciplined leader, who hieratically moved from one agenda to the other – 
“being with Jesse was like a jamboree,” one of his advisors remembers – but 
who was always very careful about remaining in the center of media and 
public attention.533 He fought the good fight for the black poor and workers, 
but also became increasingly fascinated by the possibility of facilitating the 
emergence of black capitalism. He was not shy when it came to asking for 
the cause, for the organization, and for himself. With this attitude, he was 
facilitated by his role as a pastor, and the old consuetude in the black 
community of taking care of the needs of its pastors, since “we could not 
have him as our leader and not supply the appearance and the satisfaction 
that go with it,” as one of his sponsors pointed out.534  
Breadbasket was a sincere and serious project articulated by the Black 
Church to provide economic opportunities to black poor and job promotion 
to black workers. It represented an important step in King’s own 
understanding of capitalism and his first direct, personal involvement in the 
economic struggle of the African American community. When King brought 
Sullivan to Atlanta in October 1962 to meet with local ministers and replicate 
the selective patronage program developed in Philadelphia, the American 
economy was at the edge of omnipotence. In a 1962 study, University of 
Michigan researchers determined that the cost to end poverty was less than 
two percent of the Gross National Product.535  Columnist Walter Lippermann 
explained that the size of the pie could be increased by intention, and 
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unlimited economic growth would have taken care of all. President Johnson 
provided his personal contribution to building the idea of a post-scarcity 
economy. In his 1964 State of the Union Address, Johnson made clear his 
purpose and it was no less than eradicating poverty in America. “This 
administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in 
America. Our aim is not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure 
it and, above all, to prevent it.”536  Eliminating poverty was, for Johnson, a 
matter of political will and economic resources, and America, according to 
this President, was short of neither. It is not surprisingly, then, that the black 
pastors in Atlanta were approaching corporate executives in terms of love 
and brotherhood, while calling on the federal government to set fair and full 
employment policies. In a post-scarcity economy, there are no costs that 
cannot be afforded, balance sheets that cannot be fixed, and minimum wages 
that cannot be paid. Unlimited economic growth – the size of the pie in 
Lipperman’s article – will guarantee the resources needed to eliminate 
employment discrimination. It was a matter of will, legislation and 
enforcement. After Watts, King developed a better and deeper 
comprehension of the economic implications of discrimination, and raised 
his voice to denounce the racial divide in the economy that the federal 
government had to fill. More importantly, he elaborated a vision of 
institutional racism that could be challenged only with a historical, 
monumental effort led by the federal government to restore justice in the 
economic realm.537 King acknowledged the limits of campaigns such as 
Breadbasket and demanded full employment, minimum wage, and a more 
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just distribution of wealth, while criticizing corporate power and the 
executive insensibility to racial discrimination. 
While King and the old guard of the S.C.L.C. called for a redistribution of 
wealth from the “have’s” to the “have not’s,” Jackson envisioned white-
owned businesses infusing needed cash into minority-owned businesses, local 
economic development projects, small business advancement, job training, 
financial and trade institutions, and other community programs that would 
contribute to the advancement of the whole black community. They were 
living in “parallel universes.” In fact, they disagreed on the basic premise, 
that black underdevelopment was a product of capitalist development. 
Consequently, they also disagreed on the solution. King argued that in order 
for African Americans to advance economically, they would have to be 
integrated into the dominant economic structure in American capitalism once 
that structure had been changed. Jackson proposed black-controlled 
economic institutions in dialogue with white-controlled economic 
institutions, within the context of greater American capitalism.  
When Jackson became the national director of Breadbasket in 1967, the 
economy was showing clear signs of a downturn. At that point, the level of 
economic growth was not enough to sustain the domestic programs 
envisioned by the Great Society. Of course, the increasing expense of 
funding a foreign conflict in Vietnam, for all intents and purposes, a 
disgraced war,  was another cause of concern. The Great Society was running 
out of fuel as the government was running out of funds. The increase in 
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expenses created a federal deficit that contributed significantly to the rise of 
inflation, as Johnson had declined to increase taxes. The result was an 
increase of 4.5 percent in consumer prices, a policy of price stability, and in 
the words of historian Dallek, a “slowdown in capital investment, less 
residential construction, flat industrial production, disappointing retail sales 
and lower corporate profits”.538 The size of the pie could not be increased 
anymore. Once the basic laws of economics were restored, the size of the pie 
remained the same, and the good fight for employment and job promotion 
for blacks was a zero-sum game that required the bitter logic of power, 
reciprocity, and leverage. In other words, it was one thing to break racial 
discrimination barriers in the workplace in a growing economy, but another 
in a downturn.  
Together with the economic climate, the racial climate was also evolving. 
Confronting increasing poverty, unemployment, and an emerging urban 
crisis, Northern black radicals added their voices, full of resentment and 
anger, to the voices of King and the other Civil Rights leaders who were 
more conciliatory and reconciling. In his book Dark Days, Bright Nights, 
Peniel E. Joseph points out that the Black Power movement showed two 
sides. The first was a more radical, aggressive, militant posture that was 
political in character and revolutionary in nature; and the second was a 
“quiet” and “moderate” side, focusing on developing self-help campaigns, 
organizing communities, and pursuing self-reliance. This second approach 
was usually interpreted as movement toward economic and political 
independence, as well as autonomy from white authority. However, the same 
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can be said about the Civil Rights Movement. In truth, there was a vague 
border between the Civil Right Movement and the Black Power movement, 
and activists often simultaneously participated in both.539 Jackson had a foot 
in both camps, as his main message is firmly rooted in the notion of Civil 
Rights and integration, but in his aggressively pursuit of the renegotiation of 
the economic racial covenant, his behavior fell in another, much more 
ambitious camp focuses on self-determination.  
Few scholarly works connect Civil Rights activism with Black Power 
militancy in the realm of economics and business affairs. Most studies draw 
the line with the conciliatory, federal government-friendly Civil Rights 
moderates on one side, and the radical nationalists, on the other. This is 
unfortunate, as the border between the two movements is difficult to identify 
when it comes to economics and business. More conservative strategies such 
as black capitalism and more radical strategies such as black self-help not 
only historically coexisted but they eventually merged in a unique, 
authoritative message of pride and power. Jackson is a case in point. Radicals 
proclaimed that racial hostility was an effect of the unequal character of 
capitalism, and that to minimize the former it would be necessary to 
overcome the latter. Jackson recognized that the core question black leaders 
had to discuss was, what is achievable within the existing limitations of 
American capitalism, certainly not within the less realistic parameters of a 
black nation. He proclaimed that justice is the opportunity to share the 
benefits of capitalism with the whole community. Jackson was adamant 
before an audience of three thousand black nationalists and Pan-Africanists 
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in Atlanta in September 1970, as he explained that African Americans are 
part of the capitalist system, even if “morally you are not.”540 He pointed out 
that if African Americans were to advance economically, it was clear that 
they would have to be integrated into the dominant economic structures in 
American capitalism and yet maintain control of their own resources. In this 
way, he declined to adopt separatism and yet he endorsed the option of all-
black institutions, economic independence, and racial pride. With his 
message of black capitalism, Jackson appealed to both the integrationist and 
self-determinist values of the black community without moving beyond the 
confines of American capitalism. He adopted the original principle of 
modern conservatism in economics, that not everybody can be wealthy.541 
Not surprisingly, his engagement with black capitalism has been criticized by 
black radicals, because he failed to admit the value of socialist alternatives to 
capitalism. Certainly, Jackson was ambiguous in his view of black capitalism, 
due to his plan to accommodate the concept of black capitalism into the 
frameworks of both Civil Rights and Black Power. Embracing both Black 
Power and modern conservatism, Jackson eventually came to accept the 
concept of Black Power as a rationale for black capitalism and the 
development of new relationships between black businesspeople and 
corporate America.542  
Jackson recognized the effects of a failed war and an economic crisis that 
risked permanently undermining social cohesion and race relations. He 
understood that without a personal call to action, the black community could 
accept the effect of the economic crisis and wait passively for  aid from the 
286 
 
government. Jackson tried to balance his appeal for boycotts and protests 
with a strong call to racial pride and self-esteem. Along with correcting an 
inclination to passivity, he tried to build a new anthropological posture. The 
black community had to learn how to reduce their economic dependence on 
white liberals as well as on the central government, and increase their 
autonomy. This definitively changed the relationship with whites. Jackson 
often talked of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a relationship between 
equals.  
Toward a New History of Breadbasket 
Based on the traditional narrative of the political and cultural character of the 
Civil Rights Movement, scholarship does not usually pay too much attention 
to the economic context of the 1960s. It takes for granted that the 1960s 
were a long decade of economic growth, which eventually ends in 1972. The 
period, 1945-1972, was a period of enduring economic progress and 
increasing wealth, and 1965 was a transformative year that marked the birth 
of Black Power, the explosion of black riots in urban centers, and the origins 
of the white backlash. The white backlash was a reaction to the black 
radicalism of the second part of the decade, and ultimately led to the election 
of the Nixon administration and the end of liberalism as the dominant 
political and cultural tradition in the country. Once it was the accepted  
wisdom that Black Power and Civil Rights were reciprocally incompatible, 
the economic context became invariant, and conservatism was seen as a 
failed ideology after the defeat of Barry Goldwater. In this context, the 
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transformation of Breadbasket from a program led by black ministers to 
promote integration in the workplace and employment opportunities for 
African Americans, to a vehicle to promote back capitalism and protect the 
economic autonomy of black community in Chicago, was a sort of derailment. 
It was the result of Jackson’s unfair, unjust and unjustifiable decision, against 
Kings’ preferred option for the poor. The consequent disagreements 
between King and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies were based 
on ethical issues, a struggle for power, and a clash of egos. In addition, 
Jackson is not particularly loved by scholars, which quite unanimously take 
King’s side.  
This thesis offers a different approach. First, it takes into account the results 
of the most recent scholarship within a wide area of advanced studies, 
particularly the research on the economic character of the Civil Rights 
Movement, and the new subfield that Peniel E. Joseph calls “Black Power 
Studies.” It also embraces the opinions of a new generation of historians that 
has increasingly begun to view the 1960s as a decade of resurgent 
conservatism with faith in a market-centered economy. Secondly, it takes a 
closer look at the economy, in transition from boom to inflation, combined 
with the rapid escalation the war against Vietnam. By the end of 1965, an 
inflationary cycle was beginning to redefine the economic landscape, marking 
the birth of the tumultuous era we now know as “financialization.” In the 
light of this reality, this thesis assumes that during the 1960s, the American 
economy and Civil Rights Movement both underwent a major 
transformation, with the former having its sense of unlimited growth 
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dissipated over the course of the decade, and the latter intersecting with the 
mounting Black Power movement. Meanwhile, a declining liberalism and a 
rising conservatism were fighting for the economic soul of America. In 
addition, this thesis offers an analysis of the broader trends in American 
capitalism that made the search for workplace integration increasingly less 
important than access to capital and consumer credit. This thesis argues that 
the evolution of Breadbasket from economic Civil Rights to black economic 
power mirrors the changing social and economic context. The disagreements 
between King and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies were 
ideological in character, and show their different reactions to this change, 
especially in the realm of economy. 
Under Jackson’s leadership, Breadbasket became not only the legacy of a 
charismatic and enigmatic leader, but also a result of changing times. Those 
were times of expanding rights, black radicalism and pride, a crisis of the 
welfare state, the decline of the Great Society, and collapse of the New Deal 
coalition. It was a complex period, marked by a sharp deterioration in the 
economic conditions of the country, which was intellectually caught by a 
mounting laissez-faire philosophy, and the stirrings of a financial capitalism 
that would come to full maturity only in the following decade. The 
ideological conflict between the government and the market would come to a 
head during the Reagan presidency, and Jackson would be a protagonist 
during this period. But all the elements were already present in the late 
1960s. Breadbasket mirrored a profound transformation of the collective 
perception of the economy during the decade. Its history marks the passage 
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from politics to economics as a major field of social debate and the transition 
from Civil Rights to the surge in the creation of a black business class. More 
succinctly, Breadbasket tells the story of a creative merger between two 
figures: the reformist hero, King, and entrepreneurial icon, Jackson.  
Since there is not a dedicated study on Breadbasket, the main contribution of 
this thesis is an entire history of Breadbasket that fills a gap in the 
historiography. This thesis also attempts to provide a contribution to three 
topics relating to King and the history of the S.C.L.C.. The first contribution 
addresses the classic interpretation that asserts that King and the S.C.L.C. 
would place economic justice at the center of their activism, addressing issues 
of redistribution of wealth and economic power, only in the final years of 
King’s life.543 The second contribution disputes another traditional 
interpretation, that is, King focused on achieving what he conceived as 
universal rights, authorized by the Declaration of Independence and rooted 
in the wisdom of the Scriptures, in color-blind campaigns throughout his life. 
The third and last contribution challenges the popular understanding of the 
controversy between King and Jackson on the nature and destiny of 
Breadbasket as rooted in a clash of character.  
Scholarship has been quite consistent in promoting the idea that in the mid- 
to late-1960s King and the S.C.L.C. were beginning to switch the focus of 
their attention to a broader struggle for economic justice. Historians have 
identified the riots in Watts as the turning point. On August 11, 1965, riots 
ignited in Watts, a predominantly black section of Los Angeles, after the 
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arrest of a 21-year-old for drunk driving. The riots occurred only five days 
after President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act. According to 
the classic narrative, King’s less than gentle reception among Watts’ poorest 
communities during the riot’s aftermath opened his eyes to an incredible 
level of urban poverty. The rioting in Watts turns the attention of King and 
other Civil Rights activists to the urban race problem. Until 1965, King 
regarded race as a peculiarly Southern problem that could be solved by 
extending political and Civil Rights to Southern blacks. Beginning in 1965, 
however, he learned that discrimination and racial prejudice were nationwide 
problems and that black Americans were demanding not just desegregation 
in the South, but equality in all parts of the country. In the North, African 
Americans suffered, not from de jure (legal) segregation, but from de facto 
discrimination in housing, schooling, and employment – discrimination that 
lacked the overt sanction of law. “De facto segregation,” wrote James 
Baldwin, “means that Negroes are segregated but nobody did it.”544 
Accordingly, the story of King and the S.C.L.C. can be divided in two phases, 
the first is related to the non-violent protest against segregation in the South, 
the second is against economic, housing, and discrimination in education in 
the North.  
The history of Breadbasket seems to be consistent with the classic narrative 
of the Civil Rights movement in the South, centered on voting rights and 
judicial and legislative successes, and of the commitment of King and the 
S.C.L.C. to challenge economic discrimination beginning only in 1965. Most 
scholarship addresses Breadbasket as a campaign developed in Chicago, and 
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this obscures the eariler period, the first four years of operations – from the 
beginnings in Atlanta in 1962 to the expansion into Chicago in 1966. In other 
words, the biographies of King and Jackson, as well as the narratives of the 
S.C.L.C. and the Black Freedom Movement, converge in Chicago as the 
place where Breadbasket held its major events and became relevant.545 This 
may promote the perception that it is in Chicago that the program started. 
However, the period between 1962 and 1966, the undocumented time span 
from the incorporation in Atlanta to the expansion into Chicago, can be 
described as “the lost years of Breadbasket.” Concentrating on activist’s 
effort in the North, classic scholarship on Breadbasket only partially covers 
the story. In fact, the early years of Breadbasket show the commitment of 
King and S.C.L.C to correcting economic injustice well before 1965. 
Moreover, when articles on Breadbasket pay attention to its Southern 
operations, they minimize the output of the organization there, quite 
immediately shifting to the late 1960s success in Chicago. That shift in 
geographical focus leads to the conclusion that Breadbasket didn’t 
accomplish very much in the South. The truth is, successes in Chicago have 
their own importance and their own history, but Breadbasket, as such, was a 
Southern phenomenon, with economic goals that resonated in the context of 
the rising New South. Accordingly, a history of Breadbasket that 
encompassed the early years of the program not only fills a gap in the 
historiography but also reveals the importance of the first years of 
Breadbasket and is instrumental in dispelling the myth that King and the 
S.C.L.C. became involved in the strategy of non-violent protest against the 
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structures of economic discrimination only after the Voting Rights Act, and 
especially after the explosion of riots in Watts.  
Scholarship has been consistent in addressing another topic, King’s vision of 
the “beloved community,” the dream of full and equitable integration of 
blacks, which would be accomplished by way of color-blind legislation on 
behalf of all Americans. This would also include a moral appeal to the 
conscience of white America for the sake of universal principles of equality 
and justice. For example, later on,  King emphasized the more universal 
focus of the Poor People’s Campaign, i.e., the building of an interracial 
coalition for the rights of all poor people, rather than the color-conscious 
militancy of the Black Power activists.546 Breadbasket shows that King’s 
attitude toward color-conscious programs was more nuanced and less critical 
that scholarship normally assumes. For example, in June 1967 he pointed out 
that “Breadbasket is essentially a program of self-help.”547 The South where 
the activities of the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket took place was the poorest 
region in the country. Here African Americans were rigidly politically 
segregated and economically powerless despite the fact that the region was in 
a period of metamorphosis, the phase of incubation of the New South, an 
economically booming, biracial democracy. Historian Gavin Wright believes 
that “modern acceleration of economic growth in the South clearly pre-dates 
the Civil Rights era.” (In fact, his own research suggests labor legislation 
during the New Deal had spurred some of it, by destroying the basis for 
regional isolationism.) Nevertheless, he says, “It’s even harder to picture the 
South enjoying its modern prosperity in the absence of the sharp 1960s break 
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with the past.” Barriers to economic progress may have been less from 
efficiency losses, he says, than from “the inability of a segregationist South to 
join and take advantage of national and international networks of knowledge 
and culture.” Southern blacks as a group clearly benefited from the 
movement, Wright adds, however “the South’s economic success largely has 
been limited to metropolitan areas, not unlike the rest of the country.”548 
Segregation may  already have seemed expensive and anachronistic, and 
southern businessmen may have seen the economic damage caused by 
traditional patterns of race relations and by the ensuing negative national 
publicity that deterred outside investment. However, desegregation in the 
workplace was still slow and residual, and not surprisingly became a priority 
of King and the S.C.L.C., which tried to change the South in many ways. In 
addition, they  pursued integration in the workplace though color-conscious 
boycotts and protests.549  
At a national level, the S.C.L.C. was a church-based, cross-class movement 
that stressed universal legalistic Civil Rights, and was powered by leftist and 
biracial trade unions. At the local level, the level where Breadbasket operated, 
it was focused more on boycotts and aggressive efforts to address the 
persistent realities of injustice and economic discrimination against black 
workers. The color-conscious character of Breadbasket also helps illuminate 
why Breadbasket changed its nature when it expanded in Chicago, and 
embraced continuance between Civil Rights and Black Power. During the 
Roaring Twenties, African Americans rapidly transformed their Chicago into 
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a “black metropolis.” In his book, The Rise of Chicago’s Black Metropolis, 1920-
1929, Christopher Robert Reed describes the rise of African Americans in 
Chicago’s political economy, the labor issues and the struggle for control of 
black politics and black business. However, it was only in the 1960s that the 
efforts of black and Civil Rights leaders were transformed through dynamic 
social forces to promote black businesses and the establishment of a black 
professional class. Although there has always been some recognition of class 
diversity within the black community, the growth of the black middle class in 
the 1960s generated a debate within  the black community on the relative 
influence of race in the lives of middle-class blacks. The consensus that 
emerged  acknowledged the increasing influence of the entrepreneurial class, 
the competitive ideologies within the black community, while documenting 
the continued role of race in limiting black middle-class achievement in 
business and the workplace.  
In Chicago, Breadbasket found itself involved in a completely different 
process than in the South. Breadbasket became involved in the emergence of 
the entrepreneurial black middle class and a black capitalism outside of the 
traditional racial economic enclaves, while radical and militant expressions of 
Black Power were fomenting revolution. Jackson and the other black 
preachers placed Breadbasket at the intersection of economic justice and 
black capitalism, promoting coalitions among the different voices of Black 
Chicago that addressed the aspirations of the poor, as well as the more 
affluent and consumer-oriented requests of the bourgeoisie. This intersection 
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between economic justice and black capitalism is what makes Breadbasket in 
Chicago so unusual. Twenty years before Manning Marable explained How 
Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America, the Black Church was pursuing a 
Breadbasket project to actually, in the words of Marable, improve “the 
economic conditions that scar the soul” and the life of the black people, and 
challenge the structure of American capitalism.550 
King was not sympathetic to “black capitalism” and criticized Jackson for 
being a champion of black entrepreneurship and the black bourgeoisie. In 
1964, he had advocated for a “Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged” 
guaranteeing education, jobs, and social services to impoverished citizens, 
white as well as black, pushed the idea of a multi-billion dollar “domestic 
Marshall Plan” – a proposal developed by Whitney Young, Jr., and the 
National Urban League. The plan was to eliminate poverty and rebuild the 
inner cities, a plan more ambitious than the Johnson administration’s War on 
Poverty. However, for the sake of economic justice, rather than mere 
equality, he established Breadbasket to promote “compensatory or 
preferential treatment” for black workers, and embraced affirmative action 
programs.551 He elaborated moral principles of compensatory justice for the 
history of wrongs committed against African Americans, which served as the 
basis not only of affirmative action, but also of Breadbasket’s campaigns for 
“black jobs.” “The moral justification for special measures for Negroes,” he 
wrote in 1963, “is rooted in the robberies inherent in the institution of 
slavery.” As historian Stewart Burns notes, King  
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gave then rationalized extending these entitlements to poor 
whites, the majority of the poor, on the grounds of what he 
called “derivative bondage” – the impact of slavery on 
capitalists’ control and exploitation of the white labor force. 
But this corollary argument seemed a bit specious, since a 
justification that might have been appropriate for a “chosen 
people” liberated from slavery did not have the same moral 
charge when applied to a larger group that did not share this 
heritage.552  
Breadbasket at least reveals that King’s engagement with integration of the 
workplace reflects ambivalence about grounding a compelling program in the 
color-blind as well as in color-conscious fashion.  
The story of Breadbasket is not simply the story of important campaigns and 
economic accomplishments but also one of intellectual adaptation. Hence the 
title of this thesis, From Economic Rights to Black Economic Power, which refers to 
different approaches to American capitalism. A brief comparison of the 
economic analysis of Dr. King and Jesse Jackson explains the point. Like the 
progressives and the left-wing liberal around him, Dr. King was critical, if not 
entirely hostile toward capitalism. Especially in the last three years of his life, 
King shared the belief that something was wrong with capitalism and that the 
government should find a way to compensate for capitalism’s flaws. Among 
the most important manifestations of his criticism was a preoccupation with 
the issues related to economic redistribution. On the edges of liberal 
economic thought were more radical ideas; the conviction that race struggles 
had revealed the incapacity of capitalism to provide economic justice, and the 
need for a fundamentally new system. King embraced such beliefs. At the 
heart of the economic liberalism of the 1960s was the commitment to 
increase the rights and freedoms of individuals and social and racial groups, 
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to protect and expand the institutions of the welfare state, and sustain 
economic growth. King correctly linked the growth of the economy with the 
possibility of full employment. He also became aware of the decline of 
manufacturing’s centrality to the economy and the rise of services, especially 
knowledge production. Science and technology were being systematically 
integrated into production – and this was the source of tremendous threat 
for low-skilled black workers. This change, in turn, placed increasing 
demands on government to fund education, sustain diffusion of 
technological expertise, coordinate processes of technological change, and 
build some of the key infrastructure required by new technologies. While the 
black leadership had long been aware of these needs, and the Black Church 
had fulfilled these functions, sometimes under the cover of training and 
educational classes, King argued that the scale and complexity of such 
problems would require public sector efforts.  
However, when the idea of full employment became a mirage and the failure 
of President Johnson’s War on Poverty became evident, King was convinced 
that his dream of 1963 had been turned into a nightmare. He complained 
about the Vietnam War, and showed his concern about restructuring the 
capitalist system rather than acknowledging the limits of its growth.553 He 
embraced the assumption – that was not shared by Lyndon Johnson – that 
liberalism meant a commitment to reform, and that it is appropriate and fair 
to ask government to deal with the key point of the modern economy in the 
post-World War II era, the distribution of power and wealth. However, he 
misunderstood the profound implications of the end of economic growth for 
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fiscal policy – the collecting and spending of funds by the federal 
government. The limits to economic growth had immense effects on the 
ability of the federal government to sustain and maintain the welfare state. 
More importantly, he missed seeing the fiscal revolution that was coming, the 
deepening ambivalence of the American public toward paying taxes and 
growing government. King completely failed to recognize that Americans 
would become increasingly reliant on entitlements and increasingly 
disinclined to pay taxes or make the productive investments that society 
needs. 
Jackson found himself less alienated and threatening by the degenerative 
effects of capitalism, than an earlier generation of black liberals would have 
been. The critique of modern capitalism that was so important for King was 
largely missed in Jackson’s view. At least it was so attenuated as to seem to 
be little more that rhetorical artifice. He expressed a set of moderate ideas, 
essentially reconciled to the existing structure of American capitalism, and 
committed himself to use the art of bargaining to gain economic power for 
the black community. One broad assumption was particularly important to 
Jackson, the assumption that the black community’s greatest problems were 
rooted in the structure of modern industrial capitalism. In addition, it was the 
mission of the larger Black Freedom Movement to somehow deal with the 
flaws in that structure. His commitment was the product of two overlapping 
missions. The first was an attempt to expand the effects of capitalism to 
blacks previously excluded, and the second was the acknowledgement of the 
decline of rights-based liberalism, and the search for economic autonomy.  
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Described in biographies and articles as a polyhedric personality with a 
kaleidoscopic mind, Jackson could easily describe himself, at least in his early 
days, as a moderate in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in 
culture. This trinity might annoy almost everyone, but Jackson’s heterodoxy 
may have helped him to see what others could not, that well before the 
Reagan Revolution and the end of welfare as we know it, American 
capitalism would grapple with the question of the free market and private 
choices for decades to come. He had, by then, rearticulated the classic Civil 
Rights narrative, and had worked intensively to shape his own, peculiar 
meaning of the struggle for power. Not surprisingly, he redefined the black 
struggle for freedom in relation to what he considered the central issue of his 
times: consumer capitalism. Jackson incorporated in his vision the fact that 
the rise of a consumer culture from the 1920s to the 1960s had completely 
failed to include black consumers. He might or might not have predicted the 
implications of the consumer culture for the black movement, especially the 
undermining of race as a source of identity, but he certainly would have 
included it in his strategy for the advancement of the black middle class.  
Potential Further Research 
Further areas in need of research include the history of racial integration in 
the workplace, Jesse Jackson’ early career, and King’s economic thought. On 
February 18, 2009, in his first major speech since being confirmed, the 
nation’s first black attorney general, Eric Holder, took the opportunity to 
give a speech celebrating Black History Month, where he defined the 
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American people as “essentially a nation of cowards” on matters of race.554 In 
a blunt assessment of race relations in the United States, Holder told 
hundreds of Justice Department employees gathered for the event, that race 
issues continue to be a topic of political discussion, but “we, as average 
Americans, simply do not talk enough with each other about race.” No 
doubt, in order to balance the highly controversial – for some even 
incendiary – nature of his powerful opening statement, Holder immediately 
limited the extension of the issue. He stated that:  
As a nation we have done a pretty good job in melding the 
races in the workplace. We work with one another, lunch 
together and, when the event is at the workplace during work 
hours or shortly thereafter, we socialize with one another 
fairly well, irrespective of race. (…) Outside the workplace 
the situation is even bleaker in that there is almost no 
significant interaction between us. On Saturdays and Sundays 
America in the year 2009 does not, in some ways, differ 
significantly from the country that existed some fifty years 
ago. 
Of course, the reference is to one of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s most famous 
quotes concerning race and the American church. “It is appalling that the 
most segregated hour of Christian America is 11 o’clock on Sunday 
morning…” King remarked in 1963.555 However, what is significant in this 
statement is the choice of the workplace as a fine example of racial 
integration. According to Holder, work is an island of racial decency and 
mutual understanding in an ocean of social shaming and public 
embarrassment. Remarkably, fifty years ago that’s the way it was not. Fifty 
years ago, King and other clergymen established Breadbasket in order to 
provide job opportunities to black workers, fight discrimination in the 
workplace, and promote justice in hiring and promotion practices.  
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Discussing the Civil Rights Movement as a whole, historian of the U.S. 
South, C. Vann Woodward pointed out in the late 1960s that “all those 
stirring events [of the movement] were quite recent, so recent that the sound 
of them was still in our ears. And yet they seem at the same time so remote, 
so improbable.”556 To say “improbable” shows Van Woodward’s firm 
rejection of historical determinism as well as an acute recognition of the 
unpredictability of history and the degree of complexity of social dynamics. 
He advises historians to refuse any notion of cycle, recursion, or analogy 
between one period and another. History does not follow the laws of physics 
and consequently is not subject to the cause-effect process. History is – 
assuming an intimate bond between the two words – counterintuitive. This 
bond is surely true as far as the history of workplace desegregation is 
concerned. In what it might be considered a major irony of the struggle for 
integration in the workplace, blacks remained underrepresented in 
employment statistics during the age of America’s economic prosperity and 
capitalism’s major advances, and became fairly represented in the following 
era of recessions, inflation, financial crises, and relative economic decline. 
Although it is counterintuitive, the extraordinary transformation of the 
workplace has been taking place during an era of increasing unemployment 
and underemployment, rather than in the Golden Age of American 
capitalism, also known as the post-war economic boom.557 This point is 
important, because during the post–World War II economic expansion, fair 
employment and full employment became the primary rhetoric of liberals, 
labor unions, and Civil Rights leaders, just the same. The opposite is true, the 
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American workplace became less racially exclusionary with regard to  
employment policy with widespread adopted equal employment opportunity, 
and some forms of affirmative action, only after the optimism and 
expectation of full employment was over.558 Moreover, a whole series of 
adverse economic trends had a disproportionate impact on the black 
community, North and South. Their breakthrough into the labor market was 
followed by the general collapse in unskilled wages, which is a national and 
international trend, and the problems of agriculture in the South and of 
urban society in the North were real and had a race-specific dimension.559 
However, the whole history is still to be written.  
A few months earlier, on November 4, 2008, the Obama family celebrated 
with the newly elected president along with hundreds of thousands of 
supporters in Chicago’s Grant Park. Forty years after the assassination of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., the country ended the long interlude, and welcomed 
a new black leader – this time no longer a Baptist pastor from the South but 
a community organizer from the Midwest. Standing with more than 200,000 
Obama supporters in Grant Park that Tuesday, the Rev. Jesse Jackson cried 
as he learned that Barack Obama would become America’s first African-
American president. His tears have only a partial redemptive power, and the 
fact the not everybody believed in his sincerity speaks loudly about the 
relationship that the veteran Civil Rights leader, who ran for president in 
1984 and 1988, has with the national audience.560 During his career, Jackson’s 
unapologetic and confrontational style has upset a large part of the country 
while his long track record of divisive accusations along with a few scandals 
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and lies have made people skeptical about his good intentions and sincerity. 
Now, at 71 years of age, he remains an enigma. He dresses as a businessman, 
or a pastor, and has dismissed his Day-Glo designer dashikis, yet people still 
remember the six-foot-two, 200 pound leader, asking the crowd in Los 
Angeles, in the aftermaths of the Watts riots, “What time is it? Nation time!” 
His megalomaniac ego, hyperbolic proclamations and media overexposure 
did not help his reputation. Jackson has also been all but erased from the 
narrative of current Civil Rights history. Jackson is seen by many scholars as 
old and wrong, too polarizing a figure to have around as they try to build an 
arc that goes from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Barack Obama. The black man 
who ran Breadbasket as the first serious, history-making (and magazine 
cover-making) experiment in the late 1960s and early 1970s to merge 
economic Civil Rights and black economic power, and who promised to lead 
the black people of America to the capitalist promised land, is a sort of 
invisible man in the recent historiography. 561 The opposite happened to 
Jackson’s mentor. During his life, Martin Luther King, Jr was considered by 
white conservatives in both major parties to be a dangerous rebel and a 
puppet in the hand of sneaky, vicious, and anti-American members of the 
Communist Party. For black radicals, he was a “house Negro.” However, 
after his assassination, he became the prophet of non-violence. Gone was the 
radical stance, the black preacher in a black suit who did not want to stay in 
his place, gone was the troublemaker who J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI 
executive director, in November 1964, publically called “the most notorious 
liar in the country,”. The later revelations about his adulteries and acts of 
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plagiarism did not have too much of an affect on the reputation of an icon, 
which has already been sanitized and consigned to legend.  
In fact, it is Jackson, not King, who has been all but erased from the 
narrative of current Civil Rights history. Today Jackson is seen as too 
conservative in his economic stance by historians of the Black Power 
movement, as old and wrong, too polarizing a figure to have around and not 
inline enough with the core values of the Civil Rights Movement, as the 
scholarship of the movement tries to build an arc that goes from Martin 
Luther King, Jr., to Barack Obama.562 It is now the right time to re-evaluate 
him.563  
Finally, there is the eventual recognition of the differences between King and 
Johnson in terms of economic policy. Although the relationship between the 
Civil Rights leader and the 36th president has been investigates extensively 
(see for example Kotz, Nick. Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and the Laws That Changed America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
2005) a major investigation of their differing views in terms of economic 
policy and the political economy is still missing. The point is, the traditional 
narrative often assumes that King “broke” with Johnson on the Vietnam 
War, which was, among other problems, deflecting resources from the 
programs of the Great Society. King increasingly realized, this is still the 
classic scholarship, that Johnson was shifting his attention from domestic to 
international affairs, from economic justice to military power, and 
consequently altering the “center of gravity” of his economic policy. 
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However, this was only a part of King’s increasing dissatisfaction with 
capitalism. In the last years of his life, King escalated his criticism of the 
Johnson Administration, pointing out an unsatisfactory distribution of 
wealth, the limited pursuit of economic equality, and called for a reformation 
of capitalism, without recognizing that the idea of the reform of capitalism 
was already passé. It has been since the 1940s that liberalism had been 
concerned with providing a safe environment for the corporate world to 
flourish in, and the government is no longer much concerned with reform. It 
might seem a small detail, of little relevance in the history of the Civil Rights 
Movement. But in fact, it is a fine example of the importance of explorations 
in the history of economic thought. In fact, it clarifies a basic 
misunderstanding between King and Johnson. While it might be true that 
Johnson changed his economic policy because of the increasing costs of the 
Vietnam War, it is different than saying that Johnson changed his views of 
the  political economy during his presidency. In fact, the opposite is true. 
Johnson does not seem to have changed his views of the political economy. 
He never envisioned a reformation of capitalism, he never showed any 
interest in modifying the structure of capitalism in order to pursue specific 
goals. He just made the wrong assumption that American capitalism could 
sustain the cost of the Great Society’s programs at home, and the domino 
strategy abroad. More simply, the politics of his economic view was different 
from King’s from the beginning. It was King who’s perspective matured, 
changing his political and economic views, and he found himself in a 
different spot than Johnson. Due to the basic differences in terms of political 
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and economic thought between King and Johnson, it would be interesting to 
investigate why King thought he had to break with Johnson, assuming a 
previous convergence that had never been in place.564 
Conclusion 
The S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in 1962 as a Civil Rights program to 
promote economic opportunity in the workplace. In its post-1965 
reincarnation, the program ended up utilizing the same means, boycotts and 
protests, for different ends. Specifically, the S.C.L.C. emphasized black 
capitalism and the pursuit of economic self-determination. Breadbasket 
changed its goals, shifting from giving blacks the right to share the same 
employment opportunities as whites, to gaining power for black 
entrepreneurs, bankers, and consumers. Rather than the general objective of 
equality, the program emphasized its choices in promoting economic 
autonomy and racial respect.  Although it changed its goals, Breadbasket 
remained a color-conscious program, limiting its focus. It lacked the 
resources to be more than just a symbolic Civil Rights program for 
promoting integration in the workplace, and it also the will to be more than a 
rhetoric challenge to the primary structure of American capitalism. 
307 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CFM   Chicago Freedom Movement  
CIO   Congress of Industrial Organizations  
CORE   Congress of Racial Equality  
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FEPC   Fair Employment Practices Committee  
MLK      Martin Luther King 
MLKC  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social Change 
MCMLK  Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection 
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
OB   Operation Breadbasket  
OEO   Office of Economic Opportunity  
PA   Operation Breadbasket, Private Collection 
SCLC   Southern Christian Leadership Conference  
SNCC   Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee  
UAW   United Auto Workers  
 
 
308 
 
Bibliography 
 
Manuscript Collections 
Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Peace and Nonviolent Change, Atlanta, 
Ga.:  
 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Papers  
Records of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Record of Operation Breadbasket 
Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta, Ga.:  
Fred C. Bennette Collection 
The Emory University Archives, Atlanta, Ga.:  
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Series 
Martin Luther King Speaks Series 
Audiovisual Series  
Morehouse College, Atlanta, Ga.:  
Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection at Robert W. Woodruff Library of 
the Atlanta University Center 
The Rainbow PUSH Coalition Headquarter, Chicago, Ill. 
Chicago Freedom Movement Museum, Chicago, Ill.  
The Afro-American Collection at Central Library, Chicago, Ill.: 
The Reverend Addie Wyatt Collection, 1851-2010  
Operation Breadbasket, Private Collection, Author.  
309 
 
Government Reports, Presidential Speeches, Executive Orders 
Attorney General Eric Holder at the Department of Justice African 
American History Month Program, Wednesday, February 18, 2009. 
Remarks as prepared for delivery. U.S. Department of Justice.  
 
Executive Order 9346. Establishing a Committee on Fair Employment Practice. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 27, 1943. 
 
Executive Order 9981. Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of 
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Harry S. Truman, July 26, 
1948. 
 
Executive Order 10925. Establishing the President's Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity. John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1961. 
 
Lyndon B. Johnson, “State of the Union Message by the President to a Joint 
Session of the Congress.” Washington: White House, 1964.   
Otto Kerner, The Kerner Report: the 1968 Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Pantheon, 1988. 
 
U.S. Kerner Commission, Report on the National Commission on Civil Disorders, 
New York Times reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1968. 
 
Files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI File 100-106670-NR, 22 November 
1965. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI File 100-106670-2303, 14 Feb. 1966.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI File 100-106670-2325, 21 Feb. 1965. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. FBI File on the Reverend Jesse Jackson. 
Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1988. Book and Microfilm. 
 
Oral Histories (In Author’s Possession) 
Robert Adams, October 2012, by telephone.  
Lerone Bennett, December 2011, by telephone.  
Dorothy Cotton, December 2011, by telephone.  
310 
 
Vincent Harding, November 2011, San Francisco, CA.   
Fred Harris, September 211, by email. 
Peniel Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA. 
Lester McKeever, May 2012, by email.  
Aljosie Aldrich Knight, November 2011, San Francisco, CA.  
Gary Massoni, November 2012, by telephone.  
R. Drew Smith, March 2011, by email. 
Video and Audio 
“I am Somebody”. On YouTube.  
“Wattstax”: 30th Anniversary Special Edition DVD. 
“Alice's Ordinary People”. Evanston, Ill.: Imagine Video Productions, 
c2012. 1 videodisc (ca. 56 min.) : sd., col. & b&w ; 4 3/4 in.  
 
“The Long Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson”, PBS.org, 1995. Produced by 
Frontline with the Lennon Production Group. Executive producer, 
David Fanning; senior producers, Thomas Lennon, Michael Sullivan; 
producer, Mark Zwonitzer; writers, Marshall Frady, Zwonitzer. 
 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. “The Present Crisis in Civil Rights, Address 
delivered at the National Meeting of Operation Breadbasket.” 
[7/10/67]. [Chicago, Ill.] (At) 45.4 min. (2 sound cassettes: 
analog.) Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC: 
NYC-13C & 13D. 670710-002.  
 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Atlanta Daily World 
Atlanta Journal Constitution 
311 
 
Business Week  
Chicago Defender and Daily Defender  
Chicago Sun-Times  
Chicago Today Chicago Tribune  
Chicago Sun-Times 
Chicago Daily News 
Chicago Tribune  
Ebony (Chicago)  
Fortune  
Harpers  
Jet (Chicago)  
Life 
New York Times  
New York Times Magazine  
New Yorker  
Newsweek  
Readers Digest  
Time  
Wall Street Journal  
Books 
Abernathy, Ralph. And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: An Autobiography. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1989.  
  
Albert, Peter J., and Ronald Hoffman. We Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and the Black Freedom Struggle. New York: Pantheon Books in 
Cooperation with the United States Capitol Historical Society, 1990.  
  
312 
 
Allen, Leslie C. Psalm 101–150. Word Biblical Commentary. Nashville: Thomas 
Nelson, 2002. 
 
Allen, Robert L. Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History. 
Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990.  
  
Alvis, Joel L. Religion & Race: Southern Presbyterians, 1946-1983. Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1994.  
  
Anderson, Alan B., and George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The 
Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago. Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1986.  
  
Anderson, James E, and Jared Hazleton, Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The 
Johnson Presidency. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986. 
 
Anderson, Jervis. A. Philip Randolph; a Biographical Portrait. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.  
 
Anderson, Jervis. Bayard Rustin: Troubles I’ve seen: A Biography. 1st ed. New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997.  
 
Andrew, John A. Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1998.  
 
Arnesen, Eric. The Black Worker: Race, Labor, and Civil Rights since Emancipation. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007.  
  
Arsenault, Raymond. Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Asals, Frederick. Flannery O'Connor: The Imagination of Extremity. Athens: Ga., 
1982.  
  
Bailey, Ronald W. Black Business Enterprise; Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives. New York: Basic Books, 1971.  
  
Baldwin, Davarian L. Chicago's New Negroes: Modernity, the Great Migration, & 
Black Urban Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007.  
  
Baldwin, Lewis V., and Amiri YaSin. Al-Hadid. Between Cross and Crescent: 
Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Malcolm and Martin. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2002.  
  
Baldwin, Lewis V. The Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Boundaries of Law, 
Politics, and Religion. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2002.  
  
313 
 
Baldwin, Lewis V. There Is a Balm in Gilead: The Cultural Roots of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.  
  
Baldwin, Lewis V. To Make the Wounded Whole: The Cultural Legacy of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992.  
  
Baldwin, Lewis V. The Voice of Conscience: The Church in the Mind of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
  
Ball, Howard. A Defiant Life: Thurgood Marshall and the Persistence of Racism in 
America. New York: Crown Publishers, 1998.  
 
Barber, David. A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed. Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2008.  
 
Barnard, John. American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther 
Years, 1935-1970. Wayne State U. Press, 2004.  
 
Bass, S. Jonathan., and Martin Luther King. Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Eight White Religious Leaders, and the “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail” Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 
2001.  
  
Bates, Beth Tompkins. Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black 
America, 1925-1945. Chapel Hill (N.C): University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001.  
 
Bauman, Mark K., and Berkley Kalin. The Quiet Voices: Southern Rabbis and 
Black Civil Rights, 1880s to 1990s. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 1997.  
 
Beito, David T., and Linda R. Beito. Black Maverick T.R.M. Howard's Fight for 
Civil Rights and Economic Power. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2009.  
  
Beito, David T. From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social 
Services, 1890-1967. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000.  
  
Berkowitz, Edward D. Mr. Social Security: the Life of Wilbur J. Cohen. Lawrence, 
Kan.: University of Kansas, 1995.  
 
Berlin, Ira. The Making of African America: The Four Great Migrations. New York: 
Viking, 2010.  
 
Bieze, Michael, and Marybeth Gasman. Booker T. Washington Rediscovered. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. 
 
314 
 
Billingsley, Andrew. Mighty like a River: The Black Church and Social Reform. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999.  
  
Biondi, Martha. To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New 
York City. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
  
Blake, John. Children of the Movement: The Sons and Daughters of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Malcolm X, Elijah Muhammad, George Wallace, Andrew Young, 
Julian Bond, Stokely Carmichael, Bob Moses, James Chaney, Elaine Brown, 
and Others Reveal How the Civil Rights Movement Tested and Transformed 
Their Families. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2004.  
 
Blum, Edward J. W.E.B. Du Bois, American Prophet. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007.  
  
Borstelmann, Thomas. The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to 
Economic Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.  
  
Boston, Michael B. The Business Strategy of Booker T. Washington: Its Development 
and Implementation. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.  
  
Boston, Thomas D. Affirmative Action and Black Entrepreneurship. London: 
Routledge, 1999.  
 
Branch, Taylor. At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.  
  
Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.  
  
Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-65. New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998.  
  
Breitman, George. The Last Year of Malcolm X; the Evolution of a Revolutionary. 
New York: Merit Publishers, 1967.  
  
Brinkley, Alan. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1995.  
 
Brueggemann, Walter. The Prophetic Imagination. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978. 
 
Bruns, Roger. Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Biography. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 2006. 
 
Burgin, Angus. The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. 
 
Butler, John S. Entrepreneurship and Self-help among Black Americans: A 
315 
 
Reconsideration of Race and Economics. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1991.  
 
Calloway-Thomas, Carolyn, and John Louis. Lucaites. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and the Sermonic Power of Public Discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1993.  
 
Campagna, Anthony S. The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War. New 
York: Praeger, 1991.  
 
Carmichael, Stokely, and Michael Thelwell. Ready for Revolution: The Life and 
Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). New York: Scribner, 2003.  
  
Carson, Clayborne. The Eyes on the Prize: Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, 
and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990. New 
York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1991. 
 
Carson, Clayborne (ed.), King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Papers of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956, Vols 4.  
Berkeley: Univ of Cali Press, 1992. 
 
Carson, Clayborne (ed.), King, Martin Luther, Jr.  The Autobiography of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Warner Books, 2001. 
 
Carson, Clayborne. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.  
 
Carter, David C. The Music Has Gone out of the Movement: Civil Rights and the 
Johnson Administration, 1965-1968. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009.  
 
Cashman, Sean Dennis. African Americans and the Quest for Civil Rights. 1900-
1990. New York and London: New York University Press, 1991, p. 
213.  
 
Cassis, Youssef. Crises and Opportunities: The Shaping of Modern Finance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Chappell, David L. A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.  
  
Chateauvert, Melinda. Marching Together: Women of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998.  
 
Clegg, Claude Andrew. An Original Man: The Life and times of Elijah Muhammad. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.  
 
Chen, Anthony S. The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and Civil Rights in the United 
316 
 
States, 1941-1972. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.  
 
Cobb, James C. The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial 
Development, 1936-1980. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982. 
 
Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley : 
His Battle for Chicago and the Nation. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000.  
  
Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley: 
His Battle for Chicago and Nation. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 2000.  
  
Cohen, Lizabeth. A Consumer's Republic. New York (N.Y.): Vintage Books, 
2003.  
  
Collins, Donald E. When the Church Bell Rang Racist: The Methodist Church and 
the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama. Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1998.  
 
Collins, Robert M. More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Colton, Elizabeth O. The Jackson Phenomenon: The Man, the Power, the Message. 
New York: Doubleday, 1989.  
  
Cone, James H. Black Theology and Black Power. New York: Seabury Press, 
1969.  
  
Cone, James H. A Black Theology of Liberation. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970.  
  
Cone, James H. For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church. Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1984.  
  
Cone, James H. God of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.  
  
Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. 
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991.  
  
Cone, James H. Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of Liberation, 
1968-1998. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999.  
  
Cone, James H. The Spirituals and the Blues an Interpretation. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1975.  
  
Congress of African Peoples, 1970 Atlanta in African Congress: a Documentary of 
the First Modern Pan-African Congress, ed. with an Introd. by Imamu 
Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones), New York: Morrow; 1st Edition, 1972. 
 
317 
 
Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
 
Cook, Robert. Sweet Land of Liberty: The African-American Struggle for Civil Rights 
in the Twentieth-century. London: Longman, 1998.  
  
Costen, Melva Wilson. African American Christian Worship. Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1993.  
 
Crespino, Joseph. In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.  
 
Cross, Gary S. An All-consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern 
America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.  
  
Dagbovie, Pero Gaglo. African American History Reconsidered. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2010.  
 
Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Delton, Jennifer. Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990. New York: 
Cambridge, 2009.  
  
Dickerson, Dennis C. Militant Mediator: Whitney M. Young, Jr. Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1998.  
  
Donaldson, Gary A. The Second Reconstruction: A History of the Modern Civil 
Rights Movement. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 2000.  
 
Drake, St Clair., and Horace R. Cayton. Black Metropolis; a Study of Negro Life in 
a Northern City. Vol. I and II. New York: Harper & Row, 1962 (1945).  
  
Draper, Alan. Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in 
the South, 1954-1968. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1994.  
 
Drotning, Phillip T., and Wesley W. South. Up from the Ghetto. New York: 
Cowles Book Company, 1970.  
 
Du Bois W.E.B. The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1899.  
  
Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folks; Essays and Sketches. New York: 
Allograph Press, 1968.  
 
Dummelow, J. R. (ed.), A Commentary on The Holy Bible By Various Writers. 
London: The Macmillan Company, 1970 (first edition 1908). 
  
318 
 
Dyson, Michael Eric. April 4, 1968: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Death and How It 
Changed America. New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2008.  
  
Dyson, Michael Eric. I May Not Get There with You: The True Martin Luther 
King, Jr. New York: Free Press, 2000.  
 
Emerson, Michael O., and Christian Smith. Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion 
and the Problem of Race in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000.  
 
Ezra, Michael, (ed.). The Economic Civil Rights Movement. Routledge, 2013.  
 
Fairclough, Adam. Better Day Coming: Blacks and Equality, 1890-2000. New 
York: Viking, 2001.  
  
Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1987.  
 
Farmer, James. Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement. 
New York: Arbor House, 1985.  
  
Fauset, Arthur Huff. Black Gods of the Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults of the 
Urban North. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971.  
 
Fergus, Devin. Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-
1980. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009.  
  
Fields, Uriah J. Inside the Montgomery Bus Boycott: My Personal Story. Baltimore: 
AmErica House, 2002.  
 
Field, Alexander J. A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S. Economic 
Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. 
 
Findlay, James F. Church People in the Struggle: The National Council of Churches 
and the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993.  
 
Foner, Philip Sheldon. Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1981. New 
York: International Publishers, 1982. 
 
Fradin, Dennis B.. The Montgomery Bus Boycott. Terrytown (NY): Marshall 
Cavendish Benchmark, 2010. 
 
Frady, Marshall. Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: 
Random House, 1996.  
  
319 
 
Franklin, John Hope., and Alfred A. Moss. From Slavery to Freedom: A History 
of African Americans. New York: Knopf, 2003.  
  
Franklin, V. P. Black Self-determination: A Cultural History of African-American 
Resistance. Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992.  
  
Frazier, Edward Franklin, and C. Eric Lincoln. The Negro Church in America. 
New York: Schocken Books, 1974.  
 
Frazier, Edward Franklin, and Charles Eric. Lincoln. The Negro Church in 
America. The Black Church since Frazier / C. Eric Lincoln. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1974.  
  
Frazier, Edward Franklin. The Negro Church in America. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1964. 
 
Frederickson, Mary E. Looking South: Race, Gender, and the Transformation of 
Labor from Reconstruction to Globalization. Gainesville, FL: University 
Press of Florida, 2011. 
 
French, Michael. US Economic History since 1945. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Friedland, Michael B. Lift up Your Voice like a Trumpet: White Clergy and the Civil 
Rights and Antiwar Movements, 1954-1973. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998.  
 
Garrow, David J. Atlanta, Georgia, 1960-1961: Sit-ins and Student Activism. 
Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
  
Garrow, David J. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986.  
  
Garrow, David J. Birmingham, Alabama, 1956-1963: The Black Struggle for Civil 
Rights. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
  
Garrow, David J., ed. Chicago 1966: Open Housing Marches, Summit Negotiations, 
and Operation Breadbasket. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
  
Garrow, David J., ed. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1983.  
  
Garrow, David J. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From “Solo” to Memphis. 
New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.  
  
Garrow, David J. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Civil Rights Leader, Theologian, Orator. 
Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
  
320 
 
Garrow, David J. The Martin Luther King, Jr., FBI File. Black Studies Research 
Sources. Microfilms from Major Archival and Manuscript Collections. 
Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984.  
  
Garrow, David J. Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979.  
  
Garrow, David J. The Walking City: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955-1956. 
Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
  
Garrow, David J. We Shall Overcome: The Civil Rights Movement in the United 
States in the 1950's and 1960's. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
 
Gifford, Laura Jane, and Daniel K. Williams. The Right Side of the Sixties: 
Reexamining Conservatism's Decade of Transformation. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Geisst, Charles R. Collateral Damaged: The Marketing of Consumer Debt to 
America. New York: Bloomberg Press, 2009.  
 
Georgakas, Dan, and Marvin Surkin. Detroit, I Do Mind Dying: A Study in 
Urban Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.  
 
Gifford, Laura Jane., and Daniel K. Williams. The Right Side of the Sixties: 
Reexamining Conservatism's Decade of Transformation. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012.  
  
Gilmore, Glenda Elizabeth. Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 
1919-1950. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2008.  
  
Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. Toronto: Bantam Books, 
1987.  
 
Goldberg, David A., and Trevor Griffey. Black Power at Work: Community 
Control, Affirmative Action, and the Construction Industry. Ithaca, NY: ILR 
Press/Cornell University Press, 2010.  
  
Golland, David Hamilton. Constructing Affirmative Action: The Struggle for Equal 
Employment Opportunity. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
2011.  
 
Gosse, Van, and Richard R. Moser. The World the Sixties Made: Politics and 
Culture in Recent America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003.  
 
Graham, Hugh Davis. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National 
Policy, 1960-1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Grant, Joanne.  Ella Baker: Freedom Bound.  New York: Wiley Publishing, 
321 
 
1999. 
 
Green, Adam. Selling the Race: Culture, Community, and Black Chicago, 1940-1955. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
 
Greenberg, Stanley B. Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative 
Perspectives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. 
 
Gregory, James Noble. The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migration of Black 
and White Southerners Transformed America. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005.  
 
Grimshaw, William J. Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-91. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Pr., 1993.  
  
Grossman, James R. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great 
Migration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.  
  
Haines, Herbert H. Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.  
 
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005.  
 
Hayden, Tom. The Long Sixties: From 1960 to Barack Obama. Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm, 2008. 
  
Higham, John. Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-white Relations since World 
War II. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997.  
  
Hale, Grace Elizabeth. A Nation of Outsiders: How the White Middle Class Fell in 
Love with Rebellion in Postwar America. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
 
Halpern, Rick. Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's 
Packinghouses, 1904-54. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997.  
  
Hamilton, Charles V. The Black Preacher in America. New York: Morrow, 1972.  
 
Hansen, Drew D. The Dream: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Speech That Inspired 
a Nation. New York: Ecco, 2003.  
  
Harding, Vincent. Martin Luther King, the Inconvenient Hero. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1996.  
  
Harding, Vincent. There Is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.  
322 
 
 
Harris, James H. Black Ministers and Laity in the Urban Church: An Analysis of 
Political and Social Expectations. Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1987.  
  
Harris, William H. Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and 
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-37. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1977.  
 
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
 
Hatch, Roger D. Beyond Opportunity: Jesse Jackson's Vision for America. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988.  
 
Henri, Florette. Black Migration: Movement North, 1900-1920. Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Press, 1975.  
  
Henry, Charles P. Jesse Jackson: The Search for Common Ground. Oakland, CA: 
BlackScholar Press, 1991.  
 
Hertzke, Allen D. Echoes of Discontent: Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, and the 
Resurgence of Populism. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993.  
  
Hill, Collins Patricia. From Black Power to Hip Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and 
Feminism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006.  
 
Hill, Laura Warren., and Julia Rabig. The Business of Black Power: Community 
Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America. 
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012.  
  
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-
1960. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. London: Michael 
Joseph, 1994.  
  
Hogan, Wesley C. Many Minds, One Heart: SNCC's Dream for a New America. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.  
  
Holley, Donald. The Second Great Emancipation: The Mechanical Cotton Picker, 
Black Migration, and How They Shaped the Modern South. Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas, 2000.  
  
Honey, Michael K. Going down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther 
King's Last Campaign. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2007.  
  
Honey, Michael K. Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis 
323 
 
Workers. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993.  
  
Honey, Michael Keith. Black Workers Remember an Oral History of Segregation, 
Unionism and the Freedom Struggle. Berkeley (Calif.): Univ. of California 
Press, 1999.  
 
Hopkins, Dwight N., ed. Black Faith and Public Talk: Critical Essays on James H. 
Cone's Black Theology and Black Power. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1999.  
  
Hopkins, Dwight N. Introducing Black Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1999.  
 
Hornsby, Alton. Black Power in Dixie: A Political History of African Americans in 
Atlanta. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009. 
 
Houck, Davis W., and David E. Dixon, eds. Rhetoric, Religion and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 1954-1965. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006.  
  
House, Ernest R. Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Charisma: The Rise and Fall of the 
PUSH/Excel Program. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.  
  
Hunt, D. Bradford. Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public 
Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.  
  
Hunt, Martin K., and Jacqueline E. Hunt. History of Black Business: The Coming 
of America's Largest Black-owned Businesses. Chicago, IL: Knowledge 
Express, 1998.  
 
Hyman, Louis. Borrow. The American Way of Debt. Knopf Doubleday 
Publishing Group, 2012. 
 
Hyman, Louis. Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Isserman, Maurice, and Michael Kazin. America Divided: The Civil War of the 
1960s. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Jackson, J. H. A Story of Christian Activism: The History of the National Baptist 
Convention, U.S.A., Inc. Nashville, TN: Townsend Press, 1980.  
  
Jackson, J. H. Unholy Shadows and Freedom's Holy Light,. Nashville: Townsend 
Press, 1967.  
  
Jackson, Jesse, Frank Clemente, and Frank E. Watkins. Keep Hope Alive: Jesse 
Jackson's 1988 Presidential Campaign : A Collection of Major Speeches, Issue 
Papers, Photographs, and Campaign Analysis. [Washington, D.C.]: Keep 
Hope Alive PAC, 1989.  
324 
 
  
Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and the Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007.  
  
Jackson, Troy. Becoming King: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Making of a National 
Leader. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008.  
 
Jacoway, Elizabeth, and David R. Colburn. Southern Businessmen and 
Desegregation. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.  
 
Jeffries, Hasan Kwame. Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in 
Alabama's Black Belt. New York: New York University Press, 2009. 
 
Johnson, Cedric. Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of 
African American Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2007.  
 
Johnson, Ollie A., and Karin L. Stanford. Black Political Organizations in the 
Post-civil Rights Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2002.  
 
Jonas, Gilbert. Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle against Racism in 
America, 1909–1969. New York: Routlege, 2005. 
 
Jones, Major J. Black Awareness: A Theology of Hope. Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1971.  
 
Jones, Patrick D. The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
  
Joseph, Peniel E. Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama. 
New York, NY: BasicCivitas Books, 2010.  
  
Joseph, Peniel E., ed. The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black 
Power Era. New York: Routledge, 2006.  
  
Joseph, Peniel E. Waiting 'til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black 
Power in America. New York: Henry Holt and, 2006.  
  
Katznelson, Ira. When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial 
Inequality in Twentieth-century America. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.  
  
Kersten, Andrew Edmund. Race, Jobs, and the War: The FEPC in the Midwest, 
1941-46. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000.  
  
Kijakazi, Kilolo. African American Economic Development and Small Business 
Ownership. New York: Garland Publ., 1997.  
325 
 
  
Kimball, Penn. Keep Hope Alive!: Super Tuesday and Jesse Jackson's 1988 Campaign 
for the Presidency. Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies Press, 1992.  
  
King, Coretta Scott. My Life with Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1969.  
  
King, Jr., Martin Luther. “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” In Why We Can't 
Wait, by Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.  
  
King, Martin Luther, Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.  
 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New 
York: Harper & Row, 1967. 
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Called to Serve: January 1929 - June 1951. Vol. 1 of The 
Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by Clayborne Carson. Berkeley 
(Calif.): Univ. of California Press, 1992.  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Measure of a Man. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1988 (1959).  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Strength to Love. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981 
(1963).  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Stride toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story. New York: 
Harper, 1958.  
  
King,, Martin Luther, Jr. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Edited by James M. Washington. San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1986.  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Trumpet of Conscience. New York: Harper & Row, 
1967.  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New 
York: Harper & Row, 1967.  
  
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Why We Can't Wait. New York: New American 
Library, 1963.  
 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Words of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York:  
Newmarket Press, 1983.  
 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Wisdom of Martin Luther King Jr.  New York: 
Meridian, 1993. 
326 
 
 
King, Martin Luther, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story. New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1958.  
 
King, Martin Luther, Sr., and Clayton Riley. Daddy King: An Autobiography. 
New York: Morrow, 1980.  
  
Kirk, John A. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement: Controversies 
and Debates. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
 
Korstad, Robert Rodgers., James L. Leloudis, and Billy E. Barnes. To Right 
These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and 
Inequality in 1960s America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2010.  
 
Kotz, Nick. Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Laws That Changed America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.  
 
Kozmetsky, George, and Piyu Yue. The Economic Transformation of the United 
States, 1950-2000: Focusing on the Technological Revolution, the Service Sector 
Expansion, and the Cultural, Ideological, and Demographic Changes. West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2005. 
 
Krippner, Greta R. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of 
Finance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Korstad, Robert Rodgers. Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle 
for Democracy in the Mid-twentieth-century South. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003.  
  
Kotz, Nick. Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Laws That Changed America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.  
 
Kruse, Kevin Michael. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.  
  
Kunjufu, Jawanza. Black Economics: Solutions for Economic and Community 
Empowerment. Chicago, IL: African American Images, 1991.  
  
Kutler, Stanley I., and Stanley Nider. Katz. The Promise of American History: 
Progress and Prospects. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982.  
 
Landess, Tom, and Richard M. Quinn. Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race. 
Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, 1985.  
 
Landsberg, Brian K. Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the Department 
of Justice. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1997. 
  
327 
 
LaRue, Cleophus James. The Heart of Black Preaching. Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2000.  
  
Lassiter, Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.  
 
Lawson, Steven F. Civil Rights Crossroads: Nation, Community, and the Black 
Freedom Struggle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003.  
  
Leeson, Robert. The Eclipse of Keynesianism: The Political Economy of the Chicago 
Counter-revolution. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2000. 
 
Leeson, Robert. The Anti-Keynesian Tradition. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2008. 
 
Levy, Peter B. The New Left and Labor in the 1960s. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994. 
 
Lewis, David L., and Charles W. Eagles, eds. The Civil Rights Movement in 
America: Essays. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986.  
  
Lewis, George. Massive Resistance: The White Response to the Civil Rights Movement. 
London: Hodder Arnold, 2006.  
 
Lewis, John, and Michael D'Orso. Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the 
Movement. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998.  
  
Lincoln, C. Eric, and Lawrence H. Mamiya. The Black Church in the African-
American Experience. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990. 
  
Lincoln, C. Eric. Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile. New York: Hill and Wang, 
1984.  
 
Ling, Peter J. Martin Luther King, Jr. London: Routledge, 2002.  
  
Lischer, Richard. The Preacher King: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Word That 
Moved America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
 
Longenecker, Stephen L. Selma's Peacemaker: Ralph Smeltzer and Civil Rights 
Mediation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.  
  
Lutz, Norma Jean. The History of the Black Church. Philadelphia: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 2001.  
  
MacLean, Nancy. Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work 
Place. New York: R. Sage, 2006.  
  
328 
 
Madrick, Jeffrey G. Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of 
America, 1970 to the Present. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011. 
 
Malone, Walter. From Holy Power to Holy Profits: The Black Church and Community 
Economic Empowerment. Chicago, IL: African American Images, 1994.  
  
Manis, Andrew Michael. A Fire You Can't Put Out: The Civil Rights Life of 
Birmingham's Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth. Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press, 1999.  
  
Manis, Andrew Michael. Southern Civil Religions in Conflict: Black and White 
Baptists and Civil Rights, 1947-1957. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1987.  
 
Marable, Manning. Black American Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse 
Jackson. [S.l.]: Pub By Ve, 1985.  
  
Marable, Manning. Black Liberation in Conservative America. Boston: South End 
Press, 1997.  
  
Marable, Manning. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in 
Race, Political Economy, and Society. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 
2000.  
  
Marable, Manning. Living Black History: How Reimagining the African-American 
past Can Remake America's Racial Future. New York: Basic Civitas, 
2006.  
  
Marable, Manning. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and 
beyond in Black America, 1945-2006. 2nd ed. Jackson: University Press 
of Mississippi, 1991.  
 
Marable, Manning. African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the 
Grenada Revolution. London: Verso, 1987.  
  
Marable, Manning. From the Grassroots: Essays toward Afro-American Liberation. 
Boston, MA: South End Press, 1980.  
  
Marable, Manning. Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention. New York: Viking, 2011.  
 
Marsh, Charles, and John Perkins. Welcoming Justice: God's Movement toward 
Beloved Community. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2009.  
  
Marsh, Charles. The Beloved Community: How Faith Shapes Social Justice, from the 
Civil Rights Movement to Today. New York: Basic Books, 2005.  
 
Marsh, Charles. God's Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.  
329 
 
  
Marsh, Charles. The Last Days: A Son's Story of Sin and Segregation at the Dawn of 
a New South. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001.  
  
Matusow, Allen J. Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes. Lawrence, 
Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 
 
Matusow, Allen J. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1984.  
 
Mays, Benjamin E., and Joseph William. Nicholson. The Negro's Church. New 
York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1933.  
 
McAdam, Doug. Freedom Summer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
McClenahan, William M., and William H. Becker. Eisenhower and the Cold War 
Economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. 
 
McCraw, Thomas K. American Business, 1920-2000: How It Worked. Wheeling, 
IL: Harlan Davidson, 2000.  
 
McKissack, Pat. Jesse Jackson: A Biography. New York: Scholastic, 1989.  
  
McKnight, Gerald. The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King, Jr., the FBI, and the 
Poor People's Campaign. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.  
  
McWhorter, Diane. A Dream of Freedom: The Civil Rights Movement from 1954 to 
1968. New York: Scholastic, 2004.  
  
Meier, August, and Elliott M. Rudwick. Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.  
  
Meyer, Stephen Grant. As Long as They Don't Move next Door: Segregation and 
Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000.  
 
Miller, Keith D. Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
Its Sources. New York: Free Press, 1992.  
 
Minchin, Timothy J. From Rights to Economics: The Ongoing Struggle for Black 
Equality in the U.S. South. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2007.  
  
Minchin, Timothy J. Hiring the Black Worker: The Racial Integration of the Southern 
Textile Industry, 1960 - 1980. Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina 
Press, 1999.  
 
Minchin, Timothy J. The Color of Work: The Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
330 
 
Southern Paper Industry, 1945-1980. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Mitchell, Henry H. Celebration and Experience in Preaching. Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2000.  
 
Moore, Leonard N. Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002.  
  
Moore, Winfred B., and Orville Vernon. Burton. Toward the Meeting of the 
Waters: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South Carolina during the 
Twentieth Century. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
2008.  
  
Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press, 1984.  
 
Morgan, Iwan. The Age of Deficits. Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 
2009.  
 
Morgan, Iwan. Nixon. London and New York: Arnold/Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
 
Morgan, Iwan. Eisenhower versus ‘The Spenders’: The Eisenhower Administration, the 
Democrats and the Budget, 1953-1960. London and New York: Pinter/St 
Martin’s Press, 1990. 
 
Morgan, Iwan. Deficit Government: Taxing and Spending in Modern America. 
Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1995.  
  
Mukenge, Ida Rousseau. The Black Church in Urban America: A Case Study in 
Political Economy. Boston: Univ. Press of America, 1983.  
  
Murray, Peter C. Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004.  
  
Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma; the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. 
Vol. I & II. New York: Harper, 1944.  
  
Namorato, Michael V. Have We Overcome?: Race Relations since Brown, 1954-
1979. Jackson: Univ Pr Of Mississippi, 2008.  
  
Needleman, Ruth. Black Freedom Fighters in Steel: The Struggle for Democratic 
Unionism. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003.  
  
Nelsen, Hart M., and Anne Kusener Nelsen. Black Church in the Sixties. 
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975.  
  
331 
 
Nelsen, Hart M., Raytha L. Yokley, and Anne Kusener Nelsen, eds. The Black 
Church in America. New York: Basic Books, 1971.  
  
Newman, Mark. Divine Agitators: The Delta Ministry and Civil Rights in 
Mississippi. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004.  
  
Newman, Mark. Getting Right with God Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-
1995. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001.  
 
Ogbar, Jeffrey Ogbonna Green. Black Power: Radical Politics and African 
American Identity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.  
  
O'Reilly, Kenneth. Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-
1972. New York: Free Press, 1989.  
 
Orleck, Annelise, and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian. The War on Poverty: A New 
Grassroots History, 1964-1980. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
2011. 
 
Ott, Julia C. When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors' 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Paris, Peter J. Black Leaders in Conflict: Joseph H. Jackson, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Malcolm X, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1978.  
  
Paris, Peter J. The Social Teaching of the Black Churches. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985.  
 
Parks, Rosa, and James Haskins. Rosa Parks: My Story. New York: Dial Books, 
1992.  
  
Patterson, James T. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
 
Patterson, James T. The Eve of Destruction: How 1965 Transformed America. New 
York: Basic Books, 2012. 
 
Pearson, Hugh. The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black 
Power in America. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub., 1994.  
 
Perkins, John. A Quiet Revolution: The Christian Response to Human Need, a 
Strategy for Today. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976.  
  
Pfeffer, Paula F. A. Philip Randolph, Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.  
  
Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from 
the New Deal to Reagan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.  
332 
 
 
Phillips, Lisa Ann Wunderlich. A Renegade Union: Interracial Organizing and 
Labor Radicalism. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2012.  
 
Pinn, Anne H., and Anthony B. Pinn. Fortress Introduction to Black Church 
History. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002.  
  
Pinn, Anthony B. The African American Religious Experience in America. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006.  
  
Polsgrove, Carol. Divided Minds: Intellectuals and the Civil Rights Movement. New 
York: Norton, 2001.  
  
Pomerantz, Gary M. Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: A Saga of Race and 
Family. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.  
 
Raines, Howell. My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered. 
New York: Putnam, 1977.  
  
Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil 
Rights Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.  
  
Reed, Adolph L. Race, Politics, and Culture: Critical Essays on the Radicalism of the 
1960's. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.  
 
Reed, Christopher Robert. The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional 
Leadership, 1910-1966. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1997.  
 
Reed, Merl Elwyn. Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement: The President's 
Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 1941-1946. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1991.  
  
Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ 
Associates, 1985.  
  
Rieder, Jonathan. The Word of the Lord Is upon Me: The Righteous Performance of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2008.  
 
Roberts, J. Deotis. Liberation and Reconciliation: A Black Theology. Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1971.  
 
Roediger, David R., and Elizabeth D. Esch. The Production of Difference: Race 
and the Management of Labor in U.S. History. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
 
Rogers, W. Sherman. The African American Entrepreneur: Then and Now. Santa 
333 
 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010.  
 
Romano, Renee Christine., and Leigh Raiford (eds.). The Civil Rights Movement 
in American Memory. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006. 
 
Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Dutton, 1971.  
  
Royster, Deirdre A. Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks Exclude 
Black Men from Blue-collar Jobs. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003.  
  
Rustin, Bayard. Down the Line. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.  
 
Sales, William W. From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcolm X and the 
Organization of Afro-American Unity. Boston, MA: South End Press, 
1994.  
 
Satter, Beryl. Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black 
Urban America. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2009.  
 
Schulman, Bruce J., The Seventies. The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and 
Politics. New York: The Free Press, 2003. 
 
Schulman, Bruce J. From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic 
Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
Scott, Robert Lee, and Wayne Brockriede. The Rhetoric of Black Power. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1969.  
 
Scranton, Philip. The Second Wave: Southern Industrialization from the 1940s to the 
1970s. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001. 
 
Selby, Gary S. Martin Luther King and the Rhetoric of Freedom: The Exodus 
Narrative in America's Struggle for Civil Rights. Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2008.  
  
Self, Robert O. American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.  
  
Seligman, Amanda I. Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago's 
West Side. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.  
  
Sellers, Cleveland, and Robert L. Terrell. The River of No Return: The 
Autobiography of a Black Militant and the Life and Death of SNCC. 
Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1990.  
 
Shattuck, Gardiner H. Episcopalians and Race: Civil War to Civil Rights. 
334 
 
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.  
 
Skousen, Mark. Vienna & Chicago, Friends or Foes?: A Tale of Two Schools of Free-
market Economics. Washington, DC: Capital Press/Regnery Pub., 2005.  
 
Silberman, Charles E. Crisis in Black and White. New York: Random House, 
1964. 
 
Singh, Nikhil Pal. Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
  
Singh, Nikhil Pal. Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
  
Sitkoff, Harvard. King: Pilgrimage to the Mountaintop. New York: Hill and Wang, 
2008.  
  
Sitkoff, Harvard. The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995.  
  
Skousen, Mark. Vienna & Chicago, Friends or Foes?: A Tale of Two Schools of Free-
market Economics. Washington, DC: Capital Press/Regnery Pub., 2005. 
 
Smith, R. Drew, and Fredrick C. Harris. Black Churches and Local Politics: Clergy 
Influence, Organizational Partnerships, and Civic Empowerment. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.  
 
Smith, R. Drew. Long March Ahead: African American Churches and Public Policy 
in Post-civil Rights America. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Smith, R. Drew. New Day Begun: African American Churches and Civic Culture in 
Post-civil Rights America. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. 
 
Smith, R. Drew. Social Witness, Prophetic Discernment, and Post-civil Rights Era 
Churches. Atlanta, GA: Leadership Center at Morehouse College, 
2001. 
 
Sokol, Jason. There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil 
Rights, 1945-1975. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.  
 
Spear, Allan H. Black Chicago; the Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.  
  
Squires, Gregory D. Chicago: Race, Class, and the Response to Urban Decline. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.  
  
Stanford, Karin L. Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International 
Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.  
335 
 
  
Stone, Eddie. Jesse Jackson: Biography of an Ambitious Man. Los Angeles, CA: 
Holloway House, 1979.  
  
Sugrue, Thomas J. Not Even Past: Barack Obama and the Burden of Race. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.  
  
Sugrue, Thomas J. Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in 
the North. New York: Random House, 2008.  
  
Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 
1969.  
  
Sullivan, Leon Howard. Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon 
Sullivan. Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1998.  
  
Theoharis, Jeanne, and Komozi Woodard, eds. Freedom North: Black Freedom 
Struggles outside the South, 1940-1980. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003.  
  
Thomas, Frank A. They like to Never Quit Praisin' God: The Role of Celebration in 
Preaching. Cleveland, OH: United Church Press, 1997.  
  
Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. 
Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002. 
 
Tweedle, John A Lasting Impression. Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1983. 
  
Trotter, Joe William. The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions 
of Race, Class, and Gender. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991.  
 
Tye, Larry. Rising from the Rails: Pullman Porters and the Making of the Black 
Middle Class. New York: Henry Holt, 2005.  
 
Walker, Clarence Earl., and Gregory D. Smithers. The Preacher and the 
Politician: Jeremiah Wright, Barack Obama, and Race in America. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009.  
  
Walker, Juliet E. K. The History of Black Business in America: Capitalism, Race, 
Entrepreneurship. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
2009.  
  
Walker, Juliet. Encyclopedia of African American Business History. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1999.  
  
Washington, Booker T. The Negro in Business. New York: AMS Press, 1971.  
336 
 
  
Washington, Joseph R. Political Conflicts of True and Real Interests: Black-race and 
White-ethnic Kith and Kinship Ties and Binds : Of And/or the Jesse Jackson 
Factor in the Democratic Race and the Republican Religious Faction. New 
York: P. Lang, 1988.  
  
Webb, Clive. Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second Reconstruction. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
 
Weems, Robert E., and Lewis A. Randolph. Business in Black and White: 
American Presidents and Black Entrepreneurs in the Twentieth Century. New 
York: New York University Press, 2009.  
  
Weems, Robert E. Black Business in the Black Metropolis: The Chicago Metropolitan 
Assurance Company, 1925-1985. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996.  
 
Weems, Robert E. Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
  
Weiss, Nancy J. The National Urban League, 1910-1940. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974.  
  
Weiss, Nancy J. Whitney M. Young, Jr., and the Struggle for Civil Rights. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.  
 
West, Cornel. Prophecy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. 
Philadelphia: Westminster. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1982.  
 
White, Marjorie Longenecker., and Andrew Michael. Manis. Birmingham 
Revolutionaries: The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth and the Alabama Christian 
Movement for Human Rights. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
2000.  
  
Wilkins, Roy, and Tom Mathews. Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy 
Wilkins. New York: Viking Press, 1982.  
  
Wilkinson, Brenda Scott. Jesse Jackson: Still Fighting for the Dream. Morristown, 
NJ: Silver Burdett Press, 1990.  
  
Williams, Johnny E. African American Religion and the Civil Rights Movement in 
Arkansas. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003.  
  
Williams, Juan. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965. New 
York, NY: Viking, 1987.  
 
Wills, Richard W. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Image of God. Oxford: Oxford 
337 
 
University Press, 2009.  
 
 Wilmore, Gayraud S., and James H. Cone, eds. Black Theology: A Documentary 
History. Vol. I. Maryknoll (N.Y.): Orbis Books, 1979.  
  
Wilmore, Gayraud S., and James H. Cone, eds. Black Theology: A Documentary 
History. Vol. II. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993.  
  
Wilmore, Gayraud S. Black Religion and Black Radicalism: An Interpretation of the 
Religious History of Afro-American People. 2nd ed. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1983.  
  
Wilmore, Gayraud S., ed. African American Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary 
Anthology. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.  
  
Wilmore, Gayraud S., ed. Black Religion and Black Radicalism: An Interpretation of 
the Religious History of Afro-American People. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1983.  
 
Wilson, William J., and Richard P. Taub. There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, 
Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning 
for America. New York: Knopf, 2006.  
  
Wilson, William J. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. 
New York: Knopf, 1996.  
 
Woodard, K. Komozi. A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and 
Black Power Politics. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999.  
 
Woodson, Carter G. A Century of Negro Migration. New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1918.  
  
Woodson, Carter G. The History of the Negro Church. Washington, D.C.: 
Associated Publishers, 1925.  
  
Woodward, C. Vann. The Burden of Southern History. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1968.  
  
Wright, Sarah. A. Philip Randolph. Integration if the Workplace. Englewood NJ: 
Silver Burdett Press, 1990.  
 
X, Malcolm, and Alex Haley. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1992.  
 
Yarrow, Andrew L. Measuring America: How Economic Growth Came to Define 
American Greatness in the Late Twentieth Century. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2010. 
338 
 
 
Yoder, John Howard. For the Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public. Grand 
Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1997.  
 
Young, Andrew. An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the 
Transformation of America. New York: HarperCollins, 1996.  
  
Zepp, Ira G. The Social Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson 
Pub., 1989.  
  
 
Academic Articles 
Allison Calhoun-Brown, “While Marching to Zion: Otherworldliness and 
Racial Empowerment in the Black Community.” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 37, Vol. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 427–39. 
 
Allison Calhoun-Brown, “The Image of God: Black Theology and Racial 
Empowerment in the African American Community.” Review of 
Religious Research, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Mar., 1999), pp. 197–211.  
 
David L. Chappell. “The Lost Decade of Civil Rights.” Historically Speaking, 
Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr. 2009), pp. 37-41. 
 
David L. Chappell, “Prophetic Religion: A Transracial Challenge to Modern 
Democracy.” Social Research, Vol 76 : No 4 : Winter 2009, 1261-73. 
 
M. Richard Cramer, “School Desegration and New Industry: The Southern 
Community Leaders’ Viewpoint.” Social Forces, Vol. 40, No. 1 (May 
1963), pp. 384-389. 
 
John J. Donahue III and James J. Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights on the Economic Status of 
Blacks.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 
1583-1614. 
 
Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political 
Uses of the Past.” Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Mar., 
2005), pp. 1233-263.  
 
Charles W. Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era.” The 
Journal of Southern History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2000): pp. 815-848. 
 
The Editors, “The Sixties and the 2008 presidential election,” The Sixties, Vol. 
2, No. 1 (June 2009), pp.49-79. 
 
339 
 
Glenn T. Eskew, “Barack Obama, John Lewis, and the Legacy of the Civil 
Rights Struggle,” American Studies Journal, Vol. No. 56 (Winter-Spring 
2012), online journal.  
 
Adam Fairclough, “Was Martin Luther King a Marxist?” History Workshop 
Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 117–25. 
 
Adam Fairclough, ‘“’State of the Art’: Historians and the Civil Rights 
Movement.” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 24, Vol. 3 (Dec. 1990), 
pp. 387–98. 
 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political 
Uses of the Past.” Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (March 
2005): pp. 1233-1263.  
 
Arnold R. Hirsh, “Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park.” 
Chicago, 1953-1966. Journal of American History, Vol. 82, No. 2  (Sep., 
1995): 522-50. 
 
Louis Hyman, “Ending Discrimination, Legitimating Debt: The Political 
Economy of Race, Gender, and Credit Access in the 1960s and 
1970s.” Enterprise and Society, Vol. 12, N. 1 (Mar., 2011), pp. 200-232.  
 
Richard H. King, “Citizenship and Self-Respect: The Experience of Politics 
in the Civil Rights Movement.” Journal of American Studies, Vol. 22, 
No. 1 (Apr., 1988), pp. 7–24. 
 
John Kirk, “State of the Art: Martin Luther King, Jr.” Journal of American 
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Aug., 2004): pp. 329-347.  
 
John Kirk, ”Review Article: The Long and the Short of It: New Perspectives 
in Civil Rights Studies.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 46, No. 2 
(Apr., 2011): pp. 425–436.  
 
Stacy Kinlock Sewell, “The “Not-Buying Power” of the Black Community: 
Urban Boycotts and Equal Employment Opportunity, 1960-1964.” 
The Journal of African American History, Vol. 89, No. 2, African 
Americans and the Urban Landscape (Spring, 2004), pp. 135-151. 
 
Lichtenstein, Korstad, and Nelson Lichtenstein Lichtenstein. “Opportunities 
Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights 
Movement.” Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Dec. 1988), 
pp. 786-811. 
 
Dean Kotlowski, “Black Power-Nixon Style: The Nixon Administration and 
Minority Business Enterprise.” The Business History Review, Vol. 72, 
No. 3 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 409-445 
 
340 
 
Peniel E. Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field.” The 
Journal of American History, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Dec., 2009), pp. 751-776.  
 
Kevin Stainback, Corre L. Robinson and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, “Race 
and Workplace Integration. A Politically Mediated Process?” American 
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 48 No. 9 (May 2005), pp. 1200-1228. 
 
Douglas Sturm, “Martin Luther King, Jr., as Democratic Socialist.” The 
Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1990), pp. 79-105.   
 
Thomas Sugre, “Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights and the Reaction 
against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964.” The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 82, No. 2  (Sep., 1995): pp. 551-578.  
 
Brian Ward, “A curious relationship’: Barack Obama, the 1960s and the 
election of 2008,” Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 45, Issue 1-2 (Feb. 2011), 
pp. 15-42. 
 
Robert E. Weems, Jr. and Lewis A. Randolp, “The National Response to 
Richard M. Nixon's Black Capitalism Initiative: The Success of 
Domestic Détente.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Sep., 
2001), pp. 66-83. 
 
Sidney M. Willhelm, “Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Experience in 
America,” Journal of Black Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (Sep. 1979), pp. 3-19. 
 
Gavin Wright, “The Civil Rights Revolution as Economic History.” The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 1999): pp. 267-28. 
 
Thesis, Working Papers, and Essays 
Richard J. Butler, James J. Heckman and Brook Payner, “The Impact of the 
Economy and the State on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study 
of South Carolina.” pp. 231-346 in D. W. Galenson (ed.): Markets in 
History: Economic Studies of the Past. Cambridge; New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
 
Enrico Beltramini, “Between Civil Rights and Black Capitalism. Operation 
Breadbasket in Chicago (1966-71).” in Michael Ezra (ed.): The 
Economic Civil Rights. London and New York: Routdledge, 2013. 
 
James H. Cone, “An African-American Perspective on the Cross and 
Suffering,” in Yacob Tesfai (ed.), The Scandal of a Crucified 
World: Perspectives on the Cross and Suffering. Maryknoll, N.Y. : Orbis 
Books, 1994.  
341 
 
James H. Cone, “Black Theology as Liberation Theology.” pp. 177–207 in 
Gayraud S. Wilmore (ed.), African American Religious Studies: An 
Interdisciplinary Anthology. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.  
James H. Cone, “The Construction of Political Strategies Among African 
American Clergy.” pp. 85–103 in Sue S. Crawford and Laura R. 
Olson (eds.), Christian Clergy in American Politics. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.  
Richard B. Freeman, “Black Economic Progress after 1964: Who Has 
Gained and Why?” in Sherwin Rosen (ed.), Studies in Labor Markets. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
Gordon, Mantler K. Black, Brown and Poor: Martin Luther King Jr., The 
Poor People’s Campaign and its Legacies. PhD dissertation, Duke 
University, 2008. 
Marable, Manning. “Religion and Black Protest Thought in African 
American History.” pp. 318–39 in Gayraud S. Wilmore. (ed.), African-
American Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1995. 
 
Gary Massoni. “Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”. M.Div. Thesis, 
Chicago Theological Seminary, 1971.  
Mary R. Sawyer, “Theocratic, Prophetic, and Ecumenical: Political Roles of 
African American Clergy.” pp. 66–84 in Sue S. Crawford and Laura 
R. Olson (eds.): Christian Clergy in American Politics. Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.  
Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull, and Peter Tufano, A Brief Postwar History 
of US Consumer Finance, Working Paper, 11-058 
 
Presentations, Reports, Speeches, and Websites 
Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago; a Study of Race 
Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1922.  
 
David L. Chappell, “Waking from the Dream,” Presented at the Historical 
Society Annual Meeting, June 5-8, 2008, Baltimore, Maryland. 
 
Attorney General Eric Holder at the Department of Justice African 
American History Month Program, Wednesday, February 18, 2009. 
Remarks as prepared for delivery. U.S. Department of Justice.  
 
342 
 
Lyndon B. Johnson, “State of the Union Message by the President to a Joint 
Session of the Congress.” Washington: White House, 1964.   
Otto Kerner, The Kerner Report: the 1968 Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Pantheon, 1988. 
 
U.S. Kerner Commission, Report on the National Commission on Civil Disorders, 
New York Times reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1968. 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Witness to the Truth.” Eulogy for the Rev. James 
J. Reed, March 15, 1965.  
 
Joseph Jackson, September 10, 1964 Speech delivered at 84th Annual Session 
of the National Baptist Convention. Cobo Hall Arena. Detroit, 
Michigan. 
 
Kathleen O'Toole, “Economist Says Civil Rights Movement was Economic 
Success,” News Service, Stanford University, 1/26/2000, accessed 
September 3, 2012, 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/00/000126CivilRightsEcon.html 
 
Warren C. Whatley, “The Collapse of the Cotton South and the Origins of 
the Civil Rights Movement.” Paper presented to the Economic 
History Association meetings, Montreal, September 1990.  
 
Washington Post, A Brief History of U.S. Unemployment, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/us-
unemployment-rate-history/ assessed on October 24, 2012. 
 
Magazines 
David J. Garrow, “From Reformer to Revolutionary.” in Democratic Socialists 
of America, Reflections on the Legacy (New York 1983), pp. 27–36.  
 
Lippermann, Walter. “Today and Tomorrow.” New York Herald Tribune, 17 
Mar. 1964.   
 
Ralph, Jr., James R. “Assessing the Chicago Freedom Movement.” Poverty & 
Race, May/June 2006.  
  
Ralph, Jr., James R. “Home Truths: Dr. King and the Chicago Freedom 
Movement - Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960s.” American Visions, August/September 1994.  
 
343 
 
Notes 
 
                                                         
1 Asals, Frederick. Flannery O'Connor: The Imagination of Extremity. Athens: Ga., 1982, p. 233.  
2 Throughout the thesis, the terms “African American” and “black” are used 
interchangeably. Also, the expression “Civil Rights” will be used to indicate the field of study 
of the whole movement, or every time a collective enterprise is considered. Alternatively, the 
expression “civil right” will be used.  
3 More precisely, the S.C.L.C. was a church-related organization with a distinct approach to 
social justice, race segregation, and economic discrimination. See: Morris, Aldon D. The 
Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free 
Press, 1984, Chapter 4. For a introductory analysis of the Black Church, see Frazier, Edward 
Franklin. The Negro Church in America. New York: Schocken Books, 1964; Frazier, Edward 
Franklin, and Charles Eric. Lincoln. The Negro Church in America. The Black Church since Frazier 
/ C. Eric Lincoln. New York: Schocken Books, 1974;  Lincoln, C. Eric, and Lawrence H. 
Mamiya. The Black Church in the African-American Experience. Durham: Duke University Press, 
1990; Mays, Benjamin E., and Joseph William. Nicholson. The Negro's Church. New York: 
Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1933; Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma; the 
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. Vol. I & II. New York: Harper, 1944; Nelsen, Hart M., 
and Anne Kusener Nelsen. Black Church in the Sixties. Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1975; Nelsen, Hart M., Raytha L. Yokley, and Anne Kusener Nelsen, eds. The 
Black Church in America. New York: Basic Books, 1971; Billingsley, Andrew. Mighty like a 
River: The Black Church and Social Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Harris, 
Fredrick C. Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999; Paris, Peter J. The Social Teaching of the Black Churches. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985; Harris, James H. Black Ministers and Laity in the Urban Church: An 
Analysis of Political and Social Expectations. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987; 
Costen, Melva Wilson. African American Christian Worship. Nashville: Abingdon, 1993; Lutz, 
Norma Jean. The History of the Black Church. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2001; 
Nelsen, Hart M., Raytha L. Yokley, and Anne Kusener Nelsen, eds. The Black Church in 
America. New York: Basic Books, 1971; Perkins, John. A Quiet Revolution: The Christian 
Response to Human Need, a Strategy for Today. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976; Pinn, Anne H., 
and Anthony B. Pinn. Fortress Introduction to Black Church History. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2002; Pinn, Anthony B. The African American Religious Experience in America. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2006; Smith, R. Drew, and Fredrick C. Harris. Black Churches and 
Local Politics: Clergy Influence, Organizational Partnerships, and Civic Empowerment. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005; Woodson, Carter G. The History of the Negro Church. 
Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1925. In his essay, “Toward New Histories of the 
Civil Rights Era”, Charles W. Eagles summarizes the three initial religious prospective of the 
Civil Rights Movement: the biographical approach, the institutional approach, and the 
approach that combines biography and the grassroots. Charles W. Eagles, “Toward New 
Histories of the Civil Rights Era”, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2000), 
pp. 815-848. Related bibliography includes: Williams, Johnny E. African American Religion and 
the Civil Rights Movement in Arkansas. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003; Collins, 
Donald E. When the Church Bell Rang Racist: The Methodist Church and the Civil Rights Movement in 
Alabama. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1998; Emerson, Michael O., and Christian 
Smith. Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000; Manis, Andrew Michael. Southern Civil Religions in Conflict: Black and 
White Baptists and Civil Rights, 1947-1957. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987; Alvis, 
Joel L. Religion & Race: Southern Presbyterians, 1946-1983. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 1994; Murray, Peter C. Methodists and the Crucible of Race, 1930-1975. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2004; Shattuck, Gardiner H. Episcopalians and Race: Civil War to 
Civil Rights. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000; Findlay, James F. Church 
People in the Struggle: The National Council of Churches and the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Longenecker, Stephen L. Selma's Peacemaker: Ralph 
Smeltzer and Civil Rights Mediation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987; Newman, 
344 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Mark. Divine Agitators: The Delta Ministry and Civil Rights in Mississippi. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2004; Newman, Mark. Getting Right with God Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 
1945-1995. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001; Bauman, Mark K., and Berkley 
Kalin. The Quiet Voices: Southern Rabbis and Black Civil Rights, 1880s to 1990s. Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1997; Miller, Keith D. Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Its Sources. New York: Free Press, 1992; Lischer, Richard. The Preacher 
King: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Word That Moved America. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995; Friedland, Michael B. Lift up Your Voice like a Trumpet: White Clergy and the Civil 
Rights and Antiwar Movements, 1954-1973. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1998; Houck, Davis W., and David E. Dixon, eds. Rhetoric, Religion and the Civil Rights 
Movement, 1954-1965. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006; Yoder, John Howard. For the 
Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1997. Other 
examples are the Marsh’s, Manis’ and Dyson’s books: Marsh, Charles, and John Perkins. 
Welcoming Justice: God's Movement toward Beloved Community. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 
2009; Marsh, Charles. The Beloved Community: How Faith Shapes Social Justice, from the Civil Rights 
Movement to Today. New York: Basic Books, 2005; Marsh, Charles. The Last Days: A Son's Story 
of Sin and Segregation at the Dawn of a New South. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001; Marsh, 
Charles. God's Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997; Manis, Andrew Michael. A Fire You Can't Put Out: The Civil Rights Life 
of Birmingham's Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999; 
Manis, Andrew Michael. Southern Civil Religions in Conflict: Black and White Baptists and Civil 
Rights, 1947-1957. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987; Dyson, Michael Eric. April 4, 
1968: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Death and How It Changed America. New York: Basic Civitas 
Books, 2008; Dyson, Michael Eric. I May Not Get There with You: The True Martin Luther King, 
Jr. New York: Free Press, 2000. Other examples are the Baldwin’s books: Baldwin, Lewis V., 
and Amiri YaSin. Al-Hadid. Between Cross and Crescent: Christian and Muslim Perspectives on 
Malcolm and Martin. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002; Baldwin, Lewis V. The 
Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Boundaries of Law, Politics, and Religion. Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002; Baldwin, Lewis V. There Is a Balm in Gilead: The 
Cultural Roots of Martin Luther King, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991; Baldwin, Lewis V. 
To Make the Wounded Whole: The Cultural Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr. Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1992; Baldwin, Lewis V. The Voice of Conscience: The Church in the Mind of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.   
4 On December 17, 1971, Jesse Jackson wrote a letter of resignation to the S.C.L.C.. He 
signed it “Jesse Louis Jackson, The Country Preacher.” Several sources. For example: 
Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, 
pp. 351-2. The meaning of this expression, “The Country Preacher,” is not that Jackson has 
seen himself as a preacher without a congregation, but rather a preacher with a congregation 
without limits other than those of the entire country. See note no. 408 and then chapter 
four, “Birth of a Leader.    
5 Martin L. King, ‘‘One Year Later in Chicago,’’ January 1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social 
Change, Inc., Atlanta, Ga. (henceforth, “MLKC”), Box 26. 670100-001. 
6 See note no. 380.  
7 Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, 
p. 55; Letter from Rutherford to Jackson & All Other Staff, 12/11/67, 9 pp, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC., Box 179:2; Atlanta Journal Constitution, 
12/24/67, p. A6; Russ Ewing, JESSE Jackson, Christian Militant, Penthouse 4/73, 78-80ff, 
Drotning, Phillip T., and Wesley W. South. Up from the Ghetto. New York: Cowles Book 
Company, 1970, pp. 19-43. Garrow, David J. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986, pp. 584-6. 
8 For an introduction to Rev. Sullivan: Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. 
Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969, and Sullivan, Leon Howard. Moving Mountains: The 
Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan. Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1998.    
345 
 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Hopkins, Dwight N. Introduction, in Hopkins, Dwight N., ed. Black Faith and Public Talk: 
Critical Essays on James H. Cone's Black Theology and Black Power. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1999, p. 1.  
10 Recently, several authors have established a connection between the rise of the New South 
and the Civil Rights Movement. See notes no. 40 and 41. The main point of this literature is 
that not only the Civil Rights Movement delivered economic gains for black southerners, but 
also, with few exceptions, preserved southern whites, who did not lose economically from 
desegregation; instead they also gained. See for example: Whatley, Warren C. “The Collapse 
of the Cotton South and the Origins of the Civil Rights Movement.” Paper presented to the 
Economic History Association meetings, Montreal, September 1990. 
11 For a recent review of the Civil Rights scholarship, see: John Kirk, State of the Art: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Journal of American Studies 38, No. 2 (Aug., 2004), pp. 329-347, p. 330. Also: 
Charles W. Eagles, Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era, The Journal of Southern 
History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2000): pp. 815-848. Although the enormous size of the 
literature necessitates a selective citations, for a general bibliography on the Civil Rights 
Movements, see (other references are included in further notes. Bibliography about the 
involvement of the black church in the Civil Rights Movement is at the previous note 8): 
Harding, Vincent. There Is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981; Garrow, David J. We Shall Overcome: The Civil Rights 
Movement in the United States in the 1950's and 1960's. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989; 
Farmer, James. Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: 
Arbor House, 1985; Bass, S. Jonathan. Blessed are the Peacemakers: Martin Luther King, Jr., Eight 
White Religious Leaders, and the “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2001; Donaldson, Gary A. The Second Reconstruction: A History of the Modern 
Civil Rights Movement. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 2000; Romano, Renee C., ed. The Civil 
Rights Movement in American Memory. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006; Namorato, 
Michael V. Have We Overcome?: Race Relations since Brown, 1954-1979. Jackson: Univ Pr Of 
Mississippi, 2008; Carson, Clayborne. The Eyes on the Prize: Civil Rights Reader: Documents, 
Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990. New York, N.Y., 
U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1991; Carson, Clayborne (ed.), King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Papers of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956, Vols 4.  Berkeley: 
Univ of Cali Press, 1992; Carson, Clayborne (ed.), King, Martin Luther, Jr.  The Autobiography of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Warner Books, 2001; Kotz, Nick. Judgment Days: Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws That Changed America. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2005; Lewis, David L., and Charles W. Eagles, eds. The Civil Rights Movement in 
America: Essays. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986; McWhorter, Diane. A Dream 
of Freedom: The Civil Rights Movement from 1954 to 1968. New York: Scholastic, 2004; Polsgrove, 
Carol. Divided Minds: Intellectuals and the Civil Rights Movement. New York: Norton, 2001; 
Williams, Juan. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965. New York, NY: 
Viking, 1987. In terms of biographies and autobiographies, see: Rustin, Bayard. Down the 
Line. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971; King, Coretta Scott. My Life with Martin Luther King, 
Jr. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969; Anderson, Jervis. A. Philip Randolph: a 
Biographical Portrait. 1st ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973; Anderson, 
Jervis. Bayard Rustin: Troubles I’ve seen: A Biography. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1997; Ling, Peter J. Martin Luther King, Jr. London: Routledge, 2002; Lincoln, C. 
Eric. Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984; Rieder, Jonathan. The 
Word of the Lord Is upon Me: The Righteous Performance of Martin Luther King, Jr. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008; Jackson, Troy. Becoming King: Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and the Making of a National Leader. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
2008; Wills, Richard W. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Image of God. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009; Sitkoff, Harvard. The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995; Sitkoff, Harvard. King: Pilgrimage to the Mountaintop. New York: Hill and Wang, 
2008; Bruns, Roger. Martin Luther King:, Jr.: A Biography. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
2006; Anderson, Jervis. Bayard Rustin: Troubles I’ve seen: A Biography. 1st ed. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1997; Grant, Joanne.  Ella Baker: Freedom Bound.  New York: Wiley 
Publishing, 1999; Lewis, John. Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement.  New 
346 
 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Simon & Schuster, 1998; Mills, Kay. This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie Lou 
Hamer.  Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2007; Ransby, Barbara. Ella Baker 
and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision.  Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003; Ball, Howard. A Defiant Life: Thurgood Marshall and 
the Persistence of Racism in America. New York: Crown Publishers, 1998; Beito, David T., and 
Linda R. Beito. Black Maverick T.R.M. Howard's Fight for Civil Rights and Economic Power. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009; Dickerson, Dennis C. Militant Mediator: Whitney M. 
Young, Jr. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998; Parks, Rosa, and James Haskins. 
Rosa Parks: My Story. New York: Dial Books, 1992; Pfeffer, Paula F. A. Philip Randolph, Pioneer 
of the Civil Rights Movement. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990; Raines, 
Howell. My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered. New York: Putnam, 
1977; Sellers, Cleveland, and Robert L. Terrell. The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a 
Black Militant and the Life and Death of SNCC. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1990; 
Weiss, Nancy J. Whitney M. Young, Jr., and the Struggle for Civil Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989; White, Marjorie Longenecker., and Andrew Michael. Manis. 
Birmingham Revolutionaries: The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth and the Alabama Christian Movement for 
Human Rights. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000; Wilkins, Roy, and Tom Mathews. 
Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins. New York: Viking Press, 1982. In terms of 
local campaigns, see for example: Orleck, Annelise, and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian. The War on 
Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964-1980. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011; 
Jones, Patrick D. The Selma of the North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009; Garrow, David J. Atlanta, Georgia, 1960-1961: Sit-ins and 
Student Activism. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989; Garrow, David J. Birmingham, Alabama, 
1956-1963: The Black Struggle for Civil Rights. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989; Garrow, 
David J. Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1979; Garrow, David J. The Walking City: The Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, 1955-1956. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989; Hansen, Drew D. The Dream: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and the Speech That Inspired a Nation. New York: Ecco, 2003; Honey, Michael 
K. Going down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King's Last Campaign. New York: 
W.W. Norton &, 2007; Honey, Michael K. Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing 
Memphis Workers. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993; Hunt, D. Bradford. Blueprint for 
Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009; 
Fields, Uriah J. Inside the Montgomery Bus Boycott: My Personal Story. Baltimore: AmErica House, 
2002; Arsenault, Raymond. Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006; Dittmer, John. Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Mississippi. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995. Of course, King’s books and 
sermons are a special source: King, Jr., Martin Luther. “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” In 
Why We Can't Wait, by Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1963; King, Jr., 
Martin Luther. “A Witness to the Truth.” Eulogy for the Rev. James J. Reed, March 15, 
1965; King, Martin Luther, Jr. Called to Serve: January 1929 - June 1951. Vol. 1 of The Papers of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by Clayborne Carson. Berkeley (Calif.): Univ. of California 
Press, 1992; King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Measure of a Man. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988 
(1959); King, Martin Luther, Jr. Strength to Love. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981 (1963); 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. Stride toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story. New York: Harper, 1958; 
King,, Martin Luther, Jr. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Edited by James M. Washington. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986; King, Martin Luther, 
Jr. The Trumpet of Conscience. New York: Harper & Row, 1967; King, Martin Luther, Jr. Where 
Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New York: Harper & Row, 1967; King, Martin 
Luther, Jr. Why We Can't Wait. New York: New American Library, 1963; King, Martin 
Luther, Sr., and King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Words of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York:  
Newmarket Press, 1983; King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Wisdom of Martin Luther King Jr.  New 
York: Meridian, 1993. Other relevant works are: Albert, Peter J., and Ronald Hoffman. We 
Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Freedom Struggle. New York: Pantheon 
Books in Cooperation with the United States Capitol Historical Society, 1990; Garrow, 
David J. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Civil Rights Leader, Theologian, Orator. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson 
Pub., 1989; Calloway-Thomas, Carolyn, and John Louis. Lucaites. Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
347 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the Sermonic Power of Public Discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993; Blake, 
John. Children of the Movement: The Sons and Daughters of Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Elijah 
Muhammad, George Wallace, Andrew Young, Julian Bond, Stokely Carmichael, Bob Moses, James 
Chaney, Elaine Brown, and Others Reveal How the Civil Rights Movement Tested and Transformed Their 
Families. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2004; Carter, David C. The Music Has Gone out of the 
Movement: Civil Rights and the Johnson Administration, 1965-1968. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2009; Tye, Larry. Rising from the Rails: Pullman Porters and the Making of 
the Black Middle Class. New York: Henry Holt, 2005. Sources on FBI files and the Civil Rights 
Movement are, for example: Garrow, David J., ed. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1983; Garrow, David J. The FBI and 
Martin Luther King, Jr.: From “Solo” to Memphis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981; Garrow, 
David J. The Martin Luther King, Jr., FBI File. Black Studies Research Sources. Microfilms from Major 
Archival and Manuscript Collections. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984; 
O'Reilly, Kenneth. Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972. New York: 
Free Press, 1989. Sources on institutions related to the Civil Rights Movement: Hogan, 
Wesley C. Many Minds, One Heart: SNCC's Dream for a New America. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007; Weiss, Nancy J. The National Urban League, 1910-1940. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1974. Books on black history that are related to the Civil 
Rights Movement: Bates, Beth Tompkins. Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black 
America, 1925-1945. Chapel Hill (N.C): University of North Carolina Press, 2001; Berlin, Ira. 
The Making of African America: The Four Great Migrations. New York: Viking, 2010; Blum, 
Edward J. W.E.B. Du Bois, American Prophet. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007; Baldwin, Davarian L. Chicago's New Negroes: Modernity, the Great Migration, & Black Urban 
Life. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007; Chateauvert, Melinda. Marching 
Together: Women of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1998; Dagbovie, Pero Gaglo. African American History Reconsidered. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2010; Du Bois W.E.B. The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1899; Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folks; Essays and 
Sketches. New York: Allograph Press, 1968; Franklin, John Hope., and Alfred A. Moss. From 
Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans. New York: Knopf, 2003; Harris, William H. 
Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 
1925-37. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977; Henri, Florette. Black Migration: Movement 
North, 1900-1920. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975; Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second 
Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
About the connection between Civil Rights Movement and Migration, see for example: 
Woodson, Carter G. A Century of Negro Migration. New York: Russell & Russell, 1918; 
Gregory, James Noble. The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migration of Black and White 
Southerners Transformed America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005; 
Trotter, Joe William. The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, 
and Gender. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.   
12 “The short Civil Rights Movement” is the traditional narrative of the Civil Rights 
Movement as a 1950s and 1960s phenomenon (“Montgomery to Memphis narrative”). It is 
centered on the King-led nonviolent movement in the South and its outstanding role in the 
fight against Jim Crow. It is a ten-year period that begins with King's rise to leadership 
during the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama, and ends with his 1968 assassination 
in Memphis, Tennessee. On the contrary, “the long Civil Rights Movement” story rejects the 
dominant, epic, and romantic narrative, and sustains that the Civil Rights Movement did not 
start with Martin Luther King, Jr., and it did not end with his assassination. This approach 
expands the regional focus of the Civil Rights Movement beyond the South, particularly in 
the North in reaction to racial discrimination in housing, labor markets, policing and criminal 
justice practices. It explores the origins and the precursors of the movement in the early XX 
century, and investigates the omissions. Consequently, it incorporates the study not just of 
the struggles for social justice, but also of the forces arrayed against them, and deals with the 
dialectic (and less frequently, with the convergence) between Civil Rights Movement and 
Black Power. It stretches the Civil Rights Movement timeline to include the movement’s 
origins in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the activism it inspired through the end of the 
348 
 
                                                                                                                                            
twentieth century. According with this narrative, the long arc of the Civil Rights Movement 
covers from the New Negro to the Rainbow Coalition and beyond. Rather than an 
America’s incomplete understanding of its past, it suspects a political use of the past (see: 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 
Journal of American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (March 2005): pp. 1233-1263). Although some 
movement historians still make a case for a distinct break between the 1950s and earlier 
activism, most contend that the roots of the modern freedom struggle lay in the upheaval 
and opportunity caused by World War II. For instance, see Biondi, Martha. To Stand and 
Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003; Theoharis, Jeanne, and Komozi Woodard, eds. Freedom North: Black Freedom 
Struggles outside the South, 1940-1980. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Self, Robert O. 
American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2003; Lawson, Steven F. Civil Rights Crossroads: Nation, Community, and the Black Freedom 
Struggle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003; Cook, Robert. Sweet Land of Liberty: 
The African-American Struggle for Civil Rights in the Twentieth-century. London: Longman, 1998; 
Fairclough, Adam. Better Day Coming: Blacks and Equality, 1890-2000. New York: Viking, 2001. 
Some authors frame the long Civil Rights Movement as a part of what scholars such as 
Manning Marable and Clayborne Carson call the “black freedom struggle” unfolding 
throughout the twentieth century at local, state and national levels. See, for example: Singh, 
Nikhil Pal. Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005; Joseph, Peniel E. Introduction: Toward a Historiography of 
the Black Power Movement, in Joseph, Peniel E., ed. The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the 
Civil Rights-Black Power Era. New York: Routledge, 2006, pp, 1, 3; Marable, Manning. Living 
Black History: How Reimagining the African-American past Can Remake America's Racial Future. 
New York: Basic Civitas, 2006; Clayborne Carson, Civil Rights Reform and the Black 
Freedom Struggle, in Lewis, David L., and Charles W. Eagles. The Civil Rights Movement in 
America: Essays. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986, p. 23. See also: David L. 
Chappell. “The Lost Decade of Civil Rights.” Historically Speaking, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr. 2009), 
pp. 37-41. 
13 John Kirk, State of the Art: Martin Luther King, Jr., Journal of American Studies 38, No. 2 
(Aug., 2004): pp. 329-347, pp. 330, 347.  
14 David J., (ed.). Chicago 1966: Open Housing Marches, Summit Negotiations, and Operation 
Breadbasket. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989, specially Massoni, Gary. “Perspectives on 
Operation Breadbasket in Chicago,” pp. 179-346, in David J. Garrow (ed.), Chicago 1966: 
Open Housing Marches, Summit Negotiations, and Operation Breadbasket. See also: Ralph, Jr., James 
R. “Assessing the Chicago Freedom Movement.” Poverty & Race, May/June 2006; Ralph, Jr., 
James R. “Home Truths: Dr. King and the Chicago Freedom Movement - Martin Luther 
King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.” American Visions, August/September 
1994. 
15 Marable, Manning. Black American Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson. [S.l.]: 
Pub By Ve, 1985. For the classic connection between Civil Rights and Obama election, see: 
Sugrue, Thomas J. Not Even Past: Barack Obama and the Burden of Race. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010. For the connection between Black Power and Obama 
election, see: Joseph, Peniel E. Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama. 
New York, NY: BasicCivitas Books, 2010. Other sources on black history and Chicago: 
Squires, Gregory D. Chicago: Race, Class, and the Response to Urban Decline. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987; Drake, St Clair., and Horace R. Cayton. Black Metropolis; a Study of 
Negro Life in a Northern City. Vol. I and II. New York: Harper & Row, 1962 (1945); Fauset, 
Arthur Huff. Black Gods of the Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults of the Urban North. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971; Green, Adam. Selling the Race: Culture, Community, 
and Black Chicago, 1940-1955. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007; Grossman, James 
R. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989; Halpern, Rick. Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in 
Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997; Chicago 
Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago; a Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1922; Reed, Christopher Robert. The Chicago 
349 
 
                                                                                                                                            
NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional Leadership, 1910-1966. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1997; Satter, Beryl. Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of 
Black Urban America. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2009; Seligman, Amanda I. Block 
by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago's West Side. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005; Spear, Allan H. Black Chicago; the Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967; Wilson, William J., and Richard P. Taub. There Goes the 
Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning for 
America. New York: Knopf, 2006.  
16 Anderson, Alan B., and George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise 
of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.  
17 Ralph's study, focused on wartime and postwar white resistance to Civil Rights in northern 
cities in general, is still the best entry point for an overview of the Chicago campaign as well 
as Meyer’s, which looks at the larger issue of race and housing, which was central to the 
Chicago campaign. See: Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and 
the Civil Rights Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; Meyer, Stephen 
Grant. As Long as They Don't Move next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American 
Neighborhoods. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. See also: Anderson, Alan B., and 
George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in 
Chicago. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986; Thomas Sugre, Crabgrass-Roots Politics: 
Race, Rights and the Reaction against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964, The Journal 
of American History, Vol. 82, No. 2  (Sep., 1995): pp. 551-578; Arnold R. Hirsh, Massive 
Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park, Chicago, 1953-1966. Journal of American 
History, Vol. 82, No. 2  (Sep., 1995), pp. 522-50; Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. 
New York: Dutton, 1971; Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. American Pharaoh: Mayor 
Richard J. Daley : His Battle for Chicago and the Nation. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000. 
18 Ralph, Jr., James R. “Home Truths: Dr. King and the Chicago Freedom Movement - 
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.” American Visions, 
August/September 1994; Massoni, Gary. “Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”. M.Div. 
Thesis, Chicago Theological Seminary, 1971, pp. 1-10. Also: Jesse Jackson, ‘‘From October 
to May. A Report to Rev. Andrew Young. Southern Christian Leadership Conference”, May 
20, 1966, 10 pp, p. 15, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 18. 
670100-172.  
19 See for example: Grimshaw, William J. Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 
1931-91. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Pr., 1993; Marable, Manning. Black American 
Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson. [S.l.]: Pub By Ve, 1985; Walker, Clarence 
Earl., and Gregory D. Smithers. The Preacher and the Politician: Jeremiah Wright, Barack Obama, 
and Race in America. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009. 
20 With regard to Breadbasket, biographers Branch and Garrow discuss the programme’s 
planning stages and some achievement, but not the programme itself. Branch, Taylor. At 
Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006; 
Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988; Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-65. New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998; Garrow, David J. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986. 
21 Actually, in the first two volumes of Branch’s epic trilogy, there is no mention of 
Breadbasket.   
22 Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle 
for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.  
23 Two cases in place are Ralph David Abernathy and Andrew Young’s biographies. 
Abernathy, Ralph. And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: An Autobiography. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1989; Young, Andrew. An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation of 
America. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. The former was King’s successor as president of 
the S.C.L.C., the latter was active in the S.C.L.C. from 1961, and later became its executive 
director at large. Chicago represented a bitter defeat for King, and in Abernathy's judgment, 
King probably never recovered from it. Perhaps the only notable result from Chicago was 
S.C.L.C.'s eventual establishment of Operation Breadbasket under Jesse Jackson, who, 
350 
 
                                                                                                                                            
despite some harsh criticisms from Abernathy, receives a balanced treatment in one full 
chapter of this autobiography.  
24 Garrow, David J. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986.  
25 See for example Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. 
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991, p. 222. However, Louis Lomax, for instance, declares 
that the turning point occurred not at Watts, but during and after the Selma campaign in 
1965. Selma “marked the end of the nonviolent civil rights era that began in Montgomery.” 
King then “shifted both his target and his goals,” determining to focus on economic 
oppression. Yet, the main point, the switch of the focus of King and the S.C.L.C. attention 
to economic justice in 1965, perseveres. Lomax, Luis. Source unknown, 1984, pp.166-167. In 
“The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.,” historian Garrow argues that in the last years of his 
life, King was considered a real threat to the establishment, having becoming so radical in his 
views. See Garrow, David J. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From “Solo” to Memphis. New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1981, pp.204-219. See also note no. 26.  
26 Several sources: see for example Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007, although Jackson’s main point is that King was in fact radical 
throughout his civil rights leadership, and not just in his later years. Also: Zepp, Ira G. The 
Social Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.  
27 Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987; Garrow, David J. 
Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New 
York: W. Morrow, 1986; McKnight, Gerald. The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King, Jr., the FBI, 
and the Poor People's Campaign. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.   
28 Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle 
for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, pp. 301-304. 
29 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic 
Justice, pp. 301-304.  
30 Garrow, David J. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986, p. 585.  
31 The classic biographies that cover Jesse Jackson’s early career are: Colton, Elizabeth O. 
The Jackson Phenomenon: The Man, the Power, the Message. New York: Doubleday, 1989; Frady, 
Marshall. Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: Random House, 1996; 
Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985; 
Landess, Tom, and Richard M. Quinn. Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race. Ottawa, IL: Jameson 
Books, 1985. Other sources on Jackson are: Wilkinson, Brenda Scott. Jesse Jackson: Still 
Fighting for the Dream. Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett Press, 1990; McKissack, Pat. Jesse 
Jackson: A Biography. New York: Scholastic, 1989; Stone, Eddie. Jesse Jackson: Biography of an 
Ambitious Man. Los Angeles, CA: Holloway House, 1979; Timmerman, Kenneth R. 
Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002. See also: 
Hatch, Roger D. Beyond Opportunity: Jesse Jackson's Vision for America. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988; Henry, Charles P. Jesse Jackson: The Search for Common Ground. Oakland, CA: 
BlackScholar Press, 1991; Hertzke, Allen D. Echoes of Discontent: Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, and 
the Resurgence of Populism. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993: House, Ernest R. Jesse Jackson & 
the Politics of Charisma: The Rise and Fall of the PUSH/Excel Programme. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1988; Jackson, Jesse, Frank Clemente, and Frank E. Watkins. Keep Hope Alive: Jesse 
Jackson's 1988 Presidential Campaign : A Collection of Major Speeches, Issue Papers, Photographs, and 
Campaign Analysis. [Washington, D.C.]: Keep Hope Alive PAC, 1989; Kimball, Penn. Keep 
Hope Alive!: Super Tuesday and Jesse Jackson's 1988 Campaign for the Presidency. Washington, D.C.: 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Press, 1992; Washington, Joseph R. Political 
Conflicts of True and Real Interests: Black-race and White-ethnic Kith and Kinship Ties and Binds : Of 
And/or the Jesse Jackson Factor in the Democratic Race and the Republican Religious Faction. New 
York: P. Lang, 1988. In a category on its own: Stanford, Karin L. Beyond the Boundaries: 
Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.  
351 
 
                                                                                                                                            
32 See the previous note, specially: Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. 
Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985; Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the 
Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002.  
33 See the state of the art of the field in: John Kirk, State of the Art: Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Journal of American Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Aug., 2004): pp. 329-347; John Kirk, Review 
Article: The Long and the Short of It: New Perspectives in Civil Rights Studies, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 2011): pp. 425–436; Charles W. Eagles, Toward 
New Histories of the Civil Rights Era, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 
2000): pp. 815-848. See also: Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the 
Field, The Journal of American History, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Dec., 2009): pp. 751-776.  
34 Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987. Aldon Morris points 
out that, in Birmingham, King signed an agreement which depended on the good graces of 
the Birmingham merchants. In fact, King's and S.C.L.C.'s accomplishment in getting the 
businessmen to capitulate on a set of demands, historian Morris argues that “their second 
objective was to score a victory that would serve as a pivotal example to be used by other 
black communities and would force the federal government to take a firm stand against 
racial domination.” Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press, 1984, p. 251. See also notes 40, 41, and 42, 
specially Jacoway, Elizabeth, and David R. Colburn (eds.). Southern Businessmen and 
Desegregation. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982. 
35 Anderson, Alan B., and George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise 
of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. Sugrue, 
Thomas J. Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North. New York: 
Random House, 2008; Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the 
Civil Rights Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; Meyer, Stephen 
Grant. As Long as They Don't Move next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American 
Neighborhoods. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. See also: Anderson, Alan B., and 
George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in 
Chicago. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.  
36 Kersten, Andrew Edmund. Race, Jobs, and the War: The FEPC in the Midwest, 1941-46. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000; Korstad, Robert Rodgers. Civil Rights Unionism: 
Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-twentieth-century South. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003; MacLean, Nancy. Freedom Is Not Enough: The 
Opening of the American Work Place. New York: R. Sage, 2006; Phillips, Lisa Ann 
Wunderlich. A Renegade Union: Interracial Organizing and Labor Radicalism. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2012; Levy, Peter B. The New Left and Labor in the 1960s. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994, and Honey, Michael Keith. Black Workers Remember an Oral 
History of Segregation, Unionism and the Freedom Struggle. Berkeley (Calif.): Univ. of California 
Press, 1999.  
37 One important exception is Minchin, Timothy J. Hiring the Black Worker: The Racial 
Integration of the Southern Textile Industry, 1960 - 1980. Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 1999. See also the essays in Higham, John. Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-
white Relations since World War II. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997.  
38 See for example: French, Michael. US Economic History since 1945. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997; Kozmetsky, George, and Piyu Yue. The Economic Transformation of the 
United States, 1950-2000: Focusing on the Technological Revolution, the Service Sector Expansion, and 
the Cultural, Ideological, and Demographic Changes. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 
2005; Patterson, James T. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996. See also: Matusow, Allen J. Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and 
Votes. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1998; McClenahan, William M., and 
William H. Becker. Eisenhower and the Cold War Economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2011; Field, Alexander J. A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S. Economic 
Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. See also: Morgan, Iwan. The Age of Deficits. 
Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2009; Morgan, Iwan. Nixon. London and New 
352 
 
                                                                                                                                            
York: Arnold/Oxford University Press, 2002; Morgan, Iwan. Eisenhower versus ‘The Spenders’: 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats and the Budget, 1953-1960. London and New York: 
Pinter/St Martin’s Press, 1990; Morgan, Iwan. Deficit Government: Taxing and Spending in 
Modern America. Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1995.  
39 Hobsbawm, E. J. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. London: Michael Joseph, 
1994, p. 285ff. 
40 Campagna, Anthony S. The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War. New York: Praeger, 
1991. As for the raise of consumption and affluence, see for example: Cohen, Lizabeth. A 
Consumer's Republic. New York (N.Y.): Vintage Books, 2003; Cross, Gary S. An All-consuming 
Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000; Weems, Robert E. Desegregating the Dollar: African American Consumerism in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 69. It is important to note that it 
wasn’t until the mid-twentieth century that material abundance emerged as the principal 
standard of American greatness, as measured by a host of new economic indicators. As for 
the importance of the concept of “growth” and its influence on the intellectual debate, see 
for example: Collins, Robert M. More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, and Yarrow, Andrew L. Measuring America: How 
Economic Growth Came to Define American Greatness in the Late Twentieth Century. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2010. 
41 Historian Gavin Wright sustains that “I argue first, that the Civil Rights revolution was an 
economic as well as a political and social revolution, and that its effects included economic 
gains for blacks in the South that were tangible and enduring; second, that the Civil Rights 
revolution was a liberating economic breakthrough for the Southern regional economy as 
well as for its black population; and third, that the black presence in economic as well as 
political life continues to be a distinguishing feature of the South, another lasting 
consequence of the Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s.” Gavin Wright, The Economics of 
the Civil Rights Revolution, in Moore, Winfred B., and Orville Vernon Burton (eds.). Toward 
the Meeting of the Waters: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South Carolina during the Twentieth 
Century. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008. 
42 Numan Bartley, “In Search of the New South: Southern Politics after Reconstruction,” in 
Kutler, Stanley I., and Stanley Nider. Katz (eds.). The Promise of American History: Progress and 
Prospects. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982.  
43 Jacoway, Elizabeth, and David R. Colburn (eds.). Southern Businessmen and Desegregation. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p.1. Also: Gavin Wright, The 
Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution, in Moore, Winfred B., and Orville Vernon 
Burton (eds.). Toward the Meeting of the Waters: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South 
Carolina during the Twentieth Century. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008. 
On the economic transformation of the South, see: Scranton, Philip. The Second Wave: 
Southern Industrialization from the 1940s to the 1970s. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001; 
Cobb, James C. The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-
1980. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982; Schulman, Bruce J. From Cotton 
Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; Frederickson, Mary E. Looking South: Race, Gender, 
and the Transformation of Labor from Reconstruction to Globalization. Gainesville, FL: University 
Press of Florida, 2011; Holley, Donald. The Second Great Emancipation: The Mechanical Cotton 
Picker, Black Migration, and How They Shaped the Modern South. Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas, 2000.  
44 Delton, Jennifer. Racial Integration in Corporate America. New York: Cambridge, 2009.   
45 This is an important point, because most scholarship addresses the political and cultural 
white defense of segregation, not the protection of the economic power inside the 
enterprise. Among the recent literature on the defense of segregation, see: See for example 
Kruse, Kevin Michael. White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Crespino, Joseph. In Search of Another Country: Mississippi 
and the Conservative Counterrevolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007; Lewis, 
George. Massive Resistance: The White Response to the Civil Rights Movement. London: Hodder 
Arnold, 2006; Sokol, Jason. There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 
353 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1945-1975. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006; Webb, Clive. Massive Resistance: Southern 
Opposition to the Second Reconstruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. See also: 
Bartley, Numan V. The Rise of Massive Resistance; Race and Politics in the South during the 1950's. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969; McMillen, Neil R. The Citizens' Council; 
Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1971; Reed, Roy. Faubus: The Life and times of an American Prodigal. Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1997; Fairclough, Adam. Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in 
Louisiana, 1915-1972. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008; Roche, Jeff. Restructured 
Resistance: The Sibley Commission and the Politics of Desegregation in Georgia. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1998; Chappell, David L. Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights 
Movement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Lassiter, Matthew D., and 
Andrew B. Lewis. The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998. On the raising business and free market 
friendly movement, see: Burgin, Angus. The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the 
Depression. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012; Harvey, David. A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Leeson, Robert. The Eclipse of 
Keynesianism: The Political Economy of the Chicago Counter-revolution. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000; Leeson, Robert. The Anti-Keynesian Tradition. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2008; Skousen, Mark. Vienna & Chicago, Friends or Foes?: 
A Tale of Two Schools of Free-market Economics. Washington, DC: Capital Press/Regnery Pub., 
2005; Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New 
Deal to Reagan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.  
46 Ezra, Michael, (ed.). The Economic Civil Rights Movement. London, New York: Routledge, 
2013; Hill, Laura Warren, and Julia Rabig (eds.). The Business of Black Power: Community 
Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America. Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2012. See also: Timothy J. Minchin, From Rights to Economics: 
The Ongoing Struggle for Black Equality in the U.S. South (Gainesville, FL, University Press of 
Florida, 2007). An early pioneer in the field is Gavin Wright, The Civil Rights Revolution as 
Economic History, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 1999): pp. 267-28. 
Previous sources are: Greenberg, Stanley B. Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative 
Perspectives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980; Allen, Robert L. Black Awakening in 
Capitalist America: An Analytic History. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990; Minchin, 
Timothy J. The Color of Work: The Struggle for Civil Rights in the Southern Paper Industry, 1945-
1980. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001; Needleman, Ruth. Black Freedom 
Fighters in Steel: The Struggle for Democratic Unionism. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2003; Arnesen, Eric. The 
Black Worker: Race, Labor, and Civil Rights since Emancipation. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2007; Bailey, Ronald W. Black Business Enterprise; Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,. 
New York: Basic Books, 1971; Bailey, Ronald W. Black Business Enterprise; Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives,. New York: Basic Books, 1971; Beito, David T. From Mutual Aid to 
the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890-1967. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000; Boston, Michael B. The Business Strategy of Booker T. Washington: 
Its Development and Implementation. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010; Bieze, 
Michael, and Marybeth Gasman. Booker T. Washington Rediscovered. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2012; Boston, Thomas D. Affirmative Action and Black Entrepreneurship. 
London: Routledge, 1999; Butler, John S. Entrepreneurship and Self-help among Black Americans: 
A Reconsideration of Race and Economics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991; 
Goldberg, David A., and Trevor Griffey. Black Power at Work: Community Control, Affirmative 
Action, and the Construction Industry. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press/Cornell University Press, 2010; 
Golland, David Hamilton. Constructing Affirmative Action: The Struggle for Equal Employment 
Opportunity. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2011; Honey, Michael Keith. Black 
Workers Remember an Oral History of Segregation, Unionism and the Freedom Struggle. Berkeley 
(Calif.): Univ. of California Press, 1999; Hunt, Martin K., and Jacqueline E. Hunt. History of 
Black Business: The Coming of America's Largest Black-owned Businesses. Chicago, IL: Knowledge 
Express, 1998; Malone, Walter. From Holy Power to Holy Profits: The Black Church and Community 
Economic Empowerment. Chicago, IL: African American Images, 1994; Meier, August, and 
Elliott M. Rudwick. Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
354 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1979; Washington, Booker T. The Negro in Business. New York: AMS Press, 1971; Mukenge, 
Ida Rousseau. The Black Church in Urban America: A Case Study in Political Economy. Boston: 
Univ. Press of America, 1983. More focused on black business are: Weems, Robert E., and 
Lewis A. Randolph. Business in Black and White: American Presidents and Black Entrepreneurs in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 2009. Rogers, W. Sherman. The 
African American Entrepreneur: Then and Now. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010; Walker, Juliet 
E. K. The History of Black Business in America: Capitalism, Race, Entrepreneurship. Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009; Early works in this field are: Butler, John 
S. Entrepreneurship and Self-help among Black Americans: A Reconsideration of Race and Economics. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991; Weems, Robert E. Black Business in the 
Black Metropolis: The Chicago Metropolitan Assurance Company, 1925-1985. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1996; Walker, Juliet. Encyclopedia of African American Business History. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999; Hunt, Martin K., and Jacqueline E. Hunt. History of 
Black Business: The Coming of America's Largest Black-owned Businesses. Chicago, IL: Knowledge 
Express, 1998. See also: M. Richard Cramer, “School Desegration and New Industry: The 
Southern Community Leaders’ Viewpoint.” Social Forces, Vol. 40, No. 1 (May 1963), pp. 384-
389; John J. Donahue III and James J. Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change: The 
Impact of Civil Rights on the Economic Status of Blacks.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
29, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1583-1614. 
47 Among the authors that embrace capitalism, see: Butler, John S. Entrepreneurship and Self-
help among Black Americans: A Reconsideration of Race and Economics. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991; Kijakazi, Kilolo. African American Economic Development and Small 
Business Ownership. New York: Garland Publ., 1997. Among the authors that reject capitalism, 
see: Marable, Manning. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political 
Economy, and Society. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000; Marable, Manning. Race, Reform, 
and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and beyond in Black America, 1945-2006. 2nd ed. Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1991; Kunjufu, Jawanza. Black Economics: Solutions for Economic 
and Community Empowerment. Chicago, IL: African American Images, 1991.  
48 Historian Joseph, summing up this specific historiographical trend. See: Joseph, Peniel E. 
Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama. New York, NY: BasicCivitas 
Books, 2010, p. 4. See also: Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the 
Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, 751-776, pp. 752.  
49 See, for example, Matusow, Allen J. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 
1960s. New York: Harper & Row, 1984; Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. 
Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987; Pearson, Hugh. The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the 
Price of Black Power in America. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub., 1994; Isserman, Maurice, 
and Michael Kazin. America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000; and Jonas, Gilbert. Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle against Racism in 
America, 1909–1969. New York: Routlege, 2005. Moreover, the traditional literature of the 
Civil Rights Movement: Branch, Taylor. At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68. 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006; Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King 
Years, 1954-63. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988; Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in 
the King Years, 1963-65. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998; Garrow, David J. Bearing the 
Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: W. 
Morrow, 1986; Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987. For 
a work that describes black power as posturing (“In the face of impotence, one boasts of 
potency.”), see McAdam, Doug. Freedom Summer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, 
p. 121. 
50 Carson, Clayborne. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981.  
51 The revisionist trend is led by historians such as Peniel E. Joseph, Komozi Woodard, 
Leonard Moore, and Cedric Johnson. See: Joseph, Peniel E., (ed.). The Black Power Movement: 
Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era. New York: Routledge, 2006; Joseph, Peniel E. 
Waiting 'til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America. New York: Henry 
Holt and, 2006; Woodard, K. Komozi. A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) 
355 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and Black Power Politics. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999; Moore, 
Leonard N. Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2002; Johnson, Cedric. Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of 
African American Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. See also: 
Hornsby, Alton. Black Power in Dixie: A Political History of African Americans in Atlanta. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009; Fergus, Devin. Liberalism, Black Power, and the 
Making of American Politics, 1965-1980. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009; Hill, 
Collins Patricia. From Black Power to Hip Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and Feminism. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2006; Ogbar, Jeffrey Ogbonna Green. Black Power: Radical Politics 
and African American Identity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004; Marable, 
Manning. Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention. New York: Viking, 2011. On the role of Malcolm 
X and the Nation of Islam in the development of Black Power, see Sales, William W. From 
Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcolm X and the Organization of Afro-American Unity. Boston, 
MA: South End Press, 1994; Sales, William W. From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcolm X 
and the Organization of Afro-American Unity. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1994; Breitman, 
George. The Last Year of Malcolm X; the Evolution of a Revolutionary. New York: Merit 
Publishers, 1967; X, Malcolm, and Alex Haley. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1992; Clegg, Claude Andrew. An Original Man: The Life and times of Elijah 
Muhammad. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. An early work on the subject is Haines, 
Herbert H. Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970. Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1988. For previous studies of the radical politics and culture of the 1960s 
that challenge this view of black power, see Marable, Manning. Black Liberation in Conservative 
America. Boston: South End Press, 1997; Gosse, Van, and Richard R. Moser. The World the 
Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003; 
Barber, David. A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2008. For previous studies that challenge the negative influence of Black Power, 
see Marable, Manning. From the Grassroots: Essays toward Afro-American Liberation. Boston, MA: 
South End Press, 1980; Marable, Manning. African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame 
Nkrumah to the Grenada Revolution. London: Verso, 1987; Marable, Manning. From the 
Grassroots: Essays toward Afro-American Liberation. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1980; 
Marable, Manning. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and beyond in Black 
America, 1945-2006. 2nd ed. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991; Marable, 
Manning. Living Black History: How Reimagining the African-American past Can Remake America's 
Racial Future. New York: Basic Civitas, 2006. For other works that go against the dominant 
narrative, see Georgakas, Dan, and Marvin Surkin. Detroit, I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban 
Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975; and Adolph L. Reed, ed., Race, Politics, and 
Culture: Critical Essays on the Radicalism of the 1960s (New York, 1986). Reed, Adolph L. Race, 
Politics, and Culture: Critical Essays on the Radicalism of the 1960's. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1986. 
52 Joseph, Peniel E. Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama. New York, 
NY: BasicCivitas Books, 2010.  
53 Interview with Vincent Harding, San Francisco, November 22, 2011.  
54 See note no. 56.  
55 Quoted in Cashman, Sean Dennis. African Americans and the Quest for Civil Rights. 1900-
1990. New York and London: New York University Press, 1991, p. 213.  
56 See for example Adam Fairclough, Was Martin Luther King a Marxist?, History Workshop 
Journal, Vol. 15 (Spring 1983), pp. 117–25; David J. Garrow, ‘From Reformer to 
Revolutionary’, in Democratic Socialists of America, Reflections on the Legacy (New York 1983), pp. 
27–36; Harding, Vincent. Martin Luther King, the Inconvenient Hero. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1996; Douglas Sturm, Martin Luther King, Jr., as Democratic Socialist, The Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1990), pp. 79-105; Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to 
Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. See also note no. 25.  
57 Franklin, V.P. Black Self-determination: a Cultural History of African-American Resistance. 
Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992, p. 215. King criticized corporate greediness and 
not only political passivity. See: Thomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin 
356 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice, p. 304. In his final speech--delivered in 
Memphis on April 3, 1968, in support of a sanitation workers' strike--Martin Luther King Jr. 
said, “I've been to the mountaintop.” Then he hinted that he might not live long. Had he 
survived, the speech might well be known for another passage, which called for black 
economic empowerment. ”Now the other thing we'll have to do is this: Always anchor our 
external direct action with the power of economic withdrawal. Now, we are poor people. 
Individually, we are poor when you compare us with white society in America. We are poor. 
Never stop and forget that collectively -- that means all of us together -- collectively we are 
richer than all the nations in the world, with the exception of nine. Did you ever think about 
that? After you leave the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, West Germany, France, 
and I could name the others, the American Negro collectively is richer than most nations of 
the world. We have an annual income of more than thirty billion dollars a year, which is 
more than all of the exports of the United States, and more than the national budget of 
Canada. Did you know that? That's power right there, if we know how to pool it. We don't 
have to argue with anybody. We don't have to curse and go around acting bad with our 
words. We don't need any bricks and bottles. We don't need any Molotov cocktails. We just 
need to go around to these stores, and to these massive industries in our country, and say, 
“God sent us by here, to say to you that you're not treating his children right. And we've 
come by here to ask you to make the first item on your agenda fair treatment, where God's 
children are concerned. Now, if you are not prepared to do that, we do have an agenda that 
we must follow. And our agenda calls for withdrawing economic support from you. And so, 
as a result of this, we are asking you tonight, to go out and tell your neighbors not to buy 
Coca-Cola in Memphis. Go by and tell them not to buy Sealtest milk. Tell them not to buy -- 
what is the other bread? -- Wonder Bread. And what is the other bread company, Jesse? Tell 
them not to buy Hart's bread. As Jesse Jackson has said, up to now, only the garbage men 
have been feeling pain; now we must kind of redistribute the pain. We are choosing these 
companies because they haven't been fair in their hiring policies; and we are choosing them 
because they can begin the process of saying they are going to support the needs and the 
rights of these men who are on strike. And then they can move on town -- downtown and 
tell Mayor Loeb to do what is right. But not only that, we've got to strengthen black institutions 
[italics mine]. I call upon you to take your money out of the banks downtown and deposit 
your money in Tri-State Bank. We want a “bank-in” movement in Memphis. Go by the 
savings and loan association. I'm not asking you something that we don't do ourselves at 
SCLC. Judge Hooks and others will tell you that we have an account here in the savings and 
loan association from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. We are telling you to 
follow what we are doing. Put your money there. You have six or seven black insurance 
companies here in the city of Memphis. Take out your insurance there. We want to have an 
“insurance-in. Now these are some practical things that we can do. We begin the process of 
building a greater economic base. And at the same time, we are putting pressure where it 
really hurts. I ask you to follow through here.” It might be easily confused for a 
Breadbasket’s strategic plan. See: Martin Luther King, Jr, “I've Been to the Mountaintop” 
delivered 3 April 1968, Mason Temple (Church of God in Christ Headquarters), Memphis, 
Tennessee.  
58 Gilmore, Glenda Elizabeth. Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950. New 
York: W.W. Norton &, 2008. See also: Jeffries, Hasan Kwame. Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and 
Black Power in Alabama's Black Belt. New York: New York University Press, 2009. 
59 Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American 
History, December 2009, 751-776, pp. 758-9. A similar re-conceptualization of black activism 
led in 1986 to historian Clayborne Carson questioning the usefulness of the term ‘Civil 
Rights Movement’. Carson said that the movement instead belonged to a much larger ‘black 
freedom struggle’ which was characterized by continuities in black protest rather than 
differences. Clayborne Carson, Civil Rights Reform and the Black Freedom Struggle, in 
Lewis, David L., and Charles W. Eagles, eds. The Civil Rights Movement in America: Essays. 
Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986, pp. 19–32. At this regard, Kirk points out that 
“Throughout this discussion there have been scholars reluctant to fully buy into the idea of a 
‘black freedom struggle’ [or ‘long Civil Rights Movement’]. Writing in 1988, historian 
357 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Richard H. King warned that studies looking to ‘create a sense of continuity and coherence’ 
between the Civil Rights Movement and other phases of the black freedom struggle risked 
‘in doing so . . . minimiz[ing] what was relatively unique about the movement’. In 1990, 
historian Adam Fairclough noted that ‘The trouble with such broad definitions . . . is that in 
stressing history’s ‘‘seamless web’’ they turn history into a homogenized mush, without sharp 
breaks and transformations.’ See: John A. Kirk, Review Article: The Long and the Short of 
It: New Perspectives in Civil Rights Studies, Journal of Contemporary History, 2011, Vol. 46 N. 
2, pp. 425–436. See also: Richard H. King, Citizenship and Self-Respect: The Experience of 
Politics in the Civil Rights Movement, Journal of American Studies 22 (April 1988), pp. 7–24; 
Adam Fairclough, ‘‘‘State of the Art’’: Historians and the Civil Rights Movement’, Journal of 
American Studies 24 (December 1990), pp. 387–98. More recently, historian Peniel Joseph 
raised the question if should the Civil Rights Movement be subsumed under the umbrella of 
a long black power movement, or vice versa. Peniel E. Joseph, Introduction: Toward a 
Historiography of the Black Power Movement, in Joseph, Peniel E., ed. The Black Power 
Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era. New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 1, 3.  
60 Chester Higgings, We Can Change Course of U.S., Jet, July 1967, pp. 20-26, p. 23. Charles 
Hamilton cites Operation Breadbasket's economic programmes as an example of what black 
power advocates mean by community control. See C. V. Hamilton, An Advocate of Black 
Power Defines It, in Scott, Robert Lee, and Wayne Brockriede (ed.). The Rhetoric of Black 
Power. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 183; Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's 
David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985. 
61 See chapter four, “The Birth of a Leader,” in particular note no. 525.  
62 The original quotation is: “The connotation of Black Power in the media was violence. 
The fact is Black Power was power sharing. It was equity.” See: Madison Davis Lacey, Jr. 
and Henry Hampton, Eyes on the Prize II. Interview with Jesse Jackson, April 11, 1989, 
accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/jac5427.0519.072marc_record_interviewer_process.ht
ml The same as note no. 525.  
63 Several sources. See for example: Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. 
New York: Random House, 1996, p. 280.  
64 Historian Burns assumes that King did the same. “A decade later, he [King] shifted from 
the interracial coalition building that had won historic civil rights reforms to local urban 
campaigns to establish “black power” (I use the term deliberately) in Chicago and then in 
Cleveland, as well as in a number of other cities where the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference's (S.C.L.C.'s) “Operation Breadbasket” pressured corporations for inner-city 
jobs. It is evident from his later writings that he embraced “black power” as a strategy while 
rejecting it as a slogan.” Stewart Burns, From the Mountaintop: The Changing Political 
Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr., The History Teacher, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Nov., 1993), pp. 7-18, 
p. 10. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967),  pp. 30-31. 
65 Several sources, see for example, Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. 
Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, p. 180. 
66 See notes no. 6, 7 and 380.  
67 Several sources. See for example, Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. 
Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, pp. 345-356. Also, Jet Editorial Comment, Jet, Jan 
13, 1972, p. 55.  
68 Several sources. See for example: Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, 
Time, April 6, 1970, 14-19, p. 14; and Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, 
Playboy, 85-112 and 188, 290-292, p. 86.  
69 See for example: Krippner, Greta R. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of 
Finance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011; Madrick, Jeffrey G. Age of Greed: 
The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2011; Ott, Julia C. When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors' Democracy. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011; Hyman, Louis. Borrow. The American Way of 
Debt. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012; Cassis, Youssef. Crises and Opportunities: The 
Shaping of Modern Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Hyman, Louis. Debtor 
358 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Nation: The History of America in Red Ink. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011; 
Geisst, Charles R. Collateral Damaged: The Marketing of Consumer Debt to America. New York: 
Bloomberg Press, 2009.  
70 For example, Elizabeth Hale sheds light on why so many white middle-class Americans 
chose to re-imagine themselves as outsiders in the second half of the twentieth century and 
explains how this unprecedented shift changed American culture and society. Love for 
outsiders launched the politics of both the New Left and the New Right. See for example: 
Isserman, Maurice, and Michael Kazin. America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000; Hale, Grace Elizabeth. A Nation of Outsiders: How the White 
Middle Class Fell in Love with Rebellion in Postwar America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011; Gifford, Laura Jane, and Daniel K. Williams. The Right Side of the Sixties: Reexamining 
Conservatism's Decade of Transformation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Lassiter, 
Matthew D. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006; Lesher, Stephan. George Wallace: American Populist. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1994; Carter, Dan T. The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New 
Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. See 
also note n. 45 for the economic side of modern conservatism. For race and management in 
the workplace, see for example Royster, Deirdre A. Race and the Invisible Hand: How White 
Networks Exclude Black Men from Blue-collar Jobs. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003; 
Delton, Jennifer. Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990. New York: Cambridge, 
2009, and Roediger, David R., and Elizabeth D. Esch. The Production of Difference: Race and the 
Management of Labor in U.S. History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
71 Martin L. King, ‘‘One Year Later in Chicago,’’ January 1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social 
Change, Inc., Atlanta, Ga. (henceforth, “MLKC”), Box 26. 670100-001. 
72 It is the classic narrative. See for example: Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A 
Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991; Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power 
Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, 751-776. 
Historian Joseph points out that the August 1965 riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles 
came to be regarded as the unofficial prelude to black power’s national rise, punctuated by 
Martin Luther King being heckled by inner-city residents immune to his eloquent pleas for 
nonviolence. Second, King’s efforts in Chicago, where his advocacy of open housing and 
slum clearance produced limited results, were interpreted as a harbinger of both the coming 
wave of black militancy and the purported shift to the north of the civil rights struggle. 
Finally, Stokely Carmichael’s election as SNCC chairman, barely a month before his 
signature moment during the Meredith march,. These three events have come to constitute 
the genesis of the black power era. See: Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A 
State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, pp. 751-776, p. 760. While 
this thesis does not address this main point, it shares Joseph’s criticism to this classic 
narrative, that is, Black Power’s novelty, on the basis that economic radicalism was already in 
place before Watts. Moreover, Watts was not a turning point, at least as far as King’s 
activism for the sake of economic justice and integration in the workplace is concerned, as 
he was already aware of the importance of the economic issues.  
73 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 
10/04/1967 printed document, 10pp, Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Collection at Robert W. Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center (henceforth, 
“MCMLK”), Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records.  
74 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 
10/04/1967 printed document, 10pp, p. 7, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
75 In previous scholar works on the subject, Alan Draper examined the relationship between 
organized labor and the black freedom struggle, and Michael K. Honey focused on blacks 
and organized labor in Memphis before the Brown decision. Merl E. Reed probed the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) of the 1940s, and Brian K. Landsberg charted the 
history of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Draper, Alan. Conflict of 
Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in the South, 1954-1968. Ithaca, NY: ILR 
359 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Press, 1994; Honey, Michael K. Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis 
Workers. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993; Reed, Merl Elwyn. Seedtime for the Modern 
Civil Rights Movement: The President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 1941-1946. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991; Landsberg, Brian K. Enforcing Civil Rights: Race 
Discrimination and the Department of Justice. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1997.  
76 There is an increasing literature on Asa Philip Randolph. See for example: Kenneth A. 
Kovach, Manager, political activist, labor leader, statesman: all in one lifetime,  Journal of 
Management History Vol. 2 No. 4, 1996, pp. 48-58. Wright, Sarah. A. Philip Randolph. Integration 
if the Workplace. Englewood NJ: Silver Burdett Press, 1990. Other sources are at note n. 12.  
77 The Great Depression of the 1930s was catastrophic for all workers. But as usual, Blacks 
suffered worse, pushed out of unskilled jobs previously scorned by whites before the 
depression. Blacks faced unemployment of 50 percent or more, compared with about 30 
percent for whites. Black wages were at least 30 percent below those of white workers, who 
themselves were barely at subsistence level. 
78 Delton, Jennifer. Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990. New York: Cambridge, 
2009; p. 23.  
79 Their target was a small chain of grocery stores in Chicago’s black ghetto that refused to 
employ African Americans. Referred to as ‘Spend Your Money Where You Can Work,’ this 
first campaign sparked a larger boycott against Woolworth stores located in Chicago’s ‘Black 
Belt’ that also resisted hiring black employees. An aggressive black newspaper, the Chicago 
Whip, published fiery editorials endorsing the campaign. 
80 Chen, Anthony S. The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-
1972. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 26.  
81 Walker, Juliet E. K. The History of Black Business in America: Capitalism, Race, 
Entrepreneurship. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. Walker, 
Juliet. Encyclopedia of African American Business History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.  
82 Stacy Kinlock Sewell, The “Not-Buying Power” of the Black Community: Urban Boycotts 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 1960-1964, The Journal of African American History, Vol. 
89, No. 2, African Americans and the Urban Landscape (Spring, 2004), pp. 135-151, p. 138.  
83 Patterson, James T. Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996; pp. 381-2. 
84 MacLean, Nancy. Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place. New York: 
R. Sage, 2006, pp. 24-25.  
85 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 12.  
86 Randolph was the chairman of the first predominantly black labor union. In a 
discriminated division of labor in the railroad industry, black workers were still enjoying a 
job better paid than most jobs blacks could get. In the 1930s, after decades of organizing 
attempts, the porters won a union representation election and Randolph became its 
chairman. In 1940, he built the March on Washington movement. 
87 In 1943, Roosevelt greatly strengthened the FEPC with a new executive order, Executive 
Order 9346. It required that all government contracts have a non-discrimination clause. 
88 Sitkoff, Harvard. The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, 
pp. 11-12.  
89 Delton, Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990, p. 26.  
90 Johnson, Ollie A., and Karin L. Stanford. Black Political Organizations in the Post-civil Rights 
Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002, p. 5.  
91 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, pp. 380-1. Between 1910 and 
1920, the first migration brought more than half a million blacks northward, and in the 
1920s another three-quarter of a million followed. Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-
1992, p. 9.  
92 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 323. 
93 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 56-7. At the 
close of the 1950s, whites already outnumbered blacks in the suburbs by a ratio of more than 
35 to 1. Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p 13. Wilson, William J. When Work 
Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New York: Knopf, 1996.   
94 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 19.  
360 
 
                                                                                                                                            
95 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 41.  
96 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 42.  
97 In 1964, 28 states had such laws in place, none was effective; some even lacked any 
enforcement rule. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 
43. 
98 Katznelson. When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 144.  
99 Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 216, note 2.  
100 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 137. 
101 In order to safeguard the image of his brother’s administration as Civil Rights-friendly, 
the attorney general Robert Kennedy asked vice president Lyndon Johnson to provide the 
updated records of integration in the workplace. As chairman of the President’s Committee 
in Government Employment Policy, unfortunately Johnson had achieved only modest 
results in convincing government contractors to hire more black workers; in Birmingham, 
Alabama, for example, blacks counted for 37 percent of the population but they held 1 
percent of non-menial federal jobs. African Americans still held only low-wage and menial 
jobs, in the private sector as well as in the federal government, and the Kennedy 
administration had done nothing to change the situation. On May 29, 1963, Kennedy 
humiliated Johnson: he asked detailed statistics on black employment by city, by occupation, 
and by region. When the staff could not respond immediately, the attorney general loudly 
complained.101 The very next day the vice president pronounced the one hundredth 
anniversary Memorial Day speech on the historic Gettysburg battlefield, where he 
emancipated himself on the issue of race. Several sources. See for example: Dallek, 
Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998, pp. 25-30.  
102 Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973, pp. 35-36.  
103 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 65 
104 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 53.  
105 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 54.  
106 Protest actions began in Birmingham in 1962, when students from local colleges arranged 
for a year of staggered boycotts. They caused downtown business to decline by as much as 
40 percent, which attracted attention from Chamber of Commerce president Sidney Smyer, 
who commented that the “racial incidents have given us a black eye that we’ll be a long time 
trying to forget.” The S.C.L.C. decided that economic pressure on Birmingham businesses 
would be more effective than pressure on politicians, a lesson learned in Albany. In the 
spring of 1963, before Easter, the Birmingham boycott intensified during the second-busiest 
shopping season of the year. Pastors urged their congregations to avoid shopping in 
Birmingham stores in the downtown district. For six weeks supporters of the boycott 
patrolled the downtown area to make sure blacks were not patronizing stores that promoted 
or tolerated segregation. If black shoppers were found in these stores, organizers confronted 
them and shamed them into participating in the boycott. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, the 
legendary native pastor of Birmingham, recalled a woman whose $15 hat was destroyed by 
boycott enforcers. Campaign participant Joe Dickson recalled, “We had to go under strict 
surveillance. We had to tell people, say look: if you go downtown and buy something, you’re 
going to have to answer to us.” After several business owners in Birmingham took down 
“white only” and “colored only” signs, Commissioner of Public Safety, Eugene 
“Bull” Connor told business owners that if they did not obey the segregation ordinances, 
they would lose their business licenses. Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1987, p. 113.  
107 Delton, Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990, p. 163. 
108 The UAW leaders rallied support from white religious and civil liberties organizations in 
what Reuther called a “coalition of conscience.” With strong support from Roy Wilkins, 
Reuther encouraged Randolph to add the Protestant notable Rev. Eugene Carson Blake, the 
Jewish leader Rabbi Joachim Prinz and the Catholic layman Matthew Ahmann to the ‘Big 
361 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Six’ Civil Rights leaders (King, Wilkins, Randolph and SNCC’s John Lewis, the Urban 
League’s Whitney Young and CORE’s James Farmer) who composed the March on 
Washington steering committee. This restructuring into a ‘Big Ten’ also included Reuther. 
Walter Reuther strongly supported the Civil Rights Movement; he was an active supporter of 
African American Civil Rights and participated in both the March on Washington for 
Freedom and Jobs (August, 1963) and the Selma to Montgomery March (March, 1965). He 
stood beside Martin Luther King Jr. while he made the “I Have A Dream“ speech, during 
the 1963 March on Washington. Several sources, see for example: Barnard, John. American 
Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970. Wayne State 
U. Press, 2004.  
109 Barnard, John. American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-
1970. Wayne State U. Press, 2004, page 38.  
110 Extract from: Korstad, Robert Rodgers., James L. Leloudis, and Billy E. Barnes. To Right 
These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s 
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. 
111 In terms of religious leaders, a special mention probably deserves the National Catholic 
Conference for Interracial Justice (NCCIJ), founded in 1960, two years after the U.S. 
Catholic bishops' statement on racial discrimination and segregation, to coordinate the 
efforts of Catholic interracial councils, first established in the 1930s under the leadership of 
John LaFarge, SJ. During its heyday in the 1960s, when it was headquartered in Chicago, the 
NCCIJ served as catalyst for the historic interfaith National Conference on Religion and 
Race and for Catholic involvement in the March on Washington and demonstrations in 
Selma, Alabama, and elsewhere in support of federal Civil Rights legislation. Notable 
initiatives included programs to combat employment discrimination (the 
interdenominational Project Equality, which became an independent organization in 1971) 
and provide human relations training for teachers. 
112 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 7.  
113 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 56.  
114 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 66-7.  
115 The Birmingham Truce Agreement states: “1. Within 3 days after close of 
demonstrations, fitting rooms will be desegregated. 2. Within 30 days after the city 
government is established by court order, signs on wash rooms, rest rooms and drinking 
fountains will be removed. 3. Within 60 days after the city government is established by 
court order, a program of lunchroom counter desegregation will be commenced. 4. When 
the city government is established by court order, a program of upgrading Negro 
employment will be continued and there will be meetings with responsible local leadership to 
consider further steps.” ‘‘The Birmingham Truce Agreement,’’ 10 May 1963, in Carson, 
Clayborne. The Eyes on the Prize: Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts 
from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1991. 
MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 71.  
116 Chappell makes the important point that the later affirmative action, as well as the 
constitutional justification, the coalition of beneficiaries, and the cultural appeal of 
affirmative action are radically different from the affirmative action that King supported. 
David L. Chappell, Waking from the Dream, Presented at the Historical Society Annual 
Meeting, June 5-8, 2008, Baltimore, Maryland. He is finishing up his third book, Waking from 
the Dream: the Battle over Martin Luther King's Legacy (Random House). 
117 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 54. 
118 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 54. 
119 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 54 and 58.  
120 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 58-9. See also: 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Foreword.” From: A Freedom Budget For All Americans. New York, 
N.Y.: A Philip Randolph Institute, January 1967. (PDS) 1 p. (Reprint of 10/26/66 
statement.) Roy Wilkins Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C Box 66. 670100-000. 
121 The popular narrative is that America enjoyed a constant grow from 1945 to 1972. In 
reality, based on the definition of recession as “a significant decline in economic activity 
spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross 
362 
 
                                                                                                                                            
domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-
retail sales” proposed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), America 
suffered recession in 1945, 1949, 1953, 1958, 1960-1 and 1969-70.  
122 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 1. 
123 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 1. 
124 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312. 
125 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312. 
126 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 316. 
127 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312. 
128 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 451. 
129 Andrew, John A. Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1998, pp. 14-15. 
130  Lippermann, Walter. “Today and Tomorrow.” New York Herald Tribune 17 Mar. 1964.   
131 Brinkley, Alan. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995, p. 7.  
132  MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 40. 
133 Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 392.  
134 See note no. 55.  
135 On credit cards, see: Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of 
Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, South Dakota Law Review, Spring 2008, assessed 
on October 24, 2012, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6528/is_1_53/ai_n25019601. 
On financial market deregulation. “The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had established a firm 
separation between commerce and banking in the financial world. Banks began lobbying 
Congress as early as the 1960s to loosen the restrictions of Glass-Steagall. With money 
market mutual funds and other complex financial instruments that blurred the lines between 
deposits and securities, the banking industry complained the Glass-Steagall restrictions were 
becoming obsolete. Banks wanted to enter the municipal bond market, among other 
securities markets, to remain competitive. Regulators in government were sympathetic to the 
industry’s concerns on some accounts. There was always a fear that financial deregulation in 
foreign countries would entice firms to take their capital abroad, and many in government 
shared the free market ideology of deregulation. A third topic is securitization. In previous 
decades, banks had essentially been portfolio lenders, holding assets on their books until 
they reached maturity. Now, by a process of securitization, assets could be pooled together 
and repackaged into securities. Financial institutions could turn the illiquid assets on their 
books into highly-liquid securities that could be sold off to investors. The first securitized 
assets, mortgage loans, were packaged into mortgage-backed securities in 1970 at the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). The Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) soon followed suit in the nationwide push to foster homeownership; these 
government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) bought up mortgage loans to facilitate a secondary 
market. The securities carried an implicit guarantee from the federal government, and they 
were required to conform to underwriting standards that ensured loan quality and limited 
risk.” Source: Matthew Sherman, A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States, 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2009.  
136 Chen, The Fifth Freedom. Jobs, Politics and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972, p. 17. 
137 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 88.  
138 Chen, The Fifth Freedom. Jobs, Politics and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972, p. 17. 
139 Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America., p. 216, note 3.  
140 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, pp. 26 and 29-30.  
141 Chen, The Fifth Freedom. Jobs, Politics and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972.  
142 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 451. 
143 Chen, The Fifth Freedom. Jobs, Politics and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972, p. 19.  
144 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 14.  
145 Truman also made three executive orders that eventually became a structure for future 
Civil Rights legislation. The first executive order, Executive Order 9981 in 1948, is generally 
363 
 
                                                                                                                                            
understood to be the act that desegregated the armed services. This was a milestone on a 
long road to desegregation of the Armed Forces. The second, also in 1948, made it illegal to 
discriminate against persons applying for civil service positions based on race. The third 
executive order, in 1951, established Committee on Government Contract Compliance 
(CGCC). This committee ensured that defense contractors to the armed forces could not 
discriminate against a person because of their race. 
146 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 21-22.  
147 Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal 
to Reagan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009, p. 8.  
148 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 29-31.  
149 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, pp. 320-1.  
150 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, p. 17.  
151 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 326.  
152 Borstelmann, Thomas. The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic 
Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 123.  
153 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, pp. 322 and 326. 
154 For previous literature focused on resistance to desegregation, see note n. 45. 
155 Roediger, David R., and Elizabeth D. Esch. The Production of Difference: Race and the 
Management of Labor in U.S. History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
156 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Statement on resolutions passed at annual Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Board meeting.” 4/14/66. Miami, Fla. 3 pp. MLKC: Box 118. 
660414-001. Also, Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, 
Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007, p. 270. This is an important point: the differences between King and Johnson in terms 
of economic policy. As for Johnson, see for example: Anderson, James E, and Jared 
Hazleton, Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency. Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 1986. See “Conclusion” and note no. 578.  
157 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 590.  
158 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 6.  
159 Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century, p. 11. 
160 Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 12. 
161 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, p. 54.  
162 Graham, Hugh Davis. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-
1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. See also: Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the 
Great Society, p. 52.  
163 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 77-8.  
164 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 82. 
165 Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 147.  
166  Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 642. 
167  Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, pp. 55 and 44. 
168 David L. Chappell, Waking from the Dream, Presented at the Historical Society Annual 
Meeting, June 5-8, 2008, Baltimore, Maryland. 
169 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 146. 
170 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, p. 147.  
171 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 95.  
172 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 101.  
173 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-century America, pp. 147-8. 
174 This is the main thesis of: Borstelmann, Thomas. The 1970s: A New Global History from 
Civil Rights to Economic Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.  
175  MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 101-3.  
364 
 
                                                                                                                                            
176 Katznelson finds the origins of affirmative action in the New Deal policies of the 1930s 
and 1940s. And instead of seeing it as a leg up for minorities, Katznelson argues that the 
prehistory of affirmative action was supported by Southern Democrats who were actually 
devoted to preserving a strict racial hierarchy, and that the resulting legislation was explicitly 
designed for the majority: its policies made certain, he argues, that whites received the full 
benefit of rising prosperity while blacks were deliberately left out. See: Katznelson, Ira. When 
Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-century America. 
New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.  
177  During the 1940s, membership in the NAACP multiplied ten times, to a half a million. 
Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, pp. 11 and 17.  
178 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 18.  
179 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 55. 
180 Delton, Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990, p. 37.  
181 Stacy Kinlock Sewell, “The “Not-Buying Power” of the Black Community: Urban 
Boycotts and Equal Employment Opportunity, 1960-1964.” The Journal of African American 
History, Vol. 89, No. 2, African Americans and the Urban Landscape (Spring, 2004), pp. 135-
151, p. 136.  
182  MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 105-6. 
183 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 185. 
184 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 187. 
185 Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, p. 192.  
186 Here is the whole quotation: “Stokely replied by saying that the question of violence 
versus nonviolence was irrelevant. The real question was the need for black people to 
consolidate their political and economic resources to achieve power. “Power,” he said, “is 
the only thing respected in this world, and we must get it at any cost.” Then he looked me 
squarely in the eye and said, “Martin, you know as well as I do that practically every other 
ethnic group in America has done just this. The Jews, the Irish and the Italians did it, why 
can't we?” King, Martin Luther, Jr. Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New 
York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 30.  
187 Quoted in: Johnson, Ollie A., and Karin L. Stanford. Black Political Organizations in the Post-
civil Rights Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002, p. 152.  
188 An act of ‘corrective justice’ is a form of public policy that is in place to correct the 
injustice that the members of a specific group have inflicted on the members of another 
specific group. As its name indicates, corrective justice has a compensatory function. By 
rectifying, corrective justice asserts a connection between the present remedy and the past 
wrong.  From the perspective of corrective justice, the public policy does not treat the 
situation being adjudicated as a morally neutral given and then ask what is the best course for 
the future all things considered.  Rather, because the public policy aims to correct the 
injustice done by one group to the other, the remedy responds to the injustice and 
endeavors, so far as possible, to undo it. Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An 
Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-century America, p. 149. 
189 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “One Year Later in Chicago.” [1/67]. 9 pp. Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 26. 670100-001.  
190 Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery Pub., 2002; p. 24; SCLC's “Operation Breadbasket: How to Win Jobs and Influence 
Business Men”, report by Fred C. Bennette and Jesse Jackson, 1967 August (printed 
document, 4pp [2 copies]), Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., MCMLK, Series 6: 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
191 Brueggemann, Walter. The Prophetic Imagination. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978. 
192 The main primary source of this chapter is the Fred C. Bennette, Jr. Collection, hosted at 
Auburn Avenue Research Library in Atlanta, Georgia. References to the meeting in 
Waycross come quite integrally from that Collection. In particular, Box 002-003-01, folders 
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They contain Breadbaskets manually written notes of various Breadbasket 
meetings from 1964 to 1966. If not specified otherwise, they are the source of the meeting at 
the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, Thursday, 
May 19, 1966. 
365 
 
                                                                                                                                            
193  E.T. (Edward Thomas) “Al” Kehrer (1921-1996) was a labor union official born near 
Brighton, Michigan. Kehrer served as the Southeastern Regional Director of the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) (1953-1964) and Southern 
Director for the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department (1965-1989). The Rev. Howard Creecy 
Sr.’s son, The Rev. Howard Creecy Jr., became a prominent Atlanta minister and president 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (S.C.L.C.) in 2011.  
194 The area now known as Waycross was first settled around 1820, locally known as “Old 
Nine” or “Number Nine” and then Pendleton. It was renamed Tebeauville in 1857, 
incorporated in 1866 and designated county seat of Ware County in 1873. Then it was 
incorporated as “Way Cross” on March 3, 1935. Waycross gets its name from the city's 
location at key railroad junctions. Lines from six directions meet at the city. Its name 
signifies its strategic position where “Ways Cross”. 
195 The Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church of Waycross was at 
802 Reynolds (now at 801 S Georgia Pkwy E), the residence of Rev. Ross was at 913 Daniel 
Street. 
196  Hamilton, Charles V. The Black Preacher in America. New York: Morrow, 1972, pp. 224-5. 
197  “What a Friend We Have in Jesus” is a Christian hymn originally written by Joseph M. 
Scriven as a poem in 1855 to comfort his mother who was living in Ireland while he was 
in Canada. When Scriven’s mother became ill in Ireland, he wrote a comforting letter to her, 
enclosing the words of his newly written poem with the prayer that these brief lines would 
remind her of a never-failing heavenly Friend. Scriven originally published the poem 
anonymously, and only received full credit for it in the 1880s. The tune to the hymn was 
composed by Charles Crozat Converse in 1868.  
198 Here is the Lyric: “What a friend we have in Jesus, / all our sins and griefs to bear!  / 
What a privilege to carry / everything to God in prayer!  / O what peace we often forfeit, / 
O what needless pain we bear, / all because we do not carry / everything to God in prayer.  
/ Have we trials and temptations?  / Is there trouble anywhere?  / We should never be 
discouraged;  / take it to the Lord in prayer.  / Can we find a friend so faithful  / who will all 
our sorrows share?  / Jesus knows our every weakness;  / take it to the Lord in prayer.  / 
Are we weak and heavy laden,  /  cumbered with a load of care?  / Precious Savior, still our 
refuge;  / take it to the Lord in prayer.  / Do thy friends despise, forsake thee?  /  Take it to 
the Lord in prayer! / In his arms he'll take and shield thee;  / thou wilt find a solace there.” 
199 Here is Reverend J.E. Ross’s version: “Citizens we have come together, / something we 
must understand  / We must not think to the weather / We must value in this land  / In this 
world men are growing / this is no time to be a boy / We must leave this whole world 
knowing / that we mean to have some joy.  / We have been registering in the army  / but 
we did not have a voice  / Now we mean to live in harmony  / We are fighting for a choice.  
/ Yes my brother we are going  / for we mean to wear our coats  / with discord the enemies 
sowing  / We are going to cast our votes  / We must blend our every motions  /  that this 
job we are trying to do  / We must kill all crazy notions  / for we mean to travel through  /  
We have been laboring for a long time / Slavering for the other man  / We must work to kill 
the mean crimes  /for we must inherit this land.” 
200 Here is the Lyric: “What a fellowship, what a joy divine, / Leaning on the everlasting 
arms; / What a blessedness, what a peace is mine, / Leaning on the everlasting arms. / 
Leaning, leaning, safe and secure from all alarms; / Leaning, leaning, leaning on the 
everlasting arms. / Oh, how sweet to walk in this pilgrim way, / Leaning on the everlasting 
arms; / Oh, how bright the path grows from day to day, / Leaning on the everlasting arms. 
/ What have I to dread, what have I to fear, / Leaning on the everlasting arms? / I have 
blessed peace with my Lord so near, / Leaning on the everlasting arms.” 
201 Dummelow, J. R. (ed.), A Commentary on The Holy Bible By Various Writers, London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1970 (first edition 1908), p. 375. 
202 Allen, Leslie C. Psalm 101–150. Word Biblical Commentary, Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2002, 
pp. 212–15, p. 212. 
203 The whole text says: “The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or 
applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor 
will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are 
366 
 
                                                                                                                                            
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. 
Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, 
demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of 
pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. 
The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants 
for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the 
provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.” Executive Order 10925. Establishing The 
President's Committee On Equal Employment Opportunity. March 6, 1961. 
204 Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford 
UP, 1998, pp. 28-30.  
205 Executive Order 10925. Establishing The President's Committee On Equal Employment 
Opportunity. March 6, 1961. 
206 American Friends Service Committee Employment on Merit Program, unknown date, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:22. 
207 Documents on the event, “Getting the Job Done,” March 1962, 10 pp, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:22. 
208 “List of Federal Government Contractors,” undeclared date, 1962, 3 pp, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:15. 
209 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Lees's article provides a comprehensive review of the first year of selective patronage. 
Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; and 
Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
210 John D. Pomfret, “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 1962. 
211 John D. Pomfret, “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 1962. 
212 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. 
213 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. 
214 214 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. 
215 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961; Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; and 
Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
216 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
217 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
218 It refers to the unintentional consequences of intentional actions. 
219 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
220 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
221 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
367 
 
                                                                                                                                            
222 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
223 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
224 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
225 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
226 John D. Pomfret, “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 1962. 
227 John D. Pomfret, “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 1962. 
228 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
229 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
230 Hannah Lees, “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes,” Reporters, May 11, 
1961. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
231 Michael Creedman, “Negroes Step Up Use of Boycotts to Back Drive for Better Jobs,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1963, 1 + 10. 
232 Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969; 
and Countryman, Matthew J. Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
233 Edward Peeks, “Clerics Get 1,000 New Jobs in Philly,” Washington AfroAmerican, 
September 25, 1962: 1; Michael Creedman, “Negroes Step Up Use of Boycotts to 
Back Drive for Better Jobs,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1963, 1 + 10. 
234 John D. Pomfret, “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, Nov. 25, 1962. 
235 Michael Creedman, “Negroes Step Up Use of Boycotts to Back Drive for Better Jobs,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1963, 1 + 10. 
236 Michael Creedman, “Negroes Step Up Use of Boycotts to Back Drive for Better Jobs,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1963, 1 + 10. 
237 Invitation to the luncheon, Oct 24, 1962, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 172:41; Invitation to the meeting at Allen Temple, date unknown, 1p, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41; Document called 
“Atlanta SCLC to Launch “Operation Bread Basket” with list of people to contact, date 
unknown, 5 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41. 
238 S.C.L.C.’s press release, October 23, 1962, 1p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 172:41. For the reports about the level and type of employment of 
African American workers in the companies, see: Southern Bakery Report, date unknown 
(probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 
172:1; Highland Bakery Report, date unknown (probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1; Atlanta Baking Company Report, date 
unknown (probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
368 
 
                                                                                                                                            
MLKC, Box 172:1; Colonial Bakery Report, November 16, 1962, 1 p, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Bx 172:1.  
239 S.C.L.C.’s press release named “Atlanta SCLC to Launch “Operation Breadbasket”, Oct 
23, 1962, 2 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. 
240 S.C.L.C.’s press release named “Atlanta SCLC to Launch “Operation Breadbasket”, Oct 
23, 1962, 2 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. 
241  Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992, pp. 55-6.  
242 Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, p. 77.  
243 Johnson III and Stanford, eds., Black Political Organizations in the Post-Civil Rights Era, p. 
132. 
244 David L. Chappell points out that “Historians forget—if they ever noticed—that this 
objection to civil disobedience was the dominant theme in public opposition to the Civil 
Rights Movement in the months before and after King’s death. Rejection of civil 
disobedience unified liberals and conservatives, North and South, including a significant 
number of black people who wanted to rein in the direct action movement. David L. 
Chappell, Waking from the Dream, Presented at the Historical Society Annual Meeting, June 
5-8, 2008 Baltimore, Maryland. 
245 Here is the full quotation: “Don’t get panicky.  Don’t do anything panicky.  Don’t get 
your weapons. If you have weapons, take them home.  He who lives by the sword will perish 
by the sword.  Remember that is what Jesus said.  We are not advocating violence.  We want 
to love our enemies.  I want you to love our enemies.  Be good to them. This is what we 
must live by.  We must meet hate with love. I did not start this boycott.  I was asked by you 
to serve as your spokesman.  I want it to be known the length and breadth of this land that if 
I am stopped, this movement will not stop.  If I am stopped, our work will not stop.  For 
what we are doing is right.  What we are doing is just.  And God is with us.” Source: Branch, 
Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1988, p. 164-7.  
246 Branch, Taylor. At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-68. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2006; p. 438.  
247 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 37.  
248 Document called “Negro Ministers Organize for Big Push in Employment,” date 
unknown (estimate November 1962), 2 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. 
249 Document called “Negro Ministers Organize for Big Push in Employment,” date 
unknown (estimate November 1962), 2 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. 
250 Invitation to a meeting scheduled on November 30th, 1962, 1 p, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. Letter from Negro Ministers of Atlanta, 
November 16th, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
News from Negro Ministers of Atlanta, “Atlanta Employment Demands Met”, date 
unknown (estimated Winter 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
MLKC, Box 172:2.  
251 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2; 
Document called “Selective Buying Campaign Against Bakery Called, January 15, 1963, 1 p, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2; leaflet “Join 
Operation Breadbasket”, date unknown (estimate Winter 1963), 1 p, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
252 Pomerantz, Gary M. Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: a Saga of Race and Family. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 252-3. As for Fred C. Bennette’s bio, see note no. 273.  
253 Document “Suggestions to Ministers on Operation Breadbasket”, Nov 16, 1962, 1 p, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1. 
254 Document “Highland Bakery Report”, date unknown, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
369 
 
                                                                                                                                            
255 News from Negro Ministers of Atlanta, “Atlanta Employment Demands Met”, date 
unknown (estimated Winter 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
MLKC, Box 172:2. 
256 News from Negro Ministers of Atlanta, “Atlanta Employment Demands Met”, date 
unknown (estimated Winter 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
MLKC, Box 172:2. 
257 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
258 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
The details are included in a untitled document with company, position (role), the number of 
new employees, level of salary, and total, unknown date (estimated Winter 1963), 1 p, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2.   
259 Ralph Abernathy on behalf of The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, Communication on 
Breadbasket, Letter to Pastors, March 27, 1963, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
260 Document called “Selective Buying Campaign Against Bakery Called, January 15, 1963, 1 
p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
261 Ralph Abernathy on behalf of The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, Communication on 
Breadbasket, Letter to Pastors, March 27, 1963, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
262 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
263 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
264 Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated 
Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
265 For example, the handwritten paper “Steering Committee”, date unknown, 1 p, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. 
266 Pomerantz, Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: a Saga of Race and Family. pp. 307-310.  
267 Reverend J.E. Boone, Atlanta, Letter to Director of Operation Breadbasket, July 19, 
1965. Also: Communication from Rev. Fred Bennette, Jr., to Rev. Andrew Young, on 
Operation Breadbasket; 2 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 
Box 2, 172:16.  
268 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Draft, Annual Report delivered at the Eighth Annual 
Convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.” [9/28/64-10/2/64]. 
[Atlanta, Ga.] 7 pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC: Vault box 
8, folder 17. 641002-000. 
269 Fred Bennette, Report from the Director, Operation Breadbasket, April 1965, 5 pp and 
attachments, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 2, 172:17. 
270 At least, this is the S.C.L.C. and labor unions’ point of view. See: A Conference with Mr. 
R.T. Blackwell, Program Director of the S.C.L.C., and Mr. Jerry Levine, Special 
Representative of the International Union Local 754, 8 pp and attachment, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 172:39. The purpose of the conference 
was to ascertain the specific facts that brought the Scipto plant to the point of strike.  
271 Fred Bennette, Report from the Director, Operation Breadbasket, April 1965, 5 pp and 
attachments, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 2, 172:17. 
272 Ted Simmons, Dr. King’s Job Push A Rights Violation?, The Atlanta Constitution, April 29, 
1965. See also King Drive Violation of Rights Act?, Journal of Atlanta, April 27, 1965.  
273 The address was – and still is - 1630 15th St., Augusta, Georgia. See previous note no. 
191: references to the meeting in Waycross come quite integrally from that Collection. In 
particular, Box 002-003-01, folders 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They contain Breadbaskets manually 
written notes of various Breadbasket meetings from 1964 to 1966. If not specified otherwise, 
they are the source of the meeting at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal 
(A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, Thursday, May 19, 1966. 
370 
 
                                                                                                                                            
274 Reverend Fred C. Bennette, Jr. was born to Annie Mae (McDowell) and Columbus 
Bennette, Jr. on December 2, 1928 in Atlanta, Ga. After graduation from David T. Howard 
High School, Reverend Bennette joined the United States Army where he served for several 
years as Sergeant. After completing his military service, he returned to Atlanta where he 
attended Morris Brown College and the Turner Theological Seminary at Morris Brown. 
During this time Reverend Bennette was friends with A. D. King which led to the meeting 
of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1960. He was also a member of Ebenezer Baptist 
Church. This meeting led to many major accomplishments and significant involvement in 
the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta. In 1960 Fred C. Bennette became a key organizer in 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (S.C.L.C.) organization. In that same year he 
became staff coordinator for the Sit-In campaign to desegregate Rich's Department Store. 
From 1961 to1964 he served as the Director of the “All Citizens Committee for Voter 
Registration” and as the Deputy Director of the Georgia Voters League. In 1964 Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. appointed Reverend Bennette as the first Director of S.C.L.C.'s Operation 
Bread Basket. This organization mobilized buying campaigns to pressure businesses and 
corporations to hire minorities. Fred Bennette served in this capacity until 1967. Reverend 
Bennette also served as interim Pastor (1964-1965) of the Mount Welcome Baptist Church 
which was then located in the Pittsburg Community of Atlanta. After the Civil Rights 
Movement, Reverend Bennette continued his work as advisor on issues in the Black 
community to Jimmy Carter during his campaign and tenure as Governor of Georgia (1970-
1976). He also served as a staff member and advisor to Congressman Andrew Young and 
during Young's tenure (1982-1989) as Mayor of Atlanta. Reverend Bennette was a personal 
friend of Coretta King and a member of the Board of Advisors for The Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Center for Non-Violent Social Change and was the King Center's Security Director. He 
died in 1994 after a long and successful career as a civic leader. 
275  Martin Luther King’s address to the Montgomery Improvement Association, Institute on 
Nonviolence and Social Change, Holt Street Baptist Church, December 1956. See: King, 
Martin Luther, J. Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 452. In his The Origins of the Civil 
Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, Aldon Morris points out that “this 
‘militant’ view of religion has always existed in the black church, as the fact that such leaders 
of slave revolts as Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey adopted it attests. This view of religion 
guided the efforts of Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman as they fought the slave 
regime and transported slaves through the underground railroad. This religious view became 
institutionalized through songs, sermons, and the literature of the church. Dr. Benjamin 
Mays, an authority on black religion and a minister who taught King and many other civil 
rights leaders the militant view of religion, maintains that ‘the Negro was selective in his 
preaching. He usually selected Biblical passages which emphasized that all men are children 
of God.’ Mays pointed out that such a position suggests equal treatment and social 
equality… In addition, the view of religion as a dynamic force for social change was a 
cornerstone of the ‘social gospel’ movement. A significant portion of the S.C.L.C.’s 
leadership was familiar with the main doctrines of the ‘social gospel’ movement, and King 
studied them while in graduate school.” See: Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights 
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press, 1984, 97.    
276 King, Martin Luther, J. Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 328. 
277 Joshua 1-6. See also: Hebrews 11:30 - By faith the walls of Jericho fell down, after they 
had been encircled for seven days. 
278 Marsh, Charles. God's Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997, p. 45.  
279 King, Martin Luther, J. Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 417.  
280 Raboteau, Albert J. A Fire in the Bones: Reflections on African-American Religious History. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1995, 172-3.  
281 David L. Chappell, Prophetic Religion: A Transracial Challenge to Modern Democracy, 
Social Research, Vol. 76, No 4 (Winter 2009), pp. 1261-73. See also: Chappell, David L. A 
371 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004.  
282 David L. Chappell, Prophetic Religion: A Transracial Challenge to Modern Democracy, 
Social Research, Vol. 76, No 4 (Winter 2009), pp. 1261-73. 
283 For example, see: Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black 
Communities Organizing for Change, p. 86.  
284 Nelsen, Hart M., and Anne Kusener Nelsen. Black Church in the Sixties. Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1975, pp. 8-9.  
285 Frazier, Edward Franklin, and C. Eric Lincoln. The Negro Church in America. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1974, p. 51. See also note 34 in the same book.  
286 Martin Luther King, Jr., Sermon at Temple Israel of Hollywood delivered 26 February 
1965. Here is the original sentence: “We will discover that there are some 10 million families 
that are considered poverty stricken families. These families have an average of four or five 
members, which means there are some 40 -- between 40 and 50 million of our brothers and 
sisters in this country who are poverty stricken. There they find themselves perishing on a 
lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. And certainly if 
we are to be a great nation, we must solve this problem.” 
287 Paris, Peter J. The Social Teaching of the Black Churches. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985, p. 
1. 
288 A generation divide was at place in black Atlanta. The old generation – Martin Luther 
King, Sr., Jesse B. Blayton, Lorimer D. Milton, Clayton R. Yates, the college presidents like 
Benjamin Mays - has pursued for decades a strategy of accommodation and compromise and 
was not at easy with the new generation, more inclined to protest and action. See: 
Pomerantz, Gary M. Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: a Saga of Race and Family. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1997, p. 254.  
289 Frazier, Edward Franklin, and C. Eric Lincoln. The Negro Church in America. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1974, p. 44. 
290 Genesis 27:34-40. The verses are from the King James Version of the Holy Bible. “And 
when Esau heard the words of his father, he cried with a great and exceeding bitter cry, and 
said unto his father, Bless me, even me also, O my father. / And he said, Thy brother came 
with subtilty, and hath taken away thy blessing. / And he said, Is not he rightly named 
Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times: he took away my birthright;  and, behold, 
now he hath taken away my blessing. And he said, Hast thou not reserved a blessing for me? 
/ And Isaac answered and said unto Esau, Behold, I have made him thy lord, and all his 
brethren have I given to him for servants; and with corn and wine have I sustained him: and 
what shall I do now unto thee, my son? / And Esau said unto his father, Hast thou but one 
blessing, my father? bless me, even me also, O my father. And Esau lifted up his voice, and 
wept. / And Isaac his father answered and said unto him, Behold, thy dwelling shall be the 
fatness of the earth, and of the dew of heaven from above; / and by thy sword shalt thou 
live, / and shalt serve thy brother: and it shall come to pass when thou shalt have the 
dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck.”  
291 But, in fact, a blessing is not a legal act; it is a sacred act that implies the impact on the 
human history of the word of God. The word of God – especially when it is evocated in a 
situation of sacredness, generates the reality, and creates a social state of-the-art. The word 
of God is creative action in concrete reality. More specifically, it is the word of God that 
constitutes endowment, provides wealth, and assures procreation. It is the word of God that 
establishes, then transforms and modifies the personal identity, i.e., constitutes 
primogeniture. In the original text in Hebrew, the word “berakah” (blessing) and the word 
“bekora” (birthright) sound alike. It is the act of blessing – “berakah” - that institutes the 
state of birthright – “bekora.” Despite the fact that Esau is the first born and the 
primogeniture belongs to him, it is Jacob that receives the blessing. The word of God inverts 
the order made by human beings: the elder shall serve the younger. What seems a natural 
order between superiority and inferiority, dominance and submission among people, can be 
subverted by the word of God. In the process, an act of apparent deceit actually serves God 
better than an act of rightness. This is the message of Genesis 27:34-40. It was a message 
that resonated to the pastors at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross. In fact, 
372 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Rev. Howard Creecy, Sr., had closed his sermon on “Blessings and Curses” with a clear 
message: don’t you have another blessing (referred to Esau). God’s will can’t be challenged. 
Then, the notes of What a Friend We have in Jesus had resounded once again in the church. 
The opposition between Esau and Jacob has traditionally been understood by Christians to 
symbolize the opposition between Jews and Christians. In fact, if Jacob, the 
younger, had supplanted Esau's birthright and the paternal blessing, the same had happened 
with the Christians, who have supplanted the Jews as recipients of the divine promise. 
292 This paragraph is inspired by: Miller, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. 
Nashville: Abington Press (revised edition), 2008, pp. 63-73 and pp. 111-113.  
293 This paragraph is inspired by: Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit Praisin’ God. The 
Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, pp. 4-5.   
294 The key point here is what we mean with ‘emotion’ in the context of the African 
American preaching tradition. “Usually, when confronted with the preaching tradition of 
African American preachers, people take great notice of the emotional intensity, energy, and 
freedom of the preacher and the people in the sermon and worship event … But for the 
purpose of this work … African American preaching is about helping people experience the 
assurance of grace that is the gospel.” Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit Praisin’ God. 
The Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, p. 3.   
295 Interview of the author with Vincent Harding, in San Francisco, November 21, 2011. 
According to Harding, Ralph Abernathy and other leaders of the civil rights movement were 
used to make extravagant comments on the phone to impress and make fun of the FBI 
agents on the other side of the line.  
296 Hamilton, Charles V. The Black Preacher in America. New York: Morrow, 1972, p. 159. 
297 Interview of the author with Vincent Harding, in San Francisco, November 21, 2011. 
298 Mitchell, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. Nashville: Abington Press 
(revised edition), 2008, p. 121. Miller also points out that there is an “unquestionable 
evidence of a deep concern in Hebrew tradition for the holistic commitment to persons to 
and in the faith. Such commitment was seen as the very will of God.” Mitchell, Henry H., 
Celebration and Experience in Preaching, p. 129. 
299 Selby, Gary S. Martin Luther King and the Rhetoric of Freedom: the Exodus Narrative in America's 
Struggle for Civil Rights. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008, p. 41.  
300 Harris, Frederick, C., Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 70. Quoted in Selby, Gary S. Martin Luther King and 
the Rhetoric of Freedom: the Exodus Narrative in America's Struggle for Civil Rights. Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2008, p. 42. 
301 LaRue describes the first posture as ‘escapist:’ “Christians … have been called out of the 
world to live separate and apart from the present order.”. He then describes the second 
posture, focusing on social justice: “God’s power is believed to be at work on systemic and 
capricious structures of evil and inequality, and God is understood as acting mightily to make 
things right for all people.” LaRue, Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching, Louisville, 
London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000, p. 26.  
302  This paragraph is inspired by: Miller, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. 
Nashville: Abington Press (revised edition), 2008, pp. 13-18. Miller also sustains that the goal 
of “the very creeds traditionally included in Christian liturgy … was to answer abstract 
theological questions in a manner that appeals to reason. The goal was to provide a basis for 
unity in great empires and ecclesiastical bodies. The point is that this confession if faith was 
focused on issues almost completely irrelevant to existential concerns and spiritual 
wholeness.” Miller, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. p. 130. Thomas assures 
that “the point was not abstract answers to suffering and evil, but an experience of 
assurance, hope, empowerment, and victory.” Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit 
Praisin’ God. The Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, p. 
3.  LaRue addresses the same point in a more technical way: “Sacred stories … form 
consciousness rather than being among the objects of which consciousness is directly 
aware.” LaRue, Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching, Louisville, London: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2000, p. 3. He also provides the theological foundations of such a liturgy: 
“a mighty God who takes up the cause of dispossessed African Americans is the major 
373 
 
                                                                                                                                            
premise that undergirds powerful black preaching.” But not only that. God also “acts in very 
concrete and practical ways in matters pertaining to their (i.e., African American, author’s 
note) survival, deliverance, advancement, prosperity, and over-all well-being.” LaRue, 
Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching, Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2000, p. 5.  
303 Famously, Stokely Carmichael pointed out that “This is the twenty-seventh time I have 
been arrested, and I ain't going to jail no more! The only way we gonna stop them white men 
from whuppin' us is to take over. We been saying freedom for six years and we ain't got 
nothin'. What we gonna start saying now is Black Power!” The suddenly unified mass 
shouted back “Black Power!” whereupon Willie Ricks leaped up beside Carmichael and 
shouted to the crowd: “What do you want?” ”Black Power!” ”What do you want?” ”Black 
Power!”“What do you want?” ”Black Power!! Black Power!!! Black Power!!!!” 
304 Gerard Reed, Chairman, Employment Committee, Atlanta S.C.L.C., July 11, 1966, 3 p, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:27. 
305 Pomerantz, Gary M. Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: a Saga of Race and Family. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 345-50. 
306  Hamilton, Charles V. The Black Preacher in America. New York: Morrow, 1972, pp. 134-5. 
For information on the further activity of Breadbasket in the South, see for example: “The 
Atlanta Chapter of Operation Breadbasket Bi-Annual Report”, by Fred C. Bennette, Jr. 1968 
February 6 typed document, 7pp, Morehouse College Martin Luther King, MCMLK, Series 
6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
307 Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 
p. 64. 
308 “Chicago Freedom Movement Demands for Creating an Open City 1966 June printed 
document with annotations by Martin Luther King, Jr. and in an unknown hand, 6pp, with 
enclosures Memorandum from Melody Heaps, 5pp, Morehouse College Martin Luther King, 
MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records; 
“Staff Meeting Thursday June 30-Suggestions and Assignments”, 2pp, “Breadbasket 
Ministers”, 3pp, and “Target for the Summer: An Open City”, 1p, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2, and King, Martin Luther, Jr. “One Year 
Later in Chicago.” [1/67]. 9 pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 
Box 26. 670100-001; “Negroes Building Boycott Network,” New York Times, November 25, 
1962; “The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia’s Negroes,” Fortune, May 11, 1961, 33-35; 
“S.C.L.C. press release,” October 23, 1962, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 26, 670100-001; Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real 
Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002, p. 24. Also see Sullivan, Leon Howard. 
Build, Brother, Build. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969.  
309 Landess, Tom, and Richard M. Quinn. Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race. Ottawa, IL: 
Jameson Books, 1985, p. 36. 
310 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section 
“Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Introduction, p. 1, Box 23: 0783.  
311  Massoni, Gary, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, M.Div. thesis, CTS, 1971, 1-10; Jackson, 
Jesse, “A Strategy to End Slums,” 5/17/66, 20 pp., Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 149:35; Garrow interviews with Jackson, Evans, Pitcher, 
David Wallace & Massoni, in David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, New York: W. Morrow, 1986; Jackson, Jesse, Dr. 
Martin Luther King. A Recollection, in Tweedle, John A Lasting Impression. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1983; Pitcher & Wallace, Breadbasket News 10/67, p. 2; 
Chicago Tribune 2/12/66, p. 5; Chicago Daily News 2/12/66, p. 5; Chicago American 2/13/66, p. 
5; Minutes of Breadbasket Temporary Steering Committee meeting, 2/28/66, 4pp, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 150:10.  
312 Baldwin, Lewis V. The Voice of Conscience: the Church in the Mind of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 138 
374 
 
                                                                                                                                            
313 Joseph Jackson, September 10, 1964 Speech delivered at 84th Annual Session of the 
National Baptist Convention. Cobo Hall Arena. Detroit, Michigan. See also: Jackson, J. H. A 
Story of Christian Activism: The History of the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc. Nashville, 
TN: Townsend Press, 1980; Jackson, J. H. Unholy Shadows and Freedom's Holy Light,. Nashville: 
Townsend Press, 1967; and Paris, Peter J. Black Leaders in Conflict: Joseph H. Jackson, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1978.  
314 King, Jr., Martin Luther. “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” In Why We Can't Wait, by Martin 
Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.  
315  Joseph H. Jackson: the Meaning of the Cross. Time Magazine. April 6, 1970.  
316  Joseph H. Jackson: the Meaning of the Cross. Time Magazine. April 6, 1970. 
317 Breadbasket was not the first economic rights program in Chicago. Breadbasket built 
upon momentum that already existed in Chicago and demonstrated that the economic phase 
of the Civil Rights Movement was happening well before it was particularly termed “black 
capitalism.” In 1929, for example, the Chicago Whip, a militant black newspaper, urged its 
readers “to spend your money where you can work.” The threat of boycotts was especially 
effective during the Great Depression. Breadbasket built upon this tradition. One of Leon 
Sullivan’s precursors was T.R.M. Howard, a wealthy South Side doctor and entrepreneur and 
a key financial contributor to Breadbasket. Before he moved to Chicago from Mississippi in 
1956, Howard was the head of the Regional Council of Negro Leadership, which had 
successfully organized a boycott against service stations that refused to provide restrooms 
for blacks. During the summer of 1963, area black ministers led by Howard formed the 
Clergy Alliance of Chicago and began a boycott of the Bowman Dairy Company. The 
boycott failed, but the idea of ‘selective buying’ took hold. Chicago was a particularly 
effective locale for such action because it has always played a pivotal role in the history of 
political awareness of the African American community. From Oscar S. De Priest to Barack 
Obama—through William Dawson, Harold Washington, Jesse Jackson, and Carol Moseley 
Braun—the city has a unique history of launching the careers of powerful black politicians. 
Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil Rights Movement. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 67-68; Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse 
Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, p. 113. 
318 FBI 100-106670-NR, 22 November 1965; Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 462; Chicago Defender 5-11 Feb. 1966, pp. 1-2; 
Massoni, Gary. “Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”. M.Div. Thesis, Chicago 
Theological Seminary, 1971, pp. 194-5. Anderson, Alan B, and George W Pickering. 
Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago. Athens GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1986, p. 152. The African Methodist Episcopal Church offered 
its support to the Chicago crusade in September. Chicago Sun-Times, 10 Sept. 1965, p. 32.  
319 FBI 100-106670-2303, 14 Feb. 1966; FBI 100-106670-2325, 21 Feb. 1965; Massoni, 
“Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”, pp. 198-199.  
320 Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 1-10, 194-95; Jackson, Jesse, “A Strategy to 
End Slums,” 5/17/66, 20 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 
Box 149:35; J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference, esp. p. 462; Jesse Jackson, “Dr. Martin Luther King: A Recollection,” in 
John Tweedle, A Lasting Impression, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1983; 
Breadbasket News, October 1967; Chicago Tribune, February 12, 1966; Chicago Daily News, 
February 12, 1966; Chicago American, February 13, 1966; Minutes of Breadbasket Temporary 
Steering Committee, February 28, 1966, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
MLKC, Box 150:10; FBI 100-106670-NR, November 22, 1965; Chicago Defender, February 5, 
1966; Alan B. Anderson and George W. Pickering, Confronting the Color Line: the Broken Promise 
of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986, p. 152; James 
R. Ralph, Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 68-
69.  
321 An articulate version of the High-Low boycott is in: S.C.L.C.’s Economic Power Wins 
High-Low Struggle, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 
172:23. Also: Agreement with SCLC and Operation Breadbasket on employment of African 
Americans, 7 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:23.  
375 
 
                                                                                                                                            
322 Tom Landess and Richard M. Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race. Ottawa: Jameson 
Books, 1985, p. 41. A good example of boycott plan can be found in: Operation Breadbasket 
West Side organization salesman training program proposals; sources of income and budget 
for Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, 05/08/1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9.  
323 Power of the Dollar, Newsweek, 10/26/1966.  
324 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 41.  
325 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Where Do We Go From Here?,” Delivered at the 11th Annual 
S.C.L.C. Convention, August 16, 1967, Atlanta, GA; King, Martin Luther, Jr. “One Year 
Later in Chicago.” [1/67]. 9 pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 
Box 26. 670100-001; SCLC's “Operation Breadbasket: How to Win Jobs and Influence 
Business Men”, report by Fred C. Bennette and Jesse Jackson, 1967 August (printed 
document, 4pp [2 copies]), Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., MCMLK, Series 6: 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
326 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 41.  
327 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 43.  
328 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 24.   
329 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 489.  
330 Anderson and Pickering, Confronting the Color Line: the Broken Promise of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Chicago, pp. 217-18.  
331 Power of the Dollar, Newsweek, 12/26/1966. Operation breadbasket press release on jobs 
at Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago 1966 August 25 typed document, 2pp, Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:20.  
332 Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 201-213; Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ 
of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 64.  
333 Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 201-13; Gordon Ewen, “The ‘Green Power’ 
of Breadbasket,” Commerce, April 1968, 24-25, 49-54, 64; Anderson and Pickering, Confronting 
the Color Line: the Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago, p. 296.  
334 Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: Random House, 
1996, p. 399.  
335 An articulate version of the High-Low boycott is in: S.C.L.C.’s Economic Power Wins 
High-Low Struggle, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 
172:23. Also: Agreement with SCLC and Operation Breadbasket on employment of African 
Americans, 7 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:23.   
336 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section “As 
Members, One of the Other. Operation Breadbasket. Peoplehood as a Means [sic!] of 
Finding Community”: report April 4, 1967 printed document, 9 pp, MCMLK, Series 6: 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records, p. 8. 
337 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, pp. 42-44.  
338 Barbara Reynolds, interview by Timmerman, 24 September 2001. See: Timmerman, 
Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 25. 
339 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, pp. 42-44.  
340 Private communication, undated, Reverend Hiram Crawford Sr., made available to 
Timmerman by his son, Dr. Hiram Crawford Jr., and his widow, Eleanor Crawford. Source: 
Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 26.  
341 Anderson and Pickering, Confronting the Color Line: the Broken Promise of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Chicago, p. 296. See also: “National Tea in Pact with Negro Group!”: Operation 
Breadbasket flyer 1966 December 5 printed document, 1p, “National to Upgrade Negro 
Jobs”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 December 9 printed document, 1p, and 
“Breadbasket and National Tea Agree”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 December 12 
printed document, 1p, Morehouse College Martin Luther King, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. Other documents on boycotts and 
agreements with corporate executives: “Dairy Agrees to Double Number of Negro 
Workers”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 June 22 printed document, 1p; “5th Company 
Gives in to Breadbasket Demand for Jobs”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 July 23 
376 
 
                                                                                                                                            
printed document, 1p; “Campaign Here Nets Negroes 224 New Jobs”: Operation 
Breadbasket flyer 1966 August 8 printed document, 1p; “'Breadbasket' Padded $2 Million 
Mark”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 August 27 printed document, 1p; “'Breadbasket', 
Food Chain Sign Contract”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 November 21 printed 
document, 1p; “Finalize Food Store Agreement”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1966 
December 3 printed document, 1p, Morehouse College Martin Luther King, MCMLK, 
Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records.  
342 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 538.  
343 Jesse Jackson, ‘‘From October to May. A Report to Rev. Andrew Young. Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference”, May 20, 1966, 10 pp, p. 16, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 18. 670100-172.  
344 Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 
64; “More State Funds Urged for Negro Banks”: Operation Breadbasket flyer 1967 January 
printed document, 1p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 
172, 23. 
345 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86.  
346 Anderson and Pickering, Confronting the Color Line: the Broken Promise of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Chicago, pp. 306-7.  
347 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 27. 
348 Frady, Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson, p. 124.  
349 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 565.  
350 John Pekkanen, The Jesse Jacosn Style: Militant But Non Violent. Black Hope, White 
Hope, Life, Nov 21, 1969, pp. 67-76. 
351 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 565.  
352 Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 201-213; Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ 
of OB, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 64. Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil Rights Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993, p. 
200.  
353 Jet, August 8 and October 24, 1968; Southern Patriot, October 1968; Massoni, “Perspectives 
on Breadbasket”, pp. 218-221, 232-234; and Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 133, 
141-143. 
354 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 27. 
355 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 27. 
356 Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 33-34. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 548. 
357 SCLC's “Operation Breadbasket: How to Win Jobs and Influence Business Men”, report 
by Fred C. Bennette and Jesse Jackson, 1967 August (printed document, 4pp [2 copies]), 
Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
358 Chicago Daily News, 12, 13 July 1966. Anderson and Pickering, Confronting the Color Line: 
the Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago, p. 333.  
359 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 559.  
360 Chester Higgings, We Can Change Course of U.S., Jet, July 1967, pp. 20-26, p. 23. 
361  Cleveland Press 7/4/67, p. A12, 7/8/67, p. A2, 7/13/67, p. 1; Chicago Tribune 6/25/67, p. 
10; Chicago Defender  6/29/67, p. 11; Jet 7/27/67, pp. 20 -26; NYT 7/12/67, p. 23; Cleveland 
Press 7/12/67, p. B9; Chicago Daily News 7/12/67, p. 3; 7/13/67, p. 14; Ebony 8/67, pp. 78-
86; Business Week 8/19/67, pp. 37-38; Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket”, pp. 34-35; 
King, Martin Luther, Jr. “The Present Crisis in Civil Rights, Address delivered at the 
National Meeting of Operation Breadbasket.” [7/10/67]. Chicago, Ill. 19 pp. Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 670710-001. See also: King, Martin 
Luther, Jr. “The Present Crisis in Civil Rights, Address delivered at the National Meeting of 
Operation Breadbasket.” [7/10/67]. [Chicago, Ill.] (At) 45.4 min. (2 sound cassettes: 
377 
 
                                                                                                                                            
analog.) Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC: NYC-13C & 13D. 
670710-002, and King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Press conference on Operation Breadbasket.” 
7/11/67. Chicago, Ill. 9 pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 
670711-000. 
362 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 572.  
363  Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, p. 304. 
King quoted in Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference. New York: W. Morrow, 1986, pp. 585, 569; King, Martin Luther, Jr. 
“The Present Crisis in Civil Rights, Address delivered at the National Meeting of Operation 
Breadbasket.” [7/10/67]. Chicago, Ill. 19 pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, 670710-001. See also: King, Martin Luther, Jr. “The Present Crisis in Civil 
Rights, Address delivered at the National Meeting of Operation Breadbasket.” [7/10/67]. 
[Chicago, Ill.] (At) 45.4 min. (2 sound cassettes: analog.) Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC: NYC-13C & 13D. 670710-002, and King, Martin Luther, Jr. 
“Press conference on Operation Breadbasket.” 7/11/67. Chicago, Ill. 9 pp. Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 670711-000. 
364 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 572.  
365 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, p. 568.  
366 “Operation Breadbasket: A Key to the Black Man's Freedom,” undated, probably 
summer 1967, The Emory University Archives, Atlanta, Ga.: Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Series, Subseries 10.4, Operation Breadbasket 1966-1991, Box 578:4.  
367 Simon E. Balto, MLK's Forgotten Plan to End Gun Violence in Chicago, History News 
Network, accessed June 13, 2013, http://hnn.us/articles/mlks-forgotten-plan-end-gun-
violence-chicago  
368 Jesse Jackson, interview by Timmerman, 21 December 2001. See: Timmerman, 
Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 32. 
369 See meeting between Kings and street gangs in Watts Los Angeles, Oakland, and 
Chicago. Several sources. See for example, Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A 
Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991, p.p. 221-2. 
370 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, pp. 48-49. FBI collected 
“descriptive data” on Jackson, but recognized that he failed to develop an appropriate 
“subversive characterization”; FBI investigated Jackson (and Andrew Young) ‘s “moral 
character” in regard to a Racial Matters-Black Nationalistic investigation. At least 34 people 
reported on Jackson’s activities at any given time, and the FBI eventually opened parallel 
files on Breadbasket. O'Reilly, Kenneth. Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 
1960-1972. New York: Free Press, 1989, pp. 140-1, 147, 338.   
371 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p 170.  
372 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46. 
373 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46. 
374 Glen Bone III, interview with Timmerman, 13 July, 2001. See: Timmerman, Shakedown: 
Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 49.  
375 “The West Side Organization is primarily a “Grass Roots” neighborhood representative, 
and it is this capacity they will serve the businessmen sponsors, and the neighborhood 
needs.” Operation Breadbasket West Side organization salesman training program proposals; 
sources of income and budget for Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, 05/08/1967, 9 pp, 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9.    
376 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic 
Justice, p. 17.  
377 S.C.L.C.’s Breadbasket, “SCLC's “Operation Breadbasket: How to Win Jobs and 
Influence Business Men”, report by Fred C. Bennette and Jesse Jackson, 1967 August 
(printed document, 4pp [2 copies]), Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., MCMLK, 
Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
378 
 
                                                                                                                                            
378  George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section 
“Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Introduction, p. 1. 
379 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic 
Justice, p. 303; S.C.L.C. press release, “Green Power for Nigroes,” 23 Nov. 1966, 4 pp, 
S.C.L.C. Records, MLKC, Box 122:6; King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Address delivered at meeting 
of Operation Breadbasket at Chicago Theological Seminary.” 3/25/67. Chicago, Ill. 8 
pp. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, Martin Luther King, Jr., MLKC, 
670325-002; Jackson, Jesse, “A Strategy to End Slums,” 5/17/66, 20 pp., Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 149:35 (see also: “What Did You Do to Help 
End Slums Today?”: Operation Breadbasket flyer for meeting at Warren Avenue Church 
circa 1966 printed document with annotations by Andrew J. Young, 2pp, Morehouse 
College Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records; Foner, Philip Sheldon. Organized Labor and 
the Black Worker, 1619-1981. New York: International Publishers, 1982, p. 365.  
380 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p 55; Atlanta Journal Constitution 12/24/67, p. A6; 
Penthouse 4/73, 78-80ff; Letter from Rutherford to Jackson & All Other Staff, 12/11/67, 9 
pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC., Box 179:2; Phillip T. 
Drotning and Wesley W South, Up from the Ghetto (New York: Cowles, 1970, pp. 19-43; 
Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
pp. 584-6. 
381 “This [Breadbasket] is indeed a self help program.” Operation Breadbasket West Side 
organization salesman training program proposals; sources of income and budget for 
Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, 05/08/1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9.  
382 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic 
Justice, p. 304; King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Address delivered at meeting of Operation 
Breadbasket at Chicago Theological Seminary.” 3/25/67. Chicago, Ill. 8 pp. MLKC. Box 
670325-002, pp. 5-6; Young quoted in Fairclough, Adam. The Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference & Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987, p. 354; Fannie 
G. Perryman to King, 21 Sept. 1967, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, 
MLKC, Box 172:3.  
383 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, pp. 47-50. 
384 Calvin Morris, interview with Mantler. See: Gordon, Mantler K. Black, Brown and Poor: 
Martin Luther King Jr., The Poor People’s Campaign and its Legacies. PhD dissertation, 
Duke University, 2008.  
385 Several sources. See for example: Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 141-143. 
386 Breadbasket’s band was instrumental, together with Breadbasket’s Gospel choir, in 
capturing the rhythm of black people during Breadbasket’s meetings, which were deeply 
based in religion. Actually the Breadbasket’s band director, Ben Branch, was the last man Dr. 
King talked – the subject was the songs for the next day’s rally in Memphis – with when the 
assassin’s bullet was fired. Breadbasket also cooperated with other black organization around 
the country.  
387 South Side Bulletin, Nov 11, 1970, p. 4. 
388 Gary Massoni, “Perspectives on Breadbasket,” in Garrow, David J. Chicago 1966: open 
housing marches, summit negotiations, and Breadbasket. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989, pp. 220-
221. 
389 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 327; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the 
Politics of Race, pp. 52-53; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46. 
390 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 327-332; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & 
the Politics of Race, p. 53; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38.  
391 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 331; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real 
Jesse Jackson, p. 38. 
392 Hermene Hartman, interview by Timmerman, 22 October 2001. See: Timmerman, 
Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38. 
379 
 
                                                                                                                                            
393 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 81; Timmerman, Shakedown: 
Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38. New York Times  29/01/1984, 1.  
394 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38. 
395 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 39. 
396  Chicago Tribune 28/11/1971. Chicago Tribune 2/12/1971.  
397 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 169-170, 349; Timmerman, Shakedown: 
Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 39. 
398 Chicago Tribune 2/12/1971. Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, pp. 39-
40. 
399 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 324.  
400 Chicago Tribune 28/11/1971. Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 326; Landess and 
Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 54; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse 
Jackson, pp. 40-41. 
401 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 347; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the 
Politics of Race, p. 55; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 41. See also: 
Rev. Jackson Quits Operation Breadbasket, Dec 12, 1971, The New York Times, Abernathy 
Seeks ‘Understanding’ of Breadbasket Move, Jet, Dec 16, 1971, and Operation Breadbasket’s 
Near the End, Herald Tribune, Dec 17, 1971. 
402 Chicago Tribune 4/12/1971.  
403 Chicago Tribune 5/12/1971. Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 348; Landess and 
Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 62; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse 
Jackson, p. 42. 
404 Chicago Tribune 5/12/1971; Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, p. 348; Landess and 
Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 62; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse 
Jackson, p. 42. 
405 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, p. 382. 
406 Barbara Reynolds, interview by Timmerman, 24 September 2001. See: Timmerman, 
Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 42.  
407 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 42. 
408 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, p. 351; 
Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 43; Jackson portrayed himself as a 
“country preacher,” that is, “a preacher without boundaries (it would be better said, “without 
a specific congregation”), “I’ll preach anywhere on the planet.” David Llorens, Apostle of 
Economics, Ebony, August 1967, pp. 78-86. 
409 Chicago Tribune 12/12/1971. Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 43. 
410 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 353-354; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the 
Real Jesse Jackson, p. 43. 
411 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, pp. 155-156; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the 
Real Jesse Jackson, p. 44. 
412  Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972. See also: Black Expo ’71 
Brings Biggest Cadres, Jet, Oct 21, 1971, and Abernathy Seeks ‘Understanding’ of 
Breadbasket Move, Jet, Dec 16, 1971. For another version of the split, see: “The 
Long Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson”, PBS.org, 1995. Produced by Frontline with the Lennon 
Production Group. Executive producer, David Fanning; senior producers, Thomas Lennon, 
Michael Sullivan; producer, Mark Zwonitzer; writers, Marshall Frady, Zwonitzer. 
413 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972. 
414 The key-document here is the Audit Report prepared on Feb 29, 1972, by Washington, 
Pittman & McKeever (WPM),  Founded in 1939 by Mary T. Washington who was the first 
African-American female CPA in the United States, now WPM is one of Chicago’s most 
established professional accounting and consulting firms. In the late 1960s, WPM was the 
accounting firm of both the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket in Chicago. After the devorce 
between Abernathy and Jackson, the firm continued working with the S.C.L.C. and 
Operation PUSH. See: Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David, Appendix E: Black Expo ’71. 
Audit Report, pp. 455-64. See also: “Sources of income and budget for Operation 
Breadbasket in Chicago”, 07/29/1967. Principal Correspondents: Martin Luther King, Jr.; 
Cirilo McSween; Jesse L. Jackson; Ralph D. Abernathy; William Rutherford, 9 pp, Southern 
380 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9; Jesse Jackson to Bill 
Rutherford, S.C.L.C.’s National Office of Operation Breadbasket; Six Month Projection; 
William A. Rutherford; Fred C. Bennette, Reports to Executive Board, 1965–1968. 
Operation Breadbasket activities reports, 25 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Records, MLKC, Box 172:38; “A Possible Cost Breakdown: Operation Breadbasket” circa 
1962-1968 photocopy with annotations in an unknown hand of typed document, 3pp, 
Morehouse College Martin Luther King, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Organizational Records; Operation Breadbasket of SCLC's Program Fund, audit 
report, June 30, 1970, The Emory University Archives, Atlanta, Ga.: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Series, Subseries 10.4, Operation Breadbasket 1966-1991, Box 
578:11.  
415 Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 64. Timmerman, Shakedown: 
Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 44. 
416 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 44. 
417 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 44. 
418 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972. 
419 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972. Also, in his autobiography,  
Ralph Abernathy offers a balanced treatment in one full chapter. See note no. 23. 
420 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972. 
421 Jet Editorial Comment: Blacks Should Support Organizations That Help Blacks, Jet, Jan 
13, 1971. 
422 Jet Editorial Comment: Blacks Should Support Organizations That Help Blacks, Jet, Jan 
13, 1971. 
423 Jet Editorial Comment: Blacks Should Support Organizations That Help Blacks, Jet, Jan 
13, 1971. 
424  Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 108. Emphasis is mine.  
425 Quoted in Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 85. 
426 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Annual Report”; King,, Martin Luther, Jr. A Testament of Hope: 
The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. Edited by James M. Washington. San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1986.  
427 Text and Photo “Rev Curtis Melson Leads Operation Breadbasket”. Historical Images: 
Memphis (TN), No. 20462020, 1971. Personal archive (PA).  
428 Text and Photo “Rev Curtis Melson Leads Operation Breadbasket”. Historical Images: 
Memphis (TN), No. 20462020, 1971. Personal archive (PA).  
429 Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 
1985, p. 10.  
430 Jackson, Jesse. I Am Somebody. Poem.  
431 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, Time, April 6, 1970, 14-19, p. 19.   
432 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section 
“Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Introduction, p. 1.  
433 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section “As 
Members, One of the Other. Operation Breadbasket”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Peoplehood as a Means [sic!] of Finding Community, p. 4.   
434 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section “As 
Members, One of the Other. Operation Breadbasket”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Peoplehood as a Means [sic!] of Finding Community, p. 7.  
435 For an account of the origin of Black Theology, see Cone, James H. For My People: Black 
Theology and the Black Church. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984; Wilmore, Gayraud S., and 
James H. Cone. Black Theology: A Documentary History, 1966-79. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1979. The best narrative history of black theology by one of its creators is Wilmore, Gayraud 
S. Black Religion and Black Radicalism: An Interpretation of the Religious History of Afro-American 
People. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983. See also: Cone, James H. Black Theology and Black 
381 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Power. New York: Seabury Press, 1969; Cone, James H. A Black Theology of Liberation. 
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970. They are the earliest published books on black theology. 
They were followed by Roberts, J. Deotis. Liberation and Reconciliation: A Black Theology. 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971 and Jones, Major J. Black Awareness: A Theology of Hope. 
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1971. See also: Cone, James H. God of the Oppressed. New York: 
Seabury Press, 1975; Cone, James H. Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of 
Liberation, 1968-1998. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999, and Cone, James H. The Spirituals and 
the Blues an Interpretation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1975. See also: Wilmore, Gayraud S., 
and James H. Cone, eds. Black Theology: A Documentary History. Vol. I. Maryknoll (N.Y.): 
Orbis Books, 1979; Wilmore, Gayraud S., and James H. Cone, eds. Black Theology: A 
Documentary History. Vol. II. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993; Wilmore, Gayraud S. Black 
Religion and Black Radicalism: An Interpretation of the Religious History of Afro-American People. 2nd 
ed. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983; Wilmore, Gayraud S., ed. African American Religious 
Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, and Hopkins, 
Dwight N. Introducing Black Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999.  
436 James H. Cone, “An African-American Perspective on the Cross and Suffering,” pp. 1-
19, in Yacob Tesfai (ed.), The Scandal of a Crucified World: Perspectives on the Cross and 
Suffering. Maryknoll, N.Y. : Orbis Books, 1994. 
437 On the contrary, Jackson did not embrace other, crucial principles of Black Theology. For 
example, taking the side of the poor, the so-called “option for the poor” and against those 
who are responsible for their poverty.  
438 Jesse Jackson, ‘‘From October to May. A Report to Rev. Andrew Young. Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference”, May 20, 1966, 10 pp, p. 17, Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 18. 670100-172.  
439 In order to locate Jackson in the “spirit of that time,” or at least in the trend, see: 
Billingsley, Andrew. Mighty like a River: The Black Church and Social Reform. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999; Allison Calhoun-Brown, While Marching to Zion: Otherworldliness 
and Racial Empowerment in the Black Community. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37: 
pp. 427–39. 1999. Allison Calhoun-Brown, “The Image of God: Black Theology and Racial 
Empowerment in the African American Community.” Review of Religious Research, 40(3), pp. 
197–211. Mary R. Sawyer, “Theocratic, Prophetic, and Ecumenical: Political Roles of 
African American Clergy.” pp. 66–84 in Christian Clergy in American Politics, edited by Sue S. 
Crawford and Laura R. Olson. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
James H. Cone, Black Theology as Liberation Theology. pp. 177–207 in African American 
Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by Gayraud Wilmore. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1995. James H. Cone, “The Construction of Political Strategies 
Among African American Clergy.” pp. 85–103 in Christian Clergy in American Politics, edited by 
Sue S. Crawford and Laura R. Olson. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001. Marable, Manning. “Religion and Black Protest Thought in African American 
History.” pp. 318–39 in African-American Religious Studies: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited 
by Gayraud S. Wilmore. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995. West, Cornel. Prophecy 
Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1982. Wilmore, Gayraud S., ed. Black Religion and Black 
Radicalism: An Interpretation of the Religious History of Afro-American People. New York: Orbis 
Books, 1994. 
440 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86. 
441 Author’s email(s) exchange with R. Drew Smith, March 2011. See also: Smith, R. 
Drew. Social Witness, Prophetic Discernment, and Post-civil Rights Era Churches. Atlanta, GA: 
Leadership Center at Morehouse College, 2001; Smith, R. Drew. New Day Begun: African 
American Churches and Civic Culture in Post-civil Rights America. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003; Smith, R. Drew. Long March Ahead: African American Churches and Public Policy in Post-civil 
Rights America. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. and (already mentioned in note no. 3) 
Smith, R. Drew, and Fredrick C. Harris. Black Churches and Local Politics: Clergy Influence, 
Organizational Partnerships, and Civic Empowerment. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005. 
382 
 
                                                                                                                                            
442 Several sources. See for example: Carson, Clayborne (ed.), King, Martin Luther, Jr. The 
Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956, Vols 4.  
Berkeley: Univ of Cali Press, 1992, p. 1. The whole quotation is: “[In] the quiet recesses of 
my heart, I am fundamentally a clergyman, a Baptist preacher. This is my being and my 
heritage for I am also the son of a Baptist preacher, the grandson of a Baptist preacher and 
the great-grandson of a Baptist preacher.” Martin Luther King, Jr., 1965. 
443 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section “As 
Members, One of the Other. Operation Breadbasket”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Peoplehood as a Means [sic!] of Finding Community, p. 9. 
444 This is a classic Baptist ecclesiological posture: the Church is the church of sinners.   
445 Whereas King and the other executives at S.C.L.C. made it a point to dress in a suit and 
tie, Jackson dressed casually. For this, Jackson was usually the object of many jibes from the 
staff for his casual attitude towards dress.  
446 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, Playboy, 85-112 and 188, 290-292, p. 
86.  
447 Text and Photo “Operation Breadbasket and Rev. Jesse Jackson”. Historical Images: 
Memphis (TN), No. 20504376, 1971. Personal archive (henceforth, “PA”). 
448 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 16. 
449 Wattstax: 30th Anniversary Special Edition Dvd. Running Time: Approximately 103 
minutes.  
450 Wattstax: 30th Anniversary Special Edition Dvd. 
451 Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 224. 
452 Text and Photo “Operation Breadbasket and Rev. Jesse Jackson”. Historical Images: 
Memphis (TN), No. 20504376, 1971. PA. 
453 The Cook County Democratic Organization is one of the most powerful political 
machines in U.S. history. Traditionally called the “Chicago Democratic machine”, or simply 
the “Chicago Machine”, the organization has dominated Chicago and Illinois politics since 
the 1930s. 
454 Joseph, Dark Days, Bright Nights: from Black Power to Barack Obama. p. 4.  
455 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 224.  
456 Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Dec., 2009): pp. 751-776, p. 773.  
457 Among the many sources, Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 160. 
458 Reynolds,  Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 164.  
459 Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1991, p. 291.  
460 Quoted in Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15.   
461 According to Henry  Mitchell, “the goal of one sermon is not comprehensive knowledge 
of so little as one whole verse; it is the faithful change of life in the direction of no more 
than one Christlike characteristic, as called in the Word.” In other words, the preacher does 
not lecture, he facilitates a meaningful encounter with a biblical text and has a behavioral 
purpose. Mitchell, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. Nashville: Abington Press 
(revised edition), 2008, p. 14-5.  
462 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope,” Section “As 
Members, One of the Other. Operation Breadbasket”: report April 4, 1967 printed 
document, 10pp, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records, Peoplehood as a Means [sic!] of Finding Community, p. 9.  
463 Negros Go National with Demand for Jobs, Business Week, August 19, 1967. 
464 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 14.  
465 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15. 
466 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 159.  
467 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15.   
468 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America's David. p. 197.  
469 King,, Martin Luther, Jr. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Edited by James M. Washington. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986. 
383 
 
                                                                                                                                            
470 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Draft, The Dilemma of Negro Americans, Where Do We Go 
From Here: Chaos or Community?” 2/11/67. [Atlanta, Ga.] 46 pp. Hermine Isaacs Popper 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1958-1964, Radcliffe College, Schlesinger Library on the History of 
Women in America, Cambridge, Mass.: Box 2, folder 26. 670211-000. 
471 See: Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: a Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1991.  
472 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Draft, The Dilemma of Negro Americans, Where Do We Go 
From Here: Chaos or Community?” 2/11/67. [Atlanta, Ga.] 46 pp. Hermine Isaacs Popper 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1958-1964, Radcliffe College, Schlesinger Library on the History of 
Women in America, Cambridge, Mass.: Box 2, folder 26. 670211-000. 
473 King, Martin Luther, Jr. Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967.  
474 Of course, the complex and articulate view of King on capitalism could be the subject of 
an essay on its own. See also notes no. 156 and 578.  
475 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “One Year Later in Chicago.” [1/67]. 9 pp. Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 26. 670100-001. 
476 King, Martin L. quoted in Fradin, Dennis B.. The Montgomery Bus Boycott. Terrytown (NY): 
Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2010, p. 37. 
477 King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Press conference on Operation Breadbasket.” 7/11/67. 
Chicago, Ill. 9 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 670711-000. 
Also: King, Martin Luther, Jr. “One Year Later in Chicago.” [1/67]. 9 pp.  Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC: Box 26. 670100-001.  
478 Martin Luther King, Jr. “Annual Report Delivered at the Eighth Annual Convention of 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference”, by Martin Luther King, Jr. 1964 September 
29-October 2 autograph manuscript unsigned, 14pp Morehouse College Martin Luther King, 
Jr., MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records, 
quoted in Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for 
Economic Justice, p. 304.  
479 Walker, Juliet E. K. The History of Black Business in America: Capitalism, Race, 
Entrepreneurship. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009, p. 274. Walker, 
Juliet. Encyclopedia of African American Business History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. 
For a more extensive literature, see note no. 46.  
480  “I have a sense of urgency about what has to be done”. Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy 
Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 290. 
481 A research on the influences of the counterculture on Jesse Jackson can be found in: 
Beltramini, Enrico. Between Civil Rights and Black Capitalism. Operation Breadbasket in 
Chicago (1966-71), in Michael Ezra (ed.), The Economic Civil Rights. London and New York: 
Routdledge, 2013,  
482 Frady, Marshall, Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2006, p. 254. 
483 Schulman, Bruce J., The Seventies. The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics. New 
York: The Free Press, 2003, p. 7. 
484 Some of these issues are covered in a Breadbasket’s internal report: George E. Riddick, 
“Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 10/04/1967 printed 
document, 10pp, p. 7, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Organizational Records. 
485 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 112.  
486 Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 
64. 
487 George E. Riddick, Breadbaskets of Freedom – Operation Breadbasket, 10/04/1967, p. 
7.  
488 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86.  
489 Arthur Morris, founder of the Morris Plan consumer lending banks, claimed to have 
coined this term. Arthur J. Morris papers, Library of Congress, Box 17, Speeches and 
Writings File, 1918-60. 
384 
 
                                                                                                                                            
490 Kerner, Otto. The Kerner Report: the 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders. New York: Pantheon, 1988.   
491 U.S. Kerner Commission, Report on the National Commission on Civil Disorders, New York 
Times reprint, New York: Bantam Books, 1968, p. 274.  
492 Clopton, Williard, 11,500 Troops Confront Rioters; Three-Day Arrest Total at 2686, 
Washington Post, 7 April, 168, B6.  
493 Avenging What’s-His-Name, Time Magazine, April 19, 1968.  
494  George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 
10/04/1967 printed document, 10pp, p. 7, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records.  
495 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p 108.  
496 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 110.   
497 In 1969, a population of less than 23 million African Americans spent more than $35 
billion on goods and services - only slightly less than the total population of 21 million 
citizens of Canada. “Situation Report,” Time, April 6, 1970, 43.   
498 According to a ‘Situation Report’ published by Time, since World War II, Government 
has financed only 800,000 urban units, where black people was concentrated, while insuring 
the financing of 10 million suburban homes, where white families were moving. “Situation 
Report,” Time, April 6, 1970, 55.  
499 According to the same ‘Situation Report,’ black families paid more than white families for 
comparable houses and were more likely to live in substandard housing in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. “Situation Report,” Time, April 6, 1970, 55.  
500 Louis Hyman, “Ending Discrimination, Legitimating Debt: The Political Economy of 
Race, Gender, and Credit Access in the 1960s and 1970s,” Enterprise and Society, Vol. 12, N. 1, 
(March 2011), pp. -232, p. 201.  
501 McCraw, Thomas K. American Business, 1920-2000: How It Worked. Wheeling, IL: Harlan 
Davidson, 2000, p. 103.  
502 McCraw, Thomas K. American Business, 1920-2000: How It Worked, p. 104.  
503 Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 
p. 64.  
504 Breadbasket leadership had noted in an internal report that “The Negro construction 
have been excluded from lucrative public contracts.” And it was in 1967, well after the 
Executive Act of Kennedy and the Civil Rights Act. Source: George E. Riddick, “Operation 
Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 10/04/1967 printed document, 10pp, p. 
7, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records. 
505 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, Time, April 6, 1970, 19.  
506 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, pp. 78, 84, 86.  
507 Here is the whole quotation: “In 1969, Jackson was asked what he would do as mayor of 
a major U.S. city: “I would declare poor communities in a state of emergency and deal with 
the unemployment rate, the mortality rate, and the T.B. rate. I would set up medicine tents 
and embarrass the governments into opening up their food storehouses. I would enlarge all 
the city departments that feed and heal people. The welfare of the people would be attended 
to before any new golf courses or stadiums were built. I would call the National Guard to 
deal with injustices that make the ghetto a permanent disaster area. There’s no reason the 
Army couldn’t come down the street looking for slum landlords. The Army would force 
unions to let minorities in. And those who did not pick up the garbage would themselves be 
picked up. An Army like that wouldn’t have any trouble getting volunteer soldiers because it 
would be engaged in a relevant war.”“ Quote in Henry, Charles P. Jesse Jackson: The Search for 
Common Ground. Oakland, CA: BlackScholar Press, 1991, p. 137.  
508 Franklin, Black Self-determination: a Cultural History of African-American Resistance, p. 215. 
509 Gordon Ewen, The ‘Green Power’ of Breadbasket, Commerce, April 1968, pp. 24-5, 49-54, 
64.  
510 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 86.  
511 Joseph,  Dark Days, Bright Nights: from Black Power to Barack Obama; In-person conversation 
with Peniel Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA; In-person interview with Vincent Harding, 
November 22, 2011, San Francisco, CA; Reynolds, Jesse Jackson, America's David,  pp. 428-34. 
385 
 
                                                                                                                                            
512 The original quotation is: “The connotation of Black Power in the media was violence. 
The fact is Black Power was power sharing. It was equity.” See: Madison Davis Lacey, Jr. 
and Henry Hampton, Eyes on the Prize II. Interview with Jesse Jackson, April 11, 1989, 
accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/jac5427.0519.072marc_record_interviewer_process.ht
ml 
513 Jesse Jackson Threatens Companies with Boycott, Florence Times, January 10, 1982, 45. 
514 See for example, David L. Chappell. The Lost Decade of Civil Rights. Historically Speaking, 
Volume 10, Number 2, April 2009 pp. 37-41.  
515 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 86.   
516 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 106.  
517 Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 16.   
518 “Black power activism existed alongside civil rights struggles of the 1950s and early 
1960s, and certain activists simultaneously participated in both movements.” Peniel E. 
Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, 
Vol. 96, No. 3 (Dec., 2009): pp. 751-776, p. 775.  
519 For this idea, I am indebted to Joseph,  Dark Days, Bright Nights: from Black Power to Barack 
Obama; In-person conversation with Peniel Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA.  
520 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 110.  
521 V.P. Franklin contends that African Americans through slavery and freedom have 
consistently valued survival with dignity (self-respect), resistance against oppression (self-
help), religious self-determination (moral autonomy), and freedom (justice). Franklin, Black 
Self-determination: a Cultural History of African-American Resistance, pp.195-202. 
522 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86.  
523 See chapter three on “Breadbasket in Chicago.”  
524 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 96.  
525 Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: a Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1991, p. 234. 
526 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 290.  
527 George E. Riddick, “Operation Breadbasket as Vision, Promise and Hope”: report 
10/04/1967 printed document, 10pp, p. 7, MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Organizational Records, p. 6. 
528 Operation Breadbasket: A Key to the Black Man’s Freedom. Internal document, probably 
summer 1967. Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 34:172.  
529 Text and Photo “Black Power Handshake”. Historical Images: Memphis (TN), No. 
20558215, PA.  
530 Milton Friedman, the head of the Chicago School of Economics, a neoclassical school of 
economic thought that elaborated and establish monetarism, was an official economic 
advisor to Garry Goldwater in 1964. He was also the economic advisor or another two 
presidential candidates: Richard Nixon in 1968, and Ronald Reagan in 1980. From 1969-
1970, he was a member of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 
and played a major role in ending the military draft. 
531 A few days before King’s assassination, he criticized Jackson for following his own 
agenda rather than supporting the group. Jackson, hurt by his mentor’s disapproval, told 
him, “Everything’s going to be all right” (Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse 
Jackson. New York: Random House, 1996, p. 225). King angrily replied that everything was 
not going to be all right and that he needed Jackson and all of the S.C.L.C. staff to work 
toward a common vision for America. King and Jackson reconciled in Memphis, Tennessee, 
after King called Jackson in Chicago and asked him to join him. Jackson was talking with 
King from below the balcony of the Lorraine Motel when King was killed. “The 
Long Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson”, PBS.org, 1995. Produced by Frontline with the Lennon 
Production Group. Executive producer, David Fanning; senior producers, Thomas Lennon, 
Michael Sullivan; producer, Mark Zwonitzer; writers, Marshall Frady, Zwonitzer. 
532 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic 
Justice, p. 304. At a conference of the New Orleans Business League in July 1982, Jackson 
made this preference for the private sector very clear. “We want our share of opportunities 
386 
 
                                                                                                                                            
for risks, and rewards! There’s something tricky and vicious about the way we’re locked out 
of the private sector.” Source: Marable, Manning. Black American Politics: from the Washington 
Marches to Jesse Jackson. [S.l.]: Pub By Ve, 1985, p. 264.  
533 Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery Pub., 2002, p. 24. 
534 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 24. 
535 Berkowitz, Edward D. Mr. Social Security: the Life of Wilbur J. Cohen. Lawrence, Kan.: 
University of Kansas, 1995, pp. 191-198. 
536 Johnson, Lyndon B. State of the Union Message by the President to a Joint Session of the Congress. 
Washington: White House, 1964.   
537 It was only in 1967 that Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton coined the term 
‘institutional racism,’ that “has not been on the level of the individual acts of discrimination 
between individual whites against individual Negroes, but as total acts by the white 
community against the Negro community. In trying to clarify the real effect of power and 
race in society, we came up with a concept we called institutional racism, Thelwell is always 
saying we should take credit for coining the term. Maybe, but who needs it? There have been 
traditionally two communities in America. The white community, which controlled and 
defined the forms that all institutions within the society would take, and the Negro 
community, which has been excluded from participation in the power decisions that shaped 
the society, and has traditionally been dependent upon, and subservient to, the white 
community. This has not been accidental. The history of every institution of this society 
indicates that a major concern in the ordering and structuring of the society has been the 
maintaining of the Negro community in its condition of dependence and oppression. This 
has not been on the level of the individual acts of discrimination between individual whites 
against individual Negroes, but as total acts by the white community against the Negro 
community. Institutional Racism. For example, when an unknown racist bombs a church and 
kills four children, that is an act of individual racism, widely deplored by most segments of 
the society. But when in that same city of Birmingham, Alabama, not five but five hundred 
Negro babies die each year because of a lack of proper food, shelter, and medical facilities, 
and thousands more are destroyed physically, emotionally, and intellectually because of 
conditions of poverty and deprivation in the ghetto, that is a function 
of institutional racism. But the society either pretends it doesn’t know of this situation, or is 
incapable of doing anything about it. And this resistance to do anything meaningful about 
conditions in that ghetto comes from the fact that the ghetto itself is a product of a 
combination of forces and special interests in the white community.” Carmichael, Stokely, 
and Michael Thelwell. Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame 
Ture). New York: Scribner, 2003, pp. 532-533.  
538 Dallek, Robert. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973. New York: Oxford 
UP, 1998, p. 392.  
539 In 1966, two key civil rights organizations--SNCC and CORE (the Congress of Racial 
Equality)--embraced Black Nationalism. In May, Stokely Carmichael was elected chairman of 
SNCC and proceeded to transform SNCC from an interracial organization committed to 
nonviolence and integration into an all-black organization committed to “black power.” 
“Integration is irrelevant,” declared Carmichael. “Political and economic power is what the 
black people have to have.” Although Carmichael initially denied that “black power” implied 
racial separatism, he eventually called on blacks to form their own separate political 
organizations.  
540 Jackson in African Congress: a Documentary of the First Modern Pan-African Congress, ed. with an 
Introd. by Imamu Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones),  New York : Morrow; 1st Edition, 1972, pp. 
22-34.  
541 Patterson, James T. The Eve of Destruction: How 1965 Transformed America. New York: Basic 
Books, 2012. 
542 Franklin, V. P. Black Self-determination: a Cultural History of African-American Resistance. 
Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992, p. 215. 
543 A number of historians have also pointed to King’s final years, 1965–8, as being a period 
of radicalization. See notes no. 25 and 26.  
387 
 
                                                                                                                                            
544 Quoted in Silberman, Charles E. Crisis in Black and White. New York: Random House, 
1964, p. 10, footnote. 
545 See Introduction, paragraph on Background.  
546 Several sources. See for example: Gordon, Mantler K. Black, Brown and Poor: Martin 
Luther King Jr., The Poor People’s Campaign and its Legacies. PhD dissertation, Duke 
University, 2008, and McKnight, Gerald. The Last Crusade: Martin Luther King, Jr., the FBI, and 
the Poor People's Campaign. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.   
547 Chester Higgings, We Can Change Course of U.S., Jet, July 1967, pp. 20-26, p. 23. 
548 Kathleen O'Toole, Economist Says Civil Rights Movement was Economic Success, News 
Service, Stanford University, 1/26/2000, accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/00/000126CivilRightsEcon.html 
549 It might be said that, in its early years, Breadbasket was operating in the early stage of the 
economic modernization of the South. In that period, the rise of the new metropolitan elites 
and moderates in the South helped making racial change possible. See note no. 10.  
550 Marable, Manning. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political 
Economy, and Society. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000, pp. 79 and 221. 
551 Sidney M. Willhelm notes that while the early King stressed “equality to the virtual 
exclusion of justice” the late King emphasized justice almost exclusively (p.6). Willhelm 
argues that such a transition would allow King to endorse affirmative action as a just policy 
in contrast to mere equality opportunity. See: Sidney M. Willhelm, “Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and the Black Experience in America,” Journal of Black Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (Sep. 1979), pp. 
3-19. 
552 King, Jr., Martin Luther, Jr.. Why We Can't Wait. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. Stewart 
Burns, From the Mountaintop: The Changing Political Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr., The 
History Teacher, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Nov., 1993), pp. 7-18, p. 10. 
553 On many occasions, Martin King talked about his dream of 1963 being turned into a 
nightmare. The most informative reference in this regard is his “Christmas Sermon on 
Peace,” delivered in Ebenezer Baptist Church at Atlanta, December 24, 1967. The quotation 
is: “ I saw that dream turn into a nightmare as I watched the war in Vietnam escalating, and 
as I saw so-called military advisors, sixteen thousand strong, turn into fighting soldiers until 
today over five hundred thousand American boys are fighting on Asian soil.” King, Martin 
Luther, Jr. “Massey Lecture # 5: A Christmas Sermon on Peace, Sermon delivered at 
Ebenezer Baptist Church.” 2/24/67. Atlanta, Ga. (At) 25.8 min. (1 sound cassette: 
analog.) MLKC 671224-000. 
554 The whole statement says: “though this nation has proudly thought of itself as an ethnic 
melting pot, in things racial we have always been and continue to be, in too many ways, 
essentially a nation of cowards.” Attorney General Eric Holder at the Department of Justice 
African American History Month Program, Wednesday, February 18, 2009. Remarks as 
prepared for delivery. U.S. Department of Justice.  
555 “As a preacher, I would certainly have to agree with this. I must admit that I have gone 
through those moments when I was greatly disappointed with the church and what it has 
done in this period of social change. We must face the fact that in America, the church is still 
the most segregated major institution in America. At 11:00 on Sunday morning when we 
stand and sing and Christ has no east or west, we stand at the most segregated hour in this 
nation”. Martin Luther King, Jr., interview after his Social Justice and the Emerging New 
Age Address at the Herman W. Read Fieldhouse, Western Michigan University. King made 
the same point several other times. For example: “Unfortunately, most of the major 
denominations still practice segregation in local churches, hospitals, schools, and other 
church institutions.  It is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is 
eleven o'clock on Sunday morning, the same hour when many are standing to sing:  “In 
Christ There Is No East Nor West.” King, Martin Luther, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The 
Montgomery Story. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958, p. 207-8. “I make a plea to the white 
churches to remove the yoke of segregation form its own body. Unfortunately most of the 
major denominations still practice segregation in local churches, hospitals, schools, and other 
church institutions. It is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is 11 
o’clock on Sunday morning -- the same hour many are standing to sing ‘In Christ There Is 
388 
 
                                                                                                                                            
No East Or West.’ Equally appalling is the fact that the most segregated school of the week 
is the Sunday school.” Martin Luther King, Jr., at a civic banquet celebrating his receipt of 
the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize, Atlanta (Georgia), February 4, 1965. The remark is actually a 
quotation from Yale Divinity School dean Liston Pope, The Kingdom Beyond Caste, New York, 
Friendship Press, 1957: “The Church is the most segregated major institution American 
society. It has lagged behind the Supreme Court as the conscience of the nation on questions 
of race, and it has fallen far behind trade unions, factories, schools, department stores, 
athletic gatherings and most other major areas of human association as far as the 
achievement of integration in its own life is concerned.”  
556 Woodward, C. Vann. The Burden of Southern History. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1968, p. 124.  
557 For a brief history of U.S. unemployment, see the analysis of David B. Sicilia, associate 
professor of history at the University of Maryland, on Washington Post: A Brief History of 
U.S. Unemployment, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/us-
unemployment-rate-history/ assessed on October 24, 2012. 
558 See: Kevin Stainback, Corre L. Robinson and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Race and 
Workplace Integration. A Politically Mediated Process? in American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 48 
No. 9, May 2005, pp. 1200-1228. The authors claim that “although federal and state equal 
employment opportunity pressures had initial successes in reducing racial segregation in 
workplaces, little progress has been made since the early 1980s.” 
559 Kathleen O'Toole, Economist Says Civil Rights Movement was Economic Success, News 
Service, Stanford University, 1/26/2000, accessed September 3, 2012, 
http://news.stanford.edu/pr/00/000126CivilRightsEcon.html 
560 Jackson explained his tears in an interview with National Public Radio (as transcribed 
by the Tribune's Mark Silva): “Well, on the one hand, I saw President Barack Obama standing 
there looking so majestic. And I knew that people in the villages of Kenya and Haiti, and 
mansions and palaces in Europe and China, were all watching this young African-American 
male assume the leadership to take our nation out of a pit to a higher place. “And then, I 
thought of who was not there,'' Jackson said on NPR News' Tell Me More. “As mentioned, 
Medgar Evers, the husband of Sister Myrlie. ...So the martyrs and murdered whose blood 
made last night possible. I could not help think that this was their night.”“And if I had one 
wish: if Medgar, or if Dr. King could have just been there for a second in time, would have 
made my heart rejoice. And so it was kind of duo-fold - his ascension into leadership and the 
price that was paid to get him there.” 
561 In the last 20 years, three major works have been published on Jackson: Timmerman, 
Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002; 
Stanford, Karin L. Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1997; and Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of 
Jesse Jackson. New York: Random House, 1996, p. 280. However, only the last one may be 
considered offering a balanced view on Jackson. In other words, the last serious 
investigation on Jackson is 20 years old, and was provided by the late Frady, a celebrated 
author and civil rights reporter (also the author of the critically acclaimed 
biographies, Wallace and Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness).  
562 Many sources: See for example Brian Ward (2011): ‘A curious relationship’: Barack 
Obama, the 1960s and the election of 2008, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 45, Issue 1-2 (Feb. 
2011), pp. 15-42; The Editors, ‘The Sixties and the 2008 presidential election’, The Sixties, 
Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2009), pp.49-79; G l e n n  T .  E s k e w ,  Barack Obama, John 
Lewis, and the Legacy of the Civil Rights Struggle, American Studies Journal, Vol. No. 56 
(Winter-Spring 2012); Hayden, Tom. The Long Sixties: From 1960 to Barack Obama. Boulder, 
CO: Paradigm, 2008. 
563 In-person conversation with Peniel Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA.  
564 See note no. 156.  
 
 
 
 
389 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
